Shaik v. Melton et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ZAK SHAIK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK MELTON, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.1
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	the 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	(“R&R”)
issued by U.S. Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Jackson (Docket No. 170)
regarding defendants’ renewed motions to dismiss (Docket Nos. 134,
135, 	136, 	137, 	138, 	139, 	141, 	142). 	The 	R&R 	also 	addresses
plaintiff 	Zak 	Shaik 	(“plaintiff”)’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	the
first 	amended 	complaint 	(Docket 	No. 	143), 	motion 	for 	judicial
notice of invalid lien and related fraud (Docket No. 145), motion
for expedited discovery (Docket No. 151), and motion for sanctions
(Docket 	No. 	152). 	This 	case 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	by 	designation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(d). 	See Docket No. 146.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and
REJECTS IN PART the R&R. 	Defendant Ben Flowers’s motion to dismiss
1 Senior United States District Judge for the District of Puerto Rico, sitting
by designation.
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	2
is 	DENIED 	IN 	PART. 	(Docket 	No. 	137.) 	Defendants’ 	motions 	to
dismiss with respect to each defendant except Flowers are GRANTED.
(Docket 	Nos. 	134, 	135, 	136, 	138, 	139, 	141, 	142). 	Plaintiff’s
motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	the 	complaint 	is 	DENIED. 	(Docket
No. 143.) 	Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice of invalid lien
is 	MOOT. 	(Docket 	No. 	145.) 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	expedited
discovery 	is 	DENIED. 	(Docket 	No. 	151.) 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for
sanctions is DENIED. 	(Docket No. 152.)
I. 	Background
Plaintiff 	brought 	this 	suit 	against 	(1) 	Mark 	Melton, 	an
Oklahoma 	state 	court 	judge 	of 	the 	Murray 	County 	District 	Court,
(2) Wallace Coppedge, district judge of the Murray County District
Court, 	(3) 	James 	English, 	assistant 	district 	attorney 	in 	Murray
County, 	(4) 	Rebecca 	Johnson, 	an 	Oklahoma 	attorney, 	(5) 	Darin
Rogers, Murray County sheriff, (6) Don Helpingstine, Murray County
deputy sheriff, (7) Ben Flowers, an employee in the Murray County
sheriff’s 	office, 	(8) 	Kent 	McKinley, 	Murray 	County 	commissioner,
(9) 	Colt 	Williams, 	Murray 	County 	commissioner, 	(10) 	Darrell
Hudson, Murray County commissioner, (11) the Association of County
Commissioners of Oklahoma (“ACCO”), and (12) Kara Christy, a claims
adjuster 	for 	ACCO. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	1, 	pp. 	2-3; 	Docket 	No. 	170 	at
p. 2. 	The case arises from proceedings in Murray County District
Court over a limited liability company of which plaintiff was the
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	3
sole 	member. 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that, 	during 	court 	proceedings,
opposing 	counsel 	Rebecca 	Johnson 	used 	disrespectful 	language
against 	him. 	(Docket 	No. 	1 	at 	p. 	4.) 	When 	he 	tried 	to 	object,
Judge 	Melton 	was 	not 	receptive. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	then 	“calmly”
expressed 	his 	intent 	to 	file 	an 	ethical 	complaint 	against 	Judge
Melton, which caused Judge Melton to hold him in contempt of court.
Id. 	Plaintiff 	was 	arrested 	by 	defendant 	Don 	Helpingstine 	while
District Attorney James English remained silent. 	Id. at pp. 4-5.
While 	being 	booked 	at 	the 	Murray 	County 	jail, 	plaintiff 	alleges
that he was strip-searched by defendant Ben Flowers and then held
in 	solitary 	confinement 	for 	three 	hours. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	later
sought 	audio 	and 	video 	records 	of 	the 	courtroom 	from 	DA 	English,
who 	allegedly 	withheld 	some 	of 	the 	recordings. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	5. 	He
also 	requested 	arrest 	records 	from 	the 	Murray 	County 	Sheriff’s
office, 	but 	his 	requests 	were 	either 	ignored 	or 	met 	with 	a 	“no
records 	available” 	response. 	Id. 	at 	p. 7. 	Plaintiff 	wrote 	on
multiple occasions to Judge Coppedge, complaining profusely about
his allegedly illegal arrest, but Judge Coppedge did not respond.
Id. 	at 	p. 	6. 	Plaintiff 	also 	alleges 	that 	defendant 	Johnson 	was
colluding with Judge Melton to orchestrate his case’s defeat. 	Id.
