Christensen v. Carter et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
GUY CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff,
Case Number 2:25-cv-1062
v. 	JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
WALTER (“TED”) CARTER, JR.,
in his official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Guy Christensen’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. (ECF No. 8.) Defendants, university officials, responded in opposition (ECF No. 28),
Plaintiff replied in support (ECF No. 32), and Defendants filed a surreply in further opposition
(ECF Nos. 33-1, 33-2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 8.)
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the action taken by the Ohio State University (“OSU”) to disenroll
Plaintiff Guy Christensen after he posted charged video content on social media during the
summer of 2025 related to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Mr. Christensen identifies himself as a
fervent supporter of the Palestinian liberation movement and critic of Israel’s conduct in the war
in Gaza. During the relevant time, Mr. Christensen had over three million followers on social
media.
The subject matter of and content discussed in Mr. Christensen’s videos are polarizing.
Yet, the Court emphasizes at the outset that the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution “applies to loathsome and unpopular speech with the same force as it does to speech
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that is celebrated and widely accepted.” Bible Believers v. Wayne County, Michigan, 805 F.3d
228, 243 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Speech on a matter of public concern “cannot be restricted
simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).
Therefore, “other than in a few limited areas, almost all speech is protected from governmental
interference.” McElhaney v. Williams, 81 F.4th 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Novak v. City
of Parma, 932 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2019)). The exceptions are quite limited, including
“speech expressed as part of a crime, obscene expression, incitement, and fraud.” Id. (quoting
Novak, 932 F.3d at 427).
Despite the divisive issue about which Mr. Christensen spoke, the Court’s charge is
simple—it must determine the constitutionality of Mr. Christensen’s speech and subsequent
disenrollment from OSU.
I. 	Factual Background
A. 	Mr. Christensen’s Enrollment at OSU and Social Media Presence
Mr. Christensen enrolled at OSU as an undergraduate student in the fall of 2024. (ECF
No. 8-1, ¶ 2.) At that time, he had established an online presence as a political activist and social
media influencer. (Id. ¶ 3.) Mr. Christensen has more than three million followers on the social
media platform known as TikTok. (Id. ¶ 7.) Mr. Christensen identifies himself as a strong
supporter of the movement for Palestinian liberation and routinely posts videos of himself
commenting on Palestinian rights and the Israel-Palestine conflict across a range of social media
platforms, including TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and Substack. (Id. ¶¶ 3–5.) At the
close of the spring semester of his freshman year (around the end of April 2025), Mr.
Christensen left OSU’s campus and the state of Ohio, and did not plan to return until the fall
2025 semester. (Id. ¶ 16.)
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B. 	Mr. Christensen’s Social Media Posts at Issue in this Case
This lawsuit centers around two videos that Mr. Christensen posted on TikTok on May
22, 2025, after leaving OSU’s campus for the summer. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 18–20, 26–
27.) In those videos, Mr. Christensen expressed his pro-Palestine views in a passionate and
controversial manner. (ECF No. 8-2, PageID 121, 123.)
1. 	The Rodriguez Video
The first video relates to the deaths of two employees of the Israeli embassy in
Washington, D.C. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 20; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 121.) The employees were shot and
killed by Elias Rodriguez on May 21, 2025, as they exited an event hosted by the American
Jewish Committee at the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 20.)
Initially, Mr. Christensen condemned the shooting in a video that he posted on TikTok on
May 22, 2025. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 18; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 119; Initial Condemnation Video
Transcript, ECF No. 32-6.) Later that day, Mr. Christensen posted another video to TikTok
withdrawing his condemnation (the “Rodriguez Video”), which is one of the two videos at issue
in this case. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 18–19; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 121; Rodriguez Video Transcript,
ECF No. 32-7.) In the Rodriguez Video, Mr. Christensen begins by stating: “I take it back. I do
not condemn the elimination of those two Zionist officials, who worked at the Israeli embassy
last night.” (Rodriguez Video Transcript, ECF No. 32-7, PageID 1233.) Relevant to this lawsuit,
Mr. Christensen used the terms “resistance” and “escalation” in the Rodriguez Video, which
come from the following statements:
And I want to remind you that, while this attack took the lives of two human beings,
Israel has murdered thousands of Palestinian civilians in cold blood without any
shame, with pride, rejoicing in the streets of Israel over this, and they get no
attention in this country, while this attack is being used to weaponize violence
against the movement. But we will meet it with our own greater resistance and
escalation.
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. . .
You might have seen my update early this morning where I condemned this attack
and I reaffirm that I had a change of perspective after hearing critiques from people
in the movement. It is like as they said, I am condemning Luke Skywalker for
attacking the Death Star because the Empire might crack down on the resistance.
And while my point was that this attack will be used for a crackdown on the
movement in the coming days, they’re right. We must meet with escalation and
stronger resistance.
(Id. PageID 1234–35, 1241.) Mr. Christensen also read Elias Rodriguez’s manifesto, which had
been posted on social media, aloud. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 20, 24; Rodriguez Video Transcript, ECF
No. 32-7, PageID 1235–40.)
2. 	The Torres Video
The second video relates to Mr. Christensen’s criticism of Congressman Ritchie Torres,
who serves as a member of the United States House of Representatives on behalf of New York.
(ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 26; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 123.) Also on May 22, 2025, Mr. Christensen posted a
video on TikTok denouncing Congressman Torres’s position that the conflict in Gaza did not
constitute genocide and Congressman Torres’s affiliations with the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israeli public figures, and the Zionist movement (the “Torres
Video”). (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 26; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 123.) In part, Mr. Christensen stated:
Today an AIPAC millionaire and elected official, Ritchie Torres, announced:
“There’s no genocide in South Africa. There is no genocide in Gaza. Stop debasing
the term ‘genocide’ by using it as ideological warfare.” Now Ritchie, screenshots
are forever and what you’ve said and done will haunt your family for eternity as
you will eventually, if you’re still alive, end up in a Nuremburg trials for all the
elected officials in America who facilitated and protected this genocide. How many
children have to die before the AIPAC money is outweighed by the crimes?
