Parker et al v. Lawton City of et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
FELISHA PARKER and )
LARESHA PARKER, as Next of Kin )
to ISACC D’WAYNE PARKER, Deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-24-178-JD
)
CITY OF LAWTON, OKLAHOMA )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs Felisha and Laresha Parker (Plaintiffs), represented by counsel, bring this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oklahoma state law, alleging various civil rights
violations. (ECF No. 1). United States District Judge Jodi W. Dishman has referred this
matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Defendant Cameron Paterson has filed a Motion to Dismiss
with Brief in Support, Plaintiffs have responded, and Defendant Paterson has replied.
(ECF Nos. 41, 46, 49). For the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that Defendant
Paterson’s motion be denied.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant Paterson seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 41). In ruling on Defendant’s motion, the court “‘must accept all the well-
pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most
favorable to . . . [P]laintiff.’”
Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014)
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(citation omitted). To survive dismissal, Plaintiff's “complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context
does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a
complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct,” then
the plaintiff has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility requirement “serves
not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a
reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds
of the claim against them.”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility. . . .”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. (footnote
and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not assumed to be true;
legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.
Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific
and is determined through a court’s application of “judicial experience and common
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sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679;
see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th
Cir. 2010) (discussing
Iqbal).
II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
This case presents a tragic set of circumstances resulting in the unfortunate death
of Isacc Parker. On April 23, 2023, at approximately 7:00 pm, Lawton City police officers,
Defendants Halligan and Paterson, were dispatched to the Lawton City library to assist in
a public disturbance matter. (ECF No. 1:5). Upon their arrival at the scene, the officers
found Mr. Parker, holding a bible, making statements to the effect that he was the
reincarnation of Quanah Parker, that white people were taking over Indian lands, that he
was being followed by eight cars, that the “federal bureau” was watching them, and that
a “satanic cult” existed in Lawton. (ECF No. 1:5-6). Officer Halligan arrested Mr. Parker
without resistance, and then asked Mr. Parker if he was a “Taliaferro patient.” (ECF No.
1:6).1 There was no indication that either officer explained to Mr. Parker what “Taliaferro”
was. (ECF No. 1:6). Mr. Parker answered that he was “perfectly fine” with “good health
and everything.” (ECF No. 1:6).
Officers Halligan and Paterson proceeded to drive Mr. Parker to the Lawton City
Jail where he was booked in on one count of Disturbing the Peace, a misdemeanor crime.
(ECF No. 1:7). The arrest and transporting of Mr. Parker to the jail appear to be the
extent of the officers’ involvement in Mr. Parker’s case. While at the jail, Mr. Parker was
placed in isolation, because, according to Lawton City jailer Defendant Watkins, Mr.
1 “Taliaferro” refers to the Jim Taliaferro Community Mental Health Center in Lawton, Oklahoma.
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Parker “is kind of crazy.” (ECF No. 1:11). On June 3, 2023, forty-one days after he was
booked into jail, Mr. Parker was found deceased on the floor of his jail cell, lying in a
large pool of water. (ECF No. 1:9-10). Findings from the Medical Examiner state that Mr.
Parker died from “acute water intoxication due to psychogenic polydipsia in setting of
schizophrenia.” (ECF No. 1:10).
III. DEFENDANT PATERSON’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Against Defendant Paterson, Plaintiffs allege two claims: (1) deliberate indifference
to Plaintiff’s mental health needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth
in Claim One and (2) wrongful arrest under the Fourth Amendment as set forth in Claim
Three. (ECF No. 1:12-15, 21-23). Defendant Paterson has filed a Motion to Dismiss both
claims, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim and Defendant Paterson is entitled
to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 41). Plaintiffs have responded and Defendant Paterson
has replied. (ECF Nos. 46 & 49). The Court should deny Defendant Paterson’s Motion to
Dismiss.
A. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Mental Health Needs
The right to custodial medical care is well settled.
See generally Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976). “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause entitles pretrial
detainees to the same standard of medical care that the Eighth Amendment requires for
convicted inmates.”
Lance v. Morris, 985 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 2021);
see also Clark
v. Colbert, 895 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2018) (explaining the Eighth Amendment
includes “an entitlement to a certain minimum standard of medical care while
incarcerated”). “Although pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause
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rather than the Eighth Amendment, this Court applies an analysis identical to that applied
in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to § 1983.”
Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312
F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2002).
Prison officials violate the Constitution when they act with “deliberate indifference
to an inmate's serious medical needs.”
Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005).
“The deliberate indifference standard lies ‘somewhere between the poles of negligence
at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.’ ”
Id. at 752 (quoting
Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). The contours of constitutional liability under the
deliberate indifference standard are familiar: there is both an objective and a subjective
component.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[T]he focus of the objective component is the
seriousness of the plaintiff’s alleged harm, while the focus of the subjective component
is the mental state of the defendant with respect to the risk of that harm.”
Prince v.
Sheriff of Carter Cnty., 28 F.4th 1033, 1044 (10th Cir. 2022).
