USA v. Floyd, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	CASE NO. 3:22 CR 219
Plaintiff,
v. 	JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
CARL FLOYD,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendant. 	ORDER
I NTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court is pro se Defendant Carl Floyd’s second Motion for
Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 125). The Government responds
in opposition (Doc. 129-4) and Floyd replied (Doc. 132). For the reasons discussed below, Floyd’s
motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
In May 2022, Floyd was indicted on one count of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(1) and (2). (Doc. 7, at 1-2).
On February 8, 2023, Floyd entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (Doc.
25). The facts underlying the crime to which Floyd pled guilty are as follows.1 In June 2021, money
and fentanyl were stolen from co-defendant (and Floyd’s son) Marques Floyd by a drug user. Floyd
and his son attempted to retrieve the stolen money and drugs by going to the drug user’s residence.
1. These facts are taken from the Presentence Investigation Report. (Doc. 62, at 3-5). At
sentencing, the Court asked Floyd if he saw “anything in [the PSR] that’s not right?” and he said
he did not. (Doc. 82, at 5-6); see also Doc. 25, at 6-7 (factual basis of plea agreement).
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Once there, Floyd saw the drug user’s girlfriend in the parking lot. Floyd exited the vehicle, pushed
her inside, and sped away. As he drove, his son pistol-whipped the victim. The purpose of the
kidnapping was to use the victim to obtain the stolen drugs and money. Floyd and his son took the
victim back to the drug user’s apartment in an attempt to lure him out. They were unsuccessful.
The victim was ultimately held by Marques Floyd at his apartment against her will for seven days
and supplied with drugs to ensure compliance.
On April 24, 2024, this Court sentenced Floyd to a term of 188 months’ imprisonment
followed by three years of supervised release. (Doc. 82).
On January 21, 2025, Floyd filed his first motion for compassionate release citing medical
conditions and support from friends and family. (Doc. 107). After briefing, the Court denied that
motion on April 24, 2025, finding that Floyd had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling
reasons for release, and that even if he could, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not support
release. (Doc. 119).
DISCUSSION
Floyd moves this Court a second time for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A). He contends ineffective assistance of counsel, a Fifth Amendment violation, his
medical conditions, and prison conditions justify such relief. See Doc. 125, at 15-37. He further
argues the § 3553 factors support compassionate release. Id. at 38-41. The Government responded,
arguing that (1) Floyd did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this second
compassionate release motion; (2) Floyd does not present an extraordinary and compelling reason
to justify the remedy he seeks; (3) the § 3553(a) factors do not support release; and (4) the Court
cannot consider Floyd’s ineffective assistance of counsel or Fifth Amendment claims in this
context. See Doc. 129-4. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Floyd’s motion.
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel / Due Process Claims
In his motion, Floyd argues counsel he received ineffective assistance of counsel during
the plea process and that his Fifth Amendment due process rights (based on the sufficiency of the
evidence) were violated. See Doc. 125, at 15-23. The Government is correct, however, that such
claims cannot be raised in a compassionate release motion, but must be raised in a habeas motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1058 (6th Cir. 2022)
(en banc) (“[H]abeas is the appropriate place to bring challenges to the lawfulness of a sentence. .
. . [W]e do not read ‘extraordinary and compelling’ to provide an end run around habeas.”); United
States v. Bass, 2022 WL 16752876, at *1 (6th Cir.) (“[A] compassionate-release motion is not the
proper vehicle for raising claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Spearman v.
United States, 43 F. App’x 906, 908 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]his court has consistently held that the
proper vehicle for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is in a motion to vacate under
§ 2255.”).
Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Floyd next contends prison conditions and his medical issues are extraordinary and
compelling reasons supporting compassionate release. See Doc. 125, at 24-7.
A district court generally lacks authority to “modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) – the compassionate release
provision upon which Floyd relies as the basis for his motion – states:
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment. --The court may not
modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that--
(1) in any case--
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion
of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to
appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf
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or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the
defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment
(and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without
conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of
imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable, if it finds that--
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction;
* * *
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Thus, release is appropriate only if (1) the prisoner shows that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the [sentence] reduction[,]” (2) the Court
determines that “any sentence reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission[,]” and (3) the prisoner “persuade[s] the district judge to grant the
motion after the court considers the § 3553(a) factors.” McCall, 56 F.4th at 1054 (quotations
omitted). District courts “may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three
prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others;” but “in
granting a compassionate-release motion, district courts must address all three steps.” United
States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021).2
Section 3582(c) does not define “extraordinary and compelling.” But a Sentencing
Commission policy statement addresses sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The
2. As noted, an inmate must first exhaust all administrative remedies, see 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A). The § 3582(c)(1)(A) exhaustion rule is not jurisdictional, but is a mandatory claim-
processing rule that must be enforced when invoked. See United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831,
833-36 (6th Cir. 2020). It may be waived or forfeited by the Government. Id. at 833-34. While the
Government gestures towards authority for the proposition that Floyd’s motion fails on exhaustion
grounds, it nevertheless encourages this Court to reach the merits of the motion. See Doc. 129-4,
at 4. The Court finds such encouragement constitutes an implicit waiver of the exhaustion
requirement and proceeds to the merits of Floyd’s motion.