. . .
So shame on Ritchie. He is a Zionist scumbag. And I hope that the money he sleeps
on at night stains his pajamas blood red. Thank you and free Palestine.
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(ECF No. 8-2, PageID 123.)
3. 	Additional Videos
The day after posting the Rodriguez and Torres Videos, Mr. Christensen released a video
responding to criticism he had received. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 31–32; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 125;
Clarification 1 Transcript, ECF No. 32-8.) He emphasized that he “would never make a threat
that would jeopardize [his] position to influence and educate people about the atrocity and evils
that Zionism is currently bringing down upon the Palestinian people, especially in Gaza.”
(Clarification 1 Transcript, ECF No. 32-8.)
On May 27, 2025, Mr. Christensen posted another video responding to backlash, in
which he denied that he is antisemitic and stated that he does not incite violence. (ECF No. 8-1,
¶¶ 31, 33; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 127; Clarification 2 Transcript, ECF No. 32-9.) Specifically, he
said:
Anybody in their right mind knows when they see my content that I’m not in an
antisemite. I hate Nazis just as equally as I do Zionists. Anyone who sees my
content knows that I do not incite violence. I do not tell anyone to make threats. I
do not want anyone to make threats. Why would I call for people to make threats?
All that would do is jeopardize my platform. I’m non-violent.
(Clarification 2 Transcript, ECF No. 32-9, PageID 1252.)
Mr. Christensen posted the first of his follow-up videos before receiving letters
from OSU suspending and disenrolling him from the university, which are discussed in
more detail below. (Compare ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 32 (first follow-up video posted on May 23,
2025), with ECF No. 8-2, PageID 129–31 (suspension letter dated May 25, 2025), and
ECF No. 8-2, PageID 139–40 (disenrollment letter dated May 30, 2025).) Mr.
Christensen posted the second of his follow-up videos after receiving the suspension
letter, but before receiving the disenrollment letter. (Compare ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 33 (second
follow-up video posted on May 27, 2025), with ECF No. 8-2, PageID 129–31
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(suspension letter dated May 25, 2025), and ECF No. 8-2, PageID 139–40 (disenrollment
letter dated May 30, 2025).)
C. 	Mr. Christensen’s Disenrollment from OSU
On May 25, 2025, Mr. Christensen received two letters from OSU. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 37–
39.) The first letter, signed by Ryan Lovell, an Associate Vice President at OSU, suspended Mr.
Christensen, “temporarily and immediately, from university premises and property as well as
participation in all university activities, whether on or off campus property,” pursuant to Section
3335-23-20 of OSU’s Code of Student Conduct (the “Code”) and based on Mr. Lovell’s finding
that “there is reasonable cause to believe your presence on university premises or at a university-
related or registered student organization activity poses a significant risk of substantial harm to
the safety or security of yourself, others, or to property.”1 (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 38; ECF No. 8-2,
PageID 129–31.) If Mr. Christensen were to enter university premises while suspended without
requesting and being granted temporary access privileges, his conduct would “be considered a
violation of university rules as well as criminal trespass in accordance with Ohio Revised Code
Section 2911.21, which may result in immediate arrest and/or further disciplinary action by the
university.” (ECF No. 8-2, PageID 130.)
The second letter, signed by Kelly Smith, the Director of Student Conduct at OSU,
instructed Mr. Christensen to set up a meeting with her regarding the interim suspension. (ECF
No. 8-1, ¶ 39; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 133–34.) Mr. Christensen scheduled this meeting, which
was to be held by videoconference on June 5, 2025. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 40–41.)
1 The Court noticed that some materials in the record state Mr. Christensen was suspended under
Section 3335-23-20, while others refer to Section 3355-23-01. Similarly, some materials in the
record state that Mr. Christensen was disenrolled under Section 3355-23-21, while others refer to
Section 3335-23-21. These discrepancies are not material to the Court’s analysis.
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On May 30, 2025, Mr. Christensen received a letter signed by Defendant Shivers, the
Senior Vice President for Student Life at OSU, stating that Mr. Christensen was disenrolled from
OSU pursuant to Section 3355-23-21(A) of the Code. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 43; ECF No. 8-2, PageID
139–40.) This letter explained that a student may be disenrolled from OSU under Section 3355-
23-21(A) “when the vice president for student life or designee finds that there is clear and
convincing evidence that the student’s continued presence poses a significant risk of substantial
harm to the health or safety of themselves, others, or to property.” (ECF No. 8-2, PageID 139.)
In the letter, Defendant Shivers stated:
Taken together, I find that your May 22, 2025 social media post inciting violence,
for which you received an interim suspension on May 25, 2025; your May 22, 2025
social media post about Congressman Torres that he interpreted as a threat of
violence and requested U.S. Capitol Police assistance; the myriad communications
from members of the university community expressing fear of violence based on
your posts; and the engagement of several law enforcement jurisdictions in
response to your actions to be clear and convincing evidence that your continued
presence at the university poses a significant risk of substantial harm to the safety
of the university community warranting your disenrollment.
(Id.)
Defendant Shivers explained that “a student who has been disenrolled from the university
may petition the vice president for student life for revision of that status” and that “[t]he petition
must include supporting documentation or evidence that the conditions found to have existed that
resulted in the disenrollment no longer exist and will not recur.” (Id. PageID 140.) She specified
that she “will give full consideration to a request from [Mr. Christensen] to re-enroll in the
university; however, [Mr. Christensen] must provide documentation or evidence that [he] no
longer pose[s] a significant risk of substantial harm to the safety of the university community.”
