Keever v. Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JORDAN DENAE KEEVER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 25-CV-14-GLJ
)
FRANK J. BISIGNANO,1 )
Commissioner of the Social 	)
Security Administration 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant Jordan Denae Keever requests judicial review of a denial of benefits by
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
She appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asserts that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) erred in determining she was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, the
Commissioner’s decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social Security
Act “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that she
1 On May 6, 2025, Frank J. Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security. In accordance
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Mr. Bisignano is substituted for Mr. Dudek as the Defendant in this
action.
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is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, considering her age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Social security regulations implement a
five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920.2
Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
The 	Court 	may 	not 	reweigh 	the 	evidence 	or 	substitute 	its 	discretion 	for 	the
Commissioner’s. See Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th
2 Step one requires Claimant to establish that she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity.
Step two requires Claimant to establish that she has a medically severe impairment (or combination
of impairments) that significantly limits her ability to do basic work activities. If Claimant is
engaged in substantial gainful activity, or her impairments are not medically severe, disability
benefits are denied. If he does have a medically severe impairment, it is measured at step three
against the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If Claimant has a listed (or
“medically equivalent”) impairment, she is regarded as disabled and awarded benefits without
further inquiry. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to step four, where Claimant must show that
she lacks the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to her past relevant work. At step five,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is significant work in the national
economy that Claimant can perform, given her age, education, work experience and RFC.
Disability benefits are denied if Claimant can return to any of her past relevant work or if her RFC
does not preclude alternative work. See generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th
Cir. 1988).
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Cir. 1991). Instead, the Court must review the record as a whole, and “[t]he substantiality
of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its
weight.” Univ. Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See also Casias, 933
F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant’s Background
Claimant was 35 years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (Tr. 33, 215).
She has at least a high school education and alleges an onset date of July 14, 2022, due to
limitations imposed by scoliosis, osteogenesis imperfecta, depression, anxiety, arthritis in
the back, and endometriosis. (Tr. 304-10).
Procedural History
On September 22, 2022, Claimant applied for disability insurance under Title II of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, as well as supplemental security income
benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85. (Tr. 215-24,
228-32). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Dierdre Dexter held an administrative hearing
and determined Claimant was not disabled in a written opinion dated May 10, 2024. (Tr.
14-68). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s opinion the final decision
for purposes of this appeal. (Tr. 1-4) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1484(d).
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made her decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. (Tr. 23-24). At
step two she determined Claimant had the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease,
bursitis, and brittle bone disease (osteogenesis imperfecta), as well as the non-severe
impairments of asthma, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 16). She found at
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step three that Claimant did not meet any Listing. (Tr. 17-17). At step four she found
Claimant had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), except she can occasionally reach
overhead and frequently reach in all other directions, and only occasionally stoop, kneel,
crouch or crawl, but not climb. (Tr. 18). The ALJ did not assess any psychologically-based
limitations. (Tr. 18). The ALJ then concluded that Claimant was not disabled because there
was work she could perform in the national economy, i.e., surveillance system monitor,
document preparer, touchup screener, and addresser. (Tr.24-25).
Review
Claimant contends the ALJ erred by failing to: (1) assess Claimant’s diagnosed
chronic pain syndrome, (2) properly evaluate Claimant’s subjective symptoms, and
(3) include non-exertional limitations to account for Claimant’s anxiety and depressive
disorder. The Court finds these arguments without merit.
The relevant medical evidence reveals that Claimant routinely sought treatment
between August 2020 and July 2022 for pain caused by scoliosis and osteogenesis
imperfecta. (Tr. 486-524). Claimant was diagnosed with chronic pain syndrome in
December 2021 and frequently presented to appointments with an abnormal gait, generally
described as severe lordosis. (Tr. 496, 502, 505, 508, 519, 522, 525). Claimant underwent
a posterior spinal fusion from T3 to her pelvis on July 14, 2022, performed by Timothy
Puckett, M.D. (Tr. 445, 451-61). Claimant was provided with a back brace and responded
well to the surgery but complained of some shoulder pain at the three-month follow-up and
interscapular pain that impacted her ability to perform her activities of daily living
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(“ADLs”) in January 2023, at which point she established care with physical therapy. (Tr.