Last, without explaining exactly how the following relates to his
above claims, he argues that defendant Kara Christy wrongly denied
a claim he had before ACCO. 	Id. at pp. 5-6.
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Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	asserts 	claims 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 1983
“against all defendants” for violations of his First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights.2 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	7-9. 	He 	also 	asserts
judicial 	misconduct 	claims 	against 	Judges 	Melton 	and 	Coppedge,
prosecutorial misconduct against DA English, failure to intervene
to 	prevent 	constitutional 	violations 	against 	Darin 	Rogers,
Helpingstine and “other law enforcement defendants,” conspiracy to
violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against all
defendants, 	Oklahoma 	constitutional 	violations 	against 	all
defendants, false imprisonment against all defendants, intentional
infliction of emotional distress against all defendants, violation
of the Oklahoma Open Records Act3 against DA English, Rogers, and
the 	commissioner 	defendants, 	and 	violation 	of 	the 	Oklahoma
Governmental 	Tort 	Claims 	Act4 	against 	all 	defendants. 	Id. 	at
pp. 9-13.
After various procedural developments not relevant here, each
defendant 	moved 	to 	dismiss. 	The 	magistrate 	judge 	recommends
granting 	each 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	dismissing 	all 	of 	plaintiff’s
claims without prejudice. 	He finds that many of plaintiff’s claims
2 § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of [law,] subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured.” 	42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3 Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 24A.1 – 24A.40.
4 Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151-258.
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	5
should be dismissed because the defendants possess immunities – in
the case of Judges Melton and Coppedge, absolute judicial immunity,
in the case of DA English, prosecutorial immunity, and in the case
of 	defendant 	Helpingstine, 	quasi-judicial 	immunity. 	See 	Docket
No. 170 	at 	pp. 	8-10 	(Judges 	Melton 	and 	Coppedge); 	pp. 	12-17 	(DA
English); 	pp. 	21-23 	(Helpingstine). 	He 	recommends 	that 	the
section 1983 claims against defendant Johnson be dismissed because
she 	is 	not 	a 	state 	actor, 	notwithstanding 	plaintiff’s 	conclusory
allegation that she conspired with state actors. 	Id. at pp. 10-12.
He finds that all of plaintiff’s remaining claims (against Johnson,
English, 	the 	ACCO, 	Christy, 	Hudson, 	McKinley, 	Williams, 	Rogers,
and 	Flowers) 	lack 	enough 	information 	related 	to 	each 	defendant’s
conduct 	to 	state 	a 	claim. 	As 	for 	plaintiff’s 	motions, 	the
magistrate 	judge 	recommends 	denying 	his 	request 	to 	amend 	the
complaint 	because 	his 	proposed 	First 	Amended 	Complaint 	fails 	to
cure 	the 	defects 	of 	his 	original 	complaint. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	23-25.
The 	magistrate 	judge 	recommends 	finding 	plaintiff’s 	remaining
motions moot. 	Id. at p. 26.
Plaintiff makes four objections to the R&R. 	First, he argues
that 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	dismissal 	of 	claims 	that 	did 	not
adequately 	attribute 	specific 	conduct 	to 	specific 	defendants
applied 	an 	“overly 	rigid 	group 	pleading 	standard” 	that 	is
inconsistent 	with 	the 	lenience 	typically 	afforded 	to 	pro 	se
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	6
plaintiffs. 	(Docket No. 171 at pp. 1-2.) 	Second, he argues that
the 	magistrate 	judge 	erred 	in 	denying 	his 	request 	to 	amend 	the
complaint. 	Id. at pp. 2-3. 	Third, he argues that the magistrate
judge 	improperly 	found 	that 	the 	claims 	against 	Judges 	Melton 	and
Coppedge, 	DA 	English, 	and 	defendant 	Helpingstine 	were 	barred 	by
judicial, 	prosecutorial, 	and 	quasi-judicial 	immunity. 	Id. 	at
p. 3. 	Fourth, 	he 	argues 	that 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	erroneously
denied 	his 	request 	for 	expedited 	discovery. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	4. 	The
defendants 	filed 	a 	joint 	objection 	to 	the 	R&R 	with 	a 	single
argument – that the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims should be with
prejudice, not without prejudice. 	See Docket No. 172.
