Proctor v. Stitt et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ERIC PROCTOR, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-1308-G
)
KEVIN STITT et al., 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Eric Proctor, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma
pauperis, seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docs. 1 & 13.1 As Defendants,
Plaintiff names: (1) “Governor Kevin Stitt”; (2) “Tom Bates (Oklahoma Parole
Board)”2; (3) “Steven Harpe (D.O.C. Director)”3, (4) “Grady County Judge John
1 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. 	Except for 	capitalization, 	quotations are 	verbatim 	unless
otherwise indicated.
2 	Tom Bates is the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole
Board. 	See https://oklahoma.gov/ppb/about/executive-staff.html 	(last 	visited
Feb. 26, 2025).
3 	Plaintiff identifies Steven Harpe’s position as “D.O.C. Director.” Doc. 13.
Steven 	Harpe 	is the 	Executive Director 	of 	the 	Oklahoma 	Department 	of
Corrections. See https://oklahoma.gov/doc/leadership.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2025).
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Herndon”; (5) “District Attorney Joshua McGoldrick”; and (6) the “Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals” (“OCCA”). Docs. 1 & 13.4
United States District Judge Charles Goodwin referred this matter to
the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 5. The undersigned recommends that the Court
(1) dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities,
(2) dismiss Plaintiff’s request for resentencing, (3) dismiss Plaintiff’s request
to review state court rulings under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (4) dismiss
Judge Herndon and the OCCA as Defendants, and (5) abstain from hearing
Plaintiff’s claims against District Attorney McGoldrick because of the ongoing
state court proceeding challenging Plaintiff’s conviction.
Doing so will leave Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants
Stitt, Bates, and Harpe.
4 	Plaintiff 	sues 	Defendants 	Stitt, 	Bates, 	and 	Harpe 	in 	their 	official
capacity only. See Doc. 1, at 4. Plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which
he is suing Defendants Herndon, McGoldrick, and the OCCA. See Doc. 13. The
Court construes his pro se pleadings to assert 	claims against these three
Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. See Hull v. State of
N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t’s Motor Vehicle Div., 179 F. App’x 445, 447
(10th Cir. 2006).
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I. 	Screening.
This Court must 	screen 	complaints filed 	by prisoners 	seeking relief
against a governmental entity or its officer or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a);
see also id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007)). 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627
F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010).
This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings . . . liberally,” holding
them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
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Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per 	curiam). The Court, however, may not serve as
Plaintiff’s 	advocate, 	creating 	arguments 	on 	his 	behalf. 	See 	Yang 	v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. 	Procedural history and Plaintiff’s claims.
A. 	State court proceedings.
In 1994, the Grady County District Court sentenced Plaintiff to serve
310 years’ imprisonment 	consecutively after a jury convicted him of three
counts of forcible sodomy, one count of assault with a deadly weapon, and one
count of rape in the first 	degree.5 See State v. Proctor, No. CF-1994-78A,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=grady&number=
CF-1994-00078A&cmid=9510244 (Proctor I) (last visited Feb. 26, 2025); see
also https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2025).6
5 	Plaintiff states he was sixteen when he was convicted of these crimes.
Doc. 1, at 9.
6 	The OCCA reversed and remanded Plaintiff’s conviction for assault with
a deadly weapon, which the state district court then dismissed. See Proctor v.
State, 	No. 	F-1994-1184,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe
r=F-1994-1184&cmid=31460 (Proctor II) (last visited Feb. 26, 2025); see also
Proctor I (Docket entry dated May 23, 1996) (last visited Feb. 26, 2025). The
undersigned takes judicial notice of the docket sheets and related documents
in Plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings. See United States v. Pursley, 577
F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion “to take judicial
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On January 30, 2025, Plaintiff 	filed 	a motion 	for resentencing. 	See
Proctor I (Docket entry dated Jan. 30, 2025). The motion remains pending, but
the State has responded. Id. (Docket entry dated Feb. 6, 2025).