(Id.) Absent an approved petition, a disenrolled student may not return to OSU. (Shivers Dep.,
ECF No. 28-1, PageID 475.)
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On June 3, 2025, Ms. Smith informed Mr. Christensen that their meeting would no longer
be taking place because the meeting related to Mr. Christensen’s interim suspension under
Section 3355-23-01 of the Code, and Mr. Christensen was ultimately disenrolled under Section
3355-23-21 of the Code, which involves a different process. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 44; ECF No. 8-2,
PageID 147–48.)
On June 23, 2025, Mr. Christensen, through counsel, submitted a petition for re-
enrollment at OSU. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 46; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 152–61.) In the petition, Mr.
Christensen argued that his presence at OSU did not pose a threat to the safety of others and that
his disenrollment violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 8-2, PageID
159.) Defendant Shivers rejected this petition, positing that Mr. Christensen did not submit
evidence or documentation showing that he no longer posed a significant risk of substantial harm
to the safety of the university community; rather, Defendant Shivers characterized the petition as
improperly disputing “what ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of conduct that constitutes a
significant risk of substantial harm to health or safety is.” (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 47; ECF No. 8-2,
PageID 166–67.)
OSU placed a notation on Mr. Christensen’s transcript indicating that he was
“administratively disenrolled pursuant to 3335-23-21.” (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 54; ECF No. 28-6.)
Section 3335-23-21 of the Code is available on OSU’s website and states that a student may be
disenrolled “when the vice president for student life or designee finds that there is clear and
convincing evidence that the student’s continued presence poses a significant risk of substantial
harm to the health or safety of themselves, others, or to property.” (Shivers Dep., ECF No. 28-1,
PageID 374); 3335-23-21 Administrative disenrollment and other restrictions, The Ohio State
Univ. Bd. of Trs., https://trustees.osu.edu/code-student-conduct/3335-23-21
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[https://perma.cc/VN5G-RQW3] (last visited Jan. 13, 2026). Mr. Christensen currently attends
another university. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶ 53.) He plans to apply to a different university abroad by
February 2026 and will need to provide his OSU transcript as part of that application process.
(Id. ¶ 54.)
II. 	Procedural Background
In September 2025, Mr. Christensen initiated this action against Defendants Walter
“Ted” Carter, Jr., in his official capacity as President of OSU, Melissa Shivers, in her official
capacity as Senior Vice President for Student Life at OSU, and Ryan Hunt, in his official
capacity as Registrar at OSU. (ECF No. 1.) Mr. Christensen alleges that Defendants violated his
First Amendment right to free speech by expelling him for engaging in protected political speech
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by expelling him summarily, without an
opportunity to be heard. (Id.)
Shortly after filing suit, Mr. Christensen moved for a preliminary injunction that would
require Defendants to “expunge any mention of involuntary disenrollment from his academic
transcript at the Ohio State University” and enjoin them “from making any equivalent
representation through academic records or other means.” (ECF No. 8.) The Parties agreed to an
expedited discovery schedule (ECF Nos. 19, 20) and, after conducting said discovery,
Defendants responded in opposition to Mr. Christensen’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(ECF No. 28) and Mr. Christensen replied in support (ECF No. 32). Defendants also moved for
leave to file a surreply in further opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(ECF No. 33), which the Court granted (ECF No. 34).
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The Court held a hearing on Mr. Christensen’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction on
January 12, 2026. (ECF No. 35.) At the hearing, the Parties presented oral arguments and
answered questions from the Court.2 (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions.
When determining whether to grant a request for a preliminary injunction, courts consider four
factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the
movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the
injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be
served by issuance of the injunction.” City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d
427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc). In First Amendment cases, “the crucial inquiry is usually
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits” because the
remaining factors “largely depend on the constitutionality of the [state action].” See Bays v. City
of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 819 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc. v. Michigan,
501 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2007)).
ANALYSIS
The Court examines each of the preliminary injunction factors in turn.
2 The Parties informed the Court that they agree on the material facts and that an evidentiary
hearing was unnecessary for Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF Nos. 29, 30.)
Thus, the Court evaluates the Parties’ arguments presented in their papers and at oral argument,
as well as the Parties’ evidentiary submissions accompanying their papers, when deciding
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
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I. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
First, the Court considers whether Mr. Christensen has shown a strong likelihood of
success on the merits of his First Amendment retaliation claim and Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process claim.
A. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claim
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, prohibits persons acting under state authority from abridging
any constitutional right of a United States citizen. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
“‘[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from
subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions’ for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v.
Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). To
prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, Mr. Christensen must show that (1) he engaged in
protected speech, (2) Defendants took an adverse action against him, and (3) there is a causal
connection between the protected speech and the adverse action. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175
F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999).
1. 	Protected Speech
First, Mr. Christensen must show that he engaged in protected speech. As noted above,
“other than in a few limited areas, almost all speech is protected from governmental
interference.” McElhaney, 81 F.4th at 557 (quoting Novak, 932 F.3d at 427) (citation modified).
Political speech, specifically, is at the core of First Amendment protection. See Thaddeus-X, 175
F.3d at 388. Speech does not lose its protected status simply because it is “provocative and
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challenging” or has “profound unsettling effects.” Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949).
Mr. Christensen argues that the Rodriguez and Torres Videos are political speech
protected by the First Amendment. (ECF No. 8, PageID 86–99; ECF No. 32, PageID 733–51.)
Defendants do not assert that Mr. Christensen’s speech was not political in nature—Mr.
