Rielinger v. Cleveland Chinatown Development LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JULIA RIELINGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLEVELAND CHINATOWN
DEVELOPMENT LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:26-cv-995
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge
James E. Grimes, Jr.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Julia Rielinger, proceeding without a lawyer, brings this lawsuit
alleging violations of her civil rights and various State-law tort claims. Among other
things, she alleges that Defendants intentionally misused eviction proceedings in
State court in Cleveland, Ohio, resulting in unlawful seizure and destruction of her
business and personal property and the collapse of her commercial activities.
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, which Plaintiff opposes, in part with
two declarations. 	Defendants move to strike those declarations as untimely, and
Plaintiff moves for leave to file the declarations one day late. 	For the reasons that
follow, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike but declines to consider the
declarations for other reasons and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
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BACKGROUND
This case arises from eviction proceedings in State court involving Defendant
Cleveland Chinatown Development and Plaintiff Julia Rielinger. 	The Court takes
judicial notice of the State court docket in the following eviction proceedings to better
understand the background of the parties’ dispute:
• 	Cleveland Chinatown Dev. v. Rielinger, No. 2025-CVG-005572 (Cleve. Mun.
Ct.);
• 	Cleveland Chinatown Dev. v. Sara Mellott Real Est. Dev. LLC, No. 2025-
CVG-009765 (Cleve. Mun. Ct.); and
• 	Cleveland Chinatown Dev. v. Mellot Real Est. Dev. LLC, No. 2025-CVG-
002846 (Cleve. Mun. Ct.).
It does because Plaintiff expressly references these proceedings and the resulting
eviction orders in her pleadings. 	Therefore, the Court can consider the facts from
those proceedings because they are “referred to in [the] complaint and central to the
claim.” Armengau v. Cline, 7 F. App’x 336, 344 (6th Cir. 2001).
In 2025, Ms. Rielinger owned and/or invested in two businesses: 	Jupiter
Global Resources LLC and Sara Mellott Real Estate Development LLC. (ECF No. 14,
¶ 2, PageID #221; id., ¶ 35, PageID #228.) Both Jupiter and Mellott Real Estate were
commercial tenants of Defendant Cleveland Chinatown Development LLC: 	Jupiter
leased a property located at 2164 Rockwell Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, and Mellott Real
Estate leased a property at 2166A Rockwell Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. 	Cleveland
Chinatown Dev. LLC v. Mellot Real Est. Dev. LLC, No. 2025-CVG-002846 (Cleve.
Muni. Ct.); Cleveland Chinatown Dev. LLC v. Rielinger, No. 2025-CVG-005572
(Cleve. Muni. Ct.); see also ECF No. 14, ¶ 2, PageID #221. Defendant Nancy Liang,
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an attorney, serves as Cleveland Chinatown Development’s agent, and she also
served as its legal counsel in the eviction proceedings. Id.; ECF No. 14, ¶ 5, PageID
#220. According to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Defendant Shaojia Huang
is a member of Cleveland Chinatown Development and also serves as its property
manager. (ECF No. 14, ¶ 6, PageID #220.)
A. 	Evictions
Between 	February 	and 	April 	2025, 	Cleveland 	Chinatown 	Development
brought separate eviction proceedings against Jupiter and Mellott Real Estate for
failure to pay rent. Mellot, No. 2025-CVG-002846; Rielinger, No. 2025-CVG-005572;
Cleveland Chinatown Dev. LLC v. Mellot Real Est. Dev. LLC, No. 2025-CVG-009765
(Cleve. Muni. Ct.). 	In each eviction proceeding, Ms. Rielinger was named as a
defendant, and in each case she moved to dismiss because she had no lease agreement
with Cleveland Chinatown Development either in writing or verbally. Id. Each time,
the magistrate in housing court dismissed Ms. Rielinger as an improper party
because she did not sign the lease and was not listed on the lease agreements. Id. In
this action, Ms. Rielinger again asserts that she was not a lessee of Cleveland
Chinatown Development and “was not the tenant or registered agent of the tenants.”
(ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 2 & 17, PageID #221 & #224.)
Following the eviction proceedings in the municipal court, both Jupiter and
Mellott Real Estate were ordered removed from the property by bailiff-assisted move
out. 	Mellot, No. 2025-CVG-002846; Rielinger, No. 2025-CVG-005572; Mellot, No.
2025-CVG-009765. And the court entered judgment against both Jupiter and Mellott
Real Estate for failure to pay rent. Id.
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B. 	The Facts Alleged
Against this background, in this case the operative complaint alleges the
following facts, which the Court takes as true and construes in Plaintiff’s favor in the
present procedural posture.
