AlphaOne Exteriors LLC

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
ALPHAONE EXTERIORS LLC,
Debtor.
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 24-30371
Chapter 11 (Subchapter V)
Judge Crist
ORDER: (I) GRANTING FIRST AND FINAL APPLICATION OF SUBCHAPTER V
TRUSTEE FOR PAYMENT OF FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
(DOC. 122); AND (II) REQUIRING SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST AND FINAL
APPLICATION FOR THE APPROVAL OF FEES AND EXPENSES FOR PATRICIA
J. FRIESINGER AND COOLIDGE WALL, CO., L.P.A., AS COUNSEL FOR THE
DEBTOR FOR THE PERIOD OF MARCH 1, 2024 THROUGH THE
CONFIRMATION DATE OF APRIL 21, 2025 (DOC. 124)
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) First and Final Application of Subchapter V
Trustee for Payment of Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses (Doc. 122), for the period of March
1, 2024 through May 13, 2025, filed on May 15, 2025 (the “Sub V Trustee Application”); and (2)
First and Final Application for the Approval of Fees and Expenses for Patricia J. Friesinger and
Coolidge Wall, Co., L.P.A., as Counsel in the Amount of $69,490.00 for Attorney Fees and
$2,816.56 for Expenses for the Period of March 1, 2024 Through the Confirmation Date of April
21, 2025 and the Authority to Pay Same, Combined with Notice Thereof and of Opportunity to
Object (Doc. 124), filed on June 20, 2025 (the “Sub V Debtor Application” and together with the
Sub V Trustee Application, the “Applications”).
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 30, 2025
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 22

2
I. 	Background
A. Pre-Confirmation Filings and Actions
Debtor AlphaOne Exteriors LLC (“AlphaOne” and “Debtor”) filed its Voluntary Petition
(Doc. 1) on March 1, 2024 (the “Petition Date”). At that time, prior to the sunset of the pandemic
era increased debt limit on June 21, 2024,1 Debtor was able to and did elect to proceed as a debtor
under 11 U.S.C. § 1182(1) with aggregate noncontingent liquidated debts (excluding debts owed
to insiders or affiliates) that were less than $7,500,000, under subchapter V of chapter 11. See id.
at 2, part 8. However, it appears that the total noncontingent liquidated debt in this case may have
been well under the current debt limit of $3,424,000, as further discussed below.
In the Statement of Financial Affairs (Doc. 1 at 31-39) and Disclosure of Compensation of
Attorney for Debtor (Doc. 1 at 40), both filed with the Voluntary Petition, AlphaOne disclosed
that it paid the firm of Coolidge Wall Co., L.P.A. (“Debtor’s Counsel”) a prepetition retainer of
$15,000 on February 7 and 9, 2024, $11,356.50 of which was applied prepetition, leaving Debtor’s
Counsel with a balance on-hand of $3,643.50. Doc. 1 at 34.2 Total current liabilities listed in the
Balance Sheet (Doc. 11) filed on the Petition Date were $285,670.78. In the Summary of Assets
and Liabilities (Doc. 1 at 9) the total liabilities were $486,953.77; however, Colleen Sallee, as well
as Marco Majors, Steven Snelson, and United States EPA Region 5, were scheduled with
contingent, unliquidated, and disputed nonpriority unsecured claims for “unknown” or $0.00
amounts. See Schedule E/F (Doc. 1 at 21-25). Total assets of $130,512.33 were listed in Schedule
A/B (Doc. 1 at 10-16).
1 The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), Pub L. No. 116-136 (2020), enacted
on March 27, 2020, first increased the debt limit. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1182.LH. The extended debt limit
was extended under the COVID-19 Bankruptcy Relief Extension Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-5, § 2(a)(1) (Mar. 27,
2021). Id. After a gap period during which the limit went back down to $3,024,725, effective April 1, 2022, the
increased debt limit was reinstated retroactively and extended under the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment and
Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 117-151, § 2(a), (d) (June 21, 2022) until June 20, 2024, but then allowed to
expire through an amendment to § 1182(1) now simply defines a “debtor” for purposes of subchapter V as a “small
business debtor,” which is currently defined in § 101(51D) to have a debt limit of $3,424,000, as adjusted under § 104
on April 1, 2025. Id.; see also https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/04/2025-02207/adjustment-of-
certain-dollar-amounts-applicable-to-bankruptcy-cases.
2 Also, in the Disclosure of Compensation (Form B2030), Debtor’s Counsel represented that they had agreed to accept
$15,000 for legal services. That is presumed to only apply to the prepetition period, but the Application (Doc. 4) to
employ, filed on March 1, 2024, does not explain. Doc. 1 at 40; Appl. (Doc. 4) at 5, ¶ 12 (stating “[t]he Debtor desires
to retain Friesinger and the Firm under the retainer agreement set forth in the Affidavit[,]” but the Declaration attached
as Exhibit A (there being no Affidavit) only addresses disinterestedness, such that the only details about the terms of
retention are set forth in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the Application (Doc. 4).
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 22

3
Also on the Petition Date, the United States Trustee filed the Notice of Appointment of
Subchapter V Trustee (Doc. 16), by which Donald W. Mallory was appointed as the Subchapter V
Trustee in this case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1183(a). A Supplemental Notice of Appointment of
Subchapter V Trustee (Doc. 20) was filed on March 4, 2024, to include the previously referenced
Verified Statement of Subchapter V Trustee which disclosed his hourly rate of $350, for which he
would seek compensation subject to court approval pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330.
An Application (Doc. 4) to employ Patricia J. Friesinger and the law firm of Coolidge Wall
Co., L.P.A. (together, “Debtor’s Counsel”) as general counsel for the Debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 327(a)3 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rule”) 2014, was also filed on
the Petition Date. Said Application disclosed hourly rates of $380 for Ms. Friesinger in 2024;
$225-$600 for all attorneys at the Coolidge firm in 2024; and $170-$275 for paralegals at the
Coolidge firm in 2024, all subject to allowance by this Court. Appl. (Doc. 4) at 4, ¶ 9. The
Application also confirmed that Debtor’s Counsel had received a prepetition retainer of $15,000
and referred to the Statement of Financial Affairs as identifying “the amounts from the retainer
applied to the pre-petition fees of the Debtor.” Id. at 6, ¶ 13. Further, the Application stated that
“[t]he Firm shall retain the deposit to be applied to any fees, charges, and disbursements which
remain unpaid at the end of this case as ordered by the Court.” Id. On March 27, 2024, the Court
entered an Order (Doc. 29) granting the Application to employ Debtor’s Counsel as “General
Counsel.” Doc. 37 at 2.
There were two “first day” motions filed in this case: (1) an Emergency Motion (Doc. 5)
to use cash collateral and seek related relief (the “Motion to Use Cash Collateral”); and (2) Motion
(Doc. 6) to pay prepetition wages and seek related relief (the “Motion to Pay Prepetition Wages”).
The Motion to Use Cash Collateral stated that two creditors, Channel Partners Capital, LLC and
Prime 1 LLC (an entity with “similar ownership to the Debtor”) were owed $67,206.72 and
$15,000, respectively. The Declaration of Jarrod Clauser in Support of Chapter 11 Petition and
First Day Motions (Doc. 7) (the “First Day Declaration”) further explained that “the Debtor took
out a loan from Channel Partners Capital, LLC for $84,000” in June 2023. First Day Decl. at 3.
Counsel for Creditor Colleen Sallee (“Ms. Sallee”) appeared in this case on April 29, 2024
(Docs. 43-45). Ms. Sallee, by and through counsel, filed a Motion (Doc. 51) to extend the time to
3 The Motion cites § 327(e), but that appears to be an inadvertent typo as it would not apply to general counsel.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 22