462-82, 538). Claimant continued to seek treatment for pain management, reporting
ongoing but stable pain through June 2023, at which time she indicated she “usually runs
good.” (Tr. 530, 533, 634-37). Claimant returned to Dr. Puckett for a one-year follow-up
in July 2023, where X-rays of Claimant’s spine “look[ed] fantastic [and showed] no change
in spite of her” osteogenesis imperfecta. (Tr. 545). Dr. Puckett noted there was “not a lot”
they could do about Claimant’s pain, but he was “going to let her do what she wants” and
only have her return as necessary. (Tr. 545). Claimant continued to follow-up with her pain
management visits throughout the remainder of 2023 where she continued to present with
an abnormal gait, thoracic spinal tenderness on palpation, and limited range of motion. (Tr.
612-28).
As to mental impairments, the record in January 2021 reflects Claimant was
psychologically stable but had a poor quality of life due to her pain and responsibility for
taking care of her father. (Tr. 504). Claimant was diagnosed with generalized anxiety
disorder in 2022 (Tr. 638), and indicated she experienced depression during a physical
therapy appointment in January 2023 (Tr. 480) and in her function report dated March 2023
(Tr. 	320). 	Otherwise, 	Claimant’s 	mental 	status 	examinations 	were 	generally 	non-
remarkable, i.e., she presented alert and oriented, with a euthymic mood, intact memory,
good insight, and appropriate judgment. (Tr. 499-540)
In 	2023, 	state 	examiners 	determined 	initially 	and 	upon 	reconsideration 	that
Claimant could perform a full range of light work. (Tr. 89-90, 98-100). State agency
psychological consultants, Erika 	Stevens 	Olinger, 	Ph.D. and Stephen Scott, Ph.D.,
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determined initially and upon reconsideration that Claimant had the non-severe medically
determinable impairments of anxiety and depression which resulted in mild impairments
in her ability to interact with others and concentrate, persist or maintain pace, but resulted
in no functional limitations. (Tr. 87-88, 98-100).
At 	the 	administrative 	hearing, 	Claimant 	testified 	she 	was 	diagnosed 	with
osteogenesis imperfecta shortly after her birth and underwent various surgeries due to
complications stemming therefrom. (Tr. 47-49). Since her spinal surgery in July 2022,
Claimant has experienced numbness in her left leg and is unable to feel the floor with her
right foot due to instrumentation in her right leg. (Tr. 50). Claimant is imbalanced when
standing and cannot stand for a period longer than five minutes due to pain and her inability
to feel the ground. (Tr. 50-51). She does not utilize an assistive walking device but wears
a back brace continuously and must sit down for fifteen to twenty minutes before she can
stand up again. (Tr. 51). As to pain, Claimant testified she experiences pain in her shoulders
that radiates down into her hands and her left elbow. (Tr. 55). She takes the maximum dose
of her prescribed narcotic medications and, as of the date of the administrative hearing,
was experiencing a sharp, shooting pain she rated as an 8 out of 10. (Tr. 53-55).
The ALJ then elicited testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”) to determine what
jobs Claimant could perform given the RFC described above. (Tr. 59-67). The VE testified
that such a claimant could perform the representative jobs of surveillance system monitor,
document preparer, and touchup screener. (Tr. 61-62). The ALJ then offered a modified
hypothetical in which a claimant would miss on average two days a month. (Tr. 63). The
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VE testified that such a person would likely be unemployable beyond a period of four
months. (Tr. 64).
In her written opinion at step four, the ALJ extensively summarized Claimant’s
hearing testimony and most of the medical evidence in the record. (Tr. 18-23). She then
found that Claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
her symptoms were not entirely consistent with treatment records. (Tr. 20). She found the
opinions of the state agency physicians unpersuasive but supported by their limited review
of the record. (Tr. 22). Conversely, she found the opinions of the state agency psychologists
persuasive, supported by the record, and consistent with the normal mental status
examinations and lack of reports of mental health issues and lack of specialized mental
health treatment. (Tr. 22).
I. 	Subjective Symptom Analysis
Claimant first argues the ALJ erred at step four in evaluating her subjective
symptoms, asserting the ALJ did not address the appropriate factors. The Court finds this
argument without merit.
The Commissioner uses a two-step process to evaluate a claimant’s subjective
statements of pain or other symptoms:
First, 	we 	must 	consider 	whether 	there 	is 	an 	underlying 	medically
determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be
expected to produce an individual's symptoms, such as pain. Second ... we
evaluate the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the
extent to which the symptoms limit an individual's ability to perform work-
related activities . . .