B. 	Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff 	generally alleges 	that 	Defendants 	Stitt, 	Bates, 	and 	Harpe
violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
rights by “not providing [a] meaningful opportunity” for release as a “juvenile
sentence[d] to 310 years [consecutively] with parole eligibility starting at [] 62
or 68.” Doc. 1, at 6. Plaintiff maintains that “[t]he district court contended that
Plaintiff is serving only one-third of his sentences, rather than 85% as required
under Oklahoma’s []85% Rule.” Doc. 13, at 2. Plaintiff claims that the Grady
County district court’s finding “that parole eligibility at 62 is constitutional”
violates the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. Florida., 560 U.S. 48, 82
(2010). Id.7
notice 	of 	publicly-filed 	records 	in 	[this] 	court 	and 	certain 	other 	courts
concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”)
(citation omitted).
7 	He also claims that the state district court’s findings violated the Tenth
Circuit’s holding in Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017)
that “the [Supreme] Court’s categorical rule in Graham covered all offenders
who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen and who did not kill,
intend to kill, or foresee that life would be taken.” See Doc. 13, at 2-3.
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Plaintiff 	also 	maintains 	that 	Defendants 	Judge 	Herndon, 	District
Attorney McGoldrick, and the OCCA violated his Fourteenth Amendment due
process and equal protection rights. Doc. 13, at 2-3.8 He states that the state
district court9 violated his due process rights by “fail[ing] to provide findings
of fact or conclusions of law.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant OCCA violated his equal protection
rights 	“[b]y 	affirm[ing] 	the 	district 	court’s 	denial 	of 	resentencing” 	and
“applying homicide case law . . . to a non-homicide juvenile offender.” Id. at 2-
3. He claims that the OCCA denied “[him] the protections guaranteed to his
class under [Graham].” Id. at 3.
Plaintiff requests multiple forms of injunctive relief. First, he “request[s]
that [Defendants] be redirected . . . to correct unconstitutional sentence, [in]
which he may demonstrate his maturity [and] rehabilitation as [the] Pardon
8 	Plaintiff filed a motion to amend, Doc. 8, in which he sought to add
Defendants Judge Herndon, District Attorney McGoldrick, and the OCCA and
additional 	claims 	for 	relief. 	As the 	Court 	noted 	in 	its 	order 	addressing
Plaintiff’s motion, Doc. 12, Plaintiff need not seek leave since Defendants have
not been served. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s motion to amend, Doc.
13, as a supplement, and treats Docs. 1 and 13 as the operative complaint. See
Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
9 	Plaintiff has not named the Grady County district court as a Defendant.
The Court therefore presumes that Plaintiff’s references to the district court
refer to Defendant Judge Herndon.
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and Parole Board violates [his] rights under [Graham].” Doc 1, at 7. Plaintiff
also seeks “immediate resentencing” and to enjoin Defendants “from[] relying
on parole eligibility as a substitute for resentencing non-homicide juveniles.”
Doc. 13, at 3. Finally, he seeks to “[c]hallenge the [OCCA] for improperly
relying on [Martinez] (a homicide case) and misapplying relevant precedent to
deny Plaintiff, a non-homicide juvenile offender, the meaningful opportunity
for release mandated by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1.
III. 	Analysis.
A. 	The Court should dismiss the individual-capacity claims
against Defendants Herndon, McGoldrick, and OCCA.
“Section 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only for
money damages and official-capacity 	defendants only for injunctive relief.”
Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1161 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)). Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief in his complaint.
See Docs. 1 & 13. Therefore, the undersigned recommends dismissal of any
claims 	against 	Defendants 	Herndon, 	McGoldrick, 	and 	OCCA 	in 	their
individual capacity with prejudice.
B. 	Plaintiff cannot seek habeas relief in a § 1983 action.
Plaintiff requests immediate resentencing as a remedy for his Eighth
Amendment claim. Doc. 13, at 1, 3-4. “Federal law opens two main avenues to
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relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Muhammad v.
Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). But “habeas corpus is the only avenue for a
challenge to the fact or duration of confinement, at least when the remedy
requested would result in the prisoner’s immediate or speedier release from
that confinement.” Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973)).
Plaintiff seeks to alter his sentence through his request for resentencing.
This relief is unavailable under § 1983, and the Court should dismiss 	this
request for relief without prejudice to refiling in a habeas action if applicable.
C. 	The 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine 	bars 	this 	Court 	from
reviewing the state court decisions Plaintiff challenges.
