Shaik v. Melton et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ZAK SHAIK, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-252-JFH-GLJ
)
MARK MELTON, WALLACE 	)
COPPEDGE, JAMES ENGLISH, 	)
DARIN ROGERS, DON 	)
HELPINGSTINE, KENT MCKINLEY, 	)
COLT WILLIAMS, DARRELL 	)
HUDSON, BEN FLOWERS, REBECCA )
JOHNSON, KARA CHRISTY, and 	)
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY 	)
COMMISSIONERS OF OKLAHOMA, 	)
)
Defendants, 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on twelve pending motions: Defendants’
renewed motions to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Complaint, see Docket Nos. 134-139, 141-
142, as well as Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint [Docket No.
143], Motion for Judicial Notice of Invalid Lien and Related Fraud [Docket No. 145],
Motion for Expedited Discovery [Docket No. 151] and Motion for Sanctions [Docket No.
152]. 	Pro se Plaintiff Zak Shaik brings this case alleging he was unlawfully arrested,
detained, and incarcerated for contempt of court in Murray County, Oklahoma, on March
21, 2024. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ renewed Motions to Dismiss [Docket
Nos. 134-139, 141-142] should be GRANTED, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First
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Amended Complaint should be DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice of
Invalid Lien and Related Fraud [Docket No. 145], Motion for Expedited Discovery
[Docket No. 151] and Motion for Sanctions [Docket No. 152] should be DENIED.
Procedural History
Plaintiff Zak Shaik filed the original pro se Complaint in this matter on July 19,
2024.1 	Docket Nos. 1, 9.2 Shaik named eleven individuals in their individual capacities,
as well as the Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma (“ACCO”). 	The
individuals named are: Mark Melton, a judge in the Murray County District Court; Wallace
Coppedge, Chief Judge of Murray County District Court; James English, Assistant District
Attorney in Murray County; Darin Rogers, Sheriff of Murray County; Don Helpingstine,
Deputy Sheriff, Murray County; Kent McKinley, Colt Williams, and Darrell Hudson, each
Murray County Commissioners; Ben Flowers, employed by the Murray County Sheriff’s
Office; Rebecca Johnson, an attorney licensed in Oklahoma and “an officer of the court”;
and Kara Christy, a Claims Adjuster for ACCO. Docket No. 1, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 6-15. Plaintiff
alleges thirteen causes of action: (1) First Amendment retaliation, against all Defendants;
(2) unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as to all Defendants;
(3) a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, as to all Defendants; (4) a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection violation, as to all Defendants; (5) judicial misconduct, as to
1 Mr. Shaik filed four other related cases against various other parties on July 19, July 22, July 31,
and August 27, 2024. 	See OKED Case Nos. CIV-24-253-RAW-GLJ, CIV-24-256-RAW-GLJ,
CIV-24-256-RAW-GLJ, CIV-24-271-RAW-GLJ, and CIV-24-311-RAW-GLJ.
2 Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed in violation of Loc. Civ. R. 3.1, which requires that every
Complaint must be accompanied by a completed civil cover sheet. Plaintiff remedied this error
upon order of the Court, on August 4, 2024. See Docket Nos. 6, 9.
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Melton and Coppedge; (6) prosecutorial misconduct by failure to prosecute Plaintiff’s
complaints, as to English; (7) failure to intervene, as to Rogers, Helpingstine, and “other
law enforcement Defendants”; (8) conspiracy to violate civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, as to all Defendants; (9) violation of the right of assembly and petition, due process,
and unreasonable searches and seizures, under the Oklahoma Constitution, as to all
Defendants; (10) false imprisonment, as to all Defendants; (11) intentional infliction of
emotional 	distress, 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Oklahoma 	Governmental 	Tort 	Claims 	Act
(“OGTCA”), as to all Defendants; (12) violation of Oklahoma’s Open Records Act
(“ORA”), as to English, Rogers, and the three County Commissioners; and (13) violation
of the OGTCA as to all Defendants. Docket No. 1, pp. 7-13, ¶¶ 38-89. Plaintiff specifically
names each of the individual Defendants in their individual capacities. He requests relief
in the form of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs, fees, compliance with
the ORA, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Id., pp. 14-15, ¶¶ (a)-(h).
In general, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff appeared in a pro se capacity on
March 21, 2024, in front of Murray County District Judge Melton as the sole member of
Baari Ardmore Housing LLC, which was set for pre-trial conference in CS-2023-75, Okie
Plumbing LLC v. Baari Ardmore Housing LLC. 	Plaintiff alleges attorney Johnson used
disrespectful language and, when he objected, Judge Melton told him to “shut up and sit
down.” Plaintiff stated an intent to file an ethics complaint as to Melton, who then allegedly
had Plaintiff arrested for contempt of court without warning. 	Id., pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 16-20.