II. 	Legal Standard
A 	district 	court 	may 	refer 	a 	pending 	motion 	to 	a 	magistrate
judge 	for 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation. 	See 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(a). 	Any 	party 	adversely
affected 	by 	the 	report 	and 	recommendation 	may 	file 	written
objections within fourteen days of being served with the magistrate
judge’s 	report. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1). 	“A 	party 	that 	files 	a
timely 	objection 	is 	entitled 	to 	a 	de 	novo 	determination 	of 	those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations 	to 	which 	a 	specific 	objection 	is 	made.” 	Lowery
Wilkinson 	Lowery, 	LLC 	v. 	Illinois, 	No. 	25-CV-22-RAW, 	2025 	U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 268063, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 31, 2025) (citing United
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	7
States 	v. 	Raddatz, 	446 	U.S. 	667, 	673 	(1980)). 	“The 	objections
must 	specifically 	identify 	those 	findings 	or 	recommendations 	to
which 	objections 	are 	being 	made” 	and 	“[t]he 	district 	court 	need
not 	consider 	frivolous, 	conclusive, 	or 	general 	objections.” 	Id.
(citing Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.
1987)). 	In 	conducting 	its 	review, 	the 	court 	is 	free 	to 	“accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(a)(b)(1).
Pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(6) 	(“Rule
12(b)(6)”), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure
to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted. 	See 	Fed. 	R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint
must 	contain 	enough 	factual 	matter 	“to 	state 	a 	claim 	to 	relief
that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face.” 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550
U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007). 	A 	court 	must 	decide 	whether 	the 	complaint
alleges facts which “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” 	Id. at 555. 	“At the motion-to-dismiss stage, [the Court]
must 	accept 	as 	true 	all 	well-pleaded 	factual 	allegations 	in 	a
complaint 	and 	view 	these 	allegations 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable
to the plaintiff.” 	Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	8
A 	pro 	se 	litigant’s 	pleadings 	should 	be 	held 	“to 	less
stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings 	drafted 	by 	lawyers.”
Tatten v. City & Cty. of Denver, 730 F. App’x. 620, 624 (10th Cir.
2018) 	(quoting 	Haines 	v. 	Kerner, 	404 	U.S. 	519, 	520 	(1972)). 	On
the 	other 	hand, 	“a 	pro 	se 	litigant’s 	‘conclusory 	allegations
without 	supporting 	factual 	averments 	are 	insufficient 	to 	state 	a
claim 	on 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	based.’” 	West 	v. 	United 	States,
No. 25-3082, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24165, at *5 (10th Cir. Dept. 18,
2025) 	(quoting 	Hall 	v. 	Bellmon, 	935 	F.2d 	1106, 	1110 	(10th 	Cir.
1991)).
III. Discussion
A. 	Judicial & Prosecutorial Immunity
The Court will start by addressing plaintiff’s objection
to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	finding 	that 	defendants 	Melton,
Coppedge, English, and Helpingstine are immune from suit. 	(Docket
No. 	171 	at 	p. 	3.) 	The 	magistrate 	judge 	recommended 	dismissal 	of
the claims against Melton and Coppedge pursuant to the doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity, against English based on prosecutorial
immunity, 	and 	against 	Helpingstine 	based 	on 	quasi-judicial
immunity. 	The 	Court 	agrees 	with 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s
recommendation dismissing these claims.
First, the claims against Judges Melton and Coppedge are
barred 	by 	absolute 	judicial 	immunity. 	“Except 	where 	a 	judge 	has
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	9
acted ‘in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,’ the doctrine of
judicial immunity shields that judge from liability for the judge’s
official adjudicative acts.” 	Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939
(10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57
(1978)). 	The actions that Judge Melton took in holding plaintiff
in 	contempt 	were 	clearly 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	his 	official
adjudicative 	acts 	and 	jurisdiction. 	Under 	Oklahoma 	law, 	judges
have 	the 	authority 	to 	“cite 	for 	contempt 	anyone 	who, 	in 	his
presence in open court, willfully obstructs judicial proceedings.”
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 565.1. 	Punishment for contempt may include
“imprisonment 	in 	the 	county 	jail 	not 	exceeding 	six 	[] 	months[.]”
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 566. 	Because Judge Melton “had the general
power 	to 	control 	his 	courtroom 	and 	to 	hold 	individuals 	present
there 	in 	contempt[,]” 	his 	actions 	were 	within 	the 	scope 	of
jurisdiction, 	and 	“[w]hether 	he 	used 	that 	power 	appropriately 	is
not the relevant question.” 	Orta v. Repp, No. 3:22-CV-00359-JGC,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224633, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2022).
As 	for 	Judge 	Coppedge, 	plaintiff 	alleges 	without
explanation that he was responsible for supervising Judge Melton.
See 	Docket 	No. 	1 	at 	p. 	2 	(stating 	that 	Judge 	Coppedge 	“was
responsible for the training and supervision of [Judge] Melton.”)
