Sells v. Pantoja et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MARK E. SELLS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LETISHA PANTOJA et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-25-731-HE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, 	a 	state prisoner 	appearing 	pro se, 	has 	filed an amended
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking relief for alleged violations of
“Federal law” and his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution. Doc. 13, at 11; see generally Doc. 13.1
United 	States 	District 	Judge 	Joe 	Heaton 	referred 	the 	matter 	to 	the
undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). Doc. 4.2 Upon review, the
undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the amended complaint in its
entirety.
1 	The amended complaint, Doc. 13, supersedes the original complaint, Doc.
1, and now serves as the operative complaint in this matter. See May v.
Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2019) (“The amended complaint, as the
operative complaint, supersedes the original complaint’s allegations . . . .”).
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and 	pagination. 	Apart 	from 	alterations 	to 	capitalization, 	quotations 	are
verbatim unless indicated.
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I. 	Screening.
Federal law requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007)). 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627
F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010).
This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings . . . liberally,” holding
them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
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Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The Court, however, may not serve as
Plaintiff’s advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta,
525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. 	Procedural History.
A. 	Defendants.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner3 housed at the Red Rock Correctional Center,4
names as Defendants: (1) Letisha Pantoja, Correctional Officer, in her official
and individual capacities; (2) Mr. Houston, Unit Manager Hse. 3/4, in his
official and individual capacities; (3) Mr. Looney, Case Manager Hse. 4, in his
official and individual capacities; (4) Ms. Meloni, Unit Manager Hse. 8, in her
official and individual capacities; (5) Ms. Watters, Case Manager Hse 8, in her
official and individual capacities; (6) Mr. Perez, Case Manager Hse. 8, in his
official and individual capacities; (7) J. Farris, Warden Lawton Correctional
3 	Plaintiff states in his petition that he is both a state and federal prisoner.
Doc. 13, at 4. Publicly available records show, however, that he is currently
serving a state sentence imposed by the District Court of Washington County,
Oklahoma. See https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov/ (DOC # 546774) (last visited Mar.
31, 2026).
4 	On July 25, 2025, “[t]he Oklahoma Department of Corrections officially
became the owner of the Lawton Correctional and Rehabilitation Facility.” See
https://oklahoma.gov/doc/newsroom/2025/oklahoma-department-of-
corrections-finalizes-purchase-of-lawton-.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2026). The
facility is “now known as Red Rock Correctional Center.” Id.
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and Rehabilitation Facility (LCRF), in his official and individual capacities; (8)
GEO Group, Inc. Owner LCRF, in its individual capacity; (9) David Rogers,
Warden, Red Rock Correctional Center, Oklahoma Department of Corrections
(ODOC), in his official and individual capacities; and (10) Steven Harpe,
Director of ODOC, in his official and individual capacities. Doc. 13, at 6-9.
B. 	Plaintiff’s claims.
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, he raises five claims, which
mostly stem from his interactions with Correctional Officer Pantoja. First,
Plaintiff 	alleges 	Defendant 	Pantoja 	repeatedly 	threatened, 	harassed,
persecuted, and retaliated against him for helping other inmates in preparing
their legal filings. Id. at 11-17. After an inmate he assisted was transferred out
of 	the 	prison, 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	Defendant 	Pantoja 	“vindictively”
“retaliate[d] and persecute[d]” him (Claim One). Id. at 18.
In Claim Two, Plaintiff maintains that on May 28, 2025, Defendant
Pantoja “falsely claimed” Plaintiff possessed that transferred inmate’s legal
filings and “decide[d] to give Plaintiff a disciplinary ‘write up’ for being in
possession of [the inmate’s] legal work.” Id. at 17-18. On June 5, 2025, a
Disciplinary Hearing Officer found Plaintiff “‘Guilty’ of the Class ‘A’ write up.”
Id. at 19. Plaintiff claims the hearing officer gave him a sixty-day visitation
restriction for the “minor infraction.” Id. Plaintiff further claims that on June
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6, 2025, Defendant Pantoja called the “Prison Programs Department” head and
demanded they terminate Plaintiff from his position as a GED tutor. Id. The
department head immediately terminated him. Id.
