Jane Does 1-13 and 15-17 et al v. Mount Saint Mary High School Corporation of the State of Oklahoma et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JANE DOE 1, et al., 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. CIV-22-992-R
)
MOUNT SAINT MARY HIGH SCHOOL 	)
CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF 	)
OKLAHOMA, an Oklahoma corporation; 	)
et al., 	)
)
Defendants 	)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the supplemental filings submitted by Defendants
in support of their request for attorneys’ fees [Doc. Nos. 140, 141, 142]. The matter is fully
briefed [Doc. Nos. 147, 151, 155, 156, 165, 170, 176] and at issue.
In a prior order, the Court granted the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Oklahoma
City’s Motion to Compel and Mount Saint Mary High School Corporation’s Motion to
Compel and denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Referral to United States Magistrate Judge and/or
Protective Order. As part of its ruling, the Court granted Defendants’ request for attorneys’
fees under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5) and instructed Defendants to submit evidence of their
reasonable attorneys’ fees. Defendants submitted their respective filings indicating that
they seek attorneys’ fees in the following amounts: counsel for MSM seeks $28,155.25,
counsel for the Archdiocese seeks $62,527.50, and counsel for the Sisters of Mercy seeks
$2,983.50. Plaintiffs challenge the reasonableness of these fees, contending that they are
Case 5:22-cv-00992-R Document 178 Filed 05/13/26 Page 1 of 6

2
wholly unwarranted and include work that is duplicative, excessive, or unrelated to the
discovery motions. Plaintiffs also appeal to equity, arguing that any fee award, but
particularly in the amounts sought here, would impose an undue financial hardship on
Plaintiffs’ counsel, who are solo practitioners.
Rule 37(a)(5) permits the payment of “reasonable expenses” incurred in making or
opposing the discovery motions. “The lodestar figure—reasonable hours times reasonable
rate—is the mainstay of the calculation of a reasonable fee.” Anderson v. Sec'y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 80 F.3d 1500, 1504 (10 th Cir. 1996). “The burden is on the party requesting
fees to demonstrate that the time expended was indeed reasonable.” Pistone v. New Mexico
Pub. Def. Dep't, No. 13-CV-0920 MV/SMV, 2015 WL 13666991, at *1 (D.N.M. Feb. 25,
2015) (citing Case v. Unified School Dist., 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10 th Cir. 1998)). Several
factors can bear on whether the hours expended on a particular task are reasonable and a
fee request may be reduced if it includes “hours that were unnecessary, irrelevant and
duplicative.” Case, 157 F.3d at 1250 (quotation marks omitted). Importantly, “[a] request
for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough
justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).
Defendants have each included an affidavit from counsel setting out the hourly rates
charged by each attorney or paralegal. See Doc. No. 140-1 ¶ 2; Doc. No. 141-1 ¶ 4; 142-1
¶ 7. Based on its own knowledge of the prevailing rates in this community for work
performed by attorneys and legal staff with similar skill and experience, the Court finds
that the hourly rates are reasonable.
Case 5:22-cv-00992-R Document 178 Filed 05/13/26 Page 2 of 6

3
However, upon review of the time records, the Court finds that certain of the fees
sought are not recoverable. Some of the fees appear to reflect duplication of effort,
including 	entries 	showing 	that 	multiple 	attorneys 	for 	a 	single 	Defendant 	attended
conferences or drafted/revised the same briefing.1 Although there may be “occasions when
reasonable fees may be incurred for the work of multiple attorneys on a matter[,]”
Defendants have not adequately explained or justified the need for “duplicative time for
counsel to confer or for major revisions or re-writing of the motion or briefs” in this matter.
Rogers v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CIV.A. 13-1333-CM, 2014 WL 6632944, at *4 (D. Kan.
Nov. 21, 2014).
The number of hours requested for the numerous conferences amongst defense
counsel also appears excessive and is not adequately supported. See Henderson v. Horace
Mann Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (N.D. Okla. 2008) (“Time spent by lawyers
conferring with co-counsel should be excluded or certainly not billed at $250 per hour.”).
Further, some of the entries reflect work that that likely would have been performed, at
least to a certain degree, even absent Plaintiffs’ discovery conduct.2 The Court is not
1 See, e.g., Doc. No. 140-1 at ECF p. 25 (12/11/25 and 12/12/25 time entries for two attorneys to receive
and review email correspondence), ECF p. 30-31 (12/17/2025 time entries for two attorneys to attend the
same joint defense counsel meeting), ECF p. 32 (12/19/2025 time entries for two attorneys to attend the
same meet and confer), ECF p. 57 (1/21/26 time entries for two attorneys to attend the same joint defense
counsel meeting); ECF p. 58 (1/22/26 time entries for two attorneys to review and revise the same reply
brief); Doc. No. 142-1 at ECF p. 9-10 (12/12/25, 12/16/25, 12/17/25, and 12/22/25 time entries for three
attorneys to draft and revise the motion to compel), ECF p. 14-15 (1/21/26 and 1/26/26 time entries for
three attorneys to review Plaintiffs’ motion), ECF p. 15 (1/22/26 time entries by two attorneys to revise a
draft of a reply brief submitted by another defendant represented by separate counsel); ECF p. 22-23
(2/25/26 time entries for two attorneys to attend the same joint defense counsel meeting).
2 See, e.g., Doc. No. 140-1 at ECF p. 10 (11/24/25 time entry for phone call related to multiple issues,
including medication), ECF p. 25 (12/11/2025 time entry for email and phone calls to discuss “a myriad of
outstanding discovery issues”), ECF p. 61 (1/28/26 time entry dealing, in part, with a separate motion to
Case 5:22-cv-00992-R Document 178 Filed 05/13/26 Page 3 of 6

