Voigt v. Social Security Administration

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JUSTIN THOMAS VOIGT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-453-GLJ
)
FRANK BISIGNANO,1 )
Commissioner of the Social 	)
Security Administration, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant Justin Thomas Voigt requests judicial review of a denial of benefits by the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). He
appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asserts that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) erred in determining he was not disabled. 	For the reasons discussed below, the
Commissioner’s decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social Security
Act “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
1 On May 7, 2025, Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security. In accordance
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Mr. Bisignano is substituted for Martin O’Malley as the Defendant in
this action.
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is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Social security regulations implement a
five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. 	See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920.2
Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10 th
Cir. 1996). 	Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996). 	The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for the
Commissioner’s. 	See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799,
800 (10th Cir. 1991). 	Instead, the Court must review the record as a whole, and “[t]he
2 Step one requires Claimant to establish that he is not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Step
two requires Claimant to establish that he has a medically severe impairment (or combination of
impairments) that significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities. If Claimant is engaged
in substantial gainful activity, or his impairments are not medically severe, disability benefits are
denied. 	If he does have a medically severe impairment, it is measured at step three against the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If Claimant has a listed (or “medically
equivalent”) impairment, he is regarded as disabled and awarded benefits without further inquiry.
Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to step four, where Claimant must show that he lacks the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to his past relevant work. At step five, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is significant work in the national economy that
Claimant can perform, given his age, education, work experience, and RFC. Disability benefits
are denied if Claimant can return to any of his past relevant work or if his RFC does not preclude
alternative work. See generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-751 (10th Cir. 1988).
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substantiality of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see also Casias,
933 F.2d at 800-801.
Claimant’s Background
Claimant was forty-five years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (Tr. 39,
325). He completed his GED in 1995 and has worked as a sales associate, tractor mechanic,
and pastor. (Tr. 29, 369). Claimant alleges an inability to work since May 1, 2020, due to
moderate to severe back pain; arthritis in cervical, lumbar, and thoracic spine; multiple
bulging discs; degenerative disc disease ranging from mild to severe; lumbar facet
arthrosis; mild to severe right/left neural foraminal narrowing of the lumbar spine;
moderate thoracic pain awaiting MRI results; and sciatica. (Tr. 368).
Procedural History
On August 30, 2020, Claimant applied for disability insurance benefits under Title
II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434. His application was denied initially
and upon reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Christopher Hunt conducted
an administrative hearing and determined that Claimant was not disabled in a written
decision dated June 14, 2022. (Tr. 129-139). The Appeals Council remanded the case with
instructions for the ALJ to explain inconsistencies between the assessed residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) and the opinion from consultative examiner Dr. Krishnamurthi. 	(Tr.
148-149). 	On remand, ALJ Christopher Hunt held a second administrative hearing and
again determined Claimant was not disabled in a written decision dated November 6, 2023.
(Tr. 17-32). 	The Appeals Council then denied review, so ALJ Hunt’s November 2023
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opinion represents the Commissioner’s final decision for the purpose of this appeal. 	See
20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made his decision at steps four and five of the sequential evaluation. At
step two, he determined that Claimant had the severe impairments of lumbar spine
degenerative disc disease, lumbar spondylosis with radiculopathy, osteoarthritis of the
cervical spine, chronic pain syndrome, and obesity, as well as the medically determinable
impairments of hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux disease, obesity, and benign prostate
hyperplasia. (Tr. 19-20). At step three, he determined Claimant did not meet any Listing.
(Tr. 20). At step four he found Claimant had the RFC to perform light work as defined in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), i.e., he could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds
frequently, sit six hours in an eight-hour workday, and stand/walk three hours in an eight-
hour workday, but that standing and walking must be done in one-hour increments.
Additionally, he found Claimant could frequently use his lower extremities for operation
of 	pedals 	or 	foot 	controls, 	handle, 	grasp, 	and 	perform 	fine 	motor 	manipulation;
occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; but that he could
never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds, work at unprotected heights, or work around open
bodies of water, dangerous machinery, or sharp objects. Finally, he found Claimant could
not reach or work overhead, but that he had no limitation in any other direction. (Tr. 21).
The ALJ then concluded that Claimant was not disabled because he could return to his past
relevant work as sales associate or pastor. Alternatively, the ALJ found Claimant was not
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disabled because he could perform other work in the economy, i.e., routing clerk, pricer,
or garment folder. (Tr. 29-31).
Review
Claimant contends the ALJ erred by: (i) failing to find Claimant had the medically
determinable impairment of depression, which affected the RFC, and (ii) failing to
adequately account for Claimant’s objection to Dr. Krishnamurthi’s consultative opinion.
