Robert v. Brown et al.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JULIE ROBERT,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEBRA BROWN, et al.,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 1:26-cv-103
JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
RULE 60(B) MOTION
Plaintiff Julie Robert has filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment and to Reopen Case
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“Motion to Reopen”). (ECF No. 74). For the reasons discussed
below, the Motion to Reopen is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Debra Brown, Phil
McCall, and Cube Smart, alleging that Defendants unlawfully possess, control, and threaten to
dispose of her personal and business property valued at over $500,000, which includes high-end
antique furniture, medical equipment, tools, records, and documents. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Plaintiff
alleges that “Mover Dave Thompson” illegally seized her property, stored the property at Cube
Smart Unit 218 at 5440 S. Marginal Rd., Cleveland, Ohio 44114 (“Unit 218”) since November 13,
2025, and Defendants illegally seized the property around December 13, 2025. 	(Id. at PageID
#3–4, ¶¶ 3–4, 7). Plaintiff asserts six causes of action: (i) a violation of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1030; (ii) conversion; (iii) replevin; (iv) trespass to chattels; (v) civil
conspiracy; and (vi) unjust enrichment. (Id. at PageID #5–6). Plaintiff requests relief in the form
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of 	temporary, 	preliminary, 	and 	permanent 	injunctions, 	the 	return 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	property,
compensatory damages, and costs. (Id. at PageID #9).
The same day, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
Order and for Expedited Hearing on Preliminary Injunction Motion (“TRO Motion”). 	(ECF
No. 2). 	Plaintiff requested a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) that: (i) enjoins Defendants
Brown and McCall from selling, transferring, moving, hiding, damaging, disposing of, or
encumbering any of Plaintiff’s property; (ii) orders Defendant 	Cube Smart to place an
administrative hold on Unit 218; and (iii) orders Cube Smart to preserve all surveillance video and
other evidence reasonably related to Unit 218. (Id. at PageID #24–25).
On January 30, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for an ex parte temporary
restraining order, granted her request for an expedited preliminary injunction hearing, and
scheduled a hearing for February 10, 2026. (ECF No. 9). On February 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed an
emergency motion seeking to appear remotely or to continue the hearing. 	(ECF No. 11). 	The
Court granted Plaintiff’s request to continue and cancelled the February 10, 2026 preliminary
injunction hearing. 	(ECF No. 13). 	The Court also ordered Plaintiff, on or before February 16,
2026, to provide the Court with four dates when she would be available to appear in person for a
preliminary injunction hearing. 	(Id.). 	The February 16, 2026 deadline passed without Plaintiff
providing dates to the Court, requesting an extension of time, or otherwise responding to the
Court’s order.
On February 18, 2026, the Court issued an order to show cause. (ECF No. 16). The Court
ordered Plaintiff, on or before February 25, 2026, to show cause for her failure to comply with the
Court’s order and her failure to seek an extension of time. (Id.). The Court also warned Plaintiff
that a failure to timely respond to the order, or to show cause, might result in sanctions without
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further notice, up to and including dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b). (Id.). Plaintiff failed to file any response, or show cause, by the Court’s deadline.