If 	true, 	such 	conduct 	would 	clearly 	be 	within 	his 	official
adjudicative duties, and if not, it is hard to see how he could be
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	10
liable 	for 	actions 	taken 	by 	Judge 	Melton. 	In 	either 	case, 	the
claims against Judge Coppedge must be dismissed.
Similarly, 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	properly 	found 	that
defendant Helpingstine is protected by quasi-judicial immunity, at
least with respect to the claims stemming from plaintiff’s arrest
for 	contempt. 	“Absolute 	immunity, 	which 	has 	long 	been 	available
to 	protect 	judges 	from 	liability 	for 	acts 	performed 	in 	their
judicial capacity, has been extended to certain others who perform
functions closely associated with the judicial process.” 	Ward v.
Fisher, 	No. 	24-5083, 	2025 	U.S. 	App. 	LEXIS 	7506, 	at 	*7 	(10th 	Cir.
Apr. 1, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Such immunity
is 	often 	called 	quasi-judicial 	immunity 	because 	it 	is 	applied 	to
someone 	other 	than 	a 	judge.” 	Id. 	(internal 	quotation 	marks
omitted). 	Quasi-judicial 	immunity 	has 	been 	extended 	to 	cover
“officials 	charged 	with 	the 	duty 	of 	executing 	a 	facially 	valid
court order[.]” 	Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir. 1990)).
As 	discussed 	above, 	the 	arrest 	warrant 	for 	contempt 	was 	within
Judge Melton’s jurisdiction to issue. 	Plaintiff fails to present
any non-conclusory allegation that would render the arrest warrant
facially invalid. 	Accordingly, defendant Helpingstine is entitled
to 	quasi-judicial 	immunity 	against 	plaintiff’s 	claims 	related 	to
the contempt arrest.
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As for defendant English, plaintiff cites two instances
of allegedly wrongful conduct – staying silent when plaintiff was
arrested 	for 	contempt 	of 	court, 	and 	alleged 	withholding 	of
documents 	related 	to 	his 	arrest 	and 	detention. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	1
at 	p. 	10. 	Any 	claim 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	first 	is 	clearly 	barred
by prosecutorial immunity. 	“Absolute immunity [is] recognized for
a prosecutor’s activities that are ‘intimately associated with the
judicial 	phase 	of 	the 	criminal 	process.’” 	Chilcoat 	v. 	San 	Juan
Cnty., 	41 	F.4th 	1196, 	1208 	(10th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(quoting 	Imbler 	v.
Pachtman, 	424 	U.S. 	409, 	430 	(1976)). 	What 	DA 	English 	did 	or 	did
not do while sitting in court prosecuting a case is about as close
as 	one 	gets 	to 	conduct 	“connected 	with 	the 	prosecutor’s 	role 	in
judicial proceedings[.]” 	Id. at 1209.
With respect to the Open Records Act claim, DA English’s
alleged 	partial 	response 	fits 	less 	well 	into 	his 	prosecutorial
duties. 	This 	claim, 	however, 	fails 	for 	a 	different 	reason. 	The
Open 	Records 	Act 	requires 	“public 	bodies” 	and 	“public 	officials”
to 	keep 	records 	open 	for 	“inspection, 	copying, 	or 	mechanical
reproduction 	during 	regular 	business 	hours[.]” 	Okla. 	Stat.
tit. 51, 	§ 24A.5. 	Any 	duty 	to 	produce 	documents 	that 	DA 	English
may 	have 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Open 	Records 	Act 	would 	arise 	from 	his
status 	as 	a 	public 	official 	– 	he 	has 	no 	duties 	in 	his 	individual
capacity. 	But 	plaintiff 	sued 	English 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	12
only, not in his official capacity. 	Accordingly, plaintiff’s Open
Records 	Act 	allegations 	against 	English 	also 	fail 	to 	state 	a
claim.5
B. 	Claims Dismissed for Lack of Specificity
Next, 	the 	Court 	will 	consider 	plaintiff’s 	objection 	to
the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommended 	dismissal 	of 	his 	claims 	based
on lack of specificity as to each defendant’s wrongdoing.6 	(Docket
No. 	171 	at 	pp. 	1-2.) 	As 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	indicated, 	many 	of
plaintiff’s 	claims 	allege 	that 	defendants 	collectively 	violated
various laws. 	Relying on Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242 (10th
Cir. 	2008), 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	rejected 	many 	of 	plaintiff’s
claims as failing to provide proper notice to the defendants with
what 	exactly 	they 	are 	being 	charged. 	See 	generally 	id. 	at 1250
(noting that “it is particularly important in [section 1983 cases
against multiple government actors] that the complaint make clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each
individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against
him 	or 	her, 	as 	distinguished 	from 	collective 	allegations 	against
the 	state.”) 	(emphasis 	in 	original). 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the
5 The same argument applies to plaintiff’s Open Records Act claims with respect
to the Murray County Sheriff’s office employees, who are only sued in their
individual capacities.