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Soc. Sec. Rul. 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3 (October 25, 2017).3 Tenth Circuit
precedent is in alignment with the Commissioner’s regulations but characterizes the
evaluation as a three-part test. See e. g., Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166-67
(10th Cir. 2012) (citing Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1987)).4 As part
of the symptom analysis, the ALJ should consider the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1529(c)(3) 	& 416.929(c)(3), 	including: 	(i) 	daily 	activities; 	(ii) 	the 	location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (iii) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (iv) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication
the individual takes or has taken; (v) treatment for pain relief aside from medication;
(vi) any other measures the claimant uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms;
and (vii) any other factors concerning functional limitations. See Soc. Sec. Rul. 16-3p,
2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8. An ALJ’s symptom evaluation is entitled deference unless the
Court finds that the ALJ misread the medical evidence as a whole. See Casias, 933 F.2d at
801. An ALJ’s findings regarding a claimant’s symptoms “should be closely and
affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of
findings.” Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). The
3 SSR 16-3p is applicable for decisions on or after March 28, 2016, and superseded SSR 96-7p,
1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996). See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *1. SSR 16-3p eliminated
the use of the term “credibility” to clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination
of [a claimant’s] character.” Id. at *2.
4 Analyses under SSR 16-3p and Luna are substantially similar and require the ALJ to consider
the degree to which a claimant’s subjective symptoms are consistent with the evidence. See,
e.g., Paulek v. Colvin, 662 Fed. Appx. 588, 593-94 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding SSR 16-3p
“comports” with Luna) and Brownrigg v. Berryhill, 688 Fed. Appx. 542, 545-46 (10th Cir.
2017) (finding the factors to consider in evaluating intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a
claimant's symptoms in 16-3p are similar to those set forth in Luna).
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ALJ 	is 	not 	required 	to 	perform 	a 	“formalistic 	factor-by-factor 	recitation 	of 	the
evidence[,]” Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000), but simply “recit[ing]
the factors” is insufficient. See Soc. Sec. Rul. 16–3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *10.
Claimant argues the ALJ denied Claimant’s subjective symptoms based solely on
the objective evidence and failed to address the factors above. However, upon review of
the record, the Court finds the ALJ set out the appropriate analysis and cited evidence
supporting her reasons for finding Claimant’s subjective complaints as to her pain and her
limitations were not believable to the extent alleged, i.e., she gave clear and specific reasons
that were specifically linked to the evidence in the record. In particular, the ALJ discussed,
inter alia, Claimant’s hearing testimony regarding her daily activities, the various narcotics
she took for pain, her spinal surgery and the physical therapy appointments thereafter, and
ultimately concluded Claimant’s pain is not as debilitating as alleged. (Tr. 20-22). There is
no indication here that the ALJ misread the Claimant’s medical evidence taken as a whole,
and her evaluation of Claimant’s subjective statements is entitled to deference. See Casias,
933 F.3d at 801.
II. 	Chronic Pain Syndrome
Claimant next challenges the ALJ’s RFC assessment, contending that the ALJ erred
at step four by failing to account for her chronic pain syndrome in conjunction with her
other impairments. Although the ALJ did fail to discuss Claimant’s chronic pain syndrome
at step two, the ALJ did consider it at step four. As such, the Court finds no reversible error
here.
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At step two, the ALJ failed to classify or address Claimant’s chronic pain syndrome.
However, this failure is not reversible error in and of itself, as the ALJ’s determination that
Claimant had other severe impairments required the ALJ to account for Claimant’s chronic
pain syndrome at step four, even if it did not amount to a severe impairment. See, e.g.,
Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (“At step two, the ALJ must
‘consider the combined effect of all of [Claimant’s] impairments without regard to whether
any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity [to survive
step two]. Nevertheless, any error here became harmless when the ALJ reached the proper
conclusion that Mrs. Carpenter could not be denied benefits conclusively at step two and
proceeded to the next step of the evaluation sequence.”) (quoting Langley v. Barnhart, 373
F.3d 1116, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2004)).
