United States of America v. Singh et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	CASE NO. 3:23 CR 622
Plaintiff,
v. 	JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
GURSHARN SINGH,1
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendant. 	ORDER
I NTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court is pro se Defendant Gursharn Singh’s Motion for
Sentence Reduction. (Doc. 27). The Government opposes (Doc. 28) and Singh replies (Doc. 29).
For the reasons discussed below, Singh’s motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
In October 2023, Singh was charged in a criminal complaint with one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. (Doc. 1). On December 6, 2023,
he was indicted for the same offense. (Doc. 12).
On October 8, 2024, Singh pled guilty to the indictment. According to the Government, at
the request of defense counsel, it scheduled a “Safety Valve” interview with Singh pursuant to
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 5C1.2, but Singh ultimately refused to
1. On the first page of Singh’s motion, he lists his co-Defendant Gurpinder Singh’s name in the
caption. See Doc. 27, at 1. However, the name/signature and Bureau of Prisons Register Number
at the end of the motion makes clear it is brought by Gursharn Singh. See id. at 27.
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participate. See 	Doc. 28, at 1. As a result, Singh remained subject to the 120 month (ten year)
mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). See Doc. 19, at 9.
On May 6, 2025, this Court sentenced Singh to the mandatory minimum 120 months
imprisonment, followed by five years’ supervised release. See Doc. 22 (Judgment).
DISCUSSION
Although Singh filed his motion on a form indicating he seeks sentence reduction pursuant
to the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), he
substantively argues for a reduction based on recent changes to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. See Doc. 27, at 7-8, Doc. 29. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Singh
has not demonstrated entitlement to the relief he seeks.
A district court generally lacks authority to “modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) – the compassionate release
provision upon which Singh relies as the basis for his motion – states:
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment. --The court may not
modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that--
(1) in any case--
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion
of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to
appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf
or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the
defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment
(and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without
conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of
imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable, if it finds that--
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction;
* * *
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and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Thus, release under this subsection is appropriate only if (1) the prisoner
shows that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the [sentence] reduction[,]” (2) the
Court determines that “any sentence reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission[,]” and (3) the prisoner “persuade[s] the district judge to
grant the motion after the court considers the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th
1048, 	1054 	(6th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(en 	banc) 	(quotations 	omitted). 	District 	courts 	“may 	deny
compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is
lacking and do not need to address the others;” but “in granting a compassionate-release motion,
district courts must address all three steps.” United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir.
2021).2
Section 3582(c) does not define “extraordinary and compelling.” But a Sentencing
Commission policy statement addresses sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The
policy statement identifies six circumstances that, individually or in combination, may provide
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduction in sentence. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(B)(1)–(6)
(effective November 1, 2023).3 These are: (1) medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age
2. Singh has satisfied the exhaustion requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as he e-mailed
a request for compassionate release to the Warden of his present institution on October 31, 2025,
and the present motion was filed more than 30 days after the submission of that request. See Doc.
27, at 4; Doc. 28, at 3.
3. Until late 2023, the policy statement set forth in § 1B1.13 was not binding on this Court in
evaluating motions for compassionate release filed directly by prisoners. The version of § 1B1.13
in effect until November 1, 2023, was adopted before the First Step Act, and therefore did not
account for the fact that defendants are now permitted to file their own motions for compassionate
release. The Sixth Circuit therefore held it was not an “applicable” policy statement under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and “in the absence of an applicable policy statement for inmate-filed
compassionate-release motions, district courts [had] discretion to define ‘extraordinary and
compelling’ on their own initiative.” Elias, 984 F.3d at 519-. The policy statement effective
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of the defendant; (3) a defendant’s family circumstances; (4) sexual or physical abuse suffered by
the defendant while in custody involving a “sexual act” or “serious bodily injury”; (5) “other
reasons” similar in gravity as those articulated in (1)–(4); and (6) an “unusually long sentence.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). 4
In his motion, Singh does not indicate his request falls into any of these identified
categories. See Doc. 27, at 5-6. Instead, he argues a recent change in the Sentencing Guidelines
changes his base offense level and qualifies him for a sentence reduction. See id. at 6 (citing
November 1, 2025 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2).5
Such a request falls under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). That subsection provides:
(2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the
term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The relevant Sentencing Commission policy statements endorse such
sentence reductions based only on certain amendments made retroactive by the Sentencing
Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1), (d); Clemons v. United States, 102 F. App’x 933, 935
November 1, 2023, now begins: “Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the
defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term of imprisonment.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (emphasis added). As such, it is now an “applicable” policy statement with
which any sentence reduction must be “consistent”. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United
States v. Washington, 122 F.4th 264, 266 (6th Cir. 2024) (“The amendment revised the
Commission’s position on what may count as an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief,
regardless of who files the motion.”).
4. The Sixth Circuit, however, recently held that § 1B1.13(6) is entirely invalid and a non-
retroactive change in the law cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.
See United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427 (6th Cir. 2025).
5. Singh does not specifically identify this as Amendment 833, but cites an amendment to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2(a) that went into effect November 1, 2025. This is Amendment 833.
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(6th Cir. 2004) (“Since the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide that [a particular amendment] is
to be given retroactive effect, Clemons may not obtain a reduction of his sentence in a § 3582(c)
motion [based on that amendment].”).
Singh argues for a reduction based on Amendment 833, which amended, inter alia,
U.S.S.G. 	§§ 	2D1.1(a)(5) 	and 	3B1.2. 	See 	Amendment 	833, 	U.S. 	Sent’g 	Comm’n,
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/833. But Amendment 833 is not listed at U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10(d), the Sentencing Commission policy statement enumerating amendments that can
support a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1), (d). Retroactive application of
Amendment 833 is therefore not consistent with the policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission and cannot serve as the basis for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). See,
e.g., United States v. Polanco-Gonzalez, 2026 WL 179682, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v.
Leones, 2025 WL 3537608, at *2 (M.D. Fla.).
Even if Amendment 833 were retroactive, it would not apply to reduce Singh’s sentence.
Amendment 833 “contains two subparts to address concerns that § 2D1.1 and § 3B1.2 (Mitigating
Role) as they currently apply in tandem do not adequately account for the lower culpability of
individuals performing low-level functions in a drug trafficking offense.” See Amendment 833,
U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/833. But here, Singh was
sentenced to a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. A defendant’s sentence may
not be “less than any statutorily required minimum sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c); see also United
States v. Johnson, 564 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 920 (2009) (holding a
defendant was ineligible for sentence reduction when he received the statutory mandatory
minimum); United States v. McPherson, 629 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 2011) (same). In the final
PSR, Singh’s guideline range calculation was 87 to 108 months, but the guideline term was 120
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months based on the statutory mandatory minimum. See Doc. 19, at 9. That is, the mandatory
minimum sentence was already above the calculated guideline range. This would remain true for
any re-calculated guideline range based on the Amendment. Thus, even if Amendment 833 applied
retroactively, it would not change Singh’s statutorily-mandated minimum sentence.
Finally, although Singh presents arguments under the § 3553(a) factors, the Court cannot
reach that step of the sentence reduction analysis without a showing of “extraordinary and
compelling circumstances.” And Singh has not demonstrated such circumstances here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Singh’s Motion for Sentence Reduction (Doc. 27) be, and the same hereby
is, DENIED.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: February 10, 2026
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