On March 3, 2026, the Court issued an order that set a final deadline for Plaintiff to provide
dates for a preliminary injunction hearing and gave Plaintiff a final warning that she would face
sanctions, including dismissal, if she did not comply with the Court’s order. (ECF No. 23). The
order also addressed Plaintiff’s claims she was not receiving mail at her address and she was having
issues accessing PACER:
Plaintiff says that she has not received any Court notice, order, or decision at her
residential address (5 Tsienneto Road, #177, Derry, NH 03038) since this case was
initiated. (ECF No. 17, PageID #261–62). First, the record reflects that the Clerk
of Court has mailed copies of all the Court’s filings to the address provided by
Plaintiff—5 Tsienneto Road, #177, Derry, NH 03038. 	Plaintiff has provided no
documents or other evidence to support her assertion that the Court’s mailings were
not delivered to the address she provided. Nor has the Court received any returned
mail or notice of non-delivery. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide a valid and
current address. See Barber v. Runyon, No. 93-6318, 1994 WL 163765, at *1 (6th
Cir. May 2, 1994) (“If [the pro se litigant’s] address changed, [she] had an
affirmative duty to supply the court with notice of any and all changes in [her]
address.”); see also Mustin v. Wainwright, No. 3:21-cv-321, 2025 LX 526781, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2025) (“It is well-settled that a pro se litigant ‘has an
affirmative duty to notify the Court of any change in address.’”) (citing cases). The
Court satisfied its obligation to Plaintiff by mailing copies of the Court’s filings to
Plaintiff’s address on the record. 	See Chukwa v. Murphy, Civil Action No. 23-
23010 (RK) (JTQ), 2025 LX 131651, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2025); Francis v.
Hypen, No. 3:18-cv-0058, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206044, at *4–5 (D.V.I. Nov.
14, 2022); Williams v. Overmyer, Civil Action No. 17-cv-251, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 123013, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2023).
That said, even if Plaintiff has not received a copy of the Court’s filings, she has an
affirmative duty to monitor the Court’s docket and keep herself apprised of what is
happening in the case, including all filing deadlines and decisions of the Court. See
Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[P]arties have an
affirmative duty to monitor the dockets to keep apprised of the entry of orders[.]”)
(citation omitted); see also Nitka v. Nelnet, Inc., 809 F. App’x 491, 495 (10th Cir.
2020) (“As a party representing himself, it was [the plaintiff’s] responsibility to
keep himself apprised of the status of his case.”); Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518,
527 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that it is ultimately the plaintiff’s burden to
prosecute a case, and a litigant has “a duty to keep track of the progress of their
lawsuit”); State v. Jenkins, No. 22CA011874, 2023- Ohio 2635, 2023 Ohio App.
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LEXIS 2606, at *7 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. July 21, 2023) (providing that, under Ohio
law, “[p]arties are charged with the duty to keep themselves apprised of entries
upon the court's docket and to monitor the progress of the suit”).
Plaintiff has demonstrated that she has the ability to both monitor the docket and
timely respond to the Court’s orders. She states that she has been able to call the
clerk’s office to check the status of her case and that she has an active PACER
account. 	(ECF No. 17, PageID #261–62). 	She filed an emergency motion to
continue the original scheduled preliminary injunction hearing, (ECF No. 11), and
filed a request for entry of default, (ECF No. 18), with both motions indicating that
she was aware of specific deadlines, the docket, and the general status of the
proceedings. Moreover, the Court has been informed that Plaintiff personally filed
these motions, as well as the Notice of Non-Service, at the clerk’s office located in
the Carl B. Stokes United States Courthouse in Cleveland, Ohio.
(Id. at PageID #566–68).
Plaintiff provided dates for her availability by the deadline, (ECF No. 28), and the Court
set a Preliminary Injunction Hearing for April 29, 2026, (ECF No. 29). On April 29, 2026, the
Court held the Preliminary Injunction Hearing. (ECF No. 66). At the hearing, the Court confirmed
with Plaintiff that she had an active PACER account, and explained to her several times that it was
her responsibility to both keep track of the case and to resolve any purported PACER access issues
with PACER. 	(ECF No. 82, PageID #1157–58, 1170, 1280–81, 1288–91, 93). 	The Court also
addressed Plaintiff’s issues with receiving mail at the mailing address she provided and mail that
was being returned to the Court as undeliverable; the Court reiterated that it was her responsibility
to provide a proper address to the Court and address any delivery issues. (Id. at PageID #1280–83).
