Fields et al v. Hench's Country Liv'n Homes of Calera et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(1) CARTER FIELDS, an individual;
(2) HANNAH HIPPS, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
(1) HENCH'S COUNTRY LIV'N HOMES
OF CALERA;
(2) JESSUP HOUSING;
(3) CROWN CONTRACTING, LLC;
(4) 21st MORTGAGE CORPORATION;
(5) AUSTIN RUPP, an individual;
(6) STEPHEN STUBBS, an individual,
Defendants,
and
(1) CROWN CONTRACTING, LLC;
(2) 21st MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Cross-Claimants,
v.
(1) STEPHEN STUBBS, an individual;
(2) HENCH'S COUNTRY LIV'N HOMES
OF CALERA,
Cross-Defendants.
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Case No. 6:23-cv-372-JAR
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
defendants Hench's Country Liv'n Homes of Calera ("Hench's") and Austin Rupp
("Rupp") pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). [Dkt. 198]. Plaintiffs timely responded in
opposition [Dkt. 201], and defendants submitted a reply brief [Dkt. 211].
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"A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is treated as a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita,
226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000). "To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'" Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When applying this standard, courts must
accept as true well-pleaded factual allegations and then ask whether those facts state
a plausible claim for relief. See id. at 679. Allegations that state "legal conclusions"
or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" "are not entitled to the
assumption of truth." Id. at 678-79.
I. 	BACKGROUND
1. 	Plaintiffs initiated this action on September 18, 2023 in the District
Court 	of 	Bryan 	County, 	Oklahoma 	against 	defendants 	Hench's, 	Rupp, 	Jessup
Manufactured Housing LLC ("Jessup"), Crown Contracting LLC ("Crown"), and 21 st
Mortgage 	Corporation 	("21 st 	Mortgage"), 	alleging 	defects 	in 	the 	mobile 	home
purchased from Hench's, manufactured by Jessup, installed by Crown, and financed
by 21st Mortgage. [Dkt. 2-3].1
1 For clarity and consistency herein, when the Court cites to the record, it uses the pagination
and document numbers provided by CM/ECF.
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2. 	On October 27, 2023, defendants removed the action to this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [Dkt. 2]. By express consent of all parties [Dkt. 48], and
in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the undersigned
United States Magistrate Judge exercises complete jurisdiction over this matter
through and including trial and entry of a final judgment.
3. 	Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint ("Amended Complaint") on
March 4, 2024, adding defendant Stephen Stubbs ("Stubbs") and asserting seven
causes of action: fraud and deceit against Hench's, Rupp, and 21st Mortgage (Count
I); breach of contract against Hench's, Rupp, and 21st Mortgage (Count II); breach of
warranty against Hench's, Jessup, and 21 st Mortgage (Count III); negligence against
Hench's, Jessup, Crown, Stubbs, and 21st Mortgage (Count IV); violations of the
Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act ("OCPA"), 15 O.S. § 751 et seq., against Hench's,
Rupp, Jessup, Crown, Stubbs, and 21 st Mortgage (Count V); unjust enrichment
against Hench's, Rupp, Jessup, and 21st Mortgage (Count VI); 2 and violations of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., against Hench's, Jessup, and
21st Mortgage (Count VII). [Dkt. 56, ¶¶ 62-113].
4. 	On January 6, 2025, Jessup moved to dismiss Counts IV, V, VI and part
of Count III. [Dkt. 156]. By Order entered September 18, 2025, the Court granted
that motion in part, dismissing Count V as well as Count III insofar as it alleged
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose against Jessup. [Dkt.
2 On March 24, 2025, the Court granted plaintiffs' request to voluntarily dismiss Count VI as
to defendant 21 st Mortgage. [Dkt. 166].
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196]. The Court further permitted plaintiffs to seek leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint, subject to specified limitations. [Id. at 14-15].
5. 	Hench's and Rupp filed the motion at issue on September 30, 2025,
seeking judgment on the pleadings as to Counts III, IV, V, VI, and VII. [Dkt. 198].
6. 	Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking leave to amend on October 2, 2025, and
attached a proposed Second Amended Complaint thereto. [Dkt. 199]. By Order
entered January 5, 2026, the Court denied leave to amend based on, inter alia,
plaintiffs' failure to comply with the limitations set forth in its prior Order. [Dkt. 217].