6 	The 	magistrate 	judge’s 	lack-of-specificity 	argument 	applied 	to 	all 	of
plaintiff’s 	claims 	apart 	from 	1) 	those 	dismissed 	due 	to 	judicial, 	quasi-
judicial, 	or 	prosecutorial 	immunity, 	and 	2) 	the 	section 1983 	claim 	against
defendant Johnson.
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magistrate 	judge’s 	reasoning 	subjects 	him 	to 	an 	overly 	exacting
pleading 	standard, 	particularly 	given 	his 	status 	as 	a 	pro 	se
plaintiff.
The Court does not find fault with most of the magistrate
judge’s recommended dismissals for lack of specificity. 	Although
a 	complaint 	need 	not 	be 	highly 	detailed, 	it 	must 	be 	facially
plausible – in other words, it must “plead[] factual content that
allows 	the 	court 	to 	draw 	the 	reasonable 	inference 	that 	the
defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the 	misconduct 	alleged.” 	Ashcroft 	v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	Without basic details as to who
did 	what, 	most 	of 	plaintiff’s 	claims 	do 	not 	allow 	the 	court 	to
draw 	such 	an 	inference. 	Instead, 	the 	complaint 	is 	rife 	with
conclusory 	allegations 	unsupported 	by 	any 	factual 	averment 	that
might render the claims plausible. 	See West, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS
24165, 	at 	*5 	(conclusory 	allegations 	without 	supporting 	factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be
based).
There are two claims where the Court disagrees with the
magistrate 	judge’s 	recommended 	dismissal 	based 	on 	lack 	of
specificity. 	The 	first 	claim 	is 	plaintiff’s 	Open 	Records 	Act
claims 	against 	the 	Murray 	County 	Sheriff’s 	office 	defendants 	-
Rogers, 	Helpingstine, 	and 	Flowers 	- 	though 	these 	are 	dismissed
because, 	as 	discussed 	above, 	the 	sheriff’s 	office 	defendants 	are
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only 	sued 	in 	their 	respective 	individual 	capacities. 	See 	supra
n. 5. 	The 	second 	is 	plaintiff’s 	second 	1983 	claim 	against
defendant Flowers based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the
strip search. 	Plaintiff alleges that, after his contempt arrest,
he 	was 	booked 	at 	the 	Murray 	County 	jail. 	While 	being 	booked, 	he
was 	subject 	to 	a 	cavity 	search 	by 	defendant 	Flowers. 	After 	the
search, 	he 	was 	placed 	in 	“solitary 	confinement” 	for 	three 	hours
before being released.
In 	Florence 	v. 	Bd. 	of 	Chosen 	Freeholders,7 	the 	Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of performing a full body cavity
search 	prior 	to 	incarceration, 	but 	noted 	potential 	limits.
Particularly relevant here is the Supreme Court’s observation that
a 	strip 	search 	may 	be 	excessive 	for 	a 	detainee 	held 	without
assignment to the general jail population and without substantial
contact with other detainees. 	Id. at 338-39; see also id. at 341
(Alito, 	J., 	concurring) 	(“[T]he 	Court 	does 	not 	hold 	that 	it 	is
always 	reasonable 	to 	conduct 	a 	full 	strip 	search 	of 	an 	arrestee
whose 	detention 	has 	not 	been 	reviewed 	by 	a 	judicial 	officer 	and
who 	could 	be 	held 	in 	available 	facilities 	apart 	from 	the 	general
population.”) 	Following 	Florence, 	the 	Tenth 	Circuit 	Court 	of
Appeals found that a body-cavity strip search of a detainee which
7 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	15
takes place before deciding whether the detainee will be housed in
the jail’s general population violates the Fourth Amendment. 	See
Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1235-
39 (10th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	contains 	sufficient 	non-
conclusory 	factual 	allegations 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	strip
search potentially violated the Fourth Amendment, and accordingly,
states a claim pursuant to section 1983. 	Plaintiff claims that he
was subject to a cavity search by defendant Flowers prior to being
held 	in 	solitary 	confinement 	at 	the 	Murray 	County 	jail. 	(Docket
No. 1 at pp. 4-5.) 	Interpreted in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, 	his 	allegations 	render 	it 	possible 	that 	the 	search
occurred 	before 	any 	determination 	that 	he 	would 	be 	placed 	in 	the
general 	population 	of 	the 	jail. 	Indeed, 	his 	allegation 	of
“solitary confinement” may be understood to indicate that he never
intermingled 	with 	the 	general 	population 	of 	the 	jail 	at 	all. 	If
so, 	the 	strip 	search 	was 	unreasonably 	invasive 	and 	violated 	his
Fourth Amendment rights.