In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pantoja also called his
Case Manager, Defendant Looney, to have Plaintiff transferred from his more
lenient “Honor Pod” to “housing unit 8-A, one of the most violent housing
unit[s] in the prison.” Id. at 20. Plaintiff’s Unit Manager, Defendant Houston,
and Defendant Looney then confirmed they were moving Plaintiff to housing
unit 8-A. Id.
In Claim Four, Plaintiff outlines two other June library interactions with
Defendant Pantoja where she allegedly threatened him with a write-up for
assisting other inmates. Id. at 21-22. On June 18, 2025, Plaintiff’s new case
manager, Defendant Watters, informed Plaintiff they had scheduled a Unit
Classification Committee meeting to review his behavioral level based on his
interactions with Defendant Pantoja. Id. at 22. At the conclusion of the meeting
on June 20, 2025, Defendants Unit Manager, Defendant Meloni, his Case
Manager, 	Defendant 	Perez, 	and 	Defendant 	Watters 	dropped 	Plaintiff’s
classification to the lowest level, 1, from the highest level, 4. Id. at 23-24.
And in Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pantoja, Houston,
and Looney conspired to send Plaintiff to unit 8-A, and that, as a result of living
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there, he has suffered. Id. at 24. He states that Defendants Meloni, Watters,
and Perez are aware of the unit’s dangers (broken cell door locks and lack of
access to toilet paper for several days) and of the Eighth Amendment violations
he has endured. Id. at 24-26. He claims Defendant Meloni personally denied
him toilet paper on July 7, 2025. Id. at 25. He also claims he received a five-
year restriction from the telephone and table-canteen kiosk without reason,
showing continued persecution. Id. at 26. Finally, he alleges the undersigned
ignored Plaintiff’s Ex Parte suit, further endangering his life.5 Id.
C. 	The remedies Plaintiff seeks.
Plaintiff seeks the following temporary relief:
A remand to federal custody or to alternative housing until adjudication
of this suit; an order prohibiting his transfer to another ODOC facility to avoid
preventing or delaying the adjudication of this suit; an order prohibiting the
former LCRF employees named as Defendants from working inside the prison
until 	the 	completion 	of 	this 	suit; 	an 	order 	prohibiting 	RRCC 	staff 	from
harassing him, persecuting him, or retaliating against him during this suit;
and an order allowing Plaintiff library access three days a week for twelve
hours a week to work on this suit. Id. at 27.
5 	The undersigned denied Plaintiff’s request for an emergency injunction
and ordered Plaintiff to complete a complaint on the proper form. Doc. 5.
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Plaintiff seeks the following permanent relief:
An order that RRCC staff not retaliate against Plaintiff for bringing this
lawsuit; an order for the prison to house Plaintiff in a safe housing unit for his
age; an order to reinstate his “Level-4” status along with an award of “back
gang pay”; an order for the prison to rehire Plaintiff at a job of Plaintiff’s choice;
an order for the prison to pay him a comparable wage for the geographic area;
an order prohibiting any Defendants found responsible for violating his civil
rights from working in any Oklahoma prison for ten years; and an order that
the prison house Plaintiff where he can receive adequate health care given his
age and Veteran Affairs (VA) disability rating. Id. at 27-28.
And in damages Plaintiff seeks:
Compensatory damages of $200,000; monetary damages of $100,000,000
for his pain and suffering; and punitive damages of $1,000,000,000. Id. at 28.
III. 	Analysis.
A. 	Plaintiff 	may 	not 	recover 	monetary 	damages 	under 	42
U.S.C. § 1983 from the individuals he sues in their official
capacities.