II. 	ANALYSIS
Defendants Hench's and Rupp seek Rule 12(c) dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for
breach of warranty (Count III), negligence (Count IV), violation of the OCPA (Count
V), unjust enrichment (Count VI), and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(Count VII). The Court addresses the challenged counts in the sequence adopted in
plaintiffs’ response; however, because the viability of the Magnuson-Moss claim in
Count VII depends in part on whether plaintiffs have adequately stated claims for
breach of warranty in Count III, the Court begins with plaintiffs’ warranty theories.
A. 	V IOLATIONS OF THE OCPA | C OUNT V
"The OCPA was enacted to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade
practices 	and," 	to 	that 	end, 	"provides 	a 	private 	right 	of 	action 	for 	aggrieved
consumers." Williams v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., No. CIV-07-255-CVE-FHM, 2007
WL 1959219 at *1 (N.D. Okla. June 29, 2007) (citing Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92,
¶ 30, 19 P.3d 839, 846). To state a claim under the OCPA, a plaintiff must show:
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(1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful practice as defined by 15
O.S. § 753; (2) that the challenged practice occurred in the course of the
defendant's business; (3) that the plaintiff, as a consumer, suffered an
injury in fact; and (4) that the challenged practice caused the plaintiff's
injury.
Patterson, ¶ 30, 19 P.3d at 846. Here, Hench's and Rupp challenge the viability of
Count V based on a purported failure to plead facts establishing an "unlawful
practice" under § 753, and the regulated-transactions exemption under § 754.
1. 	Purported Unlawful Practices
The threshold question is which of § 753's thirty-two provisions plaintiffs'
allegations implicate. The Amended Complaint alleges that Hench's and Rupp
violated the OCPA by engaging in "unfair and deceptive trade practices" within the
meaning of § 753(21). [Dkt. 56, ¶ 99 (citing 15 O.S. §§ 752(13-(14))]. 3 According to
plaintiffs, these purported unlawful practices include:
(i) 	Hench's failure to supply or disclose the written warranty to plaintiffs,
as required by the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act;
(ii) 	Hench's and Rupp's misrepresentations concerning the characteristics,
uses, and benefits of the mobile home;
(iii) 	Hench's and Rupp's misrepresentations concerning the "rebuilt" status
of the home, as opposed to its being "new";
(iv) 	Hench's inconsistent and confusing statements regarding cost and
financing terms applicable to the home;
(v) 	Hench's breach of implied warranties;
(vi) 	Hench's breach of express warranties;
3 The OCPA defines "deceptive trade practice" as "a misrepresentation, omission or other
practice that has deceived or could reasonably be expected to deceive or mislead a person to the
detriment of that person." 15 O.S. § 752(13). "Unfair trade practice" means "any practice which offends
established public policy or if the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers." Id. § 752(14).
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(vii) 	The failure of "Defendants" to resolve responsibility for damage to the
home and their repeated attempts to shift blame among themselves; and
(viii) 	"Defendants'" failures to identify and notify plaintiffs of damages prior
to their receipt and possession of the home.
[Id., ¶¶ 99(i)-(vi), (viii)-(ix)].
Relying on this Court's prior conclusion that the Amended Complaint "contains
no factual allegations of false advertising, price misrepresentations, or bait-and-
switch tactics" to support an OCPA claim against Jessup, defendants argue that
Count V must likewise be dismissed as to Hench's and Rupp. [Dkt. 198 at 7 (quoting
Dkt. 196 at 7]). In that prior Order, the Court further observed that the Amended
Complaint "alleges only implied warranties" against Jessup and held that plaintiffs'
OCPA 	theories 	against 	Jessup 	"sound 	in 	warranty 	enforcement 	and 	contract
administration, not deception or unfairness" as defined by §§ 752(13)-(14). [Dkt. 196
at 	7]. 	The 	same 	Count 	V 	paragraphs, 	however, 	articulate 	multiple 	discrete
misrepresentation-based theories against Hench's and Rupp that extend beyond
mere warranty administration. In their Rule 12(c) briefing, plaintiffs contend that
Hench's and Rupp induced the sale by representing a "full one-year warranty,"
repeatedly assured plaintiffs that serious structural issues would be corrected under
that warranty, and then reversed course after the warranty period expired. [Dkt. 201
at 11]. Taken as true, these allegations describe conduct with the "capacity to deceive"
within the meaning of Oklahoma jurisprudence and the OCPA's broad "unfair" and
"deceptive trade practice" definitions. See Patterson, ¶ 33, 19 P.3d at 847, n.12.