Flowers’s 	defenses 	are 	not 	sufficient 	to 	defeat
plaintiff’s claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. 	He cannot rely
on 	qualified 	immunity. 	“Qualified 	immunity 	insulates 	officials
from 	civil 	liability 	so 	long 	as 	their 	conduct 	does 	not 	violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	16
reasonable 	person 	would 	have 	known.” 	Hinkle, 	962 	F.3d 	at 	1218
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	Here, Fourth Amendment rights
to 	unreasonable 	searches 	are 	clearly 	established, 	and 	both
Florence 	and 	Hinkle 	have 	been 	on 	the 	books 	for 	years. 	See 	Pray,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261919, at *27-28 (“The facts in Hinkle are
sufficient 	to 	put 	any 	reasonable 	officer 	on 	notice 	that 	it 	is
unlawful 	to 	strip 	search 	every 	arrestee 	who 	enters 	the 	booking
area 	before 	a 	determination 	to 	house 	the 	arrestee 	in 	general
population.”) 	Nor 	is 	it 	a 	defense 	that 	the 	complaint 	fails 	to
allege 	that 	Flowers 	knew 	plaintiff 	would 	not 	be 	placed 	in 	the
general 	population. 	For 	the 	strip 	search 	to 	be 	constitutionally
acceptable, the prison staff must have already determined that the
inmate 	will 	be 	placed 	in 	the 	general 	population. 	Plaintiff’s
allegations, 	interpreted 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	him,
suggest that this may not have been the case.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	adopts 	in 	part 	and 	rejects 	in
part the R&R’s findings dismissing plaintiff’s claims for lack of
specificity. 	The 	Court 	rejects 	the 	lack-of-specificity 	argument
with 	respect 	to 	the 	Open 	Records 	Act 	claims 	against 	Rogers,
Helpingstine, 	and 	Flowers, 	though 	these 	are 	dismissed 	on 	other
grounds. 	The Court also rejects the lack-of-specificity argument
as 	applied 	to 	plaintiff’s 	section 	1983 	claim 	against 	defendant
Flowers over the strip search, and will allow this claim to proceed
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	17
past the motion-to-dismiss stage. 	Every other application of the
lack-of-specificity argument is adopted.
C. 	Denying Leave to Amend
Plaintiff also objects to the magistrate judge’s refusal
to 	grant 	him 	leave 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint.8 	(Docket 	No. 	171
at pp. 2-3.) 	As the magistrate judge indicated, “court[s] should
freely give leave when justice so requires, [] especially [] when
the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.” 	(Docket No. 170 at pp. 24-25)
(citing Panicker v. State Dep’t of Agric., 498 Fed. Appx. 755, 757
(10th 	Cir. 	2012)). 	A 	court 	may 	refuse 	to 	grant 	leave 	to 	amend,
however, “upon a showing of futility of amendment.” 	Panicker, 498
Fed. 	Appx. 	at 	757 	(quoting 	Frank 	v. 	U.S. 	W., 	Inc., 	3 	F.3d 	1357,
1365 (10th Cir. 1993)) (internal alterations omitted). 	“A proposed
amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject
to dismissal.” 	Id. (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v.
Moody’s Inv.’s Serv., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999)).
8 Plaintiff’s motion requests leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 	Although a plaintiff may amend his or her complaint once as
of right, he or she must do so within 21 days of serving the original complaint
or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12(b),
(e), 	or 	(f), 	whichever 	is 	earlier. 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	15(a)(1). 	Plaintiff’s
request to amend the complaint was submitted in October 2025, over a year after
the first motion to dismiss was filed. 	See Docket No. 46; Docket No. 143. 	As
a result, plaintiff must obtain leave of the court before filing his amended
complaint. 	See United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 144 F. Supp.
3d 869, 877-79 (E.D. Va. 2015) (finding that “the time period for amending the
complaint as a matter of course under [Rule] 15(a)(1) beg[ins] when Defendants
filed their first motion to dismiss[,]” and subsequent motions to dismiss do
not toll the 21-day period).