Upon review, the Court finds neither contention persuasive for the following reasons.
The relevant medical evidence in the record as to depression, as pointed out by
Claimant, pre-dates the alleged onset date, with the exception of one record. (Tr. 487-488,
490, 494, 496, 503, 509, 576). 	Contrary to Claimant’s assertion, none of these records
indicate Claimant was diagnosed with even mild depression. 	Instead, these citations
reference PHQ-9 scores. “The PHQ-9 ‘is one of the most validated tools in mental health
and can be a powerful tool to assist clinicians with diagnosing depression and monitoring
treatment response. The nine items of the PHQ-9 are based directly on the nine diagnostic
criteria for major depressive disorder in the DSM-IV.’ 	The PHQ-9 may be used ‘as a
screening tool, an aid in diagnosis, and as a symptom tracking tool that can help track a
patient’s overall depression severity as well as track the improvement of specific symptoms
with treatment.”” Sullins v. Saul, 2021 WL 2169117, at *5 n.4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2021)
(quoting 	AIMS 	CENTER, 	Advancing 	Integrated 	Mental 	Health 	Solutions, 	PHQ-9
Depression Scale, (available at https://aims.uw.edu/resource-library/phq-9-depression-
scale (updated April 9, 2024)).
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Claimant’s PHQ-9 scores ranged from 3 to 7, with 7 being scored in 2018, and the
score being lower thereafter. (Tr. 487-488, 490, 494, 496, 503, 509, 576). A PHQ-9 score
of 0-4 indicates a level of depression severity of “Minimal” while a score of 5-9 indicates
a level of depression severity of “Mild.” 	See Kurt Kroenke, M.D., et al., The PHQ-9:
Validity of a Brief Depression Severity Measure, J. Gen. Intern. Med. 16, 606-613, Table
2 	(2001), 	available 	at 	https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1495268/ 	(last
visited Dec. 30, 2025); see also Sullins, 2021 WL 2169117, at *5 n.5. 	Notations
contemporaneous to these PHQ-9 scores further reflect text notations either that there was
no sign of anxiety of depression, or that Claimant denied severe depression, and, again,
contained no diagnosis of depression. (Tr. 488, 491, 494, 497, 508, 575). 	The relevant
PHQ-9 score after Claimant’s alleged onset date is 5, but the related treatment note contains
no discussion or diagnosis of depression. 	(Tr. 551-554). 	Indeed, a February 2023
treatment note specifically states, “No depression or anxiety.” (Tr. 682). Claimant further
notes that he was prescribed citalopram, which is used for treatment of depression. 	See
National 	Library 	of 	Medicine, 	Citalopram,
https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a699001.html 	(last 	visited 	Dec. 	30, 	2025).
However, Claimant’s medication reports list no associated diagnosis with this medication
prescription. (Tr., e.g., 555).
As 	to 	his 	physical 	RFC 	assessment, 	on 	April 	22, 	2022, 	Dr. 	Subramaniam
Krishnamurthi, M.D., conducted a comprehensive internal medical evaluation of Claimant,
noting Claimant reported back pain. (Tr. 647). The written portion of the report reflects
Dr. Krishnamurthi found Claimant’s range of motion largely within normal limits, except
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that he noted flexion, extension, and lateral flexion of the dorsolumbar spine are slightly
reduced due to pain. 	(Tr. 648). 	He reiterated these findings in his “Final Impression,”
stating that Claimant could walk without an assistive device, but that it was a slightly
antalgic gait due to pain with a slow, stable gait, and that “Range of motion of cervical
spine is within normal limits. Range of motion of lumbar spines are reduced due to pain.
Range of motion of both upper extremities is within normal limits. 	Range of motion of
both lower extremities is within normal limits.” 	(Tr. 649). 	Dr. Krishnamurthi also
completed a “Medical Source Statement” (“MSS”) regarding Plaintiff’s RFC, in which he
indicated, inter alia, that Claimant could sit for six hours in a workday, up to three hours
at a time, and that he could stand/walk three hours in a workday, up to one hour at a time.
(Tr. 651). Accompanying the MSS is a “Range of Motion Report Form,” containing over
fifty range of motion measurements each for Claimant’s left and right sides. (Tr. 657-659).
Dr. Krishnamurthi completed each of these measurements, except for seven measurements
related to flexion of the cervical and lumbar spines as to Claimant’s left side. Those seven
boxes were left blank. 	(Tr. 657). He further noted Claimant’s straight leg raise test was
negative bilaterally, and again noted the antalgic gait due to pain, but that it was stable with
a slow pace, and that heel/toe walking was difficult but that Claimant did not need an
assistive device. (Tr. 659).