On April 23, 2026, Defendants Debra Brown and Phil McCall moved to dismiss Count I
of the complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”). (ECF No. 58). Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d), “each party
opposing a motion must serve and file a memorandum in opposition within thirty (30) days after
service of any dispositive motion . . . . If a party opposing a motion was served with the motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C) [mail], (D), or (F), three days shall be added to the prescribed
period as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).” That deadline passed without Plaintiff Julie Robert
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filing any opposition or response to the Motion to Dismiss. On June 1, 2026, the Court ordered
Plaintiff to file a motion for an extension of time by June 8, 2026 and show good cause for her
failure to a timely file an opposition brief. (ECF No. 71). The Court also warned Plaintiff that if
she failed to file a motion for an extension of time by the stated deadline, the Court would dismiss
this case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) without further notice. (Id.).
On June 12, 2026, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice for want of prosecution
under Rule 41(b) based on Plaintiff’s missing deadlines, failing to comply with the Court’s order,
and failing to update her mailing address, even though she had been continually warned and
granted extended deadlines. (ECF No. 72).
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Reopen on June 23, 2026. (ECF No. 74). Defendants
Brown and McCall jointly filed a timely response in opposition, (ECF No. 79), and Defendant
CubeSmart a timely opposition as well, (ECF No. 81). On July 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed her reply
in support. (ECF No. 85).
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
“A Rule 60(b) motion is neither a substitute for, nor a supplement to, an appeal.” GenCorp.
v. Olin Corp., 477 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home,
Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989)). Petitioner may not use Rule 60(b) to relitigate his case.
See Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499, 509 (6th Cir. 2014). Instead, the “classic function of a Rule
60(b) motion” deals “primarily with some irregularity or procedural defect in the procurement of
the judgment denying relief.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 539 n.1, 124 S. Ct. 2641, 162 L.
Ed. 2d 480 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedures § 2858 (3d ed. June 2024 Update) (explaining that Rule 60(b)
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gives courts discretionary powers to “relieve the oppressed from the burden of judgments unfairly,
fraudulently, or mistakenly entered”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) includes the following grounds for relief from
a final judgment:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence that with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate its dismissal and reopen this case because: (i) she has
not abandoned this litigation, as evidenced by her attending the Preliminary Injunction Hearing;
(ii) Defendants intentionally failed to serve Plaintiff with critical motions and misled the Court;
(iii) she has not had actual notice of the Court’s filings because of repeated mail delivery failures,
which she states are due to the negligence of the U.S. Postal Service, and issues with PACER; and
(iv) the interest of justice favor resolving this case on the merits. (ECF No. 74, PageID #1091–
93). The Court finds that Plaintiff is seeking relief under Rule 60(b) based on excusable neglect—
(b)(1), fraud/misconduct—(b)(3), and the catcall provision—(b)(6).
Defendants Brown and McCall respond that Plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficient
excusable neglect because: (i) she admitted that Court mail was repeatedly returned but never took
any steps to remedy the situation despite having notice of the delivery issues; and (ii) technical
issues with PACER do not excuse her failure to prosecute. 	(ECF No. 79, PageID #1115–16).
Brown and McCall add that Plaintiff’s claims of negligence by the U.S. Postal Service are
undermined by the fact that she provided the same mailing address in a parallel case in the N.D.
Ohio before Judge Calabrese (case no. 1:26-cv-995), but she has experienced no returned mail or
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delivery problems in that case. (Id. at PageID #1116). They also argue that Plaintiff has failed to
meet the burden of establishing fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) because she has not provided clear and
convincing evidence of fraud on the part of Defendants. (Id.).
Cubesmart responds that Rule 60(b)(6) is inapplicable because Plaintiff has not established
the “extraordinary circumstances” required to obtain relief under this subsection and she must seek
relief solely under Rule 60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect because she is partially to blame.
(ECF No. 81, PageID #1138–40). It further responds that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under
Rule 60(b)(1) because she failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. 	(Id. at PageID #1141–43).