4
file a complaint to challenge dischargeability of debt on May 17, 2024, asserting she was owed
$2.251 million for damages in connection with a residential construction contract. The Motion was
granted by an Order (Doc. 57) entered on June 20, 2024. Thereafter, AlphaOne and Ms. Sallee
entered into a series of Stipulations (Docs. 72, 79, 86, & 104) filed on September 17, 2024,
November 18, 2024, January 14, 2025, and March 17, 2025, respectively, to further extend the
deadline.
The initial Plan of Reorganization of AlphaOne Exteriors LLC (Doc. 53) was filed on May
30, 2024. Ultimately, an Agreed Order (Doc. 81), entered into between Ms. Sallee, the Subchapter
V Trustee, the United States Trustee, and AlphaOne, was approved by the Court on November 25,
2024, extending AlphaOne’s deadline to file an amended plan of reorganization, which had
previously been set by an Order (Doc. 74) entered on September 25, 2024. The First Amended
Plan of Reorganization of AlphaOne Exteriors LLC (Doc. 84) was filed on January 2, 2025.
An Application (Doc. 77) to employ Rike LLC as a certified public accountant to prepare
tax returns, at an hourly fee of $150-$265, was filed on October 15, 2024, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 327(a), Bankruptcy Rule 2014, and LBR 2014-1. The Order (Doc. 87) granting said Application,
effective as of October 15, 2024, was entered on January 17, 2025. The Application stated that
“[s]ubject to Court approval pursuant to Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, compensation
will be payable to Rike on an hourly basis, plus reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses and
other charges incurred by Rike.” Appl. (Doc. 77) at 4. Moreover, the Affidavit of Dave Rike on
Behalf of Rike LLC (Doc. 77) stated that “Rike . . . understands that any compensation paid by the
estate must be approved by the Court.” Ex. A – Aff. (Doc. 77) at 6. But, as discussed below within
the heading of “other issues” concerning the Sub V Debtor Application, no application for
compensation for services or reimbursement of expenses has been filed on behalf of Rike LLC.
On February 19, 2025, Debtor filed several motions (Docs. 93, 94, & 95) to: (1) assume
leases, (2) approve a compromise with Ms. Sallee, and (3) approve a compromise with Channel
Partners Capital, LLC in resolution of Adversary Proceeding No. 24-3006, which had been filed
on the first day of the case. In addition, Debtor filed its Second Amended Plan of Reorganization
of AlphaOne Exteriors LLC (Doc. 96), followed by a comparison copy (Doc. 100) to identify
changes made in the Second Amended Plan (the “Plan”). The various Motions were granted by
Orders (Docs. 107, 108, & 112), entered on April 1, 3, and 14, 2025, respectively.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 22

5
On April 15, 2025, the Subchapter V Trustee filed his Report of Subchapter V Trustee in
Support of Confirmation of the Second Amended Plan of Reorganization of AlphaOne Exteriors,
LLC (Doc. No. 96) (Doc. 113) (the “Report”). The Report details the Subchapter V Trustee’s work
in this case and the efforts that lead to a settlement and confirmation of the Plan on a consensual
basis under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a). In particular, it explains that:
41. 	The instant case was unusual in that a resolution of the underlying
litigious dispute surrounding the Texas Action with Ms. Sallee and the Sallee Claim
was a significant hurdle to reaching confirmation. Trustee was involved at the onset
in many robust negotiations between the Debtor and its counsel, counsel for the
Debtor’s insurer, Ms. Sallee and counsel for Ms. Sallee. . . .
Report (Doc. 113) at 18-19, ¶ 41.
B. Confirmation of Plan and Plan Terms
The Plan was confirmed on April 21, 2025, pursuant to the Order Confirming Second
Amended Plan [Doc. 96] (Doc. 116) (the “Confirmation Order”), which stated that “the Second
Amended Plan is hereby confirmed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a).” Confirmation Order at 1.
Pursuant to the confirmed Plan, “[h]olders of Administrative Expense Claims that do not file a
request with the Bankruptcy Court and serve on all parties entitled to notice thereof no later than
sixty (60) days after the Effective Date, are forever barred from asserting such Claims except as
provided in the Plan.” Plan at 23-24, § XIV.D. The Plan provides that the term “Effective Date”
means “the first day after the first full calendar month after entry of the Confirmation Order.” Plan
at 6, § II.6. Thus, the Effective Date was June 1, 2025, and the Administrative Expense Claims bar
date was July 31, 2025.
The Plan provides that Class 14 Allowed Administrative Claims under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a),
inclusive of Debtor’s postpetition attorney’s fees, will be paid “to the extent approved by the
Court . . . first from the retainer deposit on hand from prior to the Petition Date and then, if needed,
out of the available Cash.” Plan at 17, § VIII.A. The Plan further provides that, “[t]o the extent
Cash is insufficient to cover the approved amount of the attorney’s fees and expenses, such
amounts may be paid as such funds come available, as agreed between counsel and the Debtor.”
Id. With respect to the Subchapter V Trustee’s fees, they are to be paid following approval by the
4 Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Order have the meanings given in the Plan which are incorporated
herein by reference.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 22