State reviewing physicians found initially and on reconsideration that there was no
evidence of a mental medically determinable impairment. 	(Tr. 100, 117-118). 	As to his
physical 	impairments, 	state 	reviewing 	physicians 	determined 	initially 	and 	on
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reconsideration (but prior to Dr. Krishnamurthi’s examination), that Claimant could
perform light work but that he could only occasionally stoop. (Tr. 102-105, 120-122).
In his written opinion at step two, the ALJ makes no mention of depression or the
PHQ-9 scores in the record but recognized the severe impairments of lumbar spine
degenerative disc disease, lumbar spondylosis with radiculopathy, osteoarthritis of the
cervical spine, chronic pain syndrome, and obesity. 	(Tr. 19-20). 	At step four, the ALJ
thoroughly summarizes Claimant’s hearing testimony as well the medical evidence in the
record, including evidence both prior to the alleged onset date in May 2020 and after. (Tr.
22-28). Specifically, the ALJ summarizes, inter alia, the objective test findings beginning
in 2019 and consisting of MRIs and nerve conduction studies, and noting the record reflects
Claimant had full range of motion in all extremities in 2020 and 2021. (Tr. 23-24). The
ALJ summarizes Dr. Krishnamurthi’s exam findings, including the slightly reduced range
of motion in the dorsolumbar spine. 	(Tr 24-25). 	The ALJ notes a 2021 report (after the
alleged May 2020 onset date) that Claimant reported improvement with pain medication
that allowed him to continue working and do things around his home. (Tr. 25). The ALJ
notes a decreased range of motion of the neck in February 2023, but a full range of motion
in all extremities in April 2023. (Tr. 25). The ALJ notes a decreased range of motion of
the right shoulder in June 2023, but a full range of motion in all extremities in August 2023.
(Tr. 26). The ALJ then notes Dr. Krishnamurthi’s MSS findings, and found his opinion to
be generally persuasive. The ALJ notes that the opinion was formulated after an in-person
exam, and was consistent with other exam findings in the record. 	The ALJ found Dr.
Krishnamurthi’s findings that Claimant could walk three hours and stand three hours for a
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total of six hours to be unpersuasive as there was no clear explanation for the limitation,
but agreed that the limitation to one hour at a time for each made sense. He further found
the postural limitations supported by the lumbar spine disorder and record and treatment,
but further limited Claimant to no overhead reaching (in contrast to Dr. Krishnamurthi)
based on Claimant’s cervical spine and upper extremity complaints. 	(Tr. 27). 	Noting
Claimant’s objection to Dr. Krishnamurthi’s opinion as cursory and rushed, evidenced by
the missing cervical and lumbar spine range of motion recordings, the ALJ notes he denied
an objection at the hearing because such evidence went to weight and persuasiveness rather
than admissibility. (Tr. 28). The ALJ thus found Claimant could return to his past relevant
work at light exertions, or alternatively other work in the economy, and that he was
therefore not disabled. (Tr. 29-32).
An RFC has been defined as “what an individual can still do despite his or her
limitations.” Soc. Sec. R. 98-6p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996). 	It is “an
administrative assessment of the extent to which an individual’s medically determinable
impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical or mental
limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do work-related physical
and mental activities.” 	Id. 	This includes a discussion of the “nature and extent of” a
claimant’s physical limitations including “sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying,
pushing, pulling, or other physical functions (including manipulative or postural functions,
such 	as 	reaching, 	handling, 	stooping, 	or 	crouching).” 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 404.1545(b),
416.945(b). Further, this assessment requires the ALJ to make findings on “an individual’s
ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a
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regular and continuing basis[,]” and to “describe the maximum amount of each work-
related activity the individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case
record.” 	Soc. Sec. R. 98-6p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1, 7. 	Here, the ALJ has fulfilled his
duty. Claimant nevertheless asserts that the ALJ wholly failed to account for his depression
and further erred in denying his objection to Dr. Krishnamurthi’s exam findings. (Tr. 42).
If a claimant has any severe impairment at step two, the ALJ is required at step four
to consider all his impairments, severe and nonsevere, in assessing his RFC. See id. (“In
determining the claimant's RFC, the ALJ is required to consider the effect of all of the
claimant's medically determinable impairments, both those he deems ‘severe’ and those
‘not severe.’”) [emphasis in original] [citations omitted]. 	“The RFC assessment must
include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing
specific medical facts (e. g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e. g., daily
activities, observations).” 	Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996).