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policy statement identifies six circumstances that, individually or in combination, may provide
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduction in sentence. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6)
(effective November 1, 2023).3 These are: (1) medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age
of the defendant; (3) a defendant’s family circumstances; (4) sexual or physical abuse suffered by
the defendant while in custody involving a “sexual act” or “serious bodily injury”; (5) “other
reasons” similar in gravity as those articulated in (1)–(4); and (6) an “unusually long sentence.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). 4 The policy statement describes medical circumstances under (b)(1) that
may rise to the level of an “extraordinary and compelling” reason. These include where the
individual is “suffering from a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially
diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional
facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover” or where they are “suffering from a
medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided
3. Until late 2023, the policy statement set forth in § 1B1.13 was not binding on this Court in
evaluating motions for compassionate release filed directly by prisoners. The version of § 1B1.13
in effect until November 1, 2023, was adopted before the First Step Act, and therefore did not
account for the fact that defendants are now permitted to file their own motions for compassionate
release. The Sixth Circuit therefore held it was not an “applicable” policy statement under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and “in the absence of an applicable policy statement for inmate-filed
compassionate-release motions, district courts [had] discretion to define ‘extraordinary and
compelling’ on their own initiative.” Elias, 984 F.3d at 519-20. The policy statement effective
November 1, 2023, now begins: “Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the
defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term of imprisonment.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (emphasis added). As such, it is now an “applicable” policy statement with
which any sentence reduction must be “consistent”. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United
States v. Washington, 122 F.4th 264, 266 (6th Cir. 2024) (“The amendment revised the
Commission’s position on what may count as an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief,
regardless of who files the motion.”).
4. The Sixth Circuit, however, recently held that § 1B1.13(6) is entirely invalid and a non-
retroactive change in the law cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.
See United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427 (6th Cir. 2025).
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and without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13(b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C).
It is the movant’s burden to establish he is entitled to a compassionate release or a sentence
reduction. Alam, 960 F.3d at 836. The Court addresses the arguments Floyd makes as to his specific
medical conditions and his specific treatment in prison. Floyd contends FCI Loretto, where he is
incarcerated, has inadequately trained medical staff. (Doc. 125, at 24-26); see also id. at 31 (“They
not only suffer from a shortage of staff, the staff that they do have is either incompetent or they
simply don’t care.”). He asserts the facility is staffed by a single physician, who he contends
(without support) is not qualified to treat adult patients, and three Physicians Assistants. Id. at 24-
25. As to his own medical conditions, Floyd argues that the BOP is incapable of treating “or simply
ignores” his hypertension and hyperlipidemia. See id. at 26-28. He further cites diagnoses of angina
pectoris and atherosclerosis. Id. at 28. Finally, Floyd complains of inadequate blood work,
anomalies in his blood work, and insufficient follow-up. Id. at 29. He states “no one is paying
attention” to these things. Id.
Although Floyd complains about a lack of access to medical care and the inadequacy of
that care, and Floyd certainly has diagnosed medical conditions, as with his last motion, the Court
finds Floyd’s medical records document that these conditions are treated within the BOP. See Doc.
129-3 (sealed medical records). Floyd has been seen regularly and prescribed medication and
further testing for, among other things, his cited conditions of hypertension, hyperlipidemia,
angina pectoris, coronary angioplasty, and atherosclerosis. See id. Indeed, as the Government
points out, during a July 2025 encounter for a cough, Floyd denied other symptoms and stated:
“Other th[a]n this cough I feel great.” Id. at 5. Indeed, although Floyd specifically complains that
his blood pressure was not being adequately monitored, in a July 2025 note, the provider indicated
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Floyd would be placed on weekly blood pressure checks for monitoring. Id. at 7. In short, the Court
finds Floyd has not demonstrated that his medical conditions have not been, or cannot be, treated
within the prison system. See, e.g., See United States v. Mackety, 854 F. App’x 36, 38 (6th Cir.