Christensen’s statements are undoubtedly political, albeit controversial. Instead, Defendants
respond that Mr. Christensen’s speech is not protected by the First Amendment because it
constitutes incitement under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) and posed a risk of
substantial disruption to OSU’s campus. (ECF No. 28, PageID 318–33.) The Court considers
both arguments.
i. 	Speech that Constitutes Incitement Under Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
The First Amendment does not protect a right to incite violence. Bible Believers, 805
F.3d at 244. To determine whether speech incites violence, courts examine whether “(1) the
speech explicitly or implicitly encouraged the use of violence or lawless action, (2) the speaker
intends that his speech will result in the use of violence or lawless action, and (3) the imminent
use of violence or lawless action is the likely result of his speech.” Id. at 246 (citing
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 477).
Defendants argue that at the time they learned of the Rodriguez Video, Mr. Christensen
was engaged in speech to incite violence. (ECF No. 28, PageID 318–26.) The record shows that
Defendants viewed Mr. Christensen’s use of the words “resistance” and “escalation” in the
Rodriguez Video, along with his demeanor, as the components of the Rodriguez Video likely to
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incite violence.3 (Shivers Dep., ECF No. 28-1, PageID 437–38.) The terms “resistance” and
“escalation” come from the following statements in the Rodriguez Video:
And I want to remind you that, while this attack took the lives of two human beings,
Israel has murdered thousands of Palestinian civilians in cold blood without any
shame, with pride, rejoicing in the streets of Israel over this, and they get no
attention in this country, while this attack is being used to weaponize violence
against the movement. But we will meet it with our own greater resistance and
escalation.
. . .
You might have seen my update early this morning where I condemned this attack
and I reaffirm that I had a change of perspective after hearing critiques from people
in the movement. It is like as they said, I am condemning Luke Skywalker for
attacking the Death Star because the Empire might crack down on the resistance.
And while my point was that this attack will be used for a crackdown on the
movement in the coming days, they’re right. We must meet with escalation and
stronger resistance.
(Rodriguez Video Transcript, ECF No. 32-7, PageID 1234–35, 1241.)
First, the Court examines whether these statements “explicitly or implicitly encouraged
the use of violence or lawless action.” Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 246. Mr. Christensen’s
statements did not explicitly encourage violence or lawlessness and are unlikely to be an implicit
endorsement of such action. For several reasons, the Court views these statements as
encouraging resistance and escalation in the form of lawful action. In the past, Mr. Christensen
has used his social media platform to advocate for nonviolent action, such as participating in
3 In their response in opposition, Defendants include additional arguments regarding why the
Rodriguez Video incites violence, including Mr. Christensen’s decision to read Elias
Rodriguez’s manifesto aloud. (ECF No. 28, PageID 320–21.) But “[g]overnment
‘justification[s]’ for interfering with First Amendment rights ‘must be genuine, not hypothesized
or invented post hoc in response to litigation.’” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507,
543 n.8 (2022) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). Yet, even
considering these additional points, the Court reaches the same conclusion—Mr. Christensen has
shown a strong likelihood of succeeding on his arguments that the Rodriguez Video does not
constitute incitement under Brandenburg.
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peaceful protests, signing petitions, and contacting representatives for the Uniting for Peace
Resolution in the UN General Assembly. (Christensen Dep., ECF No. 32-1, PageID 788–89.) He
also conducted a “six-day hunger strike . . . to inspire and kick off a campaign partnered with an
organization on the ground in Gaza to raise money” and mobilized followers to attend “No
Kings” protests. (Id.)
In addition, the day after posting the Rodriguez Video, Mr. Christensen uploaded another
video explaining that he “would never make a threat that would jeopardize [his] position to
influence and educate people” about Palestinian rights and the conflict in Gaza. (ECF No. 8-1,
¶¶ 31–32; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 125; Clarification 1 Transcript, ECF No. 32-8.) Similarly, on
May 27, 2025, less than a week after the Rodriguez Video, Mr. Christensen posted a video
stating that he is “non-violent” and that “[a]nyone who sees [his] content knows that [he does]
not incite violence.” (ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 31, 33; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 127; Clarification 2
Transcript, ECF No. 32-9, PageID 1252.) Finally, when asked about his use of the words
“resistance” and “escalation” at his deposition, Mr. Christensen remained adamant that he meant
“to encourage [his] audience to take part in nonviolent actions, as [he has] always advocated for
them to do.” (Christensen Dep., ECF No. 32-1, PageID 813–15.) None of the facts here indicate
an endorsement of violence or lawlessness. The record contains no other evidence to the
contrary.
Even if Mr. Christensen’s use of the terms “resistance” and “escalation” referred to the
use of illegal violence, “the First Amendment protects endorsements of lawlessness that do not
contain a specific call to action.” Higgins v. Ky. Sports Radio, LLC, 951 F.3d 728, 737 (6th Cir.
2020); see also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002)) (“The mere tendency of speech to encourage
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unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it absent some showing of a direct connection
between the speech and imminent illegal conduct.”). For example, in Hess v. Indiana, a protester
in an angry mob yelled “[w]e’ll take the f[------] street later” or “[w]e’ll take the f[------] street
again.” 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973). The Supreme Court found that, “at worst,” this statement
“amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time,”
which lacked the particularity necessary to prevail under the Brandenburg standard. Id. at 108.
Similarly, in Nwanguma v. Trump, the Sixth Circuit held that President Trump’s calls in front of
a crowd at a campaign rally to “[g]et ‘em out of here,” referring to protestors, was protected by
the First Amendment because it did not “specifically advocate imminent lawless action,” even
when members of the audience responded by assaulting, pushing, and shoving the protestors. 903
F.3d 604, 606–07, 610–12 (6th Cir. 2018).
