USA v. Newman

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 25-CR-113-RAW
)
RAMONE ANTUAN NEWMAN, 	)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMENDATION
This 	matter 	comes 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Defendant 	Ramone 	Antuan 	Newman’s
(“Defendant”) Opposed Motion to Suppress Seizure of Ammunition and Defendant’s Statements
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C). (Docket No. 24). On August 18, 2025, United States
District Judge Ronald A. White, who presides over this case, referred the subject Motion to the
undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	Findings 	and 	Recommendation 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). (Docket No. 26). On September 5, 2025, the undersigned Magistrate Judge conducted
an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s Motion (“motion hearing”). Kevin Gross appeared on
behalf of the United States of America (“Government”). Brian Deer appeared on behalf of
Defendant, who was personally present. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS Defendant’s Motion to Suppress be DENIED.
I. 	Background
On February 2, 2024, law enforcement initiated a traffic stop because the Defendant was
speeding. The Defendant initially pulled over to the side of the road; however, when law
enforcement emerged from their vehicle and approached him, the Defendant drove away. Multiple
law enforcement officers from different state and local agencies joined in pursuit of the Defendant.
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During the pursuit, the Defendant traveled into the oncoming lane of traffic and ignored traffic
signs and signals, placing the public in danger. The pursuit reached speeds exceeding 120 MPH.
One law enforcement officer stated that he saw an object exit the passenger window of the
Defendant’s vehicle and land on the side of the road. Ultimately, officers ran the Defendant’s car
off the road near the entrance to the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant. Officers searched the
area where the Defendant was seen throwing an object from the car and found a Glock .40 caliber
pistol. Additionally, a law enforcement officer looked inside Defendant’s vehicle and observed a
box of .40 caliber ammunition in the center console. The officer then asked the Defendant
questions related to the firearms offense, the presence of ammunition, and controlled substances
in the car. The Defendant’s responses, although recorded on a body camera, appear to be
unintelligible. The Government argues that the Defendant made a statement such as “it was there
for my friend.” The Defendant acknowledged there was marijuana in the car. It is worth noting
that the Government cannot produce the box of ammunition the law enforcement officer observed
in the car.
Defendant has three previous felony convictions: (1) a 2010 conviction for robbery for
which he was sentenced to 41 months in prison; (2) a 2010 conviction for distribution of
opiates/narcotics/stimulants for which he was sentenced to 15 months in prison; and (3) a 2015
conviction for possession of drugs: second or subsequent for which he was sentenced to 32 months
in prison. (Docket No. 31 at 3-4). Therefore, Defendant is prohibited from possessing firearms and
ammunition.
Defendant has been charged in an indictment as a felon in possession of a firearm and
ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(8). (Docket No. 2). The indictment
also contains a criminal forfeiture allegation, seeking forfeiture, upon Defendant’s conviction of
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the violations charged in Count One, of all firearms and ammunition involved in the commission
of the offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). In the instant motion,
Defendant seeks to suppress the ammunition that serves as the basis for the indictment, arguing
the search of his vehicle that led to the discovery of the ammunition, was unconstitutional in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant also seeks to suppress the incriminating statements
he made to law enforcement officers while in custody, arguing that the law enforcement officers
failed to advise him of his Miranda rights before questioning him.
II. 	Analysis
a. 	Warrantless Search of Defendant’s Vehicle
The Government raises several potential arguments as to why the warrantless search of the
Defendant’s vehicle was justified under the circumstances. (Docket No. 31). The Government
advances several cases allowing exceptions to the warrant requirement for a vehicle within a
military base, but does not clarify why the authority to conduct a warrantless search should be
extended to the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, which does not have a relationship with the base at
issue here beyond a limited agreement of cooperation without specific authority to conduct
searches on behalf of the military base. Id. at 5-6. The Government also advances that an inventory
search of the vehicle, as a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, is an alternative justification for its search of the Defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 6.