6
Court “first from the funds that have been put on deposit with the Subchapter V Trustee and then,
if needed, out of available Cash. . . . ahead of the amounts Allowed for Debtor’s attorney’s fees.”
Id. The provision on treatment of the Class 1 Administrative Claims concludes as follows:
The Debtor’s Bankruptcy Case will not be closed until all Allowed
Administrative Expense Claims are paid in full. Class 1 Creditor
Allowed Administrative Expense Claims are estimated, to not
exceed the amount of $55,000.00, after application of funds held
by counsel and/or the Subchapter V Trustee for application to such
expenses.
Id (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent that the Class 1 Allowed Administrative Expense Claims
do exceed $55,000, after application of funds held by Debtor’s Counsel and/or the Subchapter V
Trustee, that will have an impact on Reorganized AlphaOne’s Cash and therefore its ability to
make distributions to the holders of Class 4 Allowed General Unsecured Claims. This is so because
the “Net Excess Funds,” from which Class 4 is to be paid pro rata, is defined as “seventy-five
(75%) of the Debtor’s projected Cash” minus accounts payable “as of June 30 of 2025, 2026, 2027,
and 2028” and “one hundred percent (100%) of the Debtor’s projected Cash” minus accounts
payable as of March 1, 2029. Plan at 6-7, § II, ¶ 20.
Related to the above-cited terms of the Plan, on October 21, 2025, AlphaOne filed a
Post-Confirmation Report Pursuant to LBR 3020-2 (Doc. 126) (the “Post-Confirmation Report”)
in which its counsel represented, amongst other things, that “[t]he first potential distribution date
was August 31, 2025. The projections called for $0.00 Net Excess Funds to be available to
distribute in the summer of 2025.” Post-Confirmation Report at 2.
As noted in the Report filed by the Subchapter V Trustee, the Subchapter V Trustee’s
services terminated “upon the substantial consummation of a consensual plan” pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 1183(c)(1). Doc. 113 at 12, ¶ 37. Likewise, the Plan states that if it was confirmed
consensually, “the Subchapter V Trustee shall be terminated upon Substantial Consummation.”
Plan at 26, § XVI.E.
C. Applications
Both Applications were presumably filed pursuant to sections 330 and 331 of Title 11 of
the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 22

7
(“Bankruptcy Rule”) 2016, and Local Bankruptcy Rule (“LBR”) 2016-1(a)(2).5 In addition, both
Applications were accompanied by notice of the 21-day response period, as required by LBR
9013-1(a). The Sub V Debtor Application, however, did not include the Notice of Application set
forth in LBR Form 2016-1(a)(1)(C), which satisfies the requirements of LBR 2016-1(a)(2)(B)6 for
final fee applications, although it did set forth the total fees and expense reimbursement requested
within the caption. No party in interest, including the United States Trustee, has responded to or
otherwise opposed the Applications.
1. 	Sub V Trustee Application
The Sub V Trustee Application covers the period of March 1, 2024 – the Petition Date –
through May 13, 2025. A review of the time entries, however, reveals that his services were
performed March 4, 2024 to, principally, April 21, 2025, the date of the confirmation hearing.
There was one entry on May 13, 2025 for 1.50 hours to prepare the Sub V Trustee Application,
which is the first and final application. See Ex. A – Invoice (Doc. 122-1 at 7). The total fees charged
over this period were $24,185; however, the Sub V Trustee voluntarily applied a discount of
$2,261.36 – a 9.35% reduction – which it appears he took in order to reduce his fees, before
addition of the total costs of $76.36, to fit within the escrowed amount of $22,000; thus, a total
reduced fee of $21,923.64 plus total costs of $76.36, which equals $22,000.
As summarized in the Sub V Trustee Application, his fees will be paid from escrow
deposits made to him in the total amount of $22,000. And due to the voluntary reduction of his
fees, there will be no balance remaining due to be paid by the reorganized AlphaOne. Moreover,
the Subchapter V Trustee did not increase his rate for 2025, charging all time at $350 an hour, and
he charged half-time for travel of 2.4 hours – a round-trip from Cincinnati to Dayton for the first-
day hearing on March 6, 2024. The costs consisted of $72.36 in mileage and $4.00 in parking. The
Subchapter V Trustee did not file an interim fee application and has not been paid anything to date,
5 Although not expressly stated in the Sub V Debtor Application, the Court presumes it was filed pursuant to the same
statutory provisions and rules as the Sub V Trustee Application.
6 See, e.g., the Sub V Trustee Application (Doc. 122 at 9-10).
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 22

8
apart from the escrowed fees that he is holding in trust pursuant to the Agreed Interim and Final
Orders (Docs. 28 and 467) on Debtor’s use of cash collateral.
2. 	Sub V Debtor Application
The Sub V Debtor Application covers the period of March 1, 2024 – the Petition Date –
through April 21, 2025. It appears that the two professionals with Coolidge Wall Co., L.P.A. who
rendered services, Patricia J. Friesinger, Shareholder, and Amanda M. Farris, Paralegal, billed time
at the respective rates of $380 and $175 in 2024, but increased their respective rates to $400 and
$180 at the beginning of 2025. From a review of the docket, it does not appear that Debtor’s
Counsel disclosed these hourly rate increases to the Court or to the parties, prior to (or soon after)
taking effect.
II. 	Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Applications pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) and Amended General Order No. 05-02 of the District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio (Amended Standing Order of Reference). These Applications arise from Debtor
AlphaOne’s bankruptcy itself and from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and may therefore
be constitutionally decided by a bankruptcy judge. See, e.g., In re Louis, No. 20-71283, 2022 WL
2055290, at *11 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. June 7, 2022) (citing Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 499
(2011)).
III. 	Analysis
Even in the absence of objections and regardless of the chapter under which a bankruptcy
case is filed, the Court still has an independent duty to review attorney and some trustee fee
applications for reasonableness “[i]n order to guard the public interest and integrity of the
bankruptcy system.” In re Vaughn, 660 B.R. 827, 843-44 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2024) (Humphrey, J.)
(citing In re Henson, 637 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2022) (citing In re Spear, 636 B.R. 765,
769 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2022) (internal citations omitted); Dery v. Cumberland Cas. & Sur. Co. (In
re 5900 Assocs.), 468 F.3d 326, 329-30 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (“In a bankruptcy case
7 The Agreed Final Order (Doc. 46) on the Debtor’s use of cash collateral states that, “[t]he Budget provides for a
$2,000 monthly carve-out for the Subchapter V Trustee to be held by the Subchapter V Trustee in trust against fees
that may be approved in the future. Such funds subject to this carve out shall remain property of the bankruptcy estate
until fees are authorized a[n]d such funds are approved for payment.” Doc. 46 6, ¶ I.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 22