Plaintiff alleges Assistant DA English was present and failed to intervene. Id., p. 5, ¶ 27.
Plaintiff alleges Deputy Sheriff Helpingstine then arrested him and booked him into the
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Murray County Jail, Murray County Sheriff’s employee Flowers conducted a search of
Plaintiff, including his wallet and all belongings, before requiring Plaintiff to submit to a
strip search. 	Plaintiff alleges he objected on the basis of the Fourth Amendment, and
Flowers told him that his rights did not matter. Id., pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 21-24. Plaintiff alleges he
was detained in solitary confinement for three hours before he was released. 	Id., p. 5,
¶¶ 25-26.
On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff alleges he submitted an ORA request seeking
information related to his arrest and detention, and that Assistant DA English provided
only a partial response. Id., pp. 5, 7, ¶¶ 28-29, 37. Plaintiff alleges he then sent a “detailed
settlement letter” on April 22, 2024, to Chief Judge Coppedge, the three County
Commissioners, and Sheriff Rogers, requesting compensation. Plaintiff alleges he did not
receive a response. Id., ¶ 30. Plaintiff does not allege he filed a claim for compensation
with ACCO, but he alleges he received a denial letter from Claims Adjuster Christy, that
he sent a 10-page demand letter for reconsideration, and that it was likewise denied. Id.,
pp. 5-6, ¶¶ 31-33.
Plaintiff alleges that between March 22, 2024, and July 1, 2024, he sent five letters
and made multiple phone calls to Chief Judge Coppedge, and Coppedge failed to respond
to all his communications. 	Id., ¶ 34. 	Additionally, he alleges he filed three “motions to
dismiss the liens for fraud.” Id., ¶ 35. Plaintiff does not elaborate, but this appears to refer
to liens issued in the underlying Murray County case where Plaintiff attempted to represent
Baari Ardmore Housing, LLC himself, but attorney Johnson repeatedly (and correctly)
asserted that Plaintiff, as a non-attorney, could not represent his LLC in court. He alleges
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Johnson was a “willful participant in joint action with [unidentified] state actors. Id., p. 6,
¶ 36.
Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status on July 22, 2024, and
summons was issued as to all Defendants on August 14, 2024. See Docket Nos. 5, 11-22.
Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against each of them. See Docket Nos. 39, 46-47,
49, 57-60. On October 1, 2024, the Court referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge for all further proceedings in accordance with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636. See Docket No. 63. On October 18, 2024, the undersigned Magistrate Judge issued
a 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	sua 	sponte 	revisiting 	Plaintiff’s 	IFP 	status, 	and
recommending that his IFP status be revoked in the present cases and all related cases,
upon being made aware of serious concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of
Plaintiff’s IFP motion. See Docket No. 87. Then-Chief Judge Ronald A. White affirmed
and adopted the Report and Recommendation on December 20, 2024, and deemed moot
all pending motions, including the pending motions to dismiss. 	See Docket No. 108.
Plaintiff appealed this decision in each related case to the Tenth Circuit, which consolidated
the appeals. See Docket Nos. 113-117 and Circuit Case No. 25-7007. While the case was
still on appeal, Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this case on July 18, 2025, so on September
17, 2025, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. See Docket No. 131, p. 5.
Following the remand from the Tenth Circuit, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
instructed all parties that any relevant and applicable motion be re-filed, and all Defendants
filed renewed Motions to Dismiss. See Docket Nos. 134-139, 141-142. Plaintiff then filed
his Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, as well as motions asking the court
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to take judicial notice of a mechanic’s lien filed by attorney Johnson as invalid, for
expedited discovery, and for sanctions. 	See Docket Nos. 143, 145, 151-152. 	Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint indicates that his proposed
amendments refine and narrow claims under § 1983 to assert only personal constitutional
injuries, clarifies factual allegations, and supports his due process, First Amendment, and
abuse-of-process theories with updated case law and statutory references, but does not seek
to add new parties. Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint asserts only five claims for
relief: 	(1) First Amendment retaliation, as to Melton, Coppedge, Johnson, and English;
(2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
with no identified Defendants; (3) § 1983 claim for procedure due process violations of the
Fourth Amendment, as to unidentified Defendants; (4) an Oklahoma common law claim
for abuse of process as to Johnson, English, Rogers, “and others”; and (5) an Oklahoma
common law negligence claim as to ACCO and Christy. See Docket No. 143, Ex. 1, pp.