Except for Defendants Farris, Rogers, and Harpe, Plaintiff alleges each
individual Defendant was employed by GEO Group when the prison was
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privately owned and known as LCRF.6 Doc. 13, at 6-8. He asserts they are now
employed 	by 	the 	ODOC 	at 	RRCC. 	Id. 	He 	seeks 	damages 	against 	these
Defendants, as well as Defendants Farris, Rogers,7 and Harpe, in both their
individual and official capacities. The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s official-
capacity claims against these Defendants.
Private prison defendants are not state actors, and they do not have
official capacities. See Jones v. Barry, 33 F. App’x 967, 971 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he [private prison] defendants are not state actors, and they do not have
an ‘official capacity’ . . . .”). So Plaintiff cannot proceed with his claims against
the LCRF Defendants in their official capacities. See, e.g., Alamiin v. Patton,
No. CIV-13-1001-F, 2016 WL 7217857, at *6 n.6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 13, 2016)
(“As employees of a private prison, they are not state officials, and official
capacity claims cannot be asserted against them.”). The Court should dismiss
these claims with prejudice.
Additionally, because Plaintiff alleges the individual Defendants, except
for Defendant Farris, are state employees, Plaintiff cannot raise claims for
6 	See 	Jaquez v. 	Lawton Corr. 	Facility, 	No. CIV-11-1066-F, 	2013 	WL
5972413, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 8, 2013) (“Lawton Correctional Facility is a
private prison owned and operated by Geo Group, Inc.”).
7 	Plaintiff states Defendant Farris was the warden of the LCRF. Doc. 1, at
8. He states Defendant Rogers is now the warden of RRCC. Id. at 9.
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damages against them. These state “officials acting in their official capacities
are [not] ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 67, 70-71 (1989) (explaining that “[s]tates or governmental entities that are
considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not
“persons” subject to suit under § 1983 (quoting Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977))); see also Tufaro v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 107 F.4th 1121, 1135 (10th Cir. 2024) (“It has long been settled
that ‘[n]either states nor state officers sued in their official capacity are
‘persons’ subject to suit under section 1983’ for monetary damages.” (quoting
Duncan v. Gunter, 15 F.3d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1994))). And the Eleventh
Amendment provides them with immunity from suit.
“When a suit alleges a claim against a state official in his [or her] official
capacity, the real party in interest in the case is the state . . . .” Callahan v.
Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But “[s]tates enjoy sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.” Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th
Cir. 2012); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Because of the
Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court unless they
consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid
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exercise 	of 	power, 	unequivocally 	expresses 	its 	intent 	to 	abrogate 	the
immunity.”).
The RRCC is now a state prison that the ODOC runs. The ODOC “is an
arm of the [S]tate” of Oklahoma. Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 632
(10th Cir. 1988). Just as the Eleventh Amendment protects states from suit,
an ODOC employee sued in his or her official capacity also enjoys the Eleventh
Amendment’s protection of immunity. Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1278
(10th 	Cir. 	2017) 	(“Damage 	claims 	against 	state 	officers 	in 	their 	official
capacities trigger Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); see also Eastwood, 846
F.2d at 631-32 (“We conclude that the DOC is an arm of the state and should
be entitled to absolute immunity.”); Cleveland v. Martin, 590 F. App’x 726, 730
(10th Cir. 2014) (“Because the defendants are employees of the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections[,] . . . the Eleventh Amendment applies to the
official-capacity claims for damages.”).
Exceptions to immunity exist where a state consents to suit in federal
court or where Congress has abrogated a state’s sovereign immunity. Muscogee
(Creek) Nation, 669 F.3d at 1166. But Oklahoma has not consented to be sued
in federal court, nor did Congress abrogate state sovereign immunity by
creating a private right of action under § 1983. Berry v. Oklahoma, 495 F. App’x
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920, 921-22 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152.1(B) & Will, 491
at 66).
Section 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a
remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.” Will, 491 U.S.
at 66. The Court should thus dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the
individual Defendants in their official capacities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2)
(authorizing the court to dismiss a claim that “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief”); Colby, 849 F.3d at 1278.8
B. 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	against 	Defendant 	GEO
Group.