2021) (affirming denial of compassionate release where nothing in the record showed BOP was
“unable to manage” defendant’s hypertension, “even during the Covid-19 pandemic”); United
States v. DeJournett, 2024 WL 1580102, at *5 (N.D. Ohio) (denying motion for compassionate
release because defendant “failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he is not being provided
with the specialized medical care that he requires”); United States v. Blackwell, 2024 WL 4534259,
at *3-4 (N.D. Ohio) (denying motion for compassionate release where petitioner did not
demonstrate evidence that his condition was not manageable in the prison environment or that he
was not receiving appropriate medical care); United States v. Walker 2022 WL 834008, at *3 (E.D.
Mich.) (denying motion for compassionate release where there was “no indication that these issues
cannot be treated and managed in the prison setting”).
The Court finds Floyd’s conditions are not uncommon and neither an extraordinary nor
compelling reason justifying release. Floyd has not demonstrated he is “suffering from a serious
physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to provide self-care
within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he . . . is not expected to recover”
or is “suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that
is not being provided and without which [he] is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.”
U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C).
Much of Floyd’s motion describes general inadequacies at Bureau of Prisons facilities. See,
e.g., Doc. 125, at 25 (citing a report that the BOP has failed to screen many inmates for colorectal
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cancer);5 id. at 29-31 (describing conditions at FCI Devens in Massachusetts). Floyd also
complains about prison conditions, noting that the facility has spent much time in lockdown due
to COVID-19 “with little or no access to recreation, church, education, the law library, or
programming. (Doc. 125, at 32).6 He further contends the facilities are overcrowded, with
inadequate space and ventilation, as well as fewer shower and toilet facilities than American
Correctional Association Standards dictate. Id. at 35-37. Floyd has not explained why these prison
conditions amount to an extraordinary and compelling basis for relief in his specific situation. See,
e.g., United States v. Reese, 2022 WL 737501, at *2 (E.D. Mich.) (rejecting a defendant’s
allegation that his release is warranted “because of general prison conditions and restrictions
caused by the pandemic,” when “[h]e has not articulated why living conditions generally
applicable to all prisoners at his facility, such as lockdowns and delayed mail, constitute an
extraordinary and compelling basis for his release”) (collecting cases); United States v. Pelletier,
2020 WL 6135052, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.) (“These arguments about the general prison conditions,
faced by every inmate confined at FCI Memphis with Mr. Pelletier, and likely at all other BOP
facilities in the country, are not sufficient, without more, to establish an extraordinary and
compelling reason specific to Mr. Pelletier.”).
The Court therefore finds Floyd has not established an extraordinary and compelling
circumstance to support release.
5. As the Government points out, Floyd’s medical records demonstrate he has received colorectal
cancer screening in prison. (Doc. 129-3, at 12).
6. Further, to the extent Floyd attempts to independently challenge his conditions of confinement,
see Doc. 125, at 34-35 (citing Eighth Amendment standard), a motion for sentence reduction or
compassionate release “is not the appropriate mechanism or vehicle to raise such a claim of alleged
constitutional violations.” United States v. Pooler, 2020 WL 7046964, at *7 (S.D. Ohio)
(collecting cases).
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§ 3553(a) Factors
Even if Floyd could clear the initial hurdle of demonstrating an extraordinary and
compelling reason, the Court would still deny his motion because the sentencing factors in §
3553(a) do not favor release. See United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 (6th Cir. 2021)
(citing § 3553(a) and directing district courts to consider all relevant statutory factors).
Nothing about the intervening ten months between the Court’s ruling on Floyd’s prior
motion for compassionate release has changed the Court’s view of the § 3553(a) factors:
Specifically, “the nature and circumstances” of Floyd’s offense were serious and
weigh heavily against release. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Although Floyd’s son,
Marques, may have been the main actor/instigator and committed additional crimes
against the victim, Floyd himself was an active participant in a kidnapping in which
the victim was abducted and held against her will.
As it did at the time of sentencing, the Court must consider the goals of reflecting
the seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, providing just punishment,
protecting the public, and deterring Floyd and others from future criminal conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The Court finds ordering Floyd’s release would undermine
each of these sentencing goals.
(Doc. 119, at 7). This remains true despite Floyd’s current attempts to dispute or recharacterize the
underlying facts and minimize his involvement.
Floyd further argues that “courts have consistently found that rehabilitation is an important
element in determining whether or not relief is appropriate.” (Doc. 125, at 38). He asserts he has
sought to improve himself while incarcerated by taking classes, working as an orderly, and
mentoring young inmates and notes the BOP has determined him to have a low risk of recidivism.
Id. at 41. The Court commends Floyd on his efforts toward improving himself while incarcerated.
However, “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and
compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Further, he contends that the simple passage of time and
aging erode the dangerousness analysis. Id. at 40.
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After considering all the § 3553(a) factors, the Court again finds they do not support
release.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED 	that 	Floyd’s 	Motion 	for 	Compassionate 	Release 	Under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§
3582(c)(1)(A) (Doc. 125) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: February 10, 2026
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