According 	to 	the 	second 	amended 	complaint, 	Ms. 	Rielinger 	“financially
invested in and supported two commercial tenant companies operating” at Cleveland
Chinatown Development’s property, presumably Jupiter Global Resources and Sara
Mellott Real Estate Development. 	(ECF No. 14, ¶ 16, PageID #224.) 	But Ms.
Rielinger never personally signed any lease agreement with Cleveland Chinatown
Development. 	(Id., 	¶ 	17, 	PageID 	#224.) 	Instead, 	Ms. 	Rielinger 	financially
contributed to Cleveland Chinatown Development’s property through rent payments
and investments toward improvements, including “HVAC, electrical, plumbing,
flooring, and structural build-out” so that the tenant companies had a “safe and
habitable commercial space.” 	(Id., ¶¶ 16–17, PageID #224–25.) 	Despite accepting
Ms. Rielinger’s financial contributions, Cleveland Chinatown Development refused
to repair “severe flooding, structural defects, and pervasive rat infestation,” which
prevented the tenant companies from opening and operating, and “prevent[ed]
Plaintiff 	from 	recovering 	her 	investment.” 	(Id., 	¶¶ 	17–18, 	PageID 	#225.)
Ms. Rielinger requested an inspection of the property, and Cleveland Chinatown
Development “retaliated” by filing eviction actions. (Id., ¶ 19, PageID #225.)
Once Cleveland Chinatown Development obtained eviction orders against the
two commercial tenants, Defendants “entered the premises and forcibly removed and
destroyed business property belonging to Plaintiff.” 	(Id., ¶ 23, PageID #226.)
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Sometime before September 22, 2025, Cleveland Chinatown Development changed
the lock on the gate where Ms. Rielinger accessed the property at issue, preventing
her from “retrieving and moving her $800k worth [of] property out before they were
illegally seized on Nov 13, 2025.” 	(Id., PageID #225.) 	At that point, Defendants
entered the premises again and “destroyed additional business property, including
$500,000 at least worth [of] medical merchandise, inventory, medical equipment,
$250,00[0] worth [of] antique furniture, and $50,000 worth [of] professional tools.”
(Id., ¶¶ 24–25, PageID #226.)
Cleveland Chinatown Development hired Defendant David Thompson, who is
no longer a party in this action, to assist in the removal and destruction of Plaintiff’s
property. 	(Id., ¶ 28, PageID #227.) 	Mr. Thompson allegedly refused to allow
Ms. Rielinger to “reclaim, store, or retrieve [her] belongings” and instead stored her
property in a “non-climate-controlled” facility at “unit 218 and unit 119, Cube Smart,
5440 S Marginal Street, Cleveland, OH 44114” against Ms. Rielinger’s wishes. (Id.;
see also id., ¶ 35, PageID #228.)
Then, Ms. Rielinger hired Defendants Debra Brown and Philip McCall, both of
whom are no longer parties in this action, to take photos and videos of her property
“when they were released by Defendant Dave Thompson.” (Id., ¶ 35, PageID #228.)
Instead of transferring the property on December 13, 2025, as allegedly promised,
Dave Thompson “made a back door deal” with Debra Brown and transferred “$500k
worth” of Ms. Rielinger’s property to Ms. Brown. (Id., ¶ 36, PageID #229.)
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Once Ms. Rielinger returned home to New Hampshire, Dave Thompson called
her once at 6:00 p.m. “demanding money and making threats relating to Plaintiff’s
property.” (Id., ¶ 39, PageID #229.) Philip McCall allegedly transmitted a “written
ransom note” to Ms. Rielinger in New Hampshire “seeking money” and threatening
to dispose of her property if she did not comply. 	(Id., ¶ 40, PageID #229.) 	Also,
Ms. Rielinger alleges that “Defendants further transmitted repeated harassing,
profane, and racially hostile communications to Plaintiff in New Hampshire,” though
it is not clear to which Defendants she is referring, and she does not allege additional
relevant facts. (Id., ¶ 42, PageID #230.)
Then, 	Ms. 	Rielinger 	filed 	this 	lawsuit 	alleging 	financial 	loss, 	business
destruction, emotional harm, and deprivation of her constitutional rights. 	(ECF
No. 14, PageID #235.) 	She asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and
under various provision of State law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Julia Rielinger commenced this action on November 25, 2025 in the
District of New Hampshire. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	Later, the case was transferred to the
Northern District of Ohio. 	(ECF No. 20.) 	Plaintiff named six Defendants, not
including a number of John Does. 	The record shows that Plaintiff perfected service
on Defendants Cleveland Chinatown Development and Nancy Liang before transfer
of the case to the Northern District of Ohio. 	(ECF No. 12.) 	At the time of transfer,
the docket did not reflect service on the remaining Defendants: Shaojia Huang; David
Thompson; Debra Brown; and Philip McCall. Therefore, the Court ordered Plaintiff
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to complete service on all Defendants by May 25, 2026. (ECF No. 21.) Since the entry
of that Order, counsel for Defendants Cleveland Chinatown Development LLC and
Shaojia Huang (although there is no indication that he was ever served) entered a
notice of appearance and filed a joint answer to the amended complaint. 	(ECF No.