3-4, ¶¶ 23-31. 	Defendants object to Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint, primarily
on the grounds of futility. 	As discussed more fully below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge agrees. All motions are fully briefed, and the undersigned Magistrate Judge makes
the following findings.
Analysis
I. 	Standard for Motion to Dismiss
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Practically, this means that the “complaint must contain sufficient
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factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim
is plausible on its face when the complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“In considering whether the complaint’s allegations are sufficient, the court first eliminates
conclusory allegations, mere ‘labels and conclusions,’ and any ‘formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.’” 	Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 606 (10th Cir. 2022)
(Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The court then accepts as
true all well-pled factual allegations and considers ‘whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting VDARE Found. v. City of Colorado Springs, 11 F.4th
1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2021)).
When reviewing a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “‘must
determine 	whether 	the 	complaint 	sufficiently 	alleges 	facts 	supporting 	all
the elements necessary 	to 	establish 	an 	entitlement 	to 	relief 	under 	the 	legal 	theory
proposed.’” Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
680 F.3d 1194, 1201-1202 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478
F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007)). 	“While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that
Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause
of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.” 	Khalik v.
United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). 	In a case against multiple
defendants, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is
alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the
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basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations. . . .”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
liberally construes his pleadings. See Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992)
(requiring courts to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings); Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (a court construes a pro se party’s pleadings liberally and
holds them “to a less stringent standard than [that applied to] formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”). Although pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than ones drafted
by lawyers, a pro se litigant must “‘follow the same rules of procedure that govern other
litigants.’” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994)).
II. 	Defendants Chief Judge Coppedge and Judge Melton
Defendants Coppedge and Melton move to dismiss all claims against them,
asserting they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as well as absolute judicial
immunity. Coppedge and Melton assert Eleventh Amendment immunity as state officials
in their official capacities, despite being only sued in their individual capacities, because
the injunctive relief requested would attempt to direct official conduct. Because Plaintiff
explicitly raises claims only as to Coppedge and Melton in their individual capacities, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge declines to address the arguments as to the Eleventh
Amendment. 	See, e.g., Whitney v. State of N.M., 113 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 1997)
(“Contrary to the decision of the district court, the Eleventh Amendment does not operate
as a bar to Whitney’s claim against Patrick in his individual capacity.”).
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The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity shields judges from liability for their
“official adjudicative acts.” Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002). The
absolute judicial immunity doctrine is founded on “a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice [i.e.] that a judicial officer, in exercising
the authority vested in him, should be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 355 (1978)).
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity applies to all judges. Id. There are only
two exceptions to the doctrine: “(1) when the act is not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity, and (2) when the act, though judicial in nature, is taken in the complete absence
of all jurisdiction.” 	Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183,
1195 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)). As to the first exception, whether an action is within a
judge’s judicial capacity relates “to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they
dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (quoting Stump, 435
U.S. at 362). As to the second exception, the scope of a judge’s jurisdiction is “construed
broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. For this
exception to apply, the judge must have acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
All allegations as to both Coppedge and Melton involve actions clearly within their
judicial capacity and jurisdiction—presiding over assigned cases and responsibilities.
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Chief Judge Coppedge and Judge Melton are therefore entitled to absolute judicial
immunity. 	Defendants Judge Wallace Coppedge and Judge Mark Melton’s Renewed
Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 141] should therefore be granted.
III. 	Defendant Johnson
Defendant Johnson contends that the claims against her should be dismissed because
she is not a state actor, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim against her. 	Plaintiff alleges
Johnson spoke rudely to him during the state court hearing on March 21, 2024. 	Docket
No. 1, p. 4, ¶ 17. 	He further alleges that Johnson, in arguing that he could not represent
Baari Ardmore Housing LLC, took action that was inextricably intertwined with “those of
state actors,” including Judge Melton. This Court addressed this same matter with Plaintiff
in related Case No. CIV-24-256-RAW-GLJ, Shaik v. Mordy, et al., Docket No. 12, noting
that neither federal nor Oklahoma statutes nor case law supported his position that he
should be permitted to represent Baari Ardmore Housing, LLC, in a pro se capacity. Id.,
pp. 4-10 (collecting cases). Despite his arguments in the Response, Plaintiff’s Complaint
makes no allegation that Johnson worked with state officials to execute a fraudulent lien,
manipulated legal process, or caused Plaintiff’s contempt arrest and reputational injury.
Compare Docket No. 1 with Docket No. 140, p. 1.