Plaintiff sues Defendant GEO Group in its individual capacity. Doc. 13,
at 8. “But as a private entity, GEO Group lacks a traditional individual or
official capacity.” Mitchell v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. CIV-19-40-G, 2019 WL
4923986, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 2019), adopted as modified, 2019 WL
4918775 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 4, 2019). This lack of traditional labeling, however,
8 	An exception to sovereign immunity applies if a plaintiff alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks prospective relief. See, e.g., Muscogee
(Creek) Nation, 669 F.3d at 1166 (noting the Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1980), exception to sovereign immunity and stating, “a plaintiff may bring suit
against 	individual 	state 	officers 	acting 	in 	their 	official 	capacities 	if 	the
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and the plaintiff seeks
prospective 	relief.”). 	The 	undersigned 	addresses 	Plaintiff’s 	requests 	for
injunctive relief below.
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does not prevent a plaintiff from suing a private entity under a municipal
liability theory.
Section 1983 “creates a private right of action against any person who,
under color of state law, deprives another individual of ‘any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Ripley v. Wyo. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 559 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). A
private 	entity 	acting 	under 	color 	of 	state 	law 	may 	be 	held 	liable 	for
constitutional violations under Section 1983. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336
F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). As a private corporation that previously
operated the LCRF, Defendant GEO Group is subject to Section 1983 liability
under the Monell doctrine of municipal liability. Id. (“Although the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of § 1983 in Monell applied to municipal governments
and not to private entities acting under color of state law, caselaw from this
and 	other 	circuits 	has 	extended 	the 	Monell 	doctrine 	to 	private 	§ 	1983
defendants.”) (footnote omitted); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658,
691-92 (1978); Goins v. GEO Lawton Corr. Facility, No. CIV-22-1014-JD, 2023
WL 7443151, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 2023) (“Geo Group, Inc.[ ] is a suable
entity performing a function akin to a municipal or county government.”).
Under this theory, Defendant GEO Group cannot be held vicariously
liable for its employees’ alleged constitutional violations under § 1983. See
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Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.
2013). Instead, to establish Defendant GEO Group’s liability under § 1983,
Plaintiff must establish three basic elements: (1) Defendant GEO Group had
an official policy or custom; (2) that caused a violation of Plaintiff’s federal
rights; and (3) that “was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to
an almost inevitable” federal rights violation. Id. at 769-71.9
Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting an inference of a policy or
custom or that such a policy or custom caused Defendant GEO Group’s officers
or employees to treat him unlawfully or caused the dangerous conditions in
9 	A municipal policy or custom may take one of five forms:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement;
(2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice
that, 	although 	not 	authorized 	by 	written 	law 	or 	express
municipal 	policy, 	is 	so 	permanent 	and 	well 	settled 	as 	to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law;
(3) 	the 	decisions 	of 	employees 	with 	final 	policymaking
authority;
(4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—
and the basis for them— of subordinates to whom authority was
delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and approval;
or
(5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so
long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the
injuries that may be caused.
Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)).
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unit 8-A. Conclusory or speculative allegations cannot support a plausible
claim for relief. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (instructing that “threadbare
recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” fail to
state a plausible claim for relief).
At best, Plaintiff alleges certain individual officers retaliated against
him for helping other inmates with their legal work, moved him to a dangerous
unit, and temporarily deprived him of toilet paper. Yet he does not claim the
actions of these individuals were under a GEO Group policy or custom. Because
Plaintiff cannot sue GEO Group “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees
or agents,” see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s
municipal liability claims against Defendant GEO Group for failure to state a
claim.
C. 	Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Farris
and Rogers in their individual capacities.
Plaintiff also sues Defendants Farris and Rogers in their individual
capacities. But Plaintiff does not allege that either Defendant personally
participated in denying his constitutional rights. Allegations of “personal
participation 	in 	the 	specific 	constitutional 	violation 	complained 	of 	[are]
essential” in a § 1983 action. Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.