To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the
prisoner’s medical need was “sufficiently serious.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citation
omitted). “A medical need is sufficiently serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d
1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). A delay in medical care
can also be sufficiently serious if “the delay resulted in substantial harm.”
Mata, 427 F.3d
at 751. “The substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap,
permanent loss, or considerable pain.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The subjective prong requires a plaintiff to establish that a prison official had “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of deliberate indifference
to inmate health or safety.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference
means “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Id. at 837.
“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”
Mata, 427 F.3d at 752
(citation omitted). “This is so because if a risk is obvious so that a reasonable man would
realize it, we might well infer that the defendant did in fact realize it.”
Id. (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). But “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial
risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at
844.
In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Paterson alleges that Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim for deliberate indifference because “[t]here is no indication, much less
factual support, to show that Defendant Paterson was subjectively aware Decedent faced
any risk of harm or that he needed medical care or attention beyond what could be
provided at the jail[.]” (ECF No. 41:7). Defendant Paterson further argues that “[t]here
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are no allegations to demonstrate any knowledge of Defendant Paterson that, when he
and the arresting officer took Decedent to jail on April 23 that Decedent was at risk of
dying by acute water intoxication on June 3. There are, likewise, no factual allegations to
show that Defendant knowingly and willingly disregarded such risk. It is simply not
plausible that Defendant Paterson could have denied Decedent adequate medical care
before he died.” (ECF No. 41:7).
Although Defendant Paterson may not have knowingly and willingly disregarded a
risk of death to Mr. Parker, Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant Paterson are that he
exhibited deliberate indifference to Mr. Parker’s serious mental health needs by not taking
him to the mental health clinic when he was exhibiting mental health symptoms.
Objectively, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant Paterson was present when Mr. Parker
was arrested—that at that time he was making incoherent and illogical statements, which
apparently prompted Defendant Halligan to ask Mr. Parker if he was a patient at the local
mental health clinic. (ECF No. 1:5-6). These allegations satisfy the objective component
of the deliberate indifference test—from Mr. Parker’s behavior, it was obvious that he was
in need of mental health treatment. And subjectively, Plaintiffs allege that under
circumstances where an individual is displaying mental health concerns, but is not violent
or a threat to himself or others, that Defendant Paterson knew that he was supposed to
either attempt to contact Mr. Parker’s friends or relatives to attend to him or refer the
individual to the Taliaferro Clinic. (ECF No. 1:6-7). Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege
Defendant Paterson knew that if an individual was taken into custody for a misdemeanor
crime for which charges may be filed, the officer must take the individual to the Taliaferro
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mental health clinic and request an immediate mental health evaluation. (ECF No. 1:7).
But according to the Complaint, Defendant Paterson failed to exercise either option, and
instead took Mr. Parker to jail. Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendant
Paterson was subjectively aware of Mr. Parker’s need for mental health treatment, but
disregarded the same.
Defendant Paterson attempts to escape liability for failing to attend to Plaintiff’s
mental health needs by stating “[i]t is simply not plausible that Defendant Paterson could
have denied Defendant adequate medical care 41 days before he died.” (ECF No. 41:7).
By this argument, Defendant Paterson suggests the absence of the causation element
necessary for liability in a Section 1983 context. However, “[t]he requisite causal
connection is satisfied if the defendant[s] set in motion a series of events that the
defendant[s] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the
plaintiff of [his] constitutional rights.”
Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir.
2006).
In
Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2012), two task force officers
approached three men who were loitering in a low-lit, high crime area.
Martinez v. Carson,
697 F.3d at 1253. When police officers arrived on the scene, one of the men fled and the
task force officers forced the other two individuals to the ground, handcuffed them, and
performed a pat-down search for weapons.
Id. A few minutes later, the task force officers
transferred the men into the custody of the police officers, where they were ultimately
held, detention which was subsequently found to be unlawful.
Id. The question on appeal
was whether the task force officers were liable only for the two-to-three-minute period
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the plaintiffs were in their custody, or whether the task force officers shared in
responsibility for the entire custodial arrests.	
Id. at 1255. The task force officers
contended they should not be held liable because they did not personally participate in
the arrests.
Id. The district court agreed, holding:
There is no evidence indicating that Defendants promoted, suggested, or
indirectly caused or conspired with any Rio Rancho DPS personnel to violate
Plaintiffs' rights. Neither is there any evidence to infer in the slightest that
Defendants knew, or should have known, that Plaintiffs would be deprived
of their rights by the Rio Rancho DPS officers or Lt. Camacho. Defendants
took no part in the decision to further detain or charge Plaintiffs once they
transferred them to the custody of the Rio Rancho police officers....
Defendants may only be held liable for their own unlawful conduct in this
case.
Id.
The Circuit Court disagreed, stating:
Defendants are liable for the harm proximately caused by their conduct. In
other words, they may be held liable if the further unlawful detention and
arrest would not have occurred but for their conduct and if there were no
unforeseeable intervening acts superseding their liability. That conduct of
other people may have concurrently caused the harm does not change the
outcome as to [Defendants].