Like the statements at issue in Hess v. Indiana and Nwanguma v. Trump, the Rodriguez
Video did not call for imminent unlawful action. Mr. Christensen did not identify a time, place,
or manner for the “resistance” or “escalation” to occur. In addition, there is no evidence that
violence or lawlessness occurred as a result of Mr. Christensen’s speech. With respect to
Defendants’ position that Mr. Christensen’s demeanor led them to conclude his speech was
inciting violence, “[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and
emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982). Stated differently, Mr. Christensen’s demeanor in the video changes
nothing.
Next, the Court considers whether Mr. Christensen intended for his statements to result in
the use of violence or lawless action. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 246. The record supports Mr.
Christensen’s position on this point—he did not possess the requisite intent. As discussed above,
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Mr. Christensen posted two videos shortly after the Rodriguez Video stating that he “would
never make a threat” and “do[es] not incite violence.” (Clarification 1 Transcript, ECF No. 32-8;
Clarification 2 Transcript, ECF No. 32-9.) Likewise, at his deposition, Mr. Christensen testified
that the Rodriguez Video was meant “to encourage [his] audience to take part in nonviolent
actions, as [he has] always advocated for them to do.” (Christensen Dep., ECF No. 32-1, PageID
813–15.) Mr. Christensen’s prior track record supports this—he historically used his platforms to
encourage nonviolent action by his supporters. Other than Defendants’ interpretation of Mr.
Christensen’s meaning of his own words, there is no evidence that Mr. Christensen intended for
his statements to result in the use of violence or lawless action.
Finally, the Court evaluates whether the imminent use of violence or lawless action was
the likely result of Mr. Christensen’s speech. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 246. The statements at
issue in this case were shared through a TikTok video to a general audience with no specific call
to action—no time, place, or planned follow-up—and, as such, were unlikely to result in the
imminent use of violence or lawless action. As stated above, there is no evidence violence or
lawlessness has occurred.
While Mr. Christensen’s statements may be deemed harsh, because there is “no evidence
or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce,
and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the
ground that they had a tendency to lead to violence.” Hess, 414 U.S. at 109.
ii. 	Speech that Causes a Substantial Disruption Under Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969)
This case involves a public university’s response to the speech of one of its students.
“[W]here state-operated educational institutions are involved, [the Supreme Court] has long
recognized ‘the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
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officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools.’” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507). At
the same time, however, Supreme Court precedent “leave[s] no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force
on college campuses than in the community at large.” Id. Students do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker, 393
U.S. at 506.
In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that public high and middle schools may prohibit
student speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others.” 393 U.S. at 513. To do so, the school “must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Id. at 509. More recently, in Mahanoy Area
School District v. B. L. by and through Levy, the Supreme Court clarified that a public school’s
interest in regulating student speech is “diminished” when that speech occurs off campus. 594
U.S. 180, 190 (2021). “[C]ourts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regulate off-
campus speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot engage in that kind of speech at all.”
Id. at 189–90.
Tinker and Mahanoy involved high schools and middle schools. Universities are different
from those types of schools due to the “age, independence, and living arrangements” of the
students who attend them. See Mahanoy, 594 U.S. at 194 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring). Universities
may be able to restrict speech that causes “substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities.” Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
514, in a case involving a graduate-level counseling program). Still, there is “no doubt” that the
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First Amendment right of speech “extend[s] to the campuses of state universities.” Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268–69 (1981). Indeed, “[t]he college campus is peculiarly suited to serve
as a marketplace of ideas and a forum for the robust exchange of different viewpoints.” Solid
Rock Found. v. Ohio State Univ., 478 F. Supp. 96, 102 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Duncan, J.).
The law is not entirely clear as to what extent Tinker applies to cases involving
universities, as opposed to cases involving public high or middle schools, but the Court need not
define the contours of such application here. Even assuming Tinker applies to the instant case,
the Court concludes that Mr. Christensen has demonstrated a strong likelihood of succeeding on
his position that his statements do not meet the “demanding standard” set forth in Tinker and
remain protected under the First Amendment. Mahanoy, 594 U.S. at 193.
Defendants argue that OSU “had multiple grounds to support its belief that Plaintiff
would cause substantial disruption on campus.” (ECF No. 28, PageID 330.) Those “grounds”
are: (1) OSU received communications from members of the university community expressing
fear of violence based on Plaintiff’s posts, (2) law enforcement was engaged to respond to
Plaintiff’s actions, (3) administrators believed that Plaintiff intended to incite violence based on
the Rodriguez Video, (4) Congressman Torres interpreted the Torres Video as a threat of
violence against him, (5) Plaintiff did not respond to law enforcement’s attempts to contact him,
and (6) administrators believed there was a strong likelihood Plaintiff’s speech would
substantially disrupt campus due to Plaintiff’s extensive online presence. (Id.)
There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Christensen’s conduct disrupted any class or
classwork at OSU. Cf. Mahanoy, 594 U.S. at 192–94 (holding that the school could not carry its
burden under Tinker even when there was evidence that the plaintiff’s social media posts
disrupted a math class on multiple occasions and upset community members). Importantly, when
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Mr. Christensen recorded and published the Rodriguez and Torres Videos, the spring semester
had ended, he was not on campus or in the state of Ohio, and he did not plan to return to campus
until the fall semester. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 16, 20, 27.) Mr. Christensen did not identify himself as
an OSU student, mention OSU or anyone in its community, or otherwise target or direct his
speech towards OSU in the Rodriguez and Torres Videos. (Id.; ECF No. 8-2, PageID 121, 123);
see Mahanoy, 594 U.S. at 204–05 (Alito, J., concurring) (collecting cases) (noting that off-
campus speech that “addresses matters of public concern” and is “not expressly and specifically
directed at the school” is “almost always beyond the regulatory authority of a public school”).