22; ECF No. 23.)
Although Plaintiff filed notices that she completed service on the remaining
Defendants (see ECF No. 25; ECF No. 27), the Court determined that Plaintiff failed
to complete service on them within the required time frame and dismissed them
without prejudice. (ECF No. 28.) In dismissing these Defendants, the Court ordered
Plaintiff to file a short explanation why she filed documents in this case without
advising the Court of Robert v. Brown, No. 1:26-cv-103 (N.D. Ohio filed Jan. 15, 2026).
(Id.)—another case that Ms. Rielinger filed under another name against some of the
same Defendants without advising either presiding judge. 	In doing so, the Court
asked Plaintiff to explain whether that lawsuit involves the same core operative facts
as the remaining claims in this case. (Id.) Nearly three weeks late, Plaintiff filed her
explanation and a motion for the Court to deem that filing timely. 	(ECF No. 37.)
Also, Plaintiff requested relief from the Court’s order dismissing Defendants David
Thompson, Debra Brown, and Philip McCall or, in the alternative, additional time to
perfect service. (Id.)
The Court noted that Defendant Nancy Liang was in default and ordered the
Clerk to enter her default under Rule 55(a) because she failed to answer, move,
defend, or otherwise appear in response to Plaintiff’s complaint. 	(ECF No. 29.) 	In
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doing so, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a motion for default judgment, with proper
support for all relief sought. (Id.) Before the deadline for Plaintiff’s motion, Ms. Liang
filed a motion to set aside the default and for leave to file an answer. (ECF No. 33.)
Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint on the same day. (ECF
No. 34). 	Nearly two weeks after the deadline, Plaintiff opposed Ms. Liang’s motion
to vacate the default and moved for default judgment. 	She did so before explaining
why she had multiple lawsuits pending in the Northern District of Ohio against the
same Defendants without advising the Court.
On July 6, 2026, the Court granted Ms. Liang’s motion to vacate the entry of
default. 	(ECF No. 39.) 	Although Ms. Liang was properly served on February 23,
2026, and failed to answer or otherwise respond, good cause existed to set aside the
default and allow Ms. Liang to defend the action on the merits. 	(ECF No. 39.)
Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a motion for default
judgment as moot. (Id.) The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of Defendants Thompson, Brown, and McCall and accepted as timely
Plaintiff’s explanation regarding Robert v. Brown. (Id.)
The Court warned Plaintiff that any further missed deadline or failure to
comply with a Court order would result in dismissal of the case for failure to
prosecute. 	(Id.) 	Finally, the Court limited the case to Cleveland Chinatown
Development, Nancy Liang, and Shaojia Huang. 	These Defendants moved for
judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 41.) When Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 42), she
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also filed two declarations in support of her opposition: one on September 8 and one
on September 9, 2026. (ECF No. 43; ECF No. 44.)
Defendants moved to strike the declarations because they were filed untimely.
(ECF No. 45, PageID #339.) 	Defendants’ motion was unnecessary and serves no
useful purpose. 	First, contrary to Defendants’ claim, the declaration of Jon Liptak
was timely filed on September 8, 2026. 	(ECF No. 43.) 	As for the one-day delay in
Plaintiff’s filing the declaration of Levell Woodruff (ECF No. 44), Defendants should
know better than to make a production over such a trivial delay—particularly Ms.
Liang after her protracted failure to appear.
Still, the declarations are not proper at the Rule 12 stage of the proceedings.
The Court declines to convert the pending motion to one for summary judgment.
Therefore, the Court gives them no consideration because they are not part of the
pleadings or otherwise present materials proper for consideration on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., JTO, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 242 F.
Supp. 3d 599, 602 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (cleaned up). 	Therefore, the Court DENIES
Defendants’ motion to strike (ECF No. 45) but declines to consider the declarations.
Therefore, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion to accept the Woodruff
declaration one day late. (ECF No. 46.)
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JURISDICTION
The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for different
reasons.
Federal Question Jurisdiction (Counts IX, X, XI, and XII)
Plaintiff 	brings 	four 	counts 	alleging 	that 	Defendants 	violated 	her
constitutional rights. (ECF No. 14, Page ID #233-34.) 	Specifically, she alleges that
Defendants (1) deprived her of her property without due process in violation of her
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) removed and destroyed her property,
constituting 	an 	unreasonable 	seizure 	under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment; 	and
(3) retaliated against her by initiating wrongful eviction proceedings and seizing her
property, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	(ECF No. 14, PageID #233-34.)