9
fees are not a matter for private agreement. There is an inherent public interest that must be
considered in awarding fees.”)). And counsel has the burden of establishing its entitlement to fees.
See In re Spurlock, 642 B.R. 269, 285 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2022) (Humphrey, J.) (“The applicant
seeking attorney fees always carries the burden of proof to establish that the fees are warranted
and should be approved.”) (citations omitted); see also In re Thomas v. Robinson (In re Robinson),
189 F. App’x 371, 374 (6th Cir. 2006) (similar); Vaughn, 660 B.R. at 844 (similar).
There is not a lot of case law on applications for approval of fees and expenses in
subchapter V cases. See, e.g., In re Louis, No. 20-71283, 2022 WL 2055290 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. June
7, 2022).8 This case was inherited by the current Court post-confirmation and this is the first
occasion to review and address fee applications in a subchapter V case. Thus, in this instance, the
Court took some time to examine the issues and to survey the fees awarded in other subchapter V
cases in Dayton, for purposes of context and comparison.
Although, by all accounts, the Court now understands that Debtor’s counsel and the
Subchapter V Trustee did an admirable job in shepherding this case to a consensual confirmation
of the Plan, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a),9 there were three main issues of concern that initially
gave the Court pause in proceeding to approve the Applications. Accordingly, this Order will
address each of those issues, in turn, which are summarized as follows:
1. 	The gatekeeping question, which is whether subchapter V trustees can be awarded
compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses pursuant to § 330(a)
without any limitation on compensation under § 326(b)?10
2. 	How the fees of Debtor’s Counsel and the Subchapter V Trustee in this case
compare to: (a) the fees projected in the Plan; and (b) the fees approved in other
subchapter V cases filed in the Western Division at Dayton, and whether either of
those issues suggests any adjustment?
8Although not reported, this is one of the few in-depth opinions on fee applications in a Subchapter V case. Citation
of this case, however, in no way suggests that the case at bar was factually similar to the Louis case.
9 Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, all sections referenced will be sections of Title 11 of the United States Code
(the “Bankruptcy Code”).
10 An ancillary issue, very briefly addressed below, is the period of time for which a subchapter V trustee can be
awarded compensation and reimbursement, which varies depending on the basis of confirmation of the plan.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 22

10
3. 	Are there any other specific issues of concern with the Applications and the time
entries and expenses therein which would affect approving the total amount of
compensation and reimbursement of expenses requested?
The Court will address each of the foregoing issues, in turn, as follows.
A. 	Basis for Approval of Subchapter V Trustee Fees and Expenses
The language of § 326(b) is not clear. Confusingly, it provides that:
(b) 	In a case under subchapter V of chapter 11 . . . , the court may not
allow compensation for services or reimbursement of expenses of the United States
Trustee or of a standing trustee appointed under section 586(b) of title 28, but may
allow reasonable compensation under section 330 of this title of a trustee appointed
under section 1202(a) or 1302(a) of this title for the trustee’s services, payable after
the trustee renders such services, not to exceed five percent upon all payments
under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 326(b) (emphasis added). It appeared that Congress, through the SBRA11 amendments
to § 326(b) made in 2019, was going to tell us how this section applied to all trustees in subchapter
V cases, but due to a presumed drafting error, they did not (parsing the plain language); at least
not with respect to subchapter V trustees that are not standing trustees or, as some refer to them,
“case-by-case” trustees. See Paul W. Bonapfel, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, N.D. Ga, A Guide to the
Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 at 66 (Rev. June 2022) (“Some observers who
participated in the drafting of SBRA and the legislative process leading to its enactment attribute
this result [— that § 326(b) “does not place a cap on such compensation” —] to a drafting error.
The drafters of subchapter V intended that provisions for compensation of non-standing sub V
trustees be the same as those for non-standing chapter 12 and 13 trustees” (n. 145 omitted; citing
In re Louis, 2022 WL 2055290, at *11 n.10)); In re DynoTec, No. 21-30803, 2024 WL 2003065,
at *2 (Bankr. D. Minn. Apr. 5, 2024). Further suggesting that this may have been a mistake is that
§ 326(a) applies to limit the compensation of trustees in traditional, non-subchapter V chapter 11
cases, as well as trustees in chapter 7 cases, thereby leaving, due to the apparent drafting error (or
omission), subchapter V trustees as the only type of trustee not subject to a cap. Moreover, § 326(b)
states that a court “may allow reasonable compensation under section 330 of this title of a trustee
appointed under section 1202(a) or 1302(a) of this title for the trustee’s services,” but § 326(b)
11 The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (the “SBRA”), Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079 (2019).
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 22

11
does not tell courts what to do with respect to the fees of a subchapter V trustee who is appointed
under § 1183(a), but who is not a standing trustee appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 586(b), which also
presents a circularity issue discussed below.
So, § 326 does not tell us what to do, but “the United States Trustee Program’s position is
that compensation may be awarded without regard to a cap[.]” Bonapfel, A Guide to the Small
Business Reorganization Act of 2019 at 66, n.146 (citing In re Louis, 2022 WL 2055290, at *11,
which did not decide the issue in the absence of any objections). And it appears that all courts to
have considered the issue, to date, have agreed that “case-by-case” subchapter V trustees may be
compensated for services and reimbursed for expenses under § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code,
without limitation – that such compensation and reimbursement is not capped by § 326(b). And,
as noted above, this is consistent with guidance from the United States Trustee, as stated in its
Program Policy and Practices Manual. See U.S. Trustee Program Policy and Practices Manual,
Vol. 3: Chapter 11 Case Administration, § 3-17.15.2, p. 206 (cited in In re Louis, 2022 WL
2055290, at *11 n.10). This Court, similarly, is not going to take a different tack, particularly on
unopposed Applications without the benefit of briefing by interested parties.
Given that subchapter V trustees in the Southern District of Ohio, like many other (if not
all) districts, are not standing trustees, but rather are appointed as disinterested persons to serve in
each case by the United States Trustee, the Court determines, as to the present unopposed
Applications, that there is no bar or cap, under current case law and United States Trustee guidance,
to awarding reasonable compensation and reimbursement of expenses to this Subchapter V Trustee
because he is not a standing trustee. See, e.g., In re Louis, 2022 WL 2055290, at *11 & n.10 (citing
11 U.S.C. §§ 326(b), 330(a), 1183(a)); In re Tri-State Roofing, 2020 WL 7345741, at *1-3 (Bankr.
D. Idaho Dec. 7, 2020) (also involving an unopposed application and “concluding that Subchapter
V trustee compensation under § 330(a) was neither barred nor capped by § 326(b)” after analyzing
“an apparent discrepancy in § 326 regarding limitations on trustee compensation” given that
“[s]ubsection (b) clearly applies to Subchapter V cases,” but “the second half of that provision,
which provides for compensation under § 330 . . . makes no reference to trustees appointed in the
context of Chapter 11 or Subchapter V or under the provisions thereof.”). If Congress wants to
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 22