No student reported to OSU concerns about Mr. Christensen’s statements before OSU
disenrolled Mr. Christensen. Activist organizations, the general public, and some parents
expressed objections to Mr. Christensen’s opinions, but “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at
508; see also Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.4th 732, 749 (6th
Cir. 2025) (en banc) (explaining that it is “unclear when (if ever) schools may silence
nondisruptive speakers because of the way that listeners will react to their message”); Bible
Believers, 805 F.3d at 248 (“A review of Supreme Court precedent firmly establishes that the
First Amendment does not countenance a heckler’s veto.”).
Similarly, Defendants argue that the engagement of law enforcement demonstrates that
believing Plaintiff would cause a substantial disruption on campus was reasonable. Nothing in
the record, however, suggests that any law enforcement agency opened an actual investigation
into Mr. Christensen beyond a single interview in November 2024, which resulted in a
determination that there were no credible threats at that time. (ECF No. 25.)
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While the record contains evidence that Mr. Christensen’s social media posts were
offensive to many people, the record contains no evidence that his speech caused, or would
cause, a disruption so significant as to meet Tinker’s high standard. Thus, the facts of this case do
not support the conclusion that Defendants’ forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable.
2. 	Adverse Action
Next, Mr. Christensen must show that he suffered an adverse action because of his
protected speech. An adverse action is one that “would chill or silence ‘a person of ordinary
firmness’ from future First Amendment activities.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of
Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 822 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 397).
Defendants do not meaningfully dispute this element of Mr. Christensen’s First Amendment
retaliation claim. (See ECF No. 28, PageID 310 (disputing that Plaintiff established the first and
third elements of his First Amendment retaliation claim).) The Court concludes Mr.
Christensen’s disenrollment from OSU constitutes an adverse action that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from engaging in protected speech. See Diei v. Boyd, 116 F.4th 637, 647–48
(6th Cir. 2024).
3. 	Causal Connection
Finally, Mr. Christensen must show a causal connection between the adverse action taken
against him and his protected speech. To demonstrate causation, a plaintiff is required to show
that his protected activity was a motivating factor in the adverse decision. Thaddeus–X, 175 F.3d
at 399; see also Thompson v. Ohio State Univ., 639 F. App’x 333, 344 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2002)). Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity.
Thaddeus–X, 175 F.3d at 399.
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Defendant Shivers’s May 30 letter to Mr. Christensen listed the following reasons for his
disenrollment from OSU:
your May 22, 2025 social media post inciting violence, for which you received an
interim suspension on May 25, 2025; your May 22, 2025 social media post about
Congressman Torres that he interpreted as a threat of violence and requested U.S.
Capitol Police assistance; the myriad communications from members of the
university community expressing fear of violence based on your posts; and the
engagement of several law enforcement jurisdictions in response to your actions.
(ECF No. 8-2, PageID 139.) Mr. Christensen argues that all four of those reasons relate to and
arise out of his protected speech, so his speech was the root cause that motivated his
disenrollment. (ECF No. 32, PageID 754.) Indeed, Defendant Shivers refers to the Rodriguez
Video, the Torres Video, and reactions by the community and law enforcement to the Rodriguez
and Torres Videos.
Defendants do not argue that they would have disenrolled Mr. Christensen even if he had
not posted the Rodriguez and Torres Videos (i.e., engaged in the protected conduct). Defendants
assert that “the decision to administratively disenroll Plaintiff was not ‘motivated in substantial
part by a desire to punish’ Plaintiff for the content of his speech,” instead, it “was motivated by a
desire to protect the safety of the campus community.” (ECF No. 28, PageID 313.) This is a
difference without a distinction. Wells v. Rice, 692 F. Supp. 3d 735, 748 (E.D. Ky. 2023)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that the adverse action “based on his fear for his family’s safety
and not to retaliate against Plaintiffs for their protected speech” and noting that “[t]he root
behavior that [Defendant] seeks to exact retribution for is [Plaintiffs’] Facebook post,” which is
“the constitutionally-protected conduct that allegedly causes him to fear for his family’s safety”).
Defendants’ motivation for disenrolling Mr. Christensen stems from the Rodriguez and
Torres Videos, and Mr. Christensen has shown a strong likelihood of establishing that those
videos are forms of protected speech. Defendants’ argument that they disenrolled Mr.
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Christensen to promote campus security, rather than to punish him, does not change the fact that
they disenrolled Mr. Christensen because of his speech. And, as explained above, there was not
violence or lawlessness incited by the videos to protect the community from. At base,
Defendants took an adverse action against Mr. Christensen because of his statements, and
Defendants’ position that they did so to ensure the safety of the students does not make their
conduct constitutional.
For these reasons, Mr. Christensen has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success of
showing that he engaged in protected speech, Defendants took an adverse action against him, and
a causal connection exists between the protected speech and the adverse action.
B. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To establish a procedural due process claim, a
plaintiff must show “(i) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or
property, and (ii) inadequate state process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023).
Defendants concede the first element of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim. (ECF
No. 28, PageID 334.) They acknowledge that due process protections have long-shielded access
to higher education and that their disenrollment deprived Mr. Christensen of his protected
interest. (Id.) The Parties dispute the second element: whether Defendants afforded Mr.
Christensen adequate process.
Generally, there are two basic due process requirements: (1) notice and (2) an opportunity
to be heard. Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 2005). In Mathews v.
Eldridge, the Supreme Court instructed courts to look at three factors when determining the due
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process required: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
When evaluating due process claims in the context of expulsions, courts “conduct a more
searching inquiry” when the case involves “a disciplinary expulsion, rather than an academic
one.” Flaim, 418 F.3d at 634 (citing Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978)). “In the
school-disciplinary context, an accused student must at least receive the following pre-expulsion:
(1) notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the evidence against him; and (3) an opportunity
to present his side of the story before an unbiased decisionmaker.” Doe v. Cummins, 662 F.