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly and intentionally conspired
to obtain unlawful eviction orders, then used those orders to seize and destroy her
property in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (ECF No. 14, PageID #234.) Because these
claims arise under federal law, the Court has jurisdiction over them under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
Diversity Jurisdiction (All Other Counts)
For the remaining nine claims that Plaintiff brings under State law, the Court
exercises diversity jurisdiction. 	“[F]or diversity jurisdiction to be proper under §
1332, no plaintiff and no defendant can be the citizen of the same state.” Tennial v.
Bank of America, N.A., No. 17-6377, 2020 WL 2530872, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020).
Plaintiff is domiciled in New Hampshire, and all Defendants are residents of Ohio.
(ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 1–8, PageID #221–23.) 	Two Defendants are limited liability
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companies—Cleveland Chinatown Development and DL Thompson LLC. 	A limited
liability company “has the citizenship of each of its members.” 	Tennial, 2020 WL
2530872, at *1. 	Here, the record does not reflect who the members of Cleveland
Chinatown Development are, Cleveland Chinatown Development did not identify its
members or their citizenship, and it did not file a corporate disclosure statement,
which would identify its members. Defendants denied Plaintiff’s allegation that the
Court has diversity jurisdiction “because at the time of the events giving rise to this
cause of action, all the parties were residents of the State of Ohio.” (ECF No. 23, ¶ 8,
PageID #11.) 	Based on Defendants’ failure to disclose its members and to comply
with the Local Rules by filing a corporate disclosure statement, the Court takes this
position in the answer as an admission that the members of Cleveland Chinatown
Development are residents of Ohio. 	Further, no evidence in the record supports
treating Ms. Rielinger as anything other than a resident of New Hampshire.
Therefore, there is complete diversity between these parties.
As for DL Thompson, it is not clear that Plaintiff brings any claims against
this entity. 	Instead, she sued David Thompson individually. 	(ECF No. 14, ¶ 7,
PageID #222.) The rest of Plaintiff’s complaint discusses the actions of Mr. Thompson
individually, and no count names DL Thompson LLC. For these reasons, the Court
disregards DL Thompson LLC as a Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges complete
diversity, and no information in the record supports a contrary determination for any
members of DL Thompson LLC.
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With respect to the amount in controversy, Plaintiff asserts various property
interests, including financial investments in the two commercial tenants, Jupiter and
Mellott Real Estate, rent payments to Cleveland Chinatown Development, payments
toward physical improvements to Cleveland Chinatown Development’s building, and
stolen or damaged property, including medical equipment and inventory, antique
furniture, and professional tools kept in the building. (ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 16–17 & 24–
25, PageID #224–26.) These losses, Plaintiff alleges, amount to over $2 million. (Id.)
For these reasons, the allegations meet the jurisdictional amount in controversy and
give the Court subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.D. § 1332.
ANALYSIS
Defendants filed a consolidated motion for judgment on the pleadings. 	(ECF
No. 41.) “The only difference between Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6)” is timing. Hunter
v. Ohio Veterans Home, 272 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2003). 	Rule 12(c)
provides that, once “the pleadings are closed” a party may “move for judgment on the
pleadings.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(c). 	“A 	motion 	for 	judgment 	on 	the 	pleadings
. . . generally follows the same rules as a motion to dismiss the complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6).” Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Assoc., 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020)
(citing D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Therefore, on a motion under Rule 12(c), courts “must follow the Supreme
Court’s changes to the pleading standards in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).” Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (citing
Engler v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2017)). While “the court’s decision rests
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primarily upon the allegations of the complaint[,]” “exhibits attached to the complaint
may also be taken into account.” 	JTO, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 242 F.
Supp. 3d 599, 602 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (cleaned up). 	Only “well-pleaded factual
allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief” and “allow the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged” will survive. 	Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (quotation and citation omitted).
Conversely, “[m]ere labels and conclusions are not enough[.]” Engler, 862 F.3d at 575.
Nor are facts that are “merely consistent with” liability. 	Bates, 958 F.3d at 480
(quotation omitted).
I. 	Constitutional Claims
To begin, the Court considers Plaintiff’s constitutional claims. Plaintiff brings
these claims on a joint-action theory of State action, asserting that Defendants
coordinated with the municipal court and local enforcement personnel to proceed with
the eviction and to obtain void eviction orders. (ECF No. 14, PageID #233–34.)