Nevertheless, Johnson is potentially identified as a Defendant in Counts 1-4 (§ 1983
claims for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations), 8 (§ 1985 conspiracy
claim), 9 (Oklahoma constitutional violation), 10 (False Imprisonment), 11(Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress), and 13 (OGTCA violations).
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a. Counts 1-4. “A claim pleaded under § 1983 requires (1) deprivation of a federally
protected right by (2) an actor acting under color of state law.” VDARE, 11 F.4th at 1160
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	“The traditional definition of acting under color of
state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action exercised power possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law.” Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting this determination “is a mixed question of fact and law”).
In other words, the purpose of § 1983 is to “provide compensatory relief to those deprived
of their federal rights by state actors.” 	Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988).
Furthermore, “[t]here is ample authority holding that an attorney does not become a state
actor by virtue of instigating state court litigation.” 	Hirsch v. Copenhaver, 839 F. Supp.
1524, 1529 (D. Wyo. 1993), affirmed, 46 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Barnard v.
Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 939 n. 21 (1982)). Plaintiff’s allegation that Johnson acted in concert with state
actors in enforcing a mechanic’s lien does not rise to the level of acting together with or
obtaining significant aid from state officials. 	Nor is her conduct chargeable to the state.
Cf. Barnard, 720 F.3d at 1189 (“If an attorney does not become a state actor merely by
virtue of instigating state court litigation[,] then the attorney does not become a state actor
merely by employing state authorized subpoena power.”) (internal citation omitted).
Accordingly, Counts 1-4 should be dismissed because Johnson is not a state actor, and her
conduct did not rise to the level of acting together with or obtaining significant aid from
state officials, nor is her conduct chargeable to the state.
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b. Count 8-11, 13. Any Complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” sufficient to provide each Defendant
with “fair notice” by informing them of the actual grounds for the claim against each of
them. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges
that “Defendants” committed the acts in each of the remaining enumerated claims, with
zero specific allegations as to Johnson. 	These allegations do not establish any sufficient
cause of action as to Johnson, or Plaintiff’s right to bring them.
Accordingly, Defendant Rebecca Johnson’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief
in Support [Docket No. 134] should be granted.
IV. 	Assistant DA English
Assistant DA English moves to dismiss, asserting he has Eleventh Amendment
immunity, absolute prosecutorial immunity, and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim.
Assistant DA English is potentially identified as a Defendant in Counts 1-4 (§ 1983 claims
for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations), 6 (Prosecutorial Misconduct), 8
(§ 	1985 	conspiracy 	claim), 	9 	(Oklahoma 	constitutional 	violation), 	10 	(False
Imprisonment), 11 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), 12 (ORA violation) and
13 (OGTCA violations). 	Only Counts 6 and 12 identify him by name. 	The factual
allegations as to English in Plaintiff’s Complaint contend English, acting under color of
state law, was present in the courtroom during the “initial incident” and failed to intervene
or object to his arrest, shrugging and remaining silent. Docket No. 1, pp. 2 & 5, ¶¶ 8, 27.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges he submitted an ORA request seeking information regarding
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his arrest and detention, but that English only provided a partial response to the request,
withholding certain information and access to audio/video recordings. Id., p. 5, ¶¶ 28-29.
a. Counts 1-4, 8-11, and 13. 	As noted above, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that
“Defendants” committed the acts in each of these enumerated claims, with zero specific
allegations as to English. Plaintiff’s Response,3 consolidated to respond to all motions to
dismiss, responds to English’s arguments by insisting that English is not entitled to judicial
immunity (addressing his motion to dismiss along with Coppedge and Melton), and
generally asserting that he asserted plausible legal claims, deprivation of protected
constitutional rights, color of law involvement, and specific, personal participation of each
defendant. 	Docket No. 146, pp. 2-3. 	This assertion cannot overcome the reality of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, which makes no specific allegation to any Defendant as to Counts
1-4 (§ 1983 claims for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations), 8 (§ 1985
conspiracy claim), 9 (Oklahoma constitutional violation), 10 (False Imprisonment),
11(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), and 13 (OGTCA violations). The general
allegations that “Defendants” committed these violations do not establish any sufficient
cause of action as to English, or Plaintiff’s right to bring them. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
3 Notably, Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response (Docket No. 146) as to ACCO, Christy, Helpingstine,
Flowers, Rogers, Hudson, McKinley, Williams, Coppedge, Melton, and English largely fails to
rebut the arguments raised by any of the parties, instead asserting with support that Plaintiff
pleaded “specific, personal participation of each defendant.” Docket No. 146, p. 2. Furthermore,
he attempts to argue that the renewed motions to dismiss are frivolous and subject to sanctions,
clearly ignoring these renewed motions were specifically filed pursuant to this Court’s instruction
to re-file relevant any applicable motions [Docket No. 133] and that no argument has been
substantively addressed until now.