“When the ALJ has failed to comply with SSR 96-8p because [s]he has not linked h[er]
RFC determination with specific evidence in the record, the court cannot adequately assess
whether relevant evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.” Jagodzinski v. Colvin,
2013 WL 4849101, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 2013), (citing Brown v. Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1187 (D. Kan. 2003)).
PHQ-9 Scores and Depression. Claimant first contends the ALJ should have found
he had depression as a medically determinable impairment, noting his PHQ-9 score of 3 in
June 2019 (Tr. 487), as well as summaries of Claimant’s diagnoses contained in the record,
reflecting a diagnosis of stress, not elsewhere classified (Tr. 723, 732). 	However, the
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record supports the ALJ’s findings. 	There is no evidence Claimant was diagnosed with
depression, reported depression, or exhibited signs of depression after the alleged onset
date, and a prescription alone is not objective medical evidence. 	See Rabon v. Astrue, 464
Fed. Appx. 732, 734 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The ALJ did not find an impairment based on
depression, and the record supports that determination.”). Claimant’s PHQ-9 scores were
all minimal or mild and themselves self-reports of subjective symptoms. 	Jackson v.
Kijakazi, 	2021 	WL 	6414658, 	at 	*4 	(W.D. 	Okla. 	Nov. 	23, 	2021), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 99994 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 10, 2022) (“[T]he [PHQ-9]
scores 	are 	not 	sufficient 	by 	themselves 	to 	determine 	disability 	or 	non-disability.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment as to mental limitations.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment as to the
lack of mental limitations for Claimant.
Consultative Opinion Evaluation. As to Dr. Krishnamurthi’s consultative opinion,
the ALJ provided the requisite narrative discussion of his opinion. Furthermore, the ALJ
explained in detail, as noted above, points where the evidence did not support further
restrictions and points where the evidence supported further restrictions than prescribed by
Dr. Krishnamurthi. This is consistent with his prerogative to adopt a middle ground among
medical opinions that does not fully embrace any one so long as the ALJ makes clear the
evidence upon which he relies. Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2016)
(“Faced with the conflicting opinions, the [ALJ] adopted a middle ground. . . . In this
manner, the judge arrived at an assessment between the two medical opinions without fully
embracing either one. We upheld this approach in Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288
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(10th Cir. 2012).”). 	The ALJ’s opinion clearly indicates he adequately considered the
medical evidence of record, and the Court can follow his reasoning as to why his
impairments considered both singly and in combination do not warrant any additional
limitations. The ALJ acknowledged the missing range of motion recordings, but noted Dr.
Krishnamurthi’s text notations regarding limited range of motion in those specific areas.
Richard v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 920651, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 16, 2018) (Even “a decision
of less-than-ideal clarity should be upheld [where] the agency’s path may be reasonably
discerned.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
An ALJ is required to recontact a consultative examiner only if the examiner’s
report is “inadequate or incomplete.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519p(b). 	While that might have
been a preferred option, re-contacting Dr. Krishnamurthi was not necessary where, as here,
the ALJ had sufficient evidence from the entirety of his report to make a disability
determination. 	The ALJ is not required to recontact a physician when the evidence
received “is consistent and there is sufficient evidence . . . to determine whether [a
claimant] is disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(a). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b (“We [only]
consider evidence to be insufficient when it does not contain all the information we need
to make our determination or decision.”).
Essentially, Claimant asks the Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor, which the
Court cannot do. See Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 2000) (“In conducting
our review, we may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of
the Commissioner.”) (citing Casias, 933 F.3d at 800). The ALJ noted the medical records
available in this case, gave reasons for his RFC determination, and ultimately found that
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Claimant was not disabled. See Hill v. Astrue, 289 Fed. Appx. 289, 293 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“The ALJ provided an extensive discussion of the medical record and the testimony in
support of his RFC finding. 	We do not require an ALJ to point to ‘specific, affirmative,
medical evidence on the record as to each requirement of an exertional work level before
[he] can determine RFC within that category.’”) (quoting Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d
945, 949 (10th Cir. 2004)). 	This was “well within the province of the ALJ.” 	Corber v.
Massanari, 20 Fed. Appx. 816, 822 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The final responsibility for
determining RFC rests with the Commissioner, and because the assessment is made based
upon all the evidence in the record, not only the relevant medical evidence, it is well within
the province of the ALJ.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2); 404.1546; 404.1545;
416.946). Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.
Conclusion
The Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial
evidence and the correct legal standards were applied. Accordingly, the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of January, 2026.
______________________________________
GERALD L. JACKSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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