Defendants do not deny that such misrepresentation theories are pleaded, but
characterize them as "warranty enforcement and contract administration." [Dkt. 198
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at 7]. Their position effectively seeks to reclassify the alleged misrepresentations and
omissions as purely contractual disputes, rather than to challenge the sufficiency of
plaintiffs' allegations of deceptive and unfair practices. Viewing the pleadings in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint
plausibly 	alleges 	"unlawful 	practices" 	under 	§ 	753 	as 	to 	Hench's 	and 	Rupp.
Accordingly, Hench's and Rupp are not entitled to Rule 12(c) dismissal of Count V on
the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish an unlawful practice under the OCPA.
2. 	Regulated-Transaction Exemption
The OCPA provides that "[n]othing in this act shall apply to ... [a]ctions or
transactions regulated under laws administered by the Corporation Commission or
any other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state ....”
15 O.S. § 754(2). Courts interpreting § 754 have found the exemption applicable when
the alleged conduct constituting a violation of the OCPA is regulated by a state or
federal agency. Rogers v. QuikTrip Corp., 2010 OK 3, ¶ 17, 230 P.3d 853, 858, n.40;
Dennis v. Good Deal Charlie, Inc., No. CIV-20-295-GKF-JFJ, 2022 WL 3577244 at *1
(N.D. Okla Aug. 19, 2022) (collecting cases). However, the exemption does not apply
when a defendant's conduct is governed in some respects by a state or federal agency
but the specific conduct at issue is not regulated under laws administered by the
regulatory body acting under statutory authority. See e.g., Sisemore v. Dolgencorp,
LLC, 212 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1109 (N.D. Okla. May 11, 2016) (citing Conatzer v. Am.
Mercury Ins. Co., Inc., 2000 OK CIV APP 141, ¶¶ 9-13, 15 P.3d 1252, 1255).
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Relying on this Court's prior determination that the "actions or transactions
complained of" against Jessup fell within a "pervasively regulated domain," Hench's
and Rupp contend they are likewise shielded by § 754(2). As with Jessup, they invoke
their licensure by the Oklahoma Used Motor Vehicle, Dismantler, and Manufactured
Housing Commission ("Commission") and HUD's Manufactured Homes Construction
and 	Safety 	Standards 	Act 	to 	argue 	that 	the 	combined 	regulatory 	framework
encompasses 	the 	core 	activities 	underlying 	Count 	V. 	They 	emphasize 	the
Commission's authority over licensing, operations, fees, penalties, and compliance of
manufactured home dealers such as Hench's and salespersons such as Rupp,4
together with HUD's extensive standards governing design, construction, transport,
labeling, and installation of manufactured homes.5 [Dkt. 198 at 5-6; Dkt. 211 at 3-5].
HUD's construction and safety standards, by their terms, impose obligations
on 	manufacturers 	like 	Jessup 	with 	respect 	to 	design, 	construction, 	transport,
labeling, and installation of manufactured homes. See 24 C.F.R. § 3280.3. Plaintiffs
correctly point out that those provisions do not regulate how a retail dealer or
salesperson (i) represents the existence, source, scope, or conditions of a dealer-offered
warranty and its limitations; (ii) disclose or fails to disclose the manufacturer's
limited warranty and its limitations; or (iii) uses serial promises of repair to defer
action until after a one-year period and then refuses performance. [Dkt. 201 at 15].
While 	defendants 	emphasize 	the 	sheer 	volume 	of 	HUD 	provisions 	governing
construction, installation, and enforcement, they do not identify specific sections that
4 See 47 O.S. §§ 582(E)(1)-(2); O KLA. A DMIN. C ODE ("OAC") Title 765, Chapters 35-38.
5 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426; 24 C.F.R. §§ 3280-3286, 3800.
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regulate the consumer-facing sales and warranty-presentation practices alleged in
Count V. Under Oklahoma law, the central question is whether the offending conduct
itself is regulated, not whether defendants operate in a pervasively regulated
industry. See Estate of Hicks v. Urban East, Inc. ("Hicks"), 2004 OK 36, ¶ 33, 94 P.3d
88, 95; Continental Res. v. Wolla Oilfield Servs., 2022 OK 40, ¶ 7, 510 P.3d 175, 179.