12
impose a cap they will have to say so.12 For now, the “universal practice” is that subchapter V
trustees can be awarded compensation under § 330(a)(1) without a statutory cap. See In re Robert
J. Ambruster, Inc., 653 B.R. 461 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2023), discussed in Bonapfel, Subchapter V
Update 	at 	82-83, 	https://www.ganb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/sub_v_update_9-30-
24_002.pdf.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ultimately concludes that the Subchapter V Trustee –
a case-by-case Subchapter V Trustee – may be paid compensation for services and reimbursed for
expenses from the estate in accordance with and pursuant to § 330(a), not subject to the cap in
§ 326(b). But § 330(a)(1) and (a)(7) present a circularity issue of quick note.
No provision in § 330, unlike § 326(a) and (b), mentions “subchapter V of chapter 11.”
The provisions of § 330 only refer to a “trustee” in § 330(a)(1) and (a)(7), and to a “trustee under
chapter 11” in § 330(a)(3). Further, § 330(a)(7), which was added in 2005, states that “[i]n
determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a trustee, the court shall
treat such compensation as a commission, based on section 326.” 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(7) (emphasis
added); see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 330.LH[6] (discussing the four amendments to section 330
made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005). This Court has
previously discussed § 330(a)(7) as applied to a chapter 7 trustee, but not to a chapter 11, or more
specifically a subchapter V, trustee. See In re Staker, 667 B.R. 556, 559-62 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2025) (Humphrey, J.) (observing that under BAPCPA, section 330 was amended to add (a)(7), but
“ ‘removed Chapter 7 trustees from the list of professionals subject to the Section 330(a)(3)
factors’ ” and concluding that the Chapter 7 Trustee could not be awarded compensation “under
§ 326(a) or otherwise for her services as the Trustee.”). Congress was presumed to be aware of the
2005 addition of sub-section (a)(7) to § 330 when it amended § 326(b) in 2019, which again leads
to the conclusion that the omission might have been an error. See In re Bunting Bearings, 302 B.R.
210, 217 & n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Congress is presumed to know the attendant
circumstances . . . pertinent to any legislation it enacts”) (citing Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988)).
12 Although the Court is not applying the five percent (5%) cap in § 326(b), simply for comparison, in this case the
Subchapter V Trustee’s fees sought, in the amount of $20,000 after voluntary reduction, total 13.33% of the estimated
Net Excess Funds to be distributed under the Plan, in the amount of $149,960.63. See Plan at 16, § VII.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 12 of 22

13
Thus, the question is how to apply sub-parts (a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(7) to a subchapter V
trustee? And that brings us back to § 326, which, as discussed above, does tell us how to
compensate chapter 11 trustees in sub-section (a), but does not tell us in sub-section (b) how to
compensate non-standing subchapter V trustees. This could potentially be interpreted in two ways:
either (a) they are compensated under § 330(a)(1) and (a)(3), without regard to (a)(7), because
§ 326 does not contain a cap or commission structure for case-by-case subchapter V trustees; or
(b) they receive no compensation. See In re Tri-State Roofing, 2020 WL 7345741, at *2 (noting
that § 330(a)(1) requires analysis of § 326 because it is expressly subject to § 326, but concluding
that the interpretation that “no compensation should be allowed under subsection 330 to subchapter
V trustees . . . . [I]s not a plausible reading of the statute” (citations omitted)); Bonapfel, A Guide
to the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 at 66-67 & n.148 (“Because § 330(a) is subject
to § 326, and § 326(b) does not provide for compensation of a non-standing sub V trustee, it may
be arguable that a sub V trustee is not entitled to compensation.”). But awarding them no
compensation would be an absurd result; thus, the position of the United States Trustee Program
that subchapter V trustees “ ‘are compensated through § 330(a)(1)(A)’ ”). See Donovan v.
FirstCredit, Inc., 983 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Under [the absurd results] canon of statutory
construction, interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if
alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”) (cleaned up);
Bonapfel, A Guide to the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 at 66-67 & n.148 (quoting
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Handbook for Small Business Chapter 11 Subchapter V Trustees (Feb. 2020)
at 3-21).
In sum, there presently is no statutory cap to awarding compensation to subchapter V
trustees under § 330(a)(1), as both the courts and the U.S. Trustee Program have concluded. There
is only an admonition that case-by-case trustees “are encouraged to keep in mind Congress’ stated
intent that subchapter V cases not be burdened with excessive administrative expenses when
planning their work and submitting their fee applications for review and approval by the court.”
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Handbook for Small Business Chapter 11 Subchapter V Trustees 3-22 (Feb.
2020). Moreover, because the United States Trustee will review such fees and “object to the
requested compensation if it is excessive or unreasonable[,]” the absence of an objection is
ordinarily an indication that the fees are reasonable. Id.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 13 of 22

14
As noted above, an ancillary issue is the period of time for which a subchapter V trustee
can be awarded compensation and reimbursement. Here, the specific question that initially arose
is whether the Court can approve fees for the Subchapter V Trustee’s services provided after the
date of consensual confirmation of the Second Amended Plan of Reorganization of AlphaOne
Exteriors LLC Chapter 11 Plan? However, the Subchapter V Trustee has not sought fees after the
date of confirmation, April 21, 2025, except for the time to prepare his Sub V Trustee Application.
And § 330(a)(6) contemplates an award of compensation for the preparation of a fee application.
With that out of the way, the Court will turn to its review of the Applications in this case
under § 330(a)(1) and (a)(3), but first will compare the fees sought in this case with the fees
projected in the Plan and with those approved in other subchapter V cases filed in the Western
Division at Dayton.
B. 	Comparison of Fees Sought in the Applications to: (a) the Fees Projected in
the Plan; and (b) the Fees Approved in Other Subchapter V Cases Filed in the
Western Division at Dayton
1. 	Comparison to Fees Projected in the Plan
Initially, it appeared that the fees and expenses applied for in the Applications exceeded
those projected in the Plan by a substantial amount. It also appeared that the fees sought in this
case were higher than in a typical subchapter V case, which prompted the Court to not only review
the fees applied for in this case, but also the fees previously approved in other subchapter V cases
in Dayton.
Taking the Plan issue first, the Second Amended Plan filed on February 29, 2025 provides
that “Class 1 Creditor Allowed Administrative Expense Claims are estimated, to not exceed the
amount of $55,000, after application of funds held by counsel and/or the Subchapter V Trustee for
application to such expenses.” Plan at 17, ¶ VIII.A. As noted above, Debtor’s Counsel disclosed
on the Petition Date that she had $3,643.50 on-hand remaining from her $15,000 prepetition
retainer. Doc. 1 at 34. However, the Sub V Debtor Application states that Debtor’s Counsel is
holding “a retainer in the amount of $8,643.50.” Sub V Debtor Appl. at 6, ¶ 7.
In comparison, prior to the application of any funds held by Debtor’s Counsel and/or the
Subchapter V Trustee, the total amount of Class 1 fees and expenses sought in the Applications is
$94,306.56, a delta of $39,306.56 over the “not to exceed” estimate projected in the Plan three and
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 14 of 22