I.A. Section 1983 Claims
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 14, PageID #233–34.) Specifically, she
claims that Defendants “acted under color of state law” by obtaining and executing
“void eviction orders” and depriving Plaintiff of her property without due process of
law. 	(Id., PageID #233 (Count IX).) 	For her Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants used the void eviction orders to remove and destroy her
property, which constituted an unreasonable seizure. (Id., PageID #234 (Count X).)
Also, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against her for exercising her legal
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rights by initiating “wrongful eviction proceedings” and by seizing her property. (Id.
(Count XII).)
To state a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege: (1) “a right secured
by the United States Constitution;” and (2) “the deprivation of that right;” (3) “by a
person acting under color of state law.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr.,
979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d
682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) (abrogated on other grounds)). 	Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law because private parties do not
become State actors merely by resorting to the State courts to pursue an eviction.
(ECF No. 41, PageID #311–12.)
Generally, private landlords are not considered State actors and do not act
under color of State law simply by filing an eviction proceeding. Hill v. Langer, 86 F.
App’x 163, 166 (6th Cir. 2004). Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendants did
not act under color of State law. 	Even if a private person maliciously or wrongfully
invoked the procedures under State law to secure an eviction, doing so does not,
without more, make him a State actor for purposes of Section 1983. Partin v. Davis,
675 F. App’x 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 288–92
(6th Cir. 2007)). 	So long as the State procedures are presumptively valid, a private
party does not become a state actor simply by invoking those procedures in bad faith.
Id.
I.B. Section 1985 Claim
In Count XI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 by
conspiring 	to 	obtain 	unlawful 	eviction 	orders 	through 	false 	sworn 	statements
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“regarding knowledge of the registered agent” and coordinating execution of the
eviction orders to seize and destroy Plaintiff’s business property. 	(ECF No. 14,
PageID #234.) 	Presumably Plaintiff relies on Section 1985(3) because she is not an
officer of the United States, and the allegations of the second amended complaint do
not allege a conspiracy to deter her from attending or participating in the eviction
proceedings. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) & (2). 	To the contrary, the record in those
proceedings shows that Ms. Rielinger voluntarily sought dismissal from those
proceedings.
Under the remaining provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must plead (1)
a conspiracy involving two or more persons (2) for the purpose of depriving her,
directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of the laws and (3) an act in furtherance
of the conspiracy (4) which causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen.
Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir. 1994). 	Under the first element, members of the
same entity do not amount to two separate “people” to form a conspiracy. 	Id.;
Amadasu 	v. 	Christ 	Hosp., 	514 	F.3d 	504, 	507 	(6th 	Cir. 	2008). 	Under 	the
“intracorporate conspiracy doctrine,” a business cannot conspire with its own agents
or employees for purposes of a § 1985(3) claim. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 839–40.
Here, 	the 	only 	remaining 	Defendants 	include 	Cleveland 	Chinatown
Development and two of its agents, Nancy Liang and Shaojia Huang. 	Accordingly,
all remaining Defendants are part of the same entity and cannot form a conspiracy.
Moreover, Plaintiff pleads no more than a conclusory allegation that Defendants
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conspired to obtain and execute wrongful eviction orders without providing any
allegations showing such a civil rights conspiracy. 	Amadasu, 514 F.3d at 507.
Therefore, the claim fails to withstand Defendants’ motion in any event.
* 	* 	*
Because Defendants do not become State actors simply by engaging in State
litigation or procedures, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings, leaving only Plaintiff’s claims under State law.
II. 	State-Law Claims
Plaintiff’s remaining claims arise under State tort law. 	After applying New
Hampshire’s choice-of-law rules, the Court examines whether each claim that
Plaintiff asserts under State law withstands Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The Court does so mindful that it is not exercising appellate review over
the eviction proceedings in State court and giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt
that she is not seeking merely to relitigate the issues resolved in those proceedings.
Instead, the Court assumes that Ms. Rielinger seeks to recover for the loss or damage
to her property that she alleges Defendants caused.
II.A. 	Choice of Law
Plaintiff initially filed this action in New Hampshire, making it the forum
State whose law supplies the conflict of laws rules that decide which State’s
substantive law applies. 	Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941). 	In making this choice of law, New Hampshire law balances five “choice-
influencing considerations”: 	(1) “the predictability of results”; (2) comity among the
States within the federal system; (3) judicial economy; (4) “advancement of the
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governmental interest of the forum”; and (5) “the court’s preference for what it
regards as the sounder rule of law.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 549 A.2d 1187, 1192
(N.H. 1988) (quoting LaBounty v. American Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 161, 163 (N.H. 1982)).
While the New Hampshire Supreme Court has rejected the traditional rule
“that the law of the forum where the injury occurs is paramount,” the result here is
essentially the same. 	LaBounty, 451 A.2d at 163. 	The first factor applies only in
disputes involving contracts or similar transactions, which is not the case here.