2011); 	see 	also 	Foote 	v. 	Spiegel, 	118 	F.3d 	1416, 	1423 	(10th 	Cir. 	1997)
(“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in
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the alleged constitutional violation.”). To survive screening, Plaintiff must
allege specific facts that make clear “who did what to whom.” Clay v. Lares,
2024 WL 79966, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2024) (affirming dismissal of complaint
on screening when the plaintiff failed to “make clear each defendant’s personal
participation in any alleged constitutional violation by alleging who did what
to whom”).
“As a general matter, § 1983 does not recognize a concept of strict
supervisor liability; the defendant’s role must be more than one of abstract
authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional violation.”
Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). A court may only
hold a supervisor “liable for the actions of other officers if an ‘affirmative link’
exists between the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control
or direction, or his failure to supervise, and the constitutional deprivation.”
Arnold v. City of Olathe, 35 F.4th 778, 793 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fogarty,
523 F.3d at 1162). A party may establish this “affirmative link between the
supervisor 	and 	the 	violation” 	by 	showing: 	“(1) 	personal 	involvement; 	(2)
sufficient causal connection, and (3) culpable state of mind.” Est. of George v.
City 	of 	Rifle, 	85 	F.4th 	1300, 	1321 	(10th 	Cir. 	2023) 	(quoting 	Valdez 	v.
Macdonald, 66 F.4th 796, 834 (10th Cir. 2023)).
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Plaintiff does not allege that either Defendant Farris or Defendant
Rogers had any involvement in threatening him or retaliating against him. He
makes no mention of either with respect to the alleged deprivation of hygienic
materials or that either was aware of this deprivation. Even if Defendants
Farris and Rogers served as Warden and acted as supervisors over Defendants
Meloni, Houston, Pantoja, Watters, and Perez—an allegation Plaintiff does not
make—mere 	awareness 	of 	unconstitutional 	actions 	does 	not 	amount 	to
personal 	participation 	in 	those 	actions. 	See 	Schneider, 	717 	F.3d 	at 	767
(explaining that personal participation requires “more than ‘a supervisor’s
mere knowledge of [their] subordinate’s conduct.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
677)). And the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round
out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.”
Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court
should therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Farris and
Rogers without prejudice based on a lack of personal participation.
D. 	Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Harpe in
his individual capacity.
Plaintiff includes no factual allegations that implicate Defendant Harpe
in the events underlying his claims. Without alleging personal participation, a
§ 1983 action for personal or supervisory liability cannot stand. Henry, 658
F.3d at 1241. Whether Plaintiff intended to allege personal or supervisory
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liability, he has failed to allege facts that, if true, state an individual capacity
claim. Thus, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Harpe in his individual capacity without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
E. 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	sufficiently 	allege 	a 	claim 	for
prospective injunctive relief against Defendants in their
official capacities.
As noted above, Plaintiff sues Defendants Pantoja, Houston, Looney,
Meloni, Watters, Perez, Rogers, and Harpe in their official capacities and seeks
prospective injunctive relief in the form of orders directing RRCC to perform a
litany of actions, some of which are within its power. Courts recognize an
exception to sovereign immunity for injunctive relief when a plaintiff (1)
alleges “‘an ongoing violation of federal law,’” and (2) “‘seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.’” Williams v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 928 F.3d 1209,
1214 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S.
635, 645 (2002)). So by naming Warden Rogers and ODOC Director Harpe in
their official capacities, he has named the proper parties from whom to obtain
certain requested prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., Brown v. Montoya, 662
F.3d 	1152, 	1161 	n.5 	(10th 	Cir. 	2011) 	(“Section 	1983 	plaintiffs 	may 	sue
individual-capacity defendants only for money damages and official-capacity
defendants only for injunctive relief.”); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985) (explaining that suing a defendant in his official capacity is
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only another way to plead an action against the defendant’s associated entity).
But 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	are 	not 	sufficient 	to 	support 	his 	requests 	for
injunctive relief against these Defendants, so the Court should dismiss them.
