Salem v. Core Civic Warden et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Yasir Salem,
Petitioner,
-vs-
Core Civic Warden, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 4:25-cv-02058-PAB
JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Yasir Salem’s (“Salem”) Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). (Doc. No. 5.) On December 22, 2025,
Respondents filed their Answer to the Petition. (Doc. No. 11.) On January 9, 2026, Salem filed his
Traverse. (Doc. No. 12.) For the reasons stated herein, Salem’s Petition is denied without prejudice.
Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision
could not be taken in good faith, and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
I. 	Factual Background
Salem entered the United States as an immigrant in 1994. 	(Doc. No. 11-1, ¶ 5.)1 	After
entering the United States, Salem was convicted of battery, taking a vehicle without the owner’s
consent, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a controlled substance. (Id. at ¶ 6–9.) On
December 5, 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a notice to appear placing
Salem in removal proceedings before the Eloy, Arizona Immigration Court. 	(Id. at ¶ 10.) 	On
1 Respondents submitted the Declaration of Allen Vanscoy with its Answer. Salem does not dispute the averments in Mr.
Vanscoy’s declaration.
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February 5, 2003, an Immigration Judge denied Salem’s applications for asylum and withholding of
removal and deferral, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture Act, and ordered Salem removed
to Jordan and, in the alternative, Israel. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Salem appealed that decision, but ultimately
his appeal was dismissed. (Id. at ¶¶ 12–13.) On February 10, 2004, Salem was released on an Order
of Supervision as ICE was unable to secure a travel document for removal at that time. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
In the 2020s, Salem was convicted of three more crimes: (1) assault with a deadly weapon,
and (2) two separate violations of a protection order. (Id. at ¶¶ 15–17.) On March 22, 2025, Salem
was arrested for possession of a controlled substance by the Akron Police Department, and that case
remains pending. 	(Id. at ¶ 18.) 	While in jail, on March 26, 2025, Salem was turned over to ICE
custody on a detainer and transported to ICE for processing and housing. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
On June 3, 2025, ICE requested a travel document for Salem from Israel for the return of
Salem to the Palestinian territories. 	(Id. at ¶ 20.) 	On June 20, 2025, ICE completed a post order
custody review, and issued Salem a decision to continue detention, indicating that a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future exists and finding Salem to be a danger to
the community based on his criminal history. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
On September 16, 2025, just under six months from when he was detained by ICE, Salem
filed his Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 5.) 	On September 25, 2025, after a panel
interview was conducted with Salem, a determination was made to continue Salem’s custody. (Id. at
¶¶ 22–24.) To date, Salem has not been removed from the United States and is still in custody.
II. 	Procedural Background
On September 16, 2025, Salem filed his Petition. (Doc. No. 5.) On November 21, 2025, the
Court, having examined the Petition, could not “determine from its face that Salem is not entitled to
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relief.” (Doc. No. 9, PageID #20.) On December 22, 2025, Respondents filed their Answer to the
Petition. On January 9, 2026, Salem filed his Traverse. (Doc. No. 12.) Accordingly, the Petition is
ripe for the Court’s review.
III. 	Standard of Review
8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs the procedures for the detention and removal of aliens that are subject
to an order of removal. The statute provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the
Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of
90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal period”).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Certain aliens, who have “been determined by the Attorney General to be
a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the
removal period . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
The Supreme Court has interpreted this statute to permit the government to detain an alien for
periods 	of 	time 	longer 	than 	90 	days 	and 	has 	found 	that 	six-months 	is 	presumptively
reasonable. 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). “This 6-month presumption, of course,
does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months.” Id. “After this 6-
month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient
to rebut that showing.” Id. “And for the detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-
removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would
have to shrink.” Id. But “the Zadvydas due process analysis applies only if a danger of indefinite
detention exists.” Jiang Lu v. United States Dep’t of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 22 F.
Supp. 3d 839, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (citing Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 51, 531 (2003) (distinguishing
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Zadvydas because the petitioner had not demonstrated that there was a real danger of indefinite or
permanent detention, and it was therefore premature to apply the due process analysis)).
IV. 	Analysis
In his Petition, Salem asserts that ICE has held him “in detention 180 days and deportion (sic)
is not hapening (sic) future soon, so continue[d] detention forever is valition (sic) of Constition (sic)
of USA.” (Id. at PageID #4.) He argues that he is from “Plastine (sic) and evry (sic) person in the
world knows what hapening (sic) in Plastine (sic) to send me this time to Plastine (sic) is dangrous
(sic).” (Id. at PageID #8.) He further argues that “ICE and Warden” have held him “(180) days in
detention” and that “they try evry (sic) step and evry (sic) tools they have ic (sic) to remove me [from
the] USA, and is not hapening (sic) nearest future or soon.” (Id. at PageID #9.) He claims that he
does not “know how [long] it takes” and that he has been in detention since March 26, 2025. (Id.)