Keeton, 549 A.2d at 1194. 	The second factor, maintenance of good relations among
the states, “requires only that the court not apply the law of a state that does not have
a substantial connection with the facts being litigated.” Id. Plaintiff received phone
calls and a letter at her home in New Hampshire, but the vast majority of the
disputed facts occurred in Cleveland, Ohio. Simplification of the judicial task is best
served by applying the law of the State where most of the events at issue occurred,
which also happens to be the State in which the Court sits. 	And New Hampshire’s
interest is “minimal and arises only from the fact that the [Plaintiff] was domiciled
in the State,” meaning New Hampshire has only a limited interest in applying its law
to the dispute at issue. LaBounty, 451 A.2d at 163.
Because a majority of the facts arise from a dispute that occurred in Cleveland,
Ohio and involves property allegedly lost or damaged there, the Court determines
that Ohio law governs Plaintiff’s claims in Counts I through VII and Counts XIII
through XVI.
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II.B. 	Application of Ohio Law to Plaintiff’s Claims
When exercising diversity jurisdiction, the Court applies Ohio substantive law
according to the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. 	Perry v. Allstate Indem. Co.,
953 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2020). Where the Ohio Supreme Court has not spoken on
an issue, the Court must “look to the decisions of [Ohio’s] lower courts, to the extent
they are persuasive, to predict how the Ohio Supreme Court would decide the issue.”
Id.
1. 	Intrusion Upon Seclusion and Intentional Racial Hatred
Harassment and Blackmail (Count I)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intruded upon her solitude and private affairs
by “directing unwanted, harassing, threatening, and coercive calls and messages” to
her while she was in New Hampshire. (ECF No. 14, PageID #230.) Under Ohio law,
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires: (1) an intentional intrusion, physical or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or her private affairs or concerns;
and (2) the intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio
St. 2d 143, 145, 431 N.E.2d 992 (1982). 	Ohio courts consider various factors when
considering whether a defendant’s telephone calls to a plaintiff are “offensive or
outrageous enough to support an actionable claim” of intrusion of seclusion, including
the “number of calls, the content of the calls, the time of day that the calls were made,
and whether the calls were accompanied by other contacts with the defendant.”
Charvat v. NMP, Ltd. Liab. Co., 656 F.3d 440, 453 (6th Cir. 2011).
According to the second amended complaint, Ms. Rielinger received one phone
call demanding money in exchange for her property and one written “ransom note”
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demanding money in exchange for her property. 	(ECF No. 14, PageID #229.) 	An
occasional phone call, message, or written communication regarding the property at
issue or the eviction proceedings does not rise to the level that Ohio courts require to
support a cause of action. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Dave Thompson and
Philip McCall were the parties who contacted her, and those individuals are no longer
Defendants in this case.
In this count, Plaintiff also includes a claim for “intentional racial hatred
harassment and blackmail.” But Ohio law does not recognize such a cause of action.
The closest Ohio law comes to such a claim is Section 2307.70 of the Ohio Revised
Code, which creates a civil cause of action for personal injury or property damage
arising from acts of ethnic intimidation. 	But nothing about the allegations of the
second amended complaint even suggests a factual predicate for application of this
statute here.
As for blackmail, Ohio law authorizes a civil action for criminal acts. See Ohio
Rev. Code § 2307.60. Ohio law includes blackmail under its extortion statute, which
prohibits a threat to commit any felony or “to damage any person's personal or
business repute, or to impair any person's credit.” 	Id. § 2905.11(1) & (5). 	But the
second 	amended 	complaint 	does 	not 	identify 	which, 	if 	any, 	of 	the 	remaining
Defendants 	allegedly 	engaged 	in 	such 	conduct. 	By 	using 	the 	general 	term
“Defendants” to describe the conduct of which she complains, Plaintiff engages in
improper group pleading and fails to place each of the remaining Defendants on
notice of the claims against which each must defend.
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For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on
the pleadings on Count I in its entirety.
2. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count II)
Under Ohio law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
a plaintiff to plead and prove four elements: (1) “conduct so extreme and outrageous
in character that it is considered utterly intolerable in a civilized society”; (2) “the
defendant either intended to cause or knew or should have known that his conduct
would cause the plaintiff emotional distress”; (3) the defendant’s conduct proximately
caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress, and; (4) “the plaintiff’s emotional distress
was both severe and debilitating.” 	Swartz v. DiCarlo, No. 1:12-cv-3112, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 138271, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2014) (citing Cooper v. Metal Sales
Mfg. Corp., 104 Ohio App. 3d 34, 660 N.E.2d 1245, 1250–51 (1995)).