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	18
The 	Court 	agrees 	with 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	finding
that 	plaintiff’s 	proposed 	First 	Amended 	Complaint 	does 	not 	cure
any 	of 	the 	deficiencies 	in 	his 	original 	complaint. 	As 	was 	the
case with his original complaint, most of the claims in plaintiff’s
amended 	complaint 	are 	built 	on 	conclusory 	allegations 	without
supporting 	factual 	averments. 	Indeed, 	his 	proposed 	amended
complaint 	generally 	contains 	less 	detail 	than 	the 	original.
Swapping the proposed amended complaint for the original complaint
would actively hurt his claim against defendant Flowers, the only
one plausible enough to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage,
and 	would 	not 	save 	any 	of 	his 	other 	claims 	from 	dismissal.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	plaintiff’s 	requested 	leave 	to
amend.
D. 	Denying Discovery Request
Plaintiff’s 	final 	objection 	to 	the 	R&R 	is 	to 	the
magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendation 	to 	deny 	his 	request 	for 	early
discovery. 	(Docket No. 171 at p. 4.) 	The magistrate judge found
that plaintiff’s request for early discovery was moot because his
complaints failed to state a single claim upon which relief may be
granted. 	Although the request for discovery is no longer moot due
to the survival of the lack of specificity claim against Flowers,
the Court rejects the request nonetheless.
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	19
“A 	party 	seeking 	expedited 	discovery 	in 	advance 	of 	a
Rule 26(f) conference has the burden of showing good cause for the
requested 	departure 	from 	usual 	discovery 	procedures.” 	Sirio 	v.
Stancil, 	No. 	1:25-cv-02790-RMR-SBP, 	2026 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	13159,
at 	*2 	(D. 	Colo. 	Jan. 	23, 	2026). 	In 	plaintiff’s 	case, 	however,
each of his cited reasons for good cause relate to claims that the
Court will dismiss. 	See Docket No. 151 at p. 1 (citing fraudulent
lien 	activity, 	contempt 	arrest 	without 	lawful 	basis, 	and 	a 	joint
conspiracy between private and public actors as factors supporting
good 	cause). 	He 	provides 	no 	reason 	why 	expedited 	discovery 	is
justified 	for 	his 	section 1983 	claim 	against 	defendant 	Flowers,
the 	only 	remaining 	claim. 	Accordingly, 	plaintiff’s 	request 	for
expedited discovery is DENIED.
E. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
Although 	not 	specifically 	addressed 	by 	the 	parties’
objections, 	the 	Court 	must 	address 	plaintiff’s 	motion 	for
sanctions. 	In 	that 	motion, 	plaintiff 	argues 	that 	defendants’
motions 	to 	dismiss 	are 	legally 	frivolous 	in 	violation 	of 	Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 	The magistrate judge found plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions moot because each of the defendants’ motions
to dismiss should be granted. 	Because the Court declines to grant
defendant Flowers’s motion to dismiss, characterizing plaintiff’s
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	20
motion for sanctions as moot is no longer appropriate. 	That said,
his request fares no better on the merits.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires attorneys to
certify 	that 	their 	pleadings 	are 	“not 	being 	presented 	for 	any
improper 	purpose, 	such 	as 	to 	harass, 	cause 	unnecessary 	delay, 	or
needlessly 	increase 	the 	cost 	of 	litigation[.]” 	A 	pleading’s
“claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [must be] warranted
by 	existing 	law 	or 	by 	a 	nonfrivolous 	argument 	for 	extending,
modifying, 	or 	reversing 	existing 	law 	or 	for 	establishing 	new
law[.]” 	Id. 	Before 	awarding 	Rule 	11 	sanctions, 	the 	Court 	“must
find 	that 	a 	pleading 	violates 	Rule 	11.” 	Collins 	v. 	Daniels, 	916
F.3d 1302, 1319 (10th Cir. 2019). 	“Rule 11 imposes an affirmative
duty 	to 	conduct 	a 	reasonable 	inquiry 	into 	the 	facts 	and 	the 	law
before 	filing.” 	Id. 	at 	1320. 	“Because 	our 	adversary 	system
expects lawyers to zealously represent their clients, the Rule 11
standard 	is 	a 	tough 	one 	to 	satisfy; 	an 	attorney 	can 	be 	rather
aggressive 	and 	still 	be 	reasonable.” 	Id. 	(internal 	alterations
omitted).
Weighed against that standard, plaintiff’s argument for
Rule 	11 	sanctions 	is 	meritless. 	Most 	of 	defendants’ 	motions 	to
dismiss 	will 	be 	granted 	– 	the 	very 	opposite 	of 	legal 	frivolity.