15
four months before the Applications were filed. The total amount of the Applications includes the
Subchapter V Trustee’s reduced fees sought in the amount of $21,923.64, plus $76.36 in expenses
– a total of $22,000 – and the Debtor’s counsel’s fees sought in the amount of $69,490.00, plus
$2,816.56 in expenses – a total of $72,306.56.13 However, the Sub V Debtor Application states
that Debtor’s Counsel is holding a retainer in the amount of $8,643.50, whereas the Statement of
Financial Affairs (Doc. 1 at 34), referred to in the Application to Employ (Doc. 4 at 6, ¶ 13),
indicated that her law firm is holding a remaining $3,643.50 in retainer. Doc. 124 at 6, ¶ 7. The
Subchapter V Trustee is holding $22,000 in escrow deposits from the Debtor pending further order
of the Court, which covers his entire requested reduced fee. Doc. 122 at 3. See also Docs. 28, 46
(Interim and Final Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral). Therefore, factoring in the
funds held by the Subchapter V Trustee negates his fees for purposes of comparison to the $55,000
amount of Class 1 Administrative Expense Claims projected in the Plan. The overage of fees
sought in the Applications, as against the “not to exceed” Plan estimate, is therefore based on the
increase in fees sought in the final Sub V Debtor Application.
Once the retainer is subtracted, if it is $3,643.50, the total amount of fees and expenses
sought to be paid by Debtor’s Counsel in the Sub V Debtor Application is $68,663.06, which is
$13,663.06 more than estimated in the Plan. Looking back at the prior version of the Plan, the
projected fee amount was changed from “the amount of $35,000” in the First Amended Plan (Doc.
84) to “$55,000.00, after application of funds held by counsel and/or the Subchapter V Trustee for
application to such expenses” in the Second Amended Plan. See Comparison Copy Identifying
Changes in the Second Am. Plan (Doc. 100) at 37, § VIII.A (Feb. 25, 2025). Also, as of the date
the Second Amended Plan was filed, February 19, 2025, the time records attached to the Sub V
Debtor Application as Exhibit B indicate that Debtor’s Counsel’s fees were $63,522 at that point.
Ultimately, while the discrepancy between the total amount of fees in the “not to exceed”
estimate in the Plan is not quite as substantial as it first appeared, there is still a delta in an amount
that depends upon the amount of retainer still held by Debtor’s Counsel and might have an impact
on the ultimate distribution to Class 4 general unsecured creditors under the Plan that the parties
voted to approve (see Doc. 111).
13 The Subchapter V Trustee wrote off $2,261.36 in fees. Doc. 122 at 1. As noted, the write off appears intended to
cap the final fee application at the cumulative escrow amount from the Interim and Final Cash Collateral orders.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 15 of 22

16
2. 	Comparison to Fees Approved in Other Subchapter V Cases Filed in
the Western Division at Dayton
In reviewing the Applications, the Court has surveyed the fees awarded in other subchapter
V cases filed in Dayton to attempt to place the requested fees in this case in context and to
determine if any patterns have emerged to date. This case proceeded to confirmation prior to the
current Court’s tenure. And although the Court has taken the time to review the record in this case
in order to rule on these Applications, canvassing the other subchapter V cases in Dayton is helpful
to provide a barometer. As the table set forth below demonstrates, the total fees applied for in this
case are the third highest out of the twelve (12) subchapter V cases identified, as follows:
Sub V Case Name 	Case No. DIP Fees
(No Expenses)14
Sub V Trustee Fees
(No Expenses)
Percentage of
Sub V Fees to
DIP Fees
1. The Lorenz Corporation 	20-31952 	$343,325 	$25,965 	7.6%
2. Reliable Castings Corporation 	23-31157 	$130,459 	$32,407 	24.8%
3. AlphaOne Exteriors LLC 	24-30371 	$69,490 	$21,924 	31.5%
4. ISIS Medical, Inc. 	20-32705 	$48,107 	$16,958 	35.25%
5. Commuter Advertising, Inc. 	23-31504 	$46,235 	$7,812 	16.9%
6. Pelletier Management and
Consulting LLC 22-31296 	$37,270 	$13,363 	35.9%
7. Glenda M. Swartz 	24-31353 	$31,810 	$3,319 	10.4%
8. JFK Heating & Cooling, LLC 	21-30341 	$31,085 	$5,307 	17.1%
9. Glenda Swartz Mulch, LLC 	24-30946 	$28,450 	$7,000 	24.6%
10. Kyle L. Young 	24-32046 	$15,000 	$7,537 	50.2%
11. American Land Investments, LTD 	23-30539 	$11,012 	$5,508 	50%
12. Rescom LTD 	23-30540 	$11,012 	$5,904 	53.6%
The two cases in which more fees were charged than those applied for in this case involved
more assets and liabilities. Reviewing the Summary of Assets and Liabilities (Case No. 20-31952,
Doc. 1) for The Lorenz Corporation case, the assets were listed at $1.397 million and the debts
were listed at $7.078 million. In turn, reviewing the Summary of Assets and Liabilities (Case No.
23-31157, Doc. 63) for the Reliable Castings Corporation case, the assets were listed at $10.848
14 The Court has not set about to review and compare the dockets of every subchapter V case for the amount of assets
and debts at issue in each case, which no doubt has an impact on the fees, along with how many contentious disputes
arise. But, as noted up front, comparing a subchapter V case filed prior to June 21, 2024, with one filed thereafter may
have limited utility if the earlier case could not have been filed today due to the reduced debt limit.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 16 of 22