As a matter of law, Plaintiff’s claim fails for many reasons. 	First, Plaintiff
pleads 	no 	operative 	facts 	even 	approaching 	the 	degree 	of 	outrageous 	conduct
necessary to support a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such
a claim contemplates conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 	Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio
St.3d 369, 374 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983). Taking Plaintiff’s claims as true, Defendants
misrepresented facts in eviction proceedings to obtain move-out orders and then
destroyed or stole Plaintiff’s personal items. 	While reprehensible, and the possible
basis to reopen those eviction proceedings, such actions do not, as a matter of law,
approach the degree necessary to state a claim. Additionally, Plaintiff does not plead
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anything other than bare, conclusory facts of her suffering. 	There is no allegation
and no reason to believe that her distress is “severe” or “debilitating.” 	For these
reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion on this claim.
3. 	Civil Conspiracy (Count III)
Under 	Ohio 	law, 	a 	civil 	conspiracy 	claim 	is 	“derivative 	and 	cannot 	be
maintained absent an underlying tort that is actionable without the conspiracy.”
Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co., 2009-Ohio-2665, 915 N.E.2d 696, ¶ 40 (Ohio
Ct. App.) (citations omitted). Because each of Plaintiff’s other claims under State law
fails as a matter of law, her civil conspiracy claim cannot stand on its own. Therefore,
the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion on this claim.
4. 	Conversion (Count IV)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally exercised control over her
tangible 	property 	without 	lawful 	justification, 	disposed 	of 	that 	property, 	and
permanently deprived her of it. 	Conversion is “any exercise of dominion or control
wrongfully exerted over the personal property of another in denial of, or under a claim
inconsistent with, the owner’s rights.” 	Dice v. White Family Cos., 2007-Ohio-5755,
878 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 17 (Ohio Ct. App.). 	To state a claim for conversion, a plaintiff
must plead that: “(1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property
at the time of the conversion; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or
disposition of the plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) damages.” 	Mathews v. Cooper,
2021-Ohio-2768, ¶ 46 (Ohio Ct. App.)
Generally, procedural due process protects property rights. 	Foster v. City of
Wickliffe, 2007-Ohio-7132, 88 N.E.2d 422, ¶ 86 (Ohio Ct. App.). After a lawful eviction
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proceeding, tenants have the opportunity to remove their belongings before the court-
ordered move-out date. Pertuset v. Hull, 2022-Ohio-2348, ¶ 38 (Ohio Ct. App.) (citing
Mathews, 2021-Ohio at ¶¶ 47–49). 	Where a person fails to remove her belongings
within the grace period provided, Defendants do not “wrongfully” control or exercise
dominion over personal property. 	Id. 	By failing to remove her property, Plaintiff
dispossessed herself of her personal items. 	Alternatively, the tenants did, and any
remedy lies against them. 	For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings on Count IV.
5. 	Civil Theft / Trespass to Chattels (Count V)
In Count V, Plaintiff brings two separate claims: 	one for civil theft and a
second for trespass to chattels. 	Plaintiff pleads that “Defendants intentionally took
and destroyed Plaintiff’s property with the purpose of benefitting themselves and
harming Plaintiff” and that she suffered financial losses. (ECF No. 14, PageID #232.)
A civil action for theft is not a common-law tort; rather, the claim is statutory
in Ohio. 	Eastlake Milford, LLC v. Jones, 2025-Ohio-5638, ¶ 4 (Ohio Ct. App.). 	A
person may recover damages for theft of property pursuant to Section 2307.60(A)(1),
which authorizes a civil action to recover for a criminal act. 	Here, Plaintiff was
deprived of her property pursuant to court-ordered eviction notices. No criminal act
occurred. 	Put another way, Defendants did not commit theft or steal Plaintiff’s
property. 	Plaintiff complains that she lost her property in eviction proceedings to
which she was not (by her choice) a party. Therefore, Ohio’s statute providing a civil
remedy for criminal acts does not apply on the facts alleged.
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As for trespass to chattels, a plaintiff must show an intentional, unauthorized
act that dispossessed or deprived plaintiff of property or otherwise impaired the
condition or value of the property. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218; Machlup v.
Bowman, 2021-Ohio-4370, ¶ 8 (Ohio Ct. App.) 	No such act appears in the second
amended complaint or in the record. Defendants obtained eviction orders, which led
to Plaintiff’s deprivation of her personal property.
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion on Count V.
6. 	Criminal Damage (Count VI)
For her criminal damage claim, Plaintiff only names Defendants Debra Brown
and Philip McCall, alleging that each damaged certain property, including antique
furniture and “$500k worth [of] property.” (ECF No. 14, PageID #232.) Because those
Defendants were previously dismissed from this case, this claim cannot go forward.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on Count VI.