However, no inventory sheet has been provided to Defendant’s counsel in this case and the
Government admits both that it does not have an inventory form in its possession and that it is
unclear whether an inventory sheet exists. The Government references Colorado v. Bertine, in
which the Supreme Court permitted inclusion of evidence obtained from an inventory search
performed “in a somewhat slipshod manner” because “there was no showing that the police, who
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were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
375 (1987). Here, it is unclear whether law enforcement conducted the inventory search according
to standardized procedures.
Nonetheless, despite the lack of evidence or authority supporting an inventory search or
extending non-ammunition plant law enforcement’s ability to search a vehicle entering onto the
ammunition plant as part of an implied consent upon entry, probable cause existed for the law
enforcement officers to search the Defendant’s vehicle. A warrantless search is presumptively
unreasonable, but there are several exceptions to this presumption. United States v. Latorre, 893
F.3d 744, 756 (10th Cir. 2018). The exception relevant here is the automobile exception, which
permits officers to perform a warrantless search of a vehicle when they “have probable cause to
believe there is contraband inside” of the vehicle. United States v. Oliver, 363 F.3d 1061, 1068
(10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 381 (1984) (per curiam)). “Probable
cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair
probability that the car contains contraband or evidence.” United States v. Phillips, 71 F4th 817,
823 (10th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). The “fair probability” standard means “something more
than a bare suspicion but less than a preponderance of the evidence at hand.” United States v.
Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). Law enforcement officers are
permitted to “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained
person.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation omitted).
Here, the combination of facts known to law enforcement gave them reason enough to
believe that the Defendant’s vehicle contained contraband or evidence. First, there is uncontested
testimony and video evidence showing that the Defendant led officers on an extended high-speed
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chase at reckless speeds, involving multiple law enforcement vehicles, and crossing major
intersections at high speeds. Witness testimony indicates that several vehicles had to swerve off
the road into a ditch to avoid being struck by the Defendant and that the Defendant briefly ran into
oncoming traffic, actions which endangered numerous people’s lives. [Video at 1:04:00 – 1:07:00].
Moreover, law enforcement observed the Defendant throw “something” from his vehicle.
Considering both the extreme nature of the high-speed chase and the law enforcement officer’s
observation that the Defendant threw an item from the vehicle, officers certainly had probable
cause to search the Defendant’s vehicle.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Chavez, No. 19-4121, 2021 WL 4438742
(10th Cir. Sept. 28, 2021), supports this conclusion. In Chavez, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether to suppress evidence of a search that took place after a high-speed chase. Id. Although
Chavez involved other potential sources of probable cause, the Court noted that “the high-speed
chase added to the totality of the circumstances . . . .” Id. at 6. Here, as in Chavez, Defendant’s
flight adds to the totality of the circumstances establishing probable cause. Accordingly,
Defendant’s egregious eluding combined with his throwing an object from his vehicle combine to
establish probable cause to search the Defendant’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
b. 	Defendant’s Statements and the Miranda Requirement
Defendant next asserts the incriminating statements he made to officers while in custody
should be suppressed because they were obtained without him being advised of his Miranda rights.
(Docket No. 24 at 6-7). In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that, in order to safeguard
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a person subject to the coercive
environment of custodial interrogation, “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
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the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
However, a number of exceptions to the Miranda requirement exist, including the public safety
exception. Under the public safety exception, a law enforcement officer may question a suspect in
custody without first giving the Miranda warnings if the questions arise out of ‘“an objectively
reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with [a]
weapon.’” United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984)). For the public safety exception to apply, the questioning law
enforcement officer must have “objectively reasonable grounds” to believe “(1) that the defendant
might have (or recently have had) a weapon, and (2) that someone other than police might gain
access to that weapon and inflict harm with it.’” Id. at 1201 (citation omitted). If the Government
satisfies this standard, the evidence need not be suppressed because the rule in Miranda does not
apply.
The circumstances surrounding Defendant’s arrest satisfy both elements of the public
safety exception. First, the law enforcement officers had reason to believe that Defendant was
recently carrying a firearm. At the outset of the high-speed pursuit, a law enforcement officer
observed Defendant throw an object from his vehicle and when law enforcement officers later
searched 	Defendant’s 	vehicle, 	they 	located 	ammunition 	but 	no 	firearm. 	Either 	of 	these
circumstances alone, and certainly the combination of them, provides the questioning law
enforcement officers reason to believe that Defendant might have, or recently had, a firearm.