As 	for 	defendant 	Flowers’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	it 	too 	was 	nowhere
near 	frivolous. 	Just 	because 	the 	Court 	did 	not 	agree 	with 	him
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	21
does 	not 	mean 	he 	failed 	to 	present 	legally 	cognizable 	arguments.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.
F. 	Defendants’ Objection to Dismissal Without Prejudice
Defendants 	object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s
recommendation 	to 	dismiss 	plaintiff’s 	claims 	without 	prejudice.
(Docket No. 172.) 	Defendants argue that the claims should instead
be dismissed with prejudice.
Courts 	in 	the 	Tenth 	Circuit 	generally 	view 	dismissal
based on judicial and prosecutorial immunity as an adjudication on
the 	merits, 	and 	accordingly 	dismiss 	with 	prejudice. 	See, 	e.g.,
Roman Serpik v. Marsee, No. CIV-23-00148-JD, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121342, at *8-9 (W.D. Okla. Jul. 14, 2023) (dismissing claims with
prejudice 	based 	on 	judicial 	and 	prosecutorial 	immunity); 	Eliason
v. 	United 	States 	DOJ, 	No. 	2:24-cv-00064-HCN-JCB, 	2025 	U.S. 	Dist.
LEXIS 	149464, 	at 	*16 	(D. 	Utah 	Feb. 	13, 	2025) 	(dismissal 	with
prejudice 	based 	on 	absolute 	judicial 	immunity). 	Accordingly,
plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	defendants 	Melton, 	Coppedge, 	English,
and 	Helpingstine 	will 	be 	dismissed 	with 	prejudice. 	Dismissing
plaintiff’s 	section 1983 	claim 	against 	defendant 	Johnson 	because
she is not a state actor, a conclusion to which plaintiff did not
object, 	is 	also 	properly 	with 	prejudice. 	See 	Lowrey 	v. 	Collela,
1:24-cv-00225-KWR-LF, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90212, at *1-2, 18-19
(D.N.M. May 9, 2025) (dismissing section 1983 claims against legal
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	22
aid attorneys with prejudice after the attorneys were found not to
be 	state 	actors). 	Plaintiff’s 	Open 	Records 	Act 	claims 	against
various 	defendants 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities 	should 	also 	be
dismissed with prejudice. 	These claims are dismissed on the merits
because 	the 	defendants 	lack 	individual 	duties 	under 	the 	Open
Records Act. 	The remaining claims are dismissed based on lack of
specificity and will be dismissed without prejudice. 	Plaintiff’s
lack 	of 	specificity 	in 	his 	complaint 	prevents 	the 	Court 	from
engaging 	with 	the 	merits 	of 	his 	claims.9 	Cf. 	Montoya 	v. 	Colony,
No. 	25-1217, 	2025 	U.S. 	App. 	LEXIS 	21143, 	at 	*3-4 	(10th 	Cir. 	Aug.
19, 	2025) 	(affirming 	dismissal 	without 	prejudice 	of 	a 	complaint
whose 	“vagaries, 	its 	lack 	of 	specific 	claims 	for 	relief 	or
recitation of facts makes it impossible to give fair notice of the
basis of any claim without constructing arguments on her behalf.”)
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART the R&R. 	(Docket No. 170). 	Defendants’ motions to
dismiss with respect to each defendant except Flowers are GRANTED.
(Docket 	Nos. 	134, 	135, 	136, 	138, 	139, 	141, 	142). 	Defendant
Flowers’s motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART. 	(Docket No. 137.)
All of plaintiff’s claims against defendant Flowers are dismissed
9 Practically speaking, this also limits a future court’s ability to meaningfully
apply res judicata against future claims.
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Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ 	__ 	23
except 	for 	his 	section 1983 	claim 	related 	to 	the 	strip 	search,
which is the only surviving claim in this case.
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	defendants 	Melton, 	Coppedge,
English, 	and 	Helpingstine 	are 	dismissed 	WITH 	PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s 	section 1983 	claim 	against 	defendant 	Johnson 	is
dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. 	Plaintiff’s Open Records Act claims are
dismissed 	WITH 	PREJUDICE. 	The 	rest 	of 	the 	dismissed 	claims 	are
dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint is DENIED.
(Docket 	No. 	143.) 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	judicial 	notice 	of
invalid 	lien 	is 	MOOT. 	(Docket 	No. 	145.) 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for
expedited 	discovery 	is 	DENIED. 	(Docket 	No. 	151.) 	Plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions is DENIED. 	(Docket No. 152.)
Partial judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 19, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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