Salem thus asks that Court “to release [him] from ICE C[u]stody.” (Id. at PageID #10.)
In their Answer, Respondents argue that “[a] review of Salem’s Petition shows that Salem
filed his petition just short of the six months presumptively reasonable time.” (Doc. No. 11, PageID
#28.) They assert that “Salem’s custody has been periodically reviewed and the decision was made
to continue his custody, most recently on September 25, 2025” and that “ICE has requested a travel
document from Israel.” 	(Id.) 	Respondents further argue that while Salem asserts that Palestine is
dangerous, “he has not alleged, nor has he set forth in credible evidence that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (Id.)
In his Traverse, Salem argues that “ICE has been trying to obtain Petitioner’s travel
documents” and that an “ICE officer informed Petitioner that his travel documents were denied,
which was 22 years ago.” (Doc. No. 12, PageID #36.) Salem argues that “it has been 22 years since
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respondent has been trying to deport Petitioner” and “[a]s of today, Petitioner has been detained for
over 9 months.” (Id. at PageID #37.) He asserts that “[i]f respondents have not been able to deport
Petitioner for the last 22 years what will change in the reasonably foreseeable future, and the truth is
in front of the Court.” (Id.) In a conclusory manner, Salem asserts that “nothing has changed in the
[past] 22 years.” (Id.)
Upon review of the evidence in the record, the Court finds that Salem has not met his initial
burden under Zadvydas to set forth good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. In a conclusory manner, Salem asserts that “deportion
(sic) is not happening [in the] future soon,” (Doc. No. 5, PageID #4) and that he is from “Plastine
(sic) and evry (sic) person in the world knows what hapening (sic) in Plastine (sic) to send me this
time to Plastine (sic) is dangrous (sic).” (Id. at PageID #8.) A petitioner, however, cannot meet his
initial burden under Zadvydas through “speculation and conjecture.” Smith v. Simon, No. 1:19 CV
41, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148526, at *11 (N.D. Ohio July 17, 2019) (citing cases). While Salem
has a point that recent events may make a return to Palestine dangerous, another judge from this
district recently denied a petition under Zadvydas based on evidence that the government “provided
Petitioner’s information to the Israeli government and anticipate receiving special transit permission
necessary to enter the occupied Palestinian territories.” Hammouda v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
4:25-cv-2696, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6602, at *14 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2026); see also Zakarneh v.
United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:25-cv-00707-DGE, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4456, at
*11–12 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2026) (denying relief under Zadvydas based on evidence that “the
government of Israel has approved Petitioner's removal through Israel to the West Bank so long as a
flight can be arranged”). 	Further, Respondents have submitted unrebutted evidence that ICE has
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successfully removed individuals to the Palestinian territories, and there is no reason to believe that
ICE will be unable to continue doing so. (Doc. No. 11-1, ¶ 26.)
Moreover, courts have also found that “that mere delay by the foreign government in issuing
travel documents, despite reasonable efforts by United States authorities to secure them, does not
satisfy a detainee’s burden under Zadvydas to provide good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Manjulaben v. ICE, No. 4:25-
cv-02252, 	2025 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	207750, 	at 	*7 	(N.D. 	Ohio 	Oct. 	22, 	2025) 	(citing
cases). 	Respondents have submitted evidence that “ICE has requested travel documents for Salem
from the Israel government for the return of the Petitioner to the Palestinian territories.” (Id.) Salem
has not submitted any contrary evidence. See Boachie-Danquah v. United States AG, No. 1:17-cv-
641, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24197, at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2018) (“In the absence of any
evidence in the record to suggest that the Ghanaian Embassy will not issue the requested and expected
travel document in the reasonably foreseeable future, the undersigned concludes that petitioner has
failed to meet his initial burden of proof under Zadvydas”).
For all these reasons, the Court finds that Salem has not demonstrated good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. If circumstances change, Salem may file a new § 2241 petition setting forth good
reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. See Estenor v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-743, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133714, at *11 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 24, 2011) (denying petition without prejudice to future relief if circumstances change), report
and recommendation adopted, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132128 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2011).
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V. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, Salem’s Petition is denied without prejudice. 	Further, the
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith, and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: January 26, 2026 	U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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