4
persuaded that the “time spent on work that would have been undertaken even if the motion
had not been filed” should be recoverable in this circumstance, where there were multiple,
separate discovery issues that were ongoing at the time. See Rogers 2014 WL 6632944, at
*4; Lincoln v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:18-CV-00652-MV-LF, 2019 WL
11623918, at *1 (D.N.M. June 13, 2019) (disallowing fees that “would have been incurred
regardless of whether a motion to compel was ultimately filed”).
More generally, Defendants’ requested amounts are excessive in light of the purpose
of monetary sanctions. Rule 37(a)(5)’s fee shifting provision is “designed to protect courts
and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process.”
Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 208 (1999). The Rule is premised on
deterrence, but the amounts requested here are well in excess of what is necessary to deter
frivolous or abusive discovery conduct. See 8B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2288 (3d ed.)
(explaining that the rule was intended to “deter[] parties from making unjustified
motions”); Palzer v. CoxCom, LLC, No. 15-CV-564-GKF-JFJ, 2019 WL 11585417, at *2
(N.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2019) (reducing fee award based on nature of discovery conduct,
attorney’s financial information, “and the Court’s purpose in imposing the discovery
sanction”). Although the Court recognizes that the number of parties and claims involved
in this case increases its complexity, the amounts sought by the Archdiocese and MSM for
submitting a motion to compel and then a joint response to Plaintiffs’ motion are not
quash); Doc. No. 140-2 at ECF p. 14 (1/19/26 time entry to revise multiple discovery related briefs); ECF
p. 15 (1/23/26 time entry to prepare deposition outline).
Case 5:22-cv-00992-R Document 178 Filed 05/13/26 Page 4 of 6

5
“reasonable.” See Miller v. Legacy Bank, No. CIV-20-946-D, 2023 WL 7408844, at *3
(W.D. Okla. Oct. 6, 2023) (concluding that “on its face, $16,110 spent in responding to
two motions to compel is unreasonable” and applying a 50% reduction).
To address the issues noted above, the Court finds that a significant reduction in the
requested fees is warranted. See Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1203
(10th Cir. 1986) (“A general reduction of hours claimed in order to achieve what the court
determines to be a reasonable number is not an erroneous method, so long as there is
sufficient reason for its use.”). The Court therefore exercises its discretion to reduce the fee
awards as follows: $2,500 to the Archdiocese and $2,500 to MSM. This amount better
captures those hours spent directly on drafting the discovery motions/responses. These
adjustments are also necessary to ensure that the fee award serves the purposes of Rule
37(a)(5).
The Court declines to award any fees to the Sisters of Mercy. The Sisters of Mercys’
involvement was limited to attending defense conferences, reviewing Plaintiffs’ motion,
and reviewing a draft response prepared by a co-defendant. The Sisters of Mercy did not
submit either of the motions to compel or draft any of the responsive pleadings. An award
of attorneys’ fee is therefore not warranted.
As set out above, Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees is granted in part and
denied in part. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall pay $2,500 to Defendant MSM and $2,500 to
Defendant the Archdiocese pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). 3
3 The amount is assessed against Plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs’ counsel may either pay in monthly
installments or within fourteen days of the entry of final judgment (or other termination of the case). See
Case 5:22-cv-00992-R Document 178 Filed 05/13/26 Page 5 of 6

6
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13 th day of May, 2026.
Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999) (recognizing “the hardship that a sanctions order
may sometimes impose on an attorney” and stating that “a district court can reduce any hardship by
reserving until the end of the trial decisions such as whether to impose the sanction, how great a sanction
to impose, or when to order collection”).
Case 5:22-cv-00992-R Document 178 Filed 05/13/26 Page 6 of 6