With respect to the Commission, defendants cite 47 O.S. § 584 and OAC Title
765, Chapters 35-38, and argue that these provisions "strictly regulate" dealers and
salespersons. Those authorities do grant the Commission robust licensing and
disciplinary powers, including the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke licenses and to
impose 	administrative 	fines 	for 	certain 	conduct, 	such 	as 	false 	or 	misleading
advertising or unworkmanlike installation. See e.g., 47 O.S. §§ 584(A)(6)(a)-(h).
However, as plaintiffs correctly note, these statutes and rules: (i) are structured
around licensing qualifications, grounds, and procedures, not detailed regulation of
the manner in which dealers must present and honor dealer-side warranties or
describe warranty source and scope to consumers; and (ii) do not create consumer
causes of action or remedial procedures addressing the particular pre-sale and
post-sale misrepresentations about a dealer warranty that plaintiffs allege here, in
contrast to the Nursing Home Care Act’s comprehensive regulation of solicitations,
contracts, standards, and remedies in Hicks. [Dkt. 201 at 15-18].
In its prior Order, the Court concluded that plaintiffs "have not identified any
discrete, pled category of Jessup's conduct that falls outside the regulated domain."
[Dkt. 196 at 9]. That conclusion flowed from the manufacturer-focused nature of the
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OCPA claim asserted against Jessup and the direct overlap between Jessup's alleged
conduct 	and 	the 	HUD 	and 	Commission 	regimes 	governing 	construction 	and
installation. The same conclusion does not automatically extend to Hench's and Rupp.
On the record presently before the Court, the sales-side misrepresentation theories
asserted against these defendants have not been shown to be wholly subsumed within
either the HUD standards or the Commission's licensing and enforcement structure.
Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that § 754(2) clearly exempts the
challenged conduct of Hench's and Rupp in the same manner that it bars plaintiffs'
OCPA 	claim 	directed 	at 	Jessup's 	manufacturing-related 	obligations. 	Because
defendants 	have 	not 	demonstrated 	that 	the 	specific 	"actions 	or 	transactions
complained of" are regulated under laws administered by a state or federal regulatory
body acting under statutory authority, they are not entitled to judgment on the
pleadings on Count V based on the OCPA's regulated-transaction exemption.
B. 	B REACH OF E XPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES | C OUNT III
Plaintiffs allege in Count III that Hench's, by delivering a manufactured home
with 	unsafe 	nonconformities, 	breached 	express 	warranties 	as 	well 	as 	implied
warranties of habitability, merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose. [Dkt.
56, ¶¶ 81-84]. Relying on this Court's prior dismissal of the implied warranty theory
against Jessup, Hench's seeks judgment on the pleadings as to Count III, contending
that plaintiffs merely recast disagreements over the condition of the manufactured
home and repair responsibility rather than articulating any actionable breach of
warranty under state or federal law. [Dkt. 198 at 8-9; Dkt. 211 at 7-8].
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As explained in that prior Order, the Court dismissed plaintiffs' claim against
Jessup for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under
12A O.S. § 2-315, concluding that use of a manufactured home as a residence is an
ordinary, not "particular," use and that plaintiffs had not alleged seller knowledge of
a particular purpose or reliance on Jessup's skill in selecting the home. [Dkt. 196 at
11-12]. The Court did not, however, foreclose other warranty theories as to Jessup.
Plaintiffs now treat that ruling as the law of the case and affirmatively represent that
they will not pursue an implied-fitness theory against Hench's. See [Dkt. 201 at 22,
n.10]. As Hench's has not meaningfully developed argument on the remaining implied
warranty theories, the Court confines its present analysis to plaintiffs' express-
warranty theory.
Under Oklahoma's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), an express warranty
arises when any affirmation of fact or promise by the seller relating to the goods
becomes part of the basis of the bargain, or where a description of the goods forms
part of that bargain. 12A O.S. § 2-313(1). Plaintiffs' allegations that Hench's, through
its salesperson and written materials, promised to "take care of" all issues reported
within the first year, provided warranty documentation reflecting that undertaking,
and then refused to perform the promised remedial obligations, adequately plead the
existence of an express warranty, its breach, and resulting damages. See Collins
Radio Co. of Dallas, Tex. v. Bell, 1980 OK CIV APP 57, ¶ 40, 623 P.2d 1039, 1052.