Indeed, law enforcement officers’ suspicions were confirmed when they later discovered a firearm
where Defendant was observed throwing an object from his vehicle. Second, law enforcement
officers reasonably believed that someone else would find the firearm and inflict harm with it.
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Evidence introduced at the September 9, 2025, evidentiary hearing indicates that the area where
Defendant threw the object from his vehicle and a firearm was later recovered was a busy, well-
traveled area near a casino. This is sufficient to establish the law enforcement officers’ reasonable
belief that someone other than law enforcement might gain access to the firearm and inflict further
harm. See United States v. Donachy, 118 F. App’x 424, 426-27 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished)
(quoting Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If the gun was discarded in a public
place, it posed continuing immediate danger because anyone could have found the gun at any time
. . . . and the danger posed by the gun does not dissipate over time.”).
Although law enforcement officers were initially unclear on what Defendant threw from
his vehicle, the fact that a gun was later recovered is a valid consideration for either element of the
public safety exception. See, e.g., DeJear, 552 F.3d at 1202 (finding the public safety exception
satisfied where defendant was seen stuffing something into a car seat cushion and refused to
comply with commands to show his hands). In any event, the discovery of the ammunition in the
Defendant’s vehicle provides a reasonable belief that Defendant had (or recently had) a firearm in
the vehicle. See Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 at 657 (finding the public safety exception satisfied where
law enforcement officers believed the suspect had just removed a firearm from his empty holster
and discarded it).
III. 	Conclusion
Because the law enforcement officers had probable cause to search the Defendant’s vehicle
under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and because the
law enforcement officers properly questioned the Defendant under the public safety exception to
the Miranda requirement, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s
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Motion to Suppress Seizure of Ammunition and Defendant’s Statement (Docket No. 24) be
DENIED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(b)(2), a party
may file specific written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendations. The
exigencies of the Court’s calendar amid the ongoing McGirt crisis, and the need to maintain the
trial date in this matter, require the Court to shorten the window for filing objections to seven (7)
days with an additional two (2) days for responses.1 See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134,
136 (9th Cir. 1978); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC. v. 7.72 Acres in Lee Cnty., Ala., No. 3:16-
CV-173-WKW, 2016 WL 10789585, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 6, 2016) (collecting cases).2 	Any
objections must be filed on or before October 6, 2023.
If specific written objections are timely filed, Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) directs the district
judge to:
consider 	de 	novo 	any 	objection 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s
recommendation. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify
the recommendation, receive further evidence, or resubmit the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely object waives a party’s
right to appellate review. See United States v. Goebel, 959 F.3d 1259, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2020).
1 The undersigned Magistrate Judge shortens the objection period after consulting with the presiding judge in this
matter, U.S. District Judge Ronald A. White.
2 	Specifically, the Northern and Eastern Districts of Oklahoma have unprecedented caseloads and jurisdictional
complexities since the Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020). McGirt caused an
immediate increase of nearly 200% in the number of criminal cases filed in the Northern District and more than 400%
in the Eastern District. See U.S. Courts, Judiciary Supplements Judgeship Request, Prioritizes Courthouse Projects
(Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/09/28/judiciary-supplements-judgeship-request-prioritizes-
courthouse-projects. This extraordinary number of criminal cases thrust into federal court, virtually overnight, is
unlike anything ever seen in this Country’s history. Indeed, the Supreme Court has since recognized the “significant
challenge for the Federal Government and for the people of Oklahoma” in the wake of McGirt. Oklahoma v. Castro-
Huerta, 142 S.Ct. 2486, 2492 (2022). Numerous federal courts have “noted McGirt’s tremendous impact.” United
States v. Budder, 601 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1114 (E.D. Okla. 2022) (collecting cases), aff’d 76 F.4th 1007 (10th Cir.
2023).
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of November, 2025.
____________________________________
D. Edward Snow
United States Magistrate Judge
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