App’x 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2016). By contrast, students dismissed for academic reasons are entitled
to “notice that his or her academic performance was not satisfactory and a ‘careful and
deliberate’ decision regarding their punishment,” but “the university need not provide a hearing.”
Mares v. Miami Valley Hosp., 96 F.4th 945, 953 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Yoder v. Univ. of
Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 549 (6th Cir. 2013); J. Endres v. Ne. Ohio Med. Univ., 938 F.3d
281, 298 (6th Cir. 2019)).
Mr. Christensen argues that the process he received was deficient for several reasons,
including: (1) Defendants did not establish that he was disenrolled for academic reasons, such
that fewer due process protections are required, (2) Mr. Christensen did not receive a pre-
expulsion hearing, which he was entitled to, (3) even assuming Mr. Christensen could be
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expelled without a hearing, it would require a dire emergency, which was not present in this
case, and (4) Mr. Christensen’s post-expulsion opportunity to petition for re-enrollment did not
constitute a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as demonstrated by Defendant Shivers’s
rejection of his petition for attempting to defend himself. (ECF No. 8, PageID 101; ECF No. 32,
PageID 757–65.)
For their part, Defendants argue that Mr. Christensen received the proper amount of
process because he was “administratively disenrolled” under Section 3335-23-21 of the Code,
which “is separate and distinct from disciplinary suspensions or disenrollments.” (ECF No. 28,
PageID 333.) Defendants assert that “[a]n administrative disenrollment is not punitive in nature;
it is a process used in exigent circumstances to ensure the safety of the student in question, other
students, and the campus community.” (Id. PageID 335–36.)
As an initial matter, Defendants do not explicitly argue that Mr. Christensen was
dismissed for academic reasons, which would require less process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, they use the term “administrative disenrollment,” but the Court does not
view Defendants’ ipse dixit assertion that Mr. Christensen’s disenrollment was not disciplinary
as a sufficient reason to disregard the constitutional notion that “[a] student faced with expulsion
has the right to a pre-expulsion hearing before an impartial trier-of-fact.” Newsome v. Batavia
Loc. Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 1988); Ashiegbu v. Williams, No. 97-3173, 1997 WL
720477, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997).
Next, the record supports concluding that the process Mr. Christensen received for his
disenrollment was insufficient. He received notice of the disenrollment at the same time that the
disenrollment took effect (May 30, 2025) and learned that he could petition for re-enrollment
once his disenrollment was already in effect. (ECF No. 8-2, PageID 139–40.) In other words, Mr.
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Christensen did not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard before his dismissal. To be sure,
Mr. Christensen received notice of his interim suspension before his disenrollment, on May 25,
2025 (ECF No. 8-2, PageID 129), but he did not receive notice of his disenrollment until May
30, 2025 (id. PageID 139–40), when the disenrollment was in effect. A meeting had been
scheduled related to Mr. Christensen’s interim suspension under Section 3355-23-01 of the
Code, but that meeting was cancelled because it was not part of OSU’s process for
disenrollments under Section 3355-23-21 of the Code. (ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 40–41; ECF No. 8-2,
PageID 147–48.)
Mr. Christensen’s post-deprivation opportunity to petition for re-enrollment only afforded
him the opportunity to argue that the circumstances giving rise to his disenrollment had
dissipated, not that those circumstances failed to justify disenrollment in the first instance. (ECF
No. 8-2, PageID 166–67 (denying Mr. Christensen’s petition for re-enrollment because it
“amounts to a disagreement on what ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of conduct that constitutes
a significant risk of substantial harm to health or safety is instead of providing evidence of a
change in conditions supporting the reasons that Mr. Christensen should be re-enrolled at the
university”).) Aside from the chance to petition for re-enrollment, Mr. Christensen did not
receive any other opportunity to be heard.
Further, for the same reasons that a substantial disruption was unlikely to result from Mr.
Christensen’s speech, the evidence does not support concluding that emergency circumstances
existed such that Defendants’ failure to hold a hearing before Mr. Christensen’s disenrollment
was justified. Schools have afforded students pre-expulsion hearings in situations more dire than
the one presented in this case. See, e.g., C.Y. ex rel. Antone v. Lakeview Pub. Schs., 557 F. App’x
426, 427–28 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the school conducted a pre-expulsion hearing when
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a counselor reported that a student had brought a knife to school and was threatening to stab
another student). And the fact that OSU had already suspended Mr. Christensen from “university
premises and property as well as participation in all university activities, whether on or off
campus property,” casts doubt on whether OSU’s decision to disenroll Mr. Christensen was
necessary to address or alleviate emergency circumstances, to the extent they existed. (ECF No.
8-2, PageID 129.)
Finally, the Mathews factors support concluding that the process related to Mr.
Christensen’s disenrollment was constitutionally deficient. First, Mr. Christensen’s private
interest is “significant” because his disenrollment could “interfere with later opportunities for
higher education and employment.” Flaim, 418 F.3d at 638 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 575 (1975)). Second, the process posed a high risk of error because OSU disenrolled Mr.
Christensen without giving him an opportunity to explain his own statements, which formed the
basis of the disenrollment decision. A pre-disenrollment hearing would lessen the risk of
erroneous deprivation by generating information from multiple parties—including the person
whose conduct is at issue—for OSU to consider before making a decision. Third, the Court
recognizes that OSU has a strong interest in ensuring safety on campus but is not convinced that
this interest justified their failure to provide a pre-disenrollment hearing, given that OSU had
already suspended Mr. Christensen from campus and Mr. Christensen had left OSU and the state
of Ohio and did not intend to return for months. In addition, the fiscal and administrative burden
on OSU to hold a pre-disenrollment hearing is minimal: OSU appears to have the capacity to
facilitate these hearings and does so for measures less extreme than disenrollment because a
similar meeting was scheduled to address Mr. Christensen’s interim suspension.