Hench's effort to recast these allegations as nothing more than disagreements over
"repair responsibility" does not defeat the well-pleaded elements of an express-
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warranty claim; rather, it goes to the merits and cannot support judgment on the
pleadings. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Count III states a plausible claim
against Hench’s for breach of an express one-year warranty but does not proceed on
any theory of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
C. 	V IOLATIONS OF THE MAGNUSON -MOSS WARRANTY A CT | C OUNT VII
In Count VII, plaintiffs assert an express warranty claim against Hench's
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, ("Magnuson-Moss" or "the Act"), which
creates a private right of action where a "supplier, warrantor, or service contractor"
fails to comply with obligations under the Act or under a written warranty, with state
law supplying the substantive warranty rules. See Platt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc.,
960 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)). Defendants
contend that plaintiffs fail to state an express warranty claim under Count VII
because, in their view, Hench's merely passed along Jessup's manufacturer warranty
and did not itself undertake written warranty obligations.
The Amended Complaint alleges that, in connection with the sale of the
manufactured 	home, 	Hench’s 	provided 	plaintiffs 	a 	separate 	"Home 	Warranty
Information Sheet," on Hench's letterhead, which expressly stated that (i) the home
carried a one-year warranty, (ii) Hench's would correct cosmetic issues at trim-out,
and (iii) "any other issues would be taken care of within the first year." [Dkt. 56, ¶¶
19-20]. The Amended Complaint further alleges that Hench's retail contract "states"
that the home "was covered by a separate written warranty from Hench's," and that
plaintiffs were instructed to and did use Hench's "Service Line" to request warranty
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service. [Id., ¶¶ 17, 30, 38]. In Count VII, plaintiffs specifically plead that "Defendant
Hench's is a warrantor under the Act and … offered a written warranty covering the
Home (the Warranty)." [Id. ¶ 110].
Taken as true, these allegations describe an undertaking in writing, made in
connection with the sale of a consumer product, to repair or otherwise take remedial
action if the product fails to conform to the promised condition during a one-year
period. That description falls within the Act's definition of a "written warranty,"
which includes "any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier
of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with
respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications
set forth in the undertaking." 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). It also supports the pleaded
conclusion that Hench's acted as a "warrantor," defined as "any supplier or other
person who gives or offers to give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated
under an implied warranty," Id. § 2301(5), with respect to its own one-year warranty,
rather than functioning solely as a conduit for Jessup's manufacturer warranty. In
addition, as set forth in this Order, plaintiffs have adequately alleged a breach of
express warranty by Hench's under Oklahoma law, which is incorporated into their
Magnuson-Moss theory.
Defendants' contention that Hench's merely "supplied" warranty information,
or that paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint "admits" adequate disclosure of
another entity's warranty, is insufficient to defeat plausibility at this stage. The
Amended Complaint, together with plaintiffs' response, plausibly alleges that (i)
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Hench's own Home Warranty Information Sheet and oral representations promised
a distinct, dealer-side, full one-year warranty; (ii) those writings neither identify
Jessup as the warrantor nor describe the terms of Jessup's limited warrant; and (iii)
Hench's itself undertook and controlled warranty performance through its service
line and repair efforts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2303(a); 16 C.F.R. § 702.3. Accepting
those allegation as true, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law on a Rule 12(c)
record that Hench's was only relaying a manufacturer warranty or that it owed no
express warranty obligations of its own. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
plaintiffs have stated a plausible Magnuson-Moss claim for breach of an express
written warranty against Hench's. Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings
is therefore denied as to the express-warranty component of Count VII.
D. 	NEGLIGENCE | C OUNT IV
Defendants contend that Jordan v. Cates, 1997 OK 9, 935 P.2d 289, and its
progeny bar plaintiffs' negligence claim because Hench's has stipulated that Rupp
acted within the course and scope of his employment at all relevant times. [Dkt. 198
at 10]. Under Jordan, where a plaintiff's tort theory against an employer sounds
solely in negligent hiring, supervision, or retention and the employer admits vicarious
liability, separate negligent‑hiring or similar theories become "unnecessary and
superfluous." Jordan, ¶ 16, 935 P.2d at 293.
Plaintiffs, however, maintain that Count IV does not assert negligent-hiring,
supervision, or retention claims and is not confined to Rupp's conduct; rather, they
contend that the claim targets Hench's own operational acts and omissions in
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authorizing and performing remedial work that allegedly damaged the home and took
it out of compliance with applicable construction standards. [Dkt. 201 at 23 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 5402(6); 24 C.F.R. § 3280.2)]. The Amended Complaint alleges, among other
things, that Hench's accepted responsibility for frame damage occurring before
plaintiffs 	took 	possession, 	undertook 	frame 	repairs 	by 	removing 	several 	steel
crossmembers, and thereby exacerbated the home's structural deficiencies and
contributed to ongoing damage to the floor system and subfloor. [Dkt. 56, ¶¶ 45, 50-
52]. Those averments are framed as direct negligence by Hench's, not merely
derivative liability through Rupp.