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b. 	Count 6, Prosecutorial Misconduct & Count 12, ORA violation. 	Because the
undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing all claims over which the Court has
original jurisdiction be dismissed, only Oklahoma state law claims remain. 	“A district
court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every
claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary[.]” 	Carlsbad
Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“The district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”) (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)). “[A] federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage
of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order
to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving
pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly
belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in
its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the
exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988), abrogated on other grounds in Royal Canin U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025), (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726-727 (1966)).
This case is not in the early stages of litigation; it has been pending for two years.
And while the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal prior to trial, the areas
of law are not novel to the Court. 	The Court may retain jurisdiction “if substantial time
and energy have been expended on the case prior to disposition of the federal claims. . . .
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[and where the Complaint] does not pose novel or unsettled questions of state law.” Jones
v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other
grounds in Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990). 	Accordingly,
the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends retaining jurisdiction considering the
nature of the claims remaining and their relationship to the federal claims, as well as the
time already expended upon this case.
Plaintiff 	alleges 	in 	Count 	6 	that 	English’s 	failure 	to 	intervene 	constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct and violates Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, and that
his refusal to prosecute Plaintiff’s complaints against “his colleagues” “demonstrates a
pattern of protecting fellow officials at the expense of citizens’ constitutional rights.” Id.,
p. 10, ¶¶ 64-65. 	As to Count 12, Plaintiff alleges that English’s partial and conditional
response to the ORA request violates the ORA. Id., p. 12, ¶¶ 84-85. Plaintiff insists he is
suing English in his individual capacity, but English asserts Eleventh Amendment
immunity for any claims pursuant to his official capacity and that any action in his official
capacity is actually a suit against the state. Furthermore, English asserts that Congress has
not abrogated the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity nor has Oklahoma consented to
suit in Federal Court, and that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state official in
his official capacity for money damages. Because Plaintiff explicitly raises claims only as
to English in his individual capacity, the undersigned Magistrate Judge declines to address
the arguments as to the Eleventh Amendment. 	See, e.g., Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1173
(“Contrary to the decision of the district court, the Eleventh Amendment does not operate
as a bar to Whitney’s claim against Patrick in his individual capacity.”).
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English contends he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, however, and
the undersigned Magistrate Judge agrees. “Absolute prosecutorial immunity is a complete
bar to a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty., 41 F.4th
1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). 	The Tenth Circuit likewise recognizes
that this applies to claims under Oklahoma common law. See, e.g., Modoc Nation v. Bohl,
2025 WL 2814397, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“In Oklahoma, ‘a judicial officer is not
liable in civil action for judicial acts.’”) (citing Powell v. Seay, 1976 OK 22, ¶ 10, 553 P.2d
161, 163). It is “recognized for a prosecutor’s activities that are ‘intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” 	Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 430 (1976)). 	The Tenth Circuit follows a “functional approach” to absolute
prosecutorial immunity, where courts “‘look to which role the prosecutor is performing’
at the time of the challenged conduct, Mink [v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1262 (10th Cir.
2007)], and examine ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who
performed it[.]’” Id. at 1209 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)).
The doctrine of absolute immunity, however, is not without limits. Absolute
prosecutorial immunity is justified “only for actions that are connected with
the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing
conduct. We will not extend absolute immunity when a prosecutor functions
in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of
advocate. 	The public policy considerations that support the protection of
prosecutorial functions are not applicable to investigative and administrative
acts.
Chilcoat, 41 F.4th at 1209 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Thomas v.
Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Absolute immunity extends only so far as
is necessary to protect the judicial process.”). 	Generally, “the determinative factor is
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advocacy.” Id. (quotation omitted). Under the functional approach, then, courts identify
the wrongful act precisely and classify it according to its function. Id. Actions taken, or
not taken, as part of a court hearing, as well as decisions regarding prosecution, are clearly
within the ambit of English’s advocacy functions as Assistant DA. Likewise are decisions
regarding interpretation of the Open Records Act and duties therefrom. 	Furthermore,
Assistant DA English is the wrong entity to sue if his ultimate goal is obtaining specific
records.
Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends Defendant Assistant
District Attorney James English’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support
[Docket No. 142] be granted.