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim partially hinges on his position
that the OCCA violated his equal protection rights “guaranteed to his class
under Graham” “[b]y applying homicide case law (Martinez, Luna, Stevens) to
a non-homicide juvenile offender.” Doc. 13, at 3. He also claims that his due
process rights were violated by “[t]he district court’s failure to provide findings
of fact or conclusions of law.” Id. at 2.
At bottom, Plaintiff asks the Court to review the state district court and
OCCA’s rulings. But that is beyond the purview of this Court’s authority.
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Market v. City of Garden City, 723 F. App’x 571, 572 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[O]nly
the United States Supreme Court has appellate authority to review a state-
court decision.” (quoting Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d
1072, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 2004))). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “a party
losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the
losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal
rights.’” Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson
v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). “[T]he doctrine applies to ‘cases
brought by state-court 	losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Alexander
v. Lucas, 259 F. App’x 145, 148 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi 	Basic 	Indus. Corp., 	544 	U.S. 	280, 	284 	(2005)). 	“Rooker-Feldman’s
applicability turns on whether the relief sought . . . would reverse or ‘undo’ the
state-court 	judgment.” Market, 723 F. App’x at 574 (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted). 	And here, Plaintiff’s 	requests 	under § 1983 for
injunctive 	relief 	are 	precisely 	an 	attempt 	to 	do just 	that. 	Therefore, 	the
undersigned 	recommends 	dismissal 	of 	his Fourteenth 	Amendment 	claims
against Judge Herndon and the OCCA.
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D. 	The 	Court 	should 	dismiss 	the 	official-capacity 	claims
against Defendants Judge Herndon and the OCCA.
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendants Judge Herndon and the OCCA, they are absolutely immune from
suit and the Court should dismiss them from this matter.
Plaintiff sues Defendants Judge Herndon and the OCCA for injunctive
relief. “[J]udges are absolutely immune from suit on any claim based on the
conduct 	of their 	office, including allegations that 	a decision 	is erroneous,
malicious, or in excess of their judicial authority.” Christensen v. Ward, 916
F.2d 1462, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990). “Section 1983 expressly disallows injunctive
relief against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.” Catanach v. Thomson, 718 F. Appx. 595, 599 (10th Cir.
2017) (quoting Knox, 632 F.3d at 1292). Plaintiff has not established that either
Judge Herndon or the OCCA violated a declaratory decree, or that declaratory
relief was unavailable in his state court proceedings. Therefore, the Court
should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Herndon and the OCCA
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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E. 	Plaintiff 	has 	stated 	plausible 	official-capacity 	claims
against Defendants Stitt, Bates, and Harpe.
“Under Ex parte Young, [209 U.S. 123 (1908),] a plaintiff may avoid the
Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition on suits against states in federal court by
seeking to enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.”
Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.8 (10th Cir. 2013). Even so, “for
the Ex parte Young exception to apply, plaintiffs must show that they are: (1)
suing 	state 	officials 	rather 	than 	the 	state 	itself, 	(2) 	alleging an ongoing
violation of federal law, and (3) seeking prospective relief.” Muscogee (Creek)
Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff requests that the Court redirect Defendants Stitt, Bates, and
Harpe 	“to 	correct 	[his] 	unconstitutional 	sentence, 	[in 	which] 	he 	may
demonstrate 	his 	maturity 	and 	rehabilitation.” 	Doc. 	1, 	at 	7. 	Here, 	the
undersigned finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief under
§ 1983.
“The 	Constitution 	requires 	states 	to 	offer 	juveniles 	convicted 	of
nonhomicide 	crimes 	‘some 	meaningful 	opportunity 	for 	release 	based 	on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” Rainer v. Hansen, 952 F.3d 1203,
1205 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). Plaintiff contends that
Oklahoma’s parole system currently does not provide him with an opportunity
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to do so. See Docs. 1 & 13. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment
claim that can be pursued under § 1983. See Thomas v. Stitt, 653 F. Supp. 3d
1084, 1088-89 	(W.D. 	Okla. 2023) 	(explaining 	that 	“Eleventh 	Amendment
immunity, 	absolute 	legislative 	immunity 	and 	qualified 	immunity 	are 	not
applicable” 	where 	§ 1983 plaintiff 	alleged that Oklahoma’s 	parole system
violated the Eighth Amendment). Defendants are not immune from suit in
their official capacities as Plaintiff is seeking prospective injunctive relief. See
id.