Although the ALJ did not expressly address Claimant’s chronic pain syndrome at
step two, she did consider Claimant’s pain and chronic pain syndrome in her decision and
in formulating her RFC. Indeed, the ALJ evaluated Claimant’s subjective statements of
pain and discussed, inter alia, Claimant’s (i) July 2022 spinal surgery and the pain she
reported thereafter, (ii) physical therapy, and (iii) pain management visits during which she
reported “stable pain” but presented with abnormal gait and thoracic tenderness. (Tr. 20-
22). Additionally, the ALJ explicitly acknowledged Claimant had various diagnoses which
“included other poly-osteoarthritis, other idiopathic scoliosis thoracic region, osteogenesis
imperfecta, other abnormalities of gait and mobility, and chronic pain syndrome.” (Tr. 21)
(emphasis added). As such, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s consideration of
Claimant’s chronic pain syndrome. She specifically discussed the global evidence in the
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record and the opinion reflects she considered all of Claimants impairments when assessing
her RFC. Baker v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1096868, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 28, 2018) (“[T]he
ALJ generally discussed and stated she considered the combined effects of Plaintiff’s wrist
surgeries, fibromyalgia, chronic pain, and her neck condition. Further, it is well established
that ‘the mere diagnosis of a condition does not establish its severity or any resulting work
limitations.’ Thus, the ALJ adequately addressed the conditions with which Plaintiff takes
issue.”) (quoting Paulsen v. Colvin, 665 Fed. Appx. 660, 666 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal
alterations omitted); Vandenbosch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 22761436, at *3 (E.D.
Okla. Sept. 22, 2022) (finding ALJ adequately discussed the claimant’s chronic pain
syndrome, despite considering it a non-severe impairment, where the ALJ considered
Claimant’s reports of pain and his various treatments for pain throughout the decision); See
also Michael L.M. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 4596155, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2022)
(“Likewise, regarding plaintiff’s assertion that his chronic pain syndrome was ignored, the
record is silent as to any limitations resulting from plaintiff’s chronic pain syndrome; the
record merely states that plaintiff has been diagnosed with this medical problem.”)
Relatedly, Claimant also maintains that ALJ’s RFC is not supported by substantial
evidence because she found the State agency physicians’ opinions unpersuasive, leaving
no opinion to support her RFC assessment. The Court disagrees and finds the ALJ’s RFC
is supported by substantial evidence.
“[I]n cases . . . where the medical opinions appear to conflict with the ALJ’s decision
regarding the extent of a claimant’s . . .impairments to the point of posing a ‘serious[]
challenge [to] the ALJ’s [RFC] assessment,’ . . . . it may be inappropriate for the ALJ to
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reach an RFC determination without expert medical assistance[.]” Wells v. Colvin, 727
F.3d 1061, 1072 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Andrande v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 985
F.2d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir. 1993)). Here, there is not a medical opinion in the record that
contradicts the ALJ’s physical RFC determination and Claimant points to no significant
probative evidence the ALJ did not consider. The ALJ explained her reasoning for
tempering the findings of the state agency physicians in Claimant’s favor, indicating that
the restriction to sedentary work accounts for Claimant’s pain and lifting limitations while
also considering her positive x-rays in July 2023, mild examination findings, and lack of
continued treatment by Dr. Puckett. Troutman v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2960134, at *4-5
(W.D. Okla. July 26, 2022) (finding the ALJ did not “play doctor” when the ALJ proffered
an adequate explanation for rejecting the [medical opinion] and determined Plaintiff’s RFC
based on the evidence of record[.]”); Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2012)
(finding an ALJ does not commit reversible error by tempering a medical opinion for the
Claimant’s benefit); Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 949 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ,
not a physician is charged with determining a claimant’s RFC from the medical record.”).
Contrary to Claimant’s arguments, the ALJ discussed all the evidence in the record
and the ALJ’s reasons for reaching her RFC. Hill v. Astrue, 289 Fed. Appx. 289, 291 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ provided an extensive discussion of the medical record and the
testimony in support of his RFC finding. We do not require an ALJ to point to ‘specific,
affirmative, medical evidence on the record as to each requirement of an exertional work
level before [she] can determine RFC within that category.’” (quoting Howard, 379 F.3d
at 949). The evidence does not reflect that Claimant had further physical limitations than
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those posed in the RFC. The ALJ clearly considered the state agency physicians’ reports
and Claimant’s pain while Claimant points to no evidence providing further limitations
than those assessed. Because Claimant points to no evidence other than her own assertions,
the Court declines to find error here. See Garcia v. Astrue, 2012 WL 4754919, at *8 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 29, 2012) (“Plaintiff’s mere suggestion that a ‘slow’ gait might adversely affect
his ability to perform the standing and walking requirements of light work is not supported
by any authority.”). When all the evidence is taken into account, the conclusion that
Claimant could perform the RFC stated above is well supported by substantial evidence.