17
million and the debts were listed at $6.722 million. Thus, it appears that neither of those cases
could be filed under the reduced debt limit that went into effect on June 21, 2024.
The Court is also aware from taking judicial notice of the filings in this case, which are
discussed in the background above, that this case involved: (a) an adversary proceeding against a
creditor, Channel Partners Capital, LLC; (b) dealing with five (5) vehicle leases; and (c)
negotiating a settlement with the largest unsecured creditor, Ms. Sallee, who had alleged a claim
for $2.251 million. See Alpha One Exteriors LLC v. Channel Partners Capital, LLC, Adv. No. 24-
3006 (Debtor and Defendant resolved this adversary proceeding by a $5,000 payment from the
Defendant, reclassifying the Defendant’s claim as non-priority unsecured, and eliminating the
defendant’s secured claim); Plan at 11-14,15 § IV, ¶ B (Post-Bankruptcy Matters).
The Court also observes that subchapter V fees do vary in Dayton cases, as they likely do
in other locations. Some of those differences may be attributable, like any chapter 11 case, to the
complexity of issues or litigiousness of the parties. That said, as the Subchapter V Trustee noted
in his Report, and has been written about in other cases, as well as by the U.S. Trustee’s Office,
“ ‘[t]he statutory hope is that by encouraging small business reorganizations more creditors will
receive greater distributions, debtors will pay less in attorneys’ fees, and more small businesses
will survive and prosper.’ ” Report at 4 (quoting In re Ellingsworth Residential Cmty. Ass’n, No.
20-bk-01346-KSJ, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 2897, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2020). Subchapter
V is intended to be a cheaper and more expedient approach for small businesses. See In re Louis,
2022 Bankr. LEXIS, at *36 (citations omitted). Accordingly, as part of its independent duty to
review attorney fees, it is incumbent upon the Court to review the fees of the Subchapter V Trustee
and Debtor’s Counsel, even in the absence of objections, as addressed below; however, in
comparison to other subchapter V cases filed in the Western Division at Dayton, for a case of its
size the fees are on the high side, and the Subchapter V Trustee’s fees are a high percentage in
comparison the fees of Debtor’s Counsel, excluding the smallest three cases, but are not outside a
range of reasonableness.
15 These are the ECF numbers, not the document page numbers.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 17 of 22

18
C. 	Other Issues
1. 	Sub V Trustee Application
The Court evaluates the Sub V Trustee Application starting with the loadstar method,
“which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a matter by a
reasonable attorney rate, while also considering the attorney’s experience level and comparable
rates in the local market.” In re Vaughn, 660 B.R. 827, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2024) (Humphrey,
J.); see also In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) (endorsing the loadstar method to
approve the reasonableness of fees under § 330). The Court can look at other factors to determine
an appropriate overall fee. The Court reviewed the Sub V Trustee Application under this
framework. Upon review of the Sub V Trustee Application and the current Court becoming
familiar with this case, and factoring in the voluntary reduction of fees, the Court is satisfied that
the fees sought in the Sub V Trustee’s Application are reasonable and necessary, should be
approved in full, and that there are no reasons to further reduce the amount of fees sought pursuant
to § 330(a)(2), (a)(3), or (a)(4).
The only critique the Court would offer is that the Subchapter V Trustee’s time entries
appear, in some instances, to be a bit “heavy,” but this is by comparison to corresponding entries
by Debtor’s Counsel for calls between them, such that it could also be an issue of inaccurate
timekeeping (or lumping tasks), which is suggested by the fact that in some instances Debtor’s
Counsel has calls with the Subchapter V Trustee listed on days where the Subchapter V Trustee
has no entry, or has an entry with a similar description on a different day.16 It could also be that
16 As one example, see the time entry dated 4/16/2024 for “Call with Friesinger re Final Cash Collateral Order, Owner
salary, vehicle sublease” for which the Subchapter V Trustee billed 0.40 hours, but for which Debtor’s Counsel billed
0.20 hours. See Ex. A to Sub V Trustee Appl. (Doc. 122-1) at 2; Ex. B to Sub V Debtor Appl. (Doc. 124) at 14, item
104. As another example, see the time entry dated 11/19/2024 for “Call with Friesinger re upcoming mediation
conference” for which the Subchapter V Trustee billed 0.60 hours, but for which Debtor’s Counsel billed 0.40 hours,
describing it as a“phone conference with D. Mallory (Subchapter V Trustee) re practical and logistical concerns with
plan submission and settlement conference.” See Ex. A to Sub V Trustee Appl. (Doc. 122-1) at 4; Ex. B to Sub V
Debtor Appl. (Doc. 124) at 20, item 296. As another example, compare the time entry dated 11/20/2024 for “Attend
and participate in Zoom Mediation regarding Sallee Settlement Conference” for which the Subchapter V Trustee billed
3.50 hours with the time entry dated 11/20/2024 for “prepare for and attend settlement conference . . . ” for which
Debtor’s Counsel billed 3.40 hours. See Ex. A to Sub V Trustee Appl. (Doc. 122-1) at 4; Ex. B to Sub V Debtor Appl.
(Doc. 124) at 20, item 302. As yet another example, compare the time entry dated 12/31/2024 for “Conference with
D. Mallory (Subchapter V Trustee) re status of settlement discussions and anticipated next steps” for which Debtor’s
Counsel billed 0.50 hours with the time entry dated 12/31/2024 for “Call with Friesinger re plan revised plan
projections and proposed plan terms” for which the Subchapter V Trustee billed 0.70 hours. In each instance it appears
that the length of the calls should be the same, but the Subchapter V Trustee billed 0.10 to 0.20 more hours. See Ex.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 18 of 22

19
the Subchapter V Trustee has also written off or chose not to charge those entries. But because the
Subchapter V Trustee has already voluntarily taken a 9.35% reduction, the Court will award the
fees and expenses sought.
As in Louis, because the United States trustee did not lodge any objections to the Sub V
Trustee Application and because, by all accounts, the work of the Subchapter V Trustee in this
case was valuable and effective, fulfilling the unique role to serve as a pseudo-mediator to facilitate
a consensual plan, the Court will not reduce the amounts, but the Court did want to take this
opportunity to provide some analysis.
2. 	Sub V Debtor Application
Upon review of the Sub V Debtor Application, a question remains as to whether the
remaining amount of the prepetition retainer held by Debtor’s Counsel is $8,643.50, as set forth in
the Sub V Debtor Application, or $3,643.50, as set forth in the Statement of Financial Affairs. See
Sub V Debtor Appl. at 6, ¶ 7; Statement of Financial Affairs (Doc. 1 at 34). Further, there are
questions about: (1) whether the 2025 hourly rate increase was disclosed to and approved by the
Debtor; (2) why the fees applied for by Debtor’s counsel exceeded the “not to exceed” estimate;
and (3) why there are instances in which Debtor’s Counsel has time entries for calls with the
Subchapter V Trustee on dates for which the Subchapter V Trustee has no time entries (see supra
A to Sub V Trustee Appl. (Doc. 122-1) at 5; Ex. B to Sub V Debtor Appl. (Doc. 124) at 21, item 329. At the same
time, there are instances in which Debtor’s Counsel billed time for a short call that the Subchapter V Trustee did not
bill. See, e.g., Ex. B to Sub V Debtor Appl. (Doc. 124) at 13, item 82 (dated 4/4/2024 – 0.50 – “Phone conference
with D. Mallory (Subchapter V Trustee) re cash collateral and concerns over amendments to be prepared”; at 21, item
342 (dated 1/7/2025 – 0.20 – “phone conference with D. Mallory (subchapter V Trustee) . . .”). And there is an instance
in which Debtor’s Counsel billed 0.10 more than the Subchapter V Trustee for a call. Compare Ex. B to Sub V Debtor
Appl. (Doc. 124) at 22, item 349 (dated 1/13/2025 – 0.40 – “phone conference with D Mallory (subchapter V
Trustee) . . .”), with Ex. A to Sub V Trustee Appl. (Doc. 122-1) at 5 (dated 1/13/2025 – 0.30 – “Call with Friesinger
re settlement documentation”). This also highlights, however, that Debtor’s Counsel has, in instances, block billed,
making it hard to compare apples to apples. There are also multiple instances in which Debtor’s Counsel has an entry
on a day in which she identifies a call with the Subchapter V Trustee on which the Subchapter V Trustee does not
have any time entry. Compare Ex. B to Sub V Debtor Appl. (Doc. 124) at 24, item 405 (dated 2/18/2025 – 0.50 –
“Conference with D. Mallory (subchapter V Trustee) re plan comments and updates to same . . .”), with Ex. A to
Subchapter V Trustee Appl. (Doc. 122-1) at 5 (containing no entry for 2/18/2025, but containing an entry for 2/19/2025
– 0.60 – “Multiple call with Friesinger to discuss Sallee settlement open issues with final plan and obtain resolution”).
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 19 of 22