7. 	Defamation (Count VII)
For Count VII, Plaintiff claims that Defendants defamed her by making “false
public filings and statements” that injured her reputation and “the reputation of the
companies she invested in and their credit standing.” 	(ECF No. 14, PageID #232.)
This claim fails as a matter of law because a “statement made in judicial proceeding
enjoys an absolute privilege against a defamation action as long as the allegedly
defamatory statement is reasonably related to the proceeding in which it appears.”
Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St. 3d 458, 460, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993). Also, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants Brown and McCall defamed her among her business associates and
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employees. Those Defendants are no longer parties to this case. Therefore, the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ motion on Count VII.
8. 	Tortious Interference (Count VIII)
Plaintiff claims that Defendants illegally deprived her and her companies of
access to personal property and “blocked business conduction [sic] for over three
months.” (ECF No. 14, PageID #233.) Plaintiff asserts “tortious interference” baldly,
which is not a claim under Ohio law. 	Again, the Court construes Plaintiff’s pro se
complaint liberally and attempts to identify the claim at issue. 	Martin v. Overton,
391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004),
Tortious interference with a business relationship happens where a person,
“without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person
not to enter into or continue a business relation with another.” A & B-Abell Elevator
Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 14, 651
N.E.2d 1283 (1995). Plaintiff claims that Defendants interfered with her commercial
interest in the tenants by refusing to make repairs to the property and by destroying
her inventory and equipment. 	(ECF No. 14, PageID #235.) 	But there is no third-
party actor here. 	Plaintiff invested in her own businesses, which were commercial
tenants of Defendants. 	Defendants’ decision to evict the tenants might have had
adverse consequences for Ms. Rielinger, but that action does not support a claim for
tortious 	interference 	with 	her 	business. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS
Defendants’ motion for judgment on Count VIII.
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9. 	Fraud on the Court (Count XIII)
Under Rule 60(B)(5) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not apply
in federal court, fraud on the court provides a basis for seeking relief from judgment.
It does not provide a basis for a separate civil action. See Coulson v. Coulson, 5 Ohio
St. 3d 12, 15, 448 N.E.2d 809 (1983) (noting that the proper procedure to raise the
issue requires a motion in the court where the fraud allegedly occurred). 	Here,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “knowingly made false sworn statements” and
“willfully misled the court.” (ECF No. 14, PageID #235.) She must raise such a claim
in the court where these events occurred. Ohio law does not provide a separate civil
action for them. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion on Count XIII.
10. 	Breach of Lease and Implied Warranty (Count XIV)
To state a claim for a breach of lease under Ohio law, a plaintiff must allege
(1) “an existing valid contract between the parties,” (2) that the defendant failed to
perform when performance was due, and 3) damages. Gilman v. Physna, LLC, 2021-
Ohio-3575, ¶ 17 (Ohio Ct. App.) (citing Lucarell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio
St.3d 453, 2018-Ohio-15, 97 N.E.3d 458, ¶ 41). By her own admission, Plaintiff was
not the lessee of Cleveland Chinatown Development and did not have a lease with
any Defendant. (ECF No. 14, ¶¶ 2 & 17, PageID #221 & #224.) Therefore, Plaintiff
cannot satisfy the first element for breach of contract. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s
claim of “implied warranty of liability” likely means “warranty of habitability.” While
Ohio law does recognize an implied warranty of habitability in rental agreements,
again, Plaintiff does not have a lease agreement with Defendants, meaning she
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cannot sustain a claim for breach of the warranty. 	Therefore, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ motion on Count XIV.
11. 	Interference with Business Expectancy (Count XV)
This claim duplicates Count VIII. It suffers the same fate.
12. 	Punitive Damages (Count XVI)
In Ohio, punitive damages are not a stand-alone claim, but a “measure of
damages.” Kwikcolor Sand v. Fairmount Minerals Ltd., 2011-Ohio-6646, ¶ 13 (Ohio
Ct. App.). 	For a plaintiff to receive punitive damages, “there must be proof of an
underlying independent compensatory damage claim.” Miller v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n,
2006-Ohio-1725, ¶ 50 (Ct. App.). Under Ohio law, “no civil action may be maintained
simply for punitive damages.” Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 2007-Ohio-6374, ¶ 73 (Ohio
Ct. App.). Because Plaintiff fails to plead a claim that survives the Rule 12 stage, she
has no claim for compensatory damages to support an award of punitive damages.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion on Count XVI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike
(ECF No. 45) but declines to consider the declarations for other reasons. Therefore,
the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for leave to accept the Woodruff
declaration one day late. (ECF No. 46.) The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 41).
SO ORDERED.
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Dated: October 13, 2026
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
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