By its terms and as applied in subsequent Oklahoma and federal decisions,
Jordan 	addresses 	duplicative 	employer-liability 	theories 	that 	accompany 	an
admitted respondeat superior claim and does not preclude independent causes of
action premised on an employer's own negligent performance of work or breach of a
direct duty of care. The cases invoked by Hench's—such as N.H. v. Presbyterian
Church U.S.A., 1999 OK 88, 998 P.2d 592, and Horton v. CRST Expedited, CIV-15-
226-RAW, 2015 WL 7575909 (E.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2015)—involved circumstances
where the employer's only alleged misconduct was negligent hiring, supervision, or
retention of the employee tortfeasor. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs advance a theory
that Hench's itself negligently performed warranty or remedial work on the home's
frame and structure, which is analytically distinct from any claim grounded solely in
Rupp's pre-sale representations. On this record, Jordan does not supply a legal basis
for granting Hench's judgment on the pleadings as to Count IV.
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E. 	UNJUST E NRICHMENT | C OUNT VI
Unjust enrichment "is a recognized ground for recovery in Oklahoma," N.C.
Corff P'ship, Ltd v. OXY USA, Inc., 1996 OK CIV APP 92, ¶ 24, 929 P.2d 288, 298,
and describes "a condition which results from the failure of a party to make
restitution in circumstances where it is inequitable," Harvell v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 2006 OK 24, ¶ 18, 164 P.3d 1028, 1035. "Under Oklahoma law, a party
may only recover under this theory by showing 'enrichment to another coupled with
a resulting injustice.'" Cty. Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir.
1991) (citation omitted) (applying Oklahoma law). As an equitable claim, unjust
enrichment generally is unavailable where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law. Harvell, supra. Oklahoma courts have emphasized their unwillingness to resort to
the doctrine of unjust enrichment where plaintiffs have asserted claims alleging breach
of contract, Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2013 OK 104, ¶ 34, 320 P.3d 1012, 1022,
or negligence, Hydro Turf, Inc. Int'l v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 2004 OK CIV APP 45, ¶ 19,
91 P.3d 667, 673.
In addition to unjust enrichment, plaintiffs assert a breach of contract claim
against Hench's and Rupp, as well as a negligence claim against Hench's. [Dkt. 56,
¶¶ 70-79, 87-97]. Because these claims provide adequate legal remedies under
Oklahoma jurisprudence, the unjust enrichment claim against those defendants is
barred as a matter of law.6 Accordingly, Hench's and Rupp are entitled to judgment
on the pleadings with respect to Count VI.
6 Plaintiffs are correct that "Oklahoma law [] 'clearly permits pleading alternative remedies …
as long as plaintiffs are not given double recovery for the same injury.'" [Dkt. 201 at 25]. Even so,
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III. 	CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the motion for judgment on the pleadings [Dkt. 198] filed on
behalf of defendants Hench's and Rupp is hereby GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Following entry of this Order, the status of each challenged
claim asserted in the Amended Complaint is as follows:
 	Count III, insofar as it alleges breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose against Hench's, is dismissed as a matter of law;
 	Count IV alleging negligence against Hench's remains pending;
 	Count V alleging violations of the OCPA against Hench's and Rupp remains
pending;
 	Count 	VI 	alleging 	unjust 	enrichment 	against 	Hench's 	and 	Rupp 	is
dismissed as a matter of law; and
 	Count VII alleging violations of the Magnuson-Moss Act against Hench's
remains pending.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 13th day of January, 2026.
_______________________________________
JASON A. ROBERTSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
federal courts remain free to dispose of claims that are unnecessary or redundant under Oklahoma
law. See Cardenas v. Ori, No. CIV-14-386-R, 2015 WL 2213510 at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 2015); Oliver
v. Soto, CIV-15-1106-R, 2016 WL 815343 at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 29, 2016). Against that backdrop,
plaintiffs' contention that dismissal of Count VI "at the pleading stage" is premature carries no weight
here, as discovery closed on September 5, 2025 [Dkt. 193 at 2], and plaintiffs have substantively
responded to multiple Daubert and summary judgment motions.
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