Cubesmart argues that: (i) Plaintiff was aware of PACER and mail delivery issues well before the
missed deadline but failed to diligently solve those issues; (ii) she had actual notice of the Motion
to Dismiss because it was discussed at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing; and (iii) Plaintiff knew
there were forthcoming decisions on several motions pending before Court and should have been
on high alert to monitor the docket. (Id.). It further argues:
Had Plaintiff acted diligently to ensure she remained apprised of all filings and
orders in the lawsuit she filed, especially when she knew that filings and orders
were expected in the case and had previously experienced mailing and PACER
issues, it is likely she would have seen the Order to Show Cause, acted
appropriately, and this case might not have been dismissed. Yet, Plaintiff took no
steps to cure the issues she claims prevented her from acting in accordance with her
affirmative duty to monitor the docket, even after being advised to do so at the April
29, 2026 Hearing. Such inaction establishes Plaintiff’s culpability and the absence
of excusable neglect.
(Id. at PageID #1143) (emphasis in original).
First, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish excusable neglect and therefore
she is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). As noted by Defendants, Plaintiff was well aware
of mail delivery and PACER access issues well before this case was ultimately dismissed. The
Court highlighted these issues in its March 3, 2026 Order and at the April 29, 2026 Preliminary
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Injunction Hearing, and clearly informed Plaintiff that it was her responsibility to monitor the
docket and to fix these issues. (ECF No. 23. at PageID #566–68; ECF No. 82, PageID #1157–58,
1170, 1280–83, 1288–91, 93). 	But Plaintiff did not fix these issues and has neither stated nor
provided any evidence that she diligently pursued actions to ensure she had the ability to monitor
the docket. The Court also agrees the lack of any delivery issues in the parallel case before Judge
Calabrese undercuts Plaintiff’s argument that the U.S. Postal Service is at fault for mail delivery
issues at the provided mailing address. The Court is convinced that Plaintiff would continue to
miss and flout the Court’s orders and deadlines moving forward, in light of her failure to take
alternative measures or sufficient corrective actions to ameliorate the matter.
Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct by Defendants Brown and McCall and therefore she is not entitled to relief under Rule
60(b)(3). 	To prevail under Rule 60(b)(3), Plaintiff needed to establish that Brown and McCall
deliberately engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct in this case by clear and
convincing evidence. Simmons v. City of Southfield, No. 23-1724, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 23634,
at *9 (6th Cir. Sep. 17, 2024) (citing Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 455 (6th
Cir. 2008); James v. City of Detroit, No. 20-1805/21-1053, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 35069, at *22
(6th Cir. Nov. 23, 2021) (same)). 	Here, Plaintiff has provided no evidence, let alone clear and
convincing evidence, that Brown and McCall engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct
during this case.
Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). “Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that provides for relief from a final
judgment for any reason justifying relief not captured in the other provisions of Rule 60(b).” West
v. Carpenter, 790 F.3d 693, 696 (6th Cir. 2015). This catchall provision is generally limited to:
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(i) exceptional or extraordinary circumstances not addressed in the other provisions of Rule 60(b);
and (ii) circumstances when “principles of equity mandate relief.” See id.; King v. United States,
143 F.4th 705, 715 (6th Cir. 2025). Plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional or extraordinary
circumstances not addressed by the other provisions under Rule 60(b). 	Nor has Plaintiff
demonstrated that she is entirely faultless for her having failed to comply with the Court’s orders
and deadlines and therefore cannot seek relief under subsection (6). See Brown v. Braman, No. 20-
1918, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 40141, at *8–9 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2020) (“To justify relief under
subsection (6), a party must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ suggesting that the party is
faultless in the delay. If a party is partly to blame for the delay, relief must be sought within one
year under subsection (1) and the party’s neglect must be excusable.” (citations omitted)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Julie Robert’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and to
Reopen Case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (ECF No. 74) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion for
clarification (ECF No. 83) is DENIED as MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: August 25, 2026
____________________________________
CHARLES E. FLEMING
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
____________________________
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