V. 	Defendants ACCO and Christy
Defendants ACCO and Christy contend they have no direct liability to Plaintiff for
the handling and/or denial of his claim, and that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim
against them. 	Specifically, ACCO contends that the proper Defendant is ACCO-SIG, a
self-insured group that is a separate governmental entity. Furthermore, ACCO and Christy
contend they are not directly liable to Plaintiff, but are insurers. Plaintiff alleges ACCO is
an organization responsible for handling liability claims against member counties, and that
Christy is a Claims Adjuster for ACCO. 	Plaintiff alleges Christy was acting under color
of state law in her capacity as a claims adjuster for a state-created entity (ACCO). Docket
No. 1, p. 3, ¶¶ 14-15. 	Plaintiff further alleges Christy sent two denial letters regarding a
claim, and he alleges that denial of his claim represented a disregard for Plaintiff’s evidence
and legal arguments. Id., pp. 5-6, ¶¶ 31-33. ACCO and Christy are identified Defendants
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in Counts 1-4 (§ 1983 claims for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations), 8
(§ 	1985 	conspiracy 	claim), 	9 	(Oklahoma 	constitutional 	violation), 	10 	(False
Imprisonment), 	11(Intentional 	Infliction 	of 	Emotional 	Distress), 	and 	13 	(OGTCA
violations).
Setting aside questions regarding the proper naming of parties, as noted above,
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “Defendants” committed the acts in each enumerated
claim, with zero specific allegations as to ACCO or Christy. 	Plaintiff’s Response,4
consolidated to respond to all motions to dismiss, provides no direct response to ACCO
and Christy’s arguments, instead generally asserting that he asserted plausible legal claims,
deprivation of protected constitutional rights, color of law involvement, and specific,
personal participation of each defendant. 	Docket No. 146, p. 2. 	This assertion cannot
overcome the reality of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which makes no specific allegation to any
Defendant as to Counts 1-4 (§ 1983 claims for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
violations), 8 (§ 1985 conspiracy claim), 9 (Oklahoma constitutional violation), 10 (False
Imprisonment), 	11(Intentional 	Infliction 	of 	Emotional 	Distress), 	and 	13 	(OGTCA
violations). The general allegations that “Defendants” committed these violations do not
establish any sufficient cause of action as to ACCO or Christy, or Plaintiff’s right to bring
them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248.
Accordingly, Defendants Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma and
Kara Christy’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 135] should
4 See supra, n.3.
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be granted.
VI. 	Defendants Hudson, McKinley, and Williams (County Commissioners)
County Commissioner Defendants Hudson, McKinley, and Williams move to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges
that County Commissioners Hudson, McKinley, and Williams were acting under color of
state law. Docket No. 1, p. 3, ¶ 11. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that he sent a detailed
settlement letter to, inter alia, the County Commissioners, and he did not receive a
response. Id., p. 5, ¶ 30. McKinley, Hudson, and Williams are identified as a Defendant
in Counts 1-4 (§ 1983 claims for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations), 8
(§ 	1985 	conspiracy 	claim), 	9 	(Oklahoma 	constitutional 	violation), 	10 	(False
Imprisonment), 11(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), 12 (ORA Violation), and
13 (OGTCA violations). Count 12 identifies “the Commissioner Defendants” specifically,
but states no additional facts or allegations toward their actions other than to assert
generally that officials failed to comply with the ORA. All other counts fail to identify any
specific Defendant.
Again, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “Defendants” committed the acts in each
enumerated claims except for Count 12, with zero specific allegations as to McKinley,
Hudson, or Williams at any point in the Complaint. 	Plaintiff’s consolidated Response,
states that he intended to oppose the motion to dismiss filed by these three Defendants, but
makes no further mention of these Defendants or their arguments. 	Instead, Plaintiff
generally 	asserts 	that 	he 	asserted 	plausible 	legal 	claims, 	deprivation 	of 	protected
constitutional rights, color of law involvement, and specific, personal participation of each
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defendant. 	Docket No. 146, p. 2. 	This bald assertion cannot overcome the reality of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, which makes no specific allegation to any Defendant as to Counts
1-4 (§ 1983 claims for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations), 8 (§ 1985
conspiracy claim), 9 (Oklahoma constitutional violation), 10 (False Imprisonment),
11(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), and 13 (OGTCA violations). The general
allegations that “Defendants” committed these violations do not establish any sufficient
cause of action as to ACCO or Christy, or Plaintiff’s right to bring them. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2); Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 (10th Cir. 2008). Additionally, because Plaintiff failed
to sufficiently allege that Defendants McKinley, Hudson, and Williams violated a clearly
established constitutional right, they are likewise entitled to qualified immunity as to
Counts 1-4 and 8, the claims brought pursuant to § 1983 and § 1985.