Plaintiff asks the Court to “[r]emand [him] to [f]ederal custody” or to a
safer housing unit, prevent his transfer to another ODOC prison, prohibit
former LCRF employees named as Defendants from working “inside” RRCC,
order “RRCC staff to not harass, persecute, or retaliate against” him for suing,
and allow him law library access. Doc. 13, at 27. He also asks the Court to order
RRCC officials to “rehire[]” him and pay him a “comp[a]rable wage,” to move
him to a safe housing unit with age-appropriate medical care, to reinstate his
previous level, and prohibit any Defendants “found guilty” of violating his
rights from working in “any Oklahoma prison for [ten] years. Id. at 27-28.
These types of orders are in the nature of mandamus relief, which the
Court 	cannot 	grant. 	Federal 	district 	courts 	have 	jurisdiction 	to 	enter
mandamus relief against federal officials and agencies, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, but
they may not enter mandamus relief against state officials. E.g., Sockey v.
Gray, 159 F. App’x 821, 822 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Federal courts are without
jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus against state and local officials.”). So
to the extent that Plaintiff requests mandamus relief from these state officials,
the Court should dismiss them.
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For his remaining requests for injunctive relief, Plaintiff relies solely on
conclusory statements to support them. He states he is housed in a dangerous
unit but does not 	relate any personal danger. He states certain officers
deprived him of toilet paper for several days but admits that is no longer the
case. He states he was issued a restriction from telephone and tablet use for
an unknown reason, and that he is afraid of continued harassment and
persecution for helping other inmates with their legal work, Doc. 13, at 23-26,
but a “plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for prospective injunctive relief that is
based on ‘speculative future harm.’” Shaw v. Smith, 166 F.4th 61, 75 (10th Cir.
2026) (quoting Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2019)). And
the Court cannot impose an injunction “to remedy past harm.” DTC Energy
Grp., Inc., v. Hirschfeld, 912 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff alleges past harm and speculates about future harm. Those
assertions are insufficient to warrant injunctive relief. See id. at 1270 (noting
that the burden for a preliminary injunction is “not an easy burden to fulfill”
and stating that a movant “must demonstrate a significant risk that he or she
will experience harm that cannot be compensated after the fact by money
damages” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court should therefore
dismiss Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief against Defendants Rogers and
Harpe in their official capacities without prejudice.
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Any 	claims 	against 	Defendants 	Pantoja, 	Houston, 	Looney 	Meloni,
Watters, and Perez are redundant of Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against
Defendants Rogers and Harpe and are therefore also subject to dismissal. The
Court 	should 	dismiss 	the 	official 	capacity 	claims 	against 	all 	remaining
Defendants.
F. 	Plaintiff fails to state a claim of retaliation.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Pantoja retaliated against him for helping
other inmates with their legal work. Doc. 13, at 11, 14-16, 21-22. And when she
discovered 	Plaintiff 	had 	possession 	of 	another 	inmate’s 	legal 	papers 	she
“decide[d] to give [him] a disciplinary write-up.” Id. at 17-18. Plaintiff further
alleges that, as part of her campaign of harassment to prevent Plaintiff from
assisting other inmates with their legal work, Defendant Pantoja had him
transferred to another unit and dropped his conduct level. Id. at 18-24.10
“‘[P]rison officials may not retaliate against or harass an inmate because
of the inmate’s exercise of his constitutional rights.’” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d
1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144
(10th Cir. 1998)). “This principle applies even where the action taken in
10 	Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Pantoja retaliated against him
for pursuing his own litigation or that she prevented or impeded either his or
any other inmate’s access to the courts.