20
note 16).17 Further, in Exhibit B attached to the Sub V Debtor Application, there was no breakdown
of the out-of-pocket expenses paid by Debtor’s Counsel.
In addition, there is an open question with respect to whether there are any amounts owed
or paid to Rike LLC, which was employed as Debtor AlphaOne’s accountant through the Order
(Doc. 87) entered on January 17, 2025. The Order (Doc. 87) approving Rike LLC’s employment
by Debtor AlphaOne stated that Debtor was “authorized to compensate Rike, according to the
terms set forth in the Motion, and upon further application and approval of fees.” No such approval
has been sought or granted, and the Administrative Expense Claim bar date, which was July 31,
2025, has passed. Until those two pieces of information are known, the Court reserves final ruling
on the Sub V Debtor Application.
IV. 	Conclusion
Upon careful review of the itemized entries in the Sub V Trustee Application, the specific
issues that arose during the pre-confirmation stage of this case, that this case resulted in a
consensually confirmed Plan, that there was no objection by the United States Trustee, and in
comparison to other subchapter V cases that have come before the Court, the Court finds that the
fees and expenses of the Subchapter V Trustee were reasonable and necessary for services
provided and expenses actually incurred in furtherance of the Subchapter V Trustee’s duties and
will be approved pursuant to § 330(a)(1) and (a)(3). With respect to the fees and expenses of
Debtor’s Counsel, the Court is likewise inclined to approve the fees given that consensual
confirmation of the Plan was achieved and there have been no objections by the United States
Trustee or other parties, but there are several other issues for which the Court needs further
information, as discussed below, before completing its review and making a final determination.
17 In reviewing the time entries in Exhibit B, some are block billed (lumped) – one entry containing multiple discrete
tasks that could be separately itemized. See, e.g. Ex. B at 11, items 2 (1.80), 8 (0.30),13 (0.40), 29 (2.70), at 12, items
35 (0.20), 50 (0.80), 55 (0.40), 63 (0.50); at 13, items 81 (0.20), 84 (0.30), 86 (0.30), 90 (0.30); at 14, items 119 (0.40),
124 (0.20); at 15, item 148 (5.90), 151 (2.70), 159 (2.30); at 16, items 172 (0.40), 175 (0.40), 176 (0.40), 185 (0.20),
187 (0.80), 196 (0.40); at 17, items 205 (1.00), 206 (0.50), 208 (0.20); at 18, items 236 (0.20), 239 (0.20), 259 (0.40);
at 19, items 265 (0.40), 289 (0.40); at 20, items 294 (0.20), 303 (0.20); at 21, items 328 (0.40), 333 (0.50), 344 (0.40);
at 22, item 351 (0.50), 357 (0.50), 358 (0.50), 367 (1.10), 372 (0.30); at 24, item 401 (0.80), 413 (0.50), 417 (0.40),
419 (0.80). This makes it more difficult to determine how much time was spent on each task and whether the time for
each task was reasonable.
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 20 of 22

21
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows with respect to
the Sub V Trustee Application:
1. 	The Sub V Trustee is awarded total compensation of $21,923.64 and
reimbursement of expenses of $76.36, for a total award of fees and expenses in the amount
of $22,000 on a FINAL basis pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330(a).
2. 	The Sub V Trustee, having represented to the Court that he is holding in
trust designated trustee fee funds received from the Debtor under prior orders of the Court
(Docs. 28 and 46) concerning Debtor’s use of cash collateral, in the amount of $22,000
(the “Escrow Funds”) to pay towards the above awarded fees and expenses, shall be and
hereby is, permitted to immediately withdrawal and pay and apply such Escrow Funds
towards the fees and expenses awarded herein; thus, Reorganized AlphaOne shall have no
further obligations to pay the Subchapter V Trustee, from available Cash (as defined in the
Plan) or otherwise.
3. 	This Order is effective immediately upon entry.
4. 	This Court retains jurisdiction of all matters relating to the interpretation
and implementation of this Order.
And it is further hereby ORDERED as follows with respect to the Sub V Debtor
Application:
5. 	Debtor’s Counsel shall, within 21 days after the entry of this Order, file
a supplement to the Sub V Debtor Application to: (a) state the amount of the balance of the
prepetition retain held by Debtor’s Counsel; (b) whether the Debtor AlphaOne was notified
of and agreed to the increase in hourly rates of Debtor’s Counsel for 2025; (c) explain the
difference in the “not to exceed” estimate of Class 1 Administrative Expense Claims –
professional fees – and those applied for by Debtor’s Counsel; (d) provide the breakdown
of the out-of-pocket expenses of $2,816.56 for which reimbursement is sought; (e) address
instances in which Debtor’s Counsel has time entries for calls with the Subchapter V
Trustee on dates for which the Subchapter V Trustee has no time entries (see supra note
16); and (f) address (i) whether Rike LLC provided postpetition services to Debtor
AlphaOne, (ii) whether the Debtor paid or owes any amounts to Rike LLC for any
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 21 of 22

22
postpetition services provided to the Debtor AlphaOne, and (iii) if so, how this is being
dealt with.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to: Default List Plus Top 20
Case 3:24-bk-30371 Doc 127 Filed 10/30/25 Entered 10/31/25 09:48:14 Desc Main
Document Page 22 of 22