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Mr. Christensen has
demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment claims.
II. 	Irreparable Harm
Next, the Court considers whether Mr. Christensen will suffer irreparable harm absent an
injunction. Generally, “[a] plaintiff’s harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is
irreparable if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette
Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). “The loss of First Amendment freedoms for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion). If a plaintiff “can establish a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of [his] First Amendment Claim, [he] also has established the possibility of
irreparable harm as a result of the deprivation of the claimed free speech rights.” Connection
Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998).
Here, Mr. Christensen has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First
Amendment retaliation claim, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
Defendants argue that Mr. Christensen did not establish irreparable harm because he failed to
allege an ongoing constitutional violation or prove that the disenrollment notation on his
academic record has harmed him or will harm him in any material way. (ECF No. 28, PageID
341.) But the Sixth Circuit explained that “an individual, who has been subjected to direct and
intentional retaliation for having exercised the protected constitutional right of expression,
continues to suffer irreparable injury even after termination of some tangible benefit.” Newsom v.
Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 1989). In addition, absent a preliminary injunction, Mr.
Christensen’s transcript from OSU will continue to show that he was administratively
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disenrolled, despite Mr. Christensen having established a strong likelihood of success on the
merits on his claims that this disenrollment was unconstitutional. At his deposition, Mr.
Christensen testified that his academic advisor explained to him that the notation on his transcript
matters for his academic career. (Christensen Dep., ECF No. 28-2, PageID 648); Goss, 419 U.S.
at 575 (“If sustained and recorded, those charges [of misconduct] could seriously damage the
students’ standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later
opportunities for higher education and employment.”). Therefore, Mr. Christensen has
demonstrated irreparable harm.
III. 	Substantial Harm to Others
Next, the Court must weigh the harm to Mr. Christensen “should the preliminary
injunction not be issued” against “the harm to others from the granting of the injunction.” United
Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 363 (6th
Cir. 1998). Defendants argue that an injunction will harm other academic institutions or
employers by preventing them from knowing why Mr. Christensen is no longer enrolled at
OSU.4 (ECF No. 28, PageID 343.) The Court is not persuaded that this harm qualifies as
substantial or outweighs the irreparable harm Mr. Christensen will incur without a preliminary
injunction, discussed above. Indeed, “if the plaintiff shows a substantial likelihood that the
4 Defendants characterize the requested preliminary injunction as “full merits relief,” rather than
the “preservation of the status quo.” (ECF No. 28, PageID 343.) As the Sixth Circuit has noted,
“[i]t is often loosely stated that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo.” Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978). But, when “the currently
existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the
situation so as to prevent the injury, either by returning to the last uncontested status quo
between the parties, by the issuance of a mandatory injunction, or by allowing the parties to take
proposed action that the court finds will minimize the irreparable injury.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the last uncontested status between the Parties was when Mr. Christensen’s transcript did
not include the administrative disenrollment notation, so the Court finds the preliminary
injunctive relief requested by Mr. Christensen to be proper.
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challenged law is unconstitutional, no substantial harm to others can be said to inhere in its
enjoinment.” Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn.,
274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001). For these reasons, this factor weighs in Mr. Christensen’s
favor and counsels for granting the preliminary injunction.
IV. 	Public Interest
Finally, the Court considers whether issuing the preliminary injunction serves the public
interest. It is well-established that “[t]he public as a whole has a significant interest in ensuring
equal protection of the laws and protection of First Amendment liberties.” Jones v. Caruso, 569
F.3d 258, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher,
70 F.3d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, “the determination of where the public interest
lies . . . is dependent on a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits of the First
Amendment challenge because ‘it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a
party’s constitutional rights.’” Connection Distrib. Co., 154 F.3d at 288 (quoting G & V Lounge,
Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994)). Here, Mr.
Christensen has demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims arising
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, so a preliminary injunction would serve the public
interest by preventing the violation of constitutional rights.
In sum, all four preliminary injunction factors weigh in favor of granting Mr.
Christensen’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 8.)
V. 	Bond
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part: “The court may
issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court
considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
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wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The purpose of the rule is to “protect[]
the enjoined party from any pecuniary injury that may accrue [while] a wrongfully issued
equitable order remains in effect.” Brown v. City of Upper Arlington, 637 F.3d 668, 674 (6th Cir.
2011). “While . . . the language of Rule 65(c) appears to be mandatory . . . the rule in our circuit
has long been that the district court possesses discretion over whether to require the posting of
security.” Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995).
Given the strength of Mr. Christensen’s likelihood of success on the merits and
Defendants’ failure to request security, Mr. Christensen shall post a bond with the Clerk of the
Court in the nominal amount of $100.00 no later than 10 days from the date of this Order. See
Moltan Co., 55 F.3d at 1176 (finding no bond required due to strength of movant’s case and
strong public interest involved); Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 223 F. Supp. 3d 704, 713 (S.D. Ohio
2016) (Barrett, J.) (setting Rule 65 bond in nominal amount of $1).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS (ECF No. 8) Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. The Court ORDERS Defendants to expunge any mention of involuntary
disenrollment from Mr. Christensen’s academic transcript at OSU and ENJOINS Defendants
from making any equivalent representation through academic records or other means no later
than 10 days from the date of this Order. Further, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to post a bond
with the Clerk of the Court in the amount of $100.00 no later than 10 days from the date of this
Order. This case remains open.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
1/14/2026 	s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE 	EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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