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retaliation would be otherwise permissible.” Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940,
948 (10th Cir. 1990). To prevail on a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must show
that the challenged actions would not have occurred “‘but for’ [a] retaliatory
motive.” Id. at 949–50. And he must “‘allege specific facts showing retaliation
because of the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.’” Peterson, 149
F.3d at 1144 (quoting Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990)).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Pantoja retaliated against him for acting as
a jailhouse lawyer on behalf of other prisoners. But “acting as a jailhouse
lawyer is not a constitutionally protected activity.” Brooks v. Colo. Dep’t of
Corr., 762 F. App’x 551, 560 (10th Cir. 2019); see Smith, 899 F.2d at 950
(“Smith does not have a protected interest in providing legal representation to
other inmates.”); Northington v. Zavaras, 229 F.3d 1164, 2000 WL 1133128, at
*2 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (holding that “the actions Northington ties to his
aid of other inmates cannot support a claim of retaliation for the exercise of his
own constitutional rights.”). Because Plaintiff’s provision of legal assistance to
other inmates does not constitute a constitutionally protected activity, it
cannot serve as the basis for his retaliation claim. See, e.g., Nielander v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1165 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that to establish
a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must first show that “he was
engaged in constitutionally protected activity”); see also Ferguson v. N.M. Dep’t
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of Corr., 21 F. App’x 822, 823 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The district court correctly held
that 	the 	First 	Amendment 	is 	not 	implicated 	by 	Mr. 	Ferguson’s 	alleged
‘jailhouse 	lawyering’ 	activities.”). 	So 	the 	Court 	should 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim for failure to state a claim. See Brooks, 762 F. App’x at 559-
60 	(upholding 	district 	court’s 	dismissal 	of 	retaliation 	claim 	because 	the
plaintiff had not alleged he had engaged in a “constitutionally protected
activity” by “acting as a jailhouse lawyer on behalf of another inmate”).
G. 	Plaintiff fails to sufficiently state a claim for relief based on
his loss of a job (Claim 2), his transfer to housing unit 8-A
(Claim 3), and his loss of classification level (Claim 4).
Plaintiff complains that his drop in classification level made him “‘Un-
hirable’” within the prison. Doc. 13, at 22-24. And that Defendants terminated
him from his job and transferred him without cause to a “dangerous” unit. Id.
at 19-20, 24. Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim for relief based on these
complaints.11
The Due Process Clause protects liberty interests that are “generally
limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in
11 	Plaintiff states Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581 and 1590 by
terminating his position and holding him “in ‘Peonage.’” Doc. 13, at 19 n.16,
24. But Plaintiff does not have a private right of action to enforce these criminal
laws. See, e.g., Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that federal criminal statutes that “do not provide for a private
right of action” are “not enforceable through a civil action”). So the Court
should dismiss those claims.
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such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process
Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
“Discipline 	[imposed] 	by 	prison 	officials 	in 	response 	to 	a 	wide 	range 	of
misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a
court of law.” Id. at 485.
Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a particular security
classification or to be housed in a particular yard. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 224 (1976); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2005)
(increase 	in 	security 	classification 	does 	not 	constitute 	an 	atypical 	and
significant hardship because “a prisoner has no constitutional right to remain
incarcerated 	in 	a 	particular 	prison 	or 	to 	be 	held 	in 	a 	specific 	security
classification”).
And “the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in
avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225 (no
liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause itself in transfer from low-to
maximum-security 	prison 	because 	“[c]onfinement 	in 	any 	of 	the 	State’s
institutions 	is 	within 	the 	normal 	limits 	or 	range 	of 	custody 	which 	the
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conviction has authorized the State to impose”)). Plaintiff has not adequately
alleged that his assignment to housing unit 8-A imposed any atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Cf.
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24 (finding atypical and significant hardship in
assignment 	to 	supermax 	facility 	where 	“almost 	all 	human 	contact 	[was]
prohibited,” conversation not permitted from cell to cell, lights on 24-hours-a-
day, 	exercise 	allowed 	for 	only 	one 	hour 	per 	day 	in 	small 	indoor 	room,
“indefinite” placement with annual review, and disqualification of otherwise
eligible inmate for parole consideration).
Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations about his loss of his job and his demotion
to classification level 1 from level 4 do not imply any protected liberty interests.
These punishments neither impose an atypical or significant hardship nor does
he claim they affected the duration of his sentence. Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d
1399, 1407 (10th Cir. 1996) (prisoners do “not have a constitutional right to
employment absent a regulation entitling [them] to employment” and “a denial
of employment opportunities to an inmate does not impose an ‘atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life’” (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484)); Marshall v. Morton, 421 F.