The 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	again 	recommends 	against 	declining
supplemental jurisdiction as to remaining state claim Count 12. See Intermountain Power
Project, 794 F.2d at 550. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further finds, however, that
Plaintiff likewise fails to state a claim against McKinley, Hudson, or Williams in Count
12, where he sets forth no facts allowing Defendants to know who did what to whom. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248.
Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’
McKinley, Williams, and Hudson’s Reurged Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support
[Docket No. 139] be granted.
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VII. 	Defendants Rogers (Sheriff), Helpingstine (Deputy Sheriff), and Flowers
(Sheriff’s employee)
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Rogers, Deputy Sheriff Helpingstine, and Sheriff
employee Flowers were acting under color of state law. 	Docket No. 1, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 9-10,
12. 	As to the factual allegations, Plaintiff alleges Helpingstine arrested him on Judge
Melton’s order, that Flowers conducted the strip search of Plaintiff and that Flowers told
Plaintiff, inter alia, “Your rights don’t matter here.” Id., pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 21-23. Plaintiff further
alleges that he sent his detailed settlement letter to Rogers, but Rogers did not respond. Id.,
p. 5, ¶ 30. 	Plaintiff also alleges that he made five separate ORA requests to the Murray
County Sheriff’s office, but each request was ignored or he was told there were no records
available. Id., p. 7, ¶ 37.
Rogers, Helpingstine, and Flowers are identified as Defendants in Counts 1-4
(§ 1983 claims for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations), 7 (failure to
intervene), 8 (§ 1985 conspiracy claim), 9 (Oklahoma constitutional violation), 10 (False
Imprisonment), 11(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), 12 (ORA Violation), and
13 (OGTCA violations). 	Count 7 identifies “Rogers, Helpingstine, and other law
enforcement defendants,” asserting that they collectively had a duty to intervene to prevent
constitutional violations and that they took an oath to uphold the Constitution, including
the right to free speech. Docket No. 1, p. 10, ¶¶ 68-69. Count 12 identifies Sheriff Rogers
only, of these three Defendants, but states no additional facts or allegations toward his
actions other than to assert generally that officials failed to comply with the ORA. 	All
other counts fails to identify any specific Defendant. Id., p. 12, ¶¶ 83-85.
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Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to Rogers are that he failed to respond to Plaintiff’s
detailed settlement letter and that the Sheriff’s office as a whole insufficiently responded
to his ORA requests. 	Plaintiff makes no assertion that Rogers was present for Plaintiff’s
arrest, and therefore any allegation as to failing to intervene or with regard to the processing
of an ORA claim fails to state a claim as to Rogers. Furthermore, the general allegations
that “Defendants” committed the alleged violations in Counts 1-4, 8-11, and 13 do not
establish any sufficient cause of action as to Flowers, or Plaintiff’s right to bring them.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs’ sole factual allegation as to Helpingstine is that he arrested Plaintiff at
Judge Melton’s instruction. 	Helpingstine contends that he is therefore entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity for any claim arising therefrom. 	The undersigned Magistrate Judge
agrees. 	“Courts have long recognized that a litigant dissatisfied with the outcome of
judicial proceedings will oftentimes accuse his ‘adversaries’ of constitutional infirmities.”
Valdez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1287 (10th Cir. 1989).
Enforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically associated with a judicial
proceeding. If losing parties were free to challenge the will of the court by
threatening its officers with harassing litigation, the officers might neglect
the execution of their sworn duties. . . . Absolute immunity for officials
assigned to carry out a judge’s orders is necessary to insure that such officials
can perform their function without the need to secure permanent legal
counsel. A lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process.
Id., 878 F.2d at 1288 (internal citation omitted). “To force officials performing ministerial
acts intimately related to the judicial process to answer in court every time a litigant
believes the judge acted improperly is unacceptable.” Id. at 1289. “The proper procedure
for a party who wishes to contest the legality of a court order enforcing a judgment is to
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appeal that order and the underlying judgment, not to sue the official responsible for its
execution.” Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986).
As to Flowers, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that is plausible on its face because his
Complaint is devoid of specific, non-conclusory factual allegations to support any of the
claims against him. The general allegations that “Defendants” or “other law enforcement
Defendants” committed the alleged violations in Counts 1-4, 7-11, and 13 do not establish
any sufficient cause of action as to Flowers, or Plaintiff’s right to bring them. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2); Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248.