Id. (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant Paterson was deliberately
indifferent to Mr. Parker’s serious mental health needs by not taking him for mental health
treatment when he obviously needed treatment, but instead taking him to jail. Given that
a mental health treatment option existed at the arrest stage, it is conceivable that mental
health treatment might not exist at jail. Without proper treatment, it is conceivable that
Mr. Parker’s mental health could have deteriorated, which it did, according to the
Complaint. Whether an unforeseeable intervening act occurred which may have
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superseded Defendant Paterson’s liability is not a question for the Court at this time. At
this stage, the Court should: (1) deny Defendant Paterson’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s mental health needs in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and (2) conclude that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim
against Defendant Paterson for deliberate indifference to Mr. Parker’s serious mental
health needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth in Claim One.
B. Wrongful Arrest
A police officer violates an arrestee’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right
to be free of unreasonable seizure if the officer makes a warrantless arrest without
probable cause.”
Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). “The law . . . is unambiguous: a government
official must have probable cause to arrest an individual.”
Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d
1108, 1117 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7).
See Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“[T]he Constitution permits an officer to arrest a
suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed or is committing an offense.”). “Probable cause exists if facts and
circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or she had
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that
the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.”
Keylon v. City of Albuquerque,
535 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d at 1476). The
Supreme Court has stated that the existence of probable cause for an arrest depends on
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whether, based on historical facts leading up to the arrest, an objectively reasonable
police officer would find probable cause:
The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or
search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to
reasonable suspicion or to probable cause. The first part of the analysis
involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed
question of law and fact: “[T]he historical facts are admitted or established,
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the
[relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way,
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated.”
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996) (alterations in original) (quoting
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Paterson argues that he is entitled to dismissal
of this claim based on the fact that he was not the actual officer who arrested Mr. Parker,
thereby exempting him from liability on the wrongful arrest claim. (ECF No. 41:7-9).
According to Defendant Paterson, the “undisputed arrest report clearly demonstrates the
arresting officer was Kendra Halligan, not Defendant Paterson.” (ECF No. 41:8). In his
reply, Defendant Paterson clarifies his position—that he should escape liability based on
a lack of personal participation in the actual arrest—i.e.—that it was Officer Halligan, not
Defendant Paterson, who performed the specific actions of placing Mr. Parker under
arrest.
See ECF No. 49:5-6.
Defendant Paterson correctly identifies the liability requisite of personal
participation in a 1983 action.
See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir.
2008). However, Defendant Paterson’s argument appears to confuse the formal arrest
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procedure with the Fourth Amendment’s concept of an arrest, which has been described
as a “seizure[ ] characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy detention and which require[s]
probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime.”
United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the mere fact that
Defendant Paterson did not physically handcuff Mr. Parker or file an arrest report does
not dictate whether Defendant Paterson “arrested” him for the purpose of Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment claim.
See Sisneros v. Fisher, 685 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1213 (D.N.M. Jan.
13, 2010) (rejecting Defendant’s argument that he was not liable for wrongful arrest
because he, personally, “did not handcuff, arrest, charge, transport, or file charges
against Plaintiff.”). As a result, the Court should deny Defendant Paterson’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful arrest. Additionally, Plaintiffs have alleged a lack of
probable cause to support Mr. Parker’s arrest.
See ECF No. 1:21-22. Because Defendant
does not dispute this fact, the Court should conclude that Plaintiff has stated a claim for
wrongful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Paterson, as set
forth in Claim Three.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Paterson has argued that he is entitled to receive qualified immunity on
the deliberate indifference and wrongful death claims because Plaintiffs “have failed to
state a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant Paterson for [either claim].” (ECF No.
41:10. The Court should conclude that a consideration of qualified immunity is premature
at this time.
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“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary
functions from individual liability in federal claims unless their conduct violates ‘clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’”
Nielander v. Board of County Commis, 582 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quoting
Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007);
see also Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U .S. 223 (2009). The correct standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss
in a qualified-immunity case is the same as for dismissals generally.
Archuleta v. Wagner
523 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing
Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 455
(10th Cir. 2006). To avoid dismissal based on qualified immunity, the “plaintiffs must
allege facts sufficient to show (assuming they are true) that the defendants plausibly
violated their constitutional rights, and that those rights were clearly established at the
time.”
Robbins 519 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008).
As discussed, Plaintiff has stated two claims against Defendant Paterson—a
Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious mental health
needs and a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest.
See supra. As a result, the
Court should reject Defendant Paterson’s reliance on a defense of qualified immunity at
this time.
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court should: (1) deny Defendant
Paterson’s Motion to Dismiss and (2) conclude that Plaintiffs have stated a claim against
Defendant Paterson for deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment to Mr.
Parker’s mental health needs as set forth in Claim One; and (3) conclude that Plaintiffs
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have stated a claim against Defendant Paterson for wrongful arrest under the Fourth
Amendment as set forth in Claim Three.
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by October 15, 2024, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to make
timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review
of both factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120,
1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
V. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral by the District
Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on September 26, 2024.
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