F. 	Younger10 abstention 	applies to Plaintiff’s 	claim against
District Attorney McGoldrick.
The undersigned 	recommends 	that 	the Court 	abstain 	from 	hearing
Plaintiff’s 	claim 	against 	District 	Attorney 	McGoldrick. 	District 	Attorney
McGoldrick is a proper party to suit because Plaintiff sues him in his official
capacity and seeks injunctive relief. See Supreme Ct. of Virginia v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980) (“Prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity from damages liability, . . ., but they are natural targets for § 1983
injunctive suits since they are the state officers who are threatening to enforce
and . . . enforcing the law.”); see also Blair v. Osborne, 777 F. App’x 926, 929
n.6 	(10th 	Cir. 2019) 	(“Prosecutorial 	immunity 	does 	not 	bar 	courts 	from
10 	Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
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providing 	[injunctive 	and 	declaratory] 	relief.”). 	But a 	federal 	court 	must
abstain under Younger when three conditions are met:
First, there must be ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative
proceedings. Second, the state court must offer an adequate forum
to hear the federal 	plaintiff’s 	claims from 	the federal 	lawsuit.
Third, the state proceeding must involve important state interests,
matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or
implicate separately articulated state policies.
Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has sought
resentencing in Grady County district court that essentially incorporates the
same allegations in his complaint and requests some of the relief that he has
requested in this matter. See Proctor I (Docket Entry dated Jan. 30, 2025).
Before the state court, Plaintiff requests a “resentencing hearing under [Okla.
Stat. tit. 22], § 1381.” Id. He maintains that § 1381 provides that “a district
attorney in the jurisdiction in which a person was convicted of an offense may
file 	a 	motion 	in the 	district 	court 	to 	vacate 	or 	set 	aside 	a judgment 	of
conviction.” Id.
Plaintiff’s claim here against District Attorney McGoldrick is based on
his 	alleged 	“abuse 	of 	discretion 	and 	perpetuation 	of 	an 	unconstitutional
sentence.” Doc. 13, at 1. Plaintiff has not shown that the state court is an
inadequate forum for his claims against District Attorney McGoldrick. Indeed,
“Younger requires only the availability of an adequate state-court forum, not a
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favorable result in the state forum.” Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th
Cir. 2019). Plaintiff has essentially requested the same injunctive relief in his
state 	court 	proceeding 	that 	he requests 	here: directing 	District 	Attorney
McGoldrick to move to set aside or vacate his conviction.
Furthermore, 	the State 	of 	Oklahoma possesses 	a strong interest 	in
administering its criminal justice system. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36,
49 (1986) (“This Court has recognized that the States’ interest in administering
their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most
powerful 	of 	the 	considerations 	that 	should 	influence 	a 	court 	considering
equitable types of relief.”).11 And “it is the plaintiff’s heavy burden to overcome
the bar of Younger abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of
bad faith or harassment.” 	Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir.
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	implicates 	no 	exception 	to 	Younger. A 	narrow
exception 	applies 	if 	the 	plaintiff 	shows 	bad 	faith, 	harassment, 	or 	other
extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at
53-54. Plaintiff makes no such showing. Accordingly, this Court should abstain
from considering Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant McGoldrick.
11 	The 	State 	has 	also 	responded 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	pending 	motion 	for
resentencing. See Proctor I (Docket entry dated Feb. 6, 2025).
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IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For these stated reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court (1)
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Herndon, McGoldrick, and the
OCCA 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities, 	(2) 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for
resentencing because it sounds in habeas, (3) dismiss Plaintiff’s request to
review state court rulings under the Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine, (4) dismiss
Judge Herndon and the OCCA as Defendants, and (5) abstain from hearing
Plaintiff’s claims against District Attorney McGoldrick.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this
Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before March 19th,
2025, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned
further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and
Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal
issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th
Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues and does
not 	terminate 	the 	referral 	to 	the 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	in 	the
captioned 	matter.
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ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2025.
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