Accordingly, 	the 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	recommends 	that 	Defendant
Helpingstine’s Re-Urged Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 136],
Defendant Flowers’ Re-Urged Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 137],
and Defendant Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 138] be
granted.
VIII. 	Futility of Amendment
Following the filing of the renewed motions to dismiss, Plaintiff moved for leave to
file an Amended Complaint [Docket No. 143]. 	The attached proposed Amended
Complaint, Docket No. 143, Ex. 1, shorter than the original Complaint, no longer alleges
the capacity of the individuals named in the Complaint, and contains fewer factual
allegations and causes of action. 	The proposed Amended Complaint sets forth the
following claims for relief: 	(1) First Amendment retaliation pursuant to § 1983, as to
Melton, Coppedge, English, and Johnson “for protected courtroom speech and filings”;
(2) unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to § 1983, identifying
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no Defendant at all; (3) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, pursuant
to § 1983, identifying no Defendant; (4) Oklahoma common law abuse of process claim as
to Johnson, English, 	Rogers, “and others”; and (5) Oklahoma common law negligence
claim as to ACCO and Christy.
As cited above, the Complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” sufficient to provide each Defendant with
“fair notice” by informing them of the actual grounds for the claim against each of them.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248. 	Counts 2 and 3 of the proposed
Amended Complaint identify no defendant at all. Counts 1, 4, and 5 likewise fail to allege
what actions each Defendant took in committing these alleged acts. 	The only specific
allegations are that Johnson filed a lien against an LLC, and that, at a hearing regarding the
lien Plaintiff was arrested for contempt on Judge Melton’s order, he was arrested and jailed
for several hours. 	As discussed above, Judge Melton’s official adjudicative acts are
protected by absolute judicial immunity. Furthermore, the only allegation of action as to
Johnson is that she filed a lien. Plaintiff complains of First Amendment retaliation in Count
1 as to multiple parties, including Johnson, regarding courtroom speech and filings that
necessarily took place after the lien was filed. 	Plaintiff’s allegations as amended are not
actionable. 	Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110 (“[C]onclusory allegations without supporting
factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.”).
Plaintiff has been on notice of the defects in his original Complaint, as discussed at
length above, based on the arguments in the Defendants’ original and renewed motions to
dismiss. 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) provides that the “court should freely give leave when
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justice so requires,” and that is especially true “when the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.”
Panicker v. State Dept. of Agriculture, 498 Fed. Appx. 755, 757 (10th Cir. 2012); see also
Gray v. Geo Grp., Inc., 727 Fed. Appx. 940, 948 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[D]enial of leave is
generally justified only for ‘undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith
or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or
futility of amendment.’”) (quoting Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir.
1993)). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where
it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be
futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	The undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that
further amendment in this case would be futile. Because Plaintiff failed to correct any of
numerous mistakes upon notice by the parties in his current proposed Amended Complaint,
and Plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged, any amendment to allow further
claim for damages for the same actions would be futile. See Jefferson County School Dist.
No. R–1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Services, Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir.1999)
(“Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend shall be given freely, the
district court may deny leave to amend where amendment would be futile[.] A proposed
amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint [Docket
No. 143] should be denied.
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IX. 	Remaining Motions.
In 	light 	of 	the 	above 	recommendations, 	the 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge
recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Invalid Lien and Related Fraud
[Docket No. 145], Motion for Expedited Discovery [Docket No. 151] and Motion for
Sanctions [Docket No. 152] be DENIED AS MOOT.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge hereby RECOMMENDS that
Defendant Rebecca Johnson’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket
No. 134], Defendants Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma and Kara
Christy’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 135], Defendant
Helpingstine’s Re-Urged Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 136],
Defendant Flowers’ Re-Urged Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 137],
and Defendant Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 138],
Defendants’ McKinley, Williams, and Hudson’s Reurged Motion to Dismiss and Brief in
Support [Docket No. 139], Defendants Judge Wallace Coppedge and Judge Mark Melton’s
Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Docket No. 141], and Defendant
Assistant District Attorney James English’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in
Support [Docket No. 142] be GRANTED and the case dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint [Docket No. 143] should be
DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Invalid Lien and Related Fraud
[Docket No. 145], Motion for Expedited Discovery [Docket No. 151] and Motion for
Sanctions [Docket No. 152] should likewise be DENIED AS MOOT.
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Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
days. See 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Any objections and response shall
each be limited to 10 pages and a reply is permitted only with leave of court upon a showing
of good cause.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of February, 2026.
GERALD L. JACKSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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