The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s failure to include any additional limitations as to
Claimant’s RFC.
III. 	Mental RFC
Lastly, Claimant asserts the ALJ erred by not including mental limitations in
Claimant’s RFC and in the hypothetical question to the VE. Particularly, Claimant faults
the ALJ (i) for failing to explain how Claimant’s mild limitations in interacting with others
and in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace did not result in any limitations, as
well as failing to discuss (ii) the treatment provider note in December 2021 indicating
Claimant was psychologically stable but had a poor quality of life and (iii) the January
2023 physical therapy appointment where she reported she had depression and that pain
impacted her ADLs. The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
The ALJ determined Claimant had non-severe mental impairments of depressive
disorder and anxiety disorder, she assessed the “paragraph B” criteria and determined
Claimant had mild limitations in interacting with others and in concentrating, persisting, or
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maintaining pace. (Tr. 17-18). Ultimately the ALJ concluded the “paragraph B” criteria
were not satisfied because “claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments cause
no more than [a] ‘mild’ limitation in any of the functional areas and the evidence does not
otherwise indicate there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to do
basic work activities[.]” (Tr. 18). However, the fact that the ALJ found limitations in the B
criteria “does not necessarily translate to a work-related functional limitation for purposes
of the RFC assessment.” Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2015).
Here, Dr. Olinger and Dr. Scott also concluded Claimant had mild limitations in her
ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace and in her ability to interact with others but,
nonetheless had no functional mental limitations. (Tr. 80, 98). The ALJ found these
opinions persuasive and adopted them wholesale explaining that Claimant “endorsed no
mental health concerns on her activities of daily living, was on conservative medication
management by her primary care provider for mental health, use[s] cannabis to treat
anxiety, [has] no history of inpatient hospitalizations, ER visits, or outpatient therapy for
mental health, [has] no acute symptoms, [is] functionally independent from a mental health
standpoint with regard to basic self-care, and [has] only mild work limitations.” (Tr. 22).
The ALJ further explained that Claimant’s mental state examinations were generally
normal, she did not endorse issues stemming from her mental health, and the record
contained no specialized mental health treatment. (Tr. 22).
As such, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s consideration of the evidence of
Claimant’s mental impairments, the hypothetical question to the VE, or the resulting RFC
assessment. Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that in positing
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a hypothetical question to the VE, the ALJ need only set forth those physical and mental
impairments accepted as true by the ALJ); Qualls, 206 F.3d at 1373 (finding an ALJ’s
hypothetical questioning of the VE provided an appropriate basis for a denial of benefits
because the question “included all the limitations the ALJ ultimately included in his RFC
assessment.”) (citations omitted). Although the ALJ did not provide a summary of
Claimant’s mental health evidence, the ALJ’s decisions demonstrate that she did not simply
disregard Claimant’s mental impairments when considering the RFC, and this Court will
not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See
Casias, 933 F.2d at 800; Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
In sum, the ALJ appropriately assessed the medical record in this case, gave reasons
for her RFC determination, and ultimately found Claimant was not disabled. See Hill, 289
Fed. Appx. at 293 (“The ALJ provided an extensive discussion of the medical record and
the testimony in support of his RFC finding. We do not require an ALJ to point to ‘specific,
affirmative, medical evidence on the record as to each requirement of an exertional work
level before [he] can determine RFC within that category.’”) (quoting Howard, 379 F.3d
at 949). This was “well within the province of the ALJ.” Corber v. Massanari, 20 Fed.
Appx. 816, 822 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The final responsibility for determining RFC rests with
the Commissioner, and because the assessment is made based upon all the evidence in the
record, not only the relevant medical evidence, it is well within the province of the ALJ.”)
(internal citations omitted). The essence of Claimant’s appeal is that the Court should
reweigh the evidence and reach a different result, which the Court simply may not do. See,
e.g., Casias, 933 F.2d at 800. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
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Conclusion
In summary, the Court finds that the correct legal standards were applied by the
ALJ, and the decision of the Commissioner is therefore supported by substantial evidence.
The decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is accordingly
hereby AFFIRMED.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2026.
GERALD L. JACKSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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