App’x 832, 838 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that the reduction to Marshall’s
inmate classification level did not implicate a protected liberty interest.”).
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Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim for a violation of his due
process rights. So the Court should dismiss them.
H. 	Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy claim.
In Claim 5, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pantoja, Houston, Looney,
Meloni, Watters, and Perez conspired to harass him and retaliate against him
by transferring him to housing unit 8-A and keeping him there under unsafe
and unsanitary conditions. Doc. 13 at 20, 24-26.12
“‘[T]o recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead
and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights;
pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.’” Thompson v.
Platt, 815 F. App’x 227, 239 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dixon v. City of Lawton,
898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990)). “An actionable conspiracy ‘requires at
least a combination of two or more persons acting in concert and an allegation
of a meeting of the minds, an agreement among the defendants, or a general
conspiratorial objective.’” Id. (quoting Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1227-
12 	Plaintiff alleges these Defendants conspired against him in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. See Doc. 13, at 20-21, 24, 26. But these criminal
statutes 	“do 	not 	provide 	for 	a 	private 	civil 	cause 	of 	action.” 	Henry 	v.
Albuquerque Police Dep’t., 49 F. App’x 272, 273 (10th Cir. 2002); see also
Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1076 (affirming dismissal of claim alleging violation of
§ 241 because it is a criminal statute that does “not provide for a private right
of action and [is] thus not enforceable through a civil action”).
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28 (10th Cir. 2010), abrogated in part on other grounds by Torres v. Madrid,
592 U.S. 306 (2021)).
Plaintiff 	does 	not 	allege 	specific 	facts 	to 	show 	an 	agreement 	and
concerted action among the named Defendants to harass him or retaliate
against him. See Brooks, 614 F.3d at 1228 (to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim,
“‘a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted
action 	amongst 	the 	defendants’” 	because 	“‘[c]onclusory 	allegations 	of
conspiracy are insufficient.’” (quoting Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159
F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998))). He references separate actions taken by
various 	Defendants 	about 	moving 	him 	to 	8-A 	and 	their 	lack 	of 	care 	in
maintaining the housing unit, but states only in a conclusory fashion that these
actions stemmed from a conspiracy. Doc. 13, at 24. At best, Plaintiff only sets
forth the possibility of a conspiracy without specific factual allegations of an
agreement to render such a claim plausible.
“It is not the role of the court to sort through a lengthy complaint to
construct the plaintiff’s case.” Chavez v. Huerfano Cnty., 195 F. App’x 728, 730
(10th Cir. 2006). And, without more, Plaintiff cannot maintain his conspiracy
claims against Defendants. See, e.g., Thompson, 815 F. App’x at 240 (holding
the 	plaintiff’s 	“allegation 	of 	a 	conspiracy 	[was] 	conclusory” 	because 	“[i]t
identifie[d] no agreement among [the defendants] to work together to achieve
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an unlawful objective”); see also Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 533 (holding the
plaintiff’s allegation “that some of the Law School faculty members met with
certain administrators during the investigatory process and then signed the
Letter 	soliciting 	complaints 	from 	students” 	was 	an 	insufficient 	basis 	to
reasonably 	infer 	“an 	agreement 	and 	concerted 	action 	amongst 	the
defendants”). So the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims for
failure to state a claim.
I. 	Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment deprivation
claim based on his temporary lack of access to toilet paper.
Assuming Plaintiff is raising an Eighth Amendment deprivation claim
based on his temporary lack of access to toilet paper, that claim also fails for
failure to state a claim. He maintains that while on lockdown, every other cell
received toilet paper, but he did not receive any for seven days. Doc. 13, at 25.
He maintains that Defendant Meloni stated on the fourth day that it was too
late to get any. Id. He admits though that he eventually received toilet paper.
Id.
Plaintiff’s 	temporary 	deprivation 	does 	not 	violate 	the 	Eighth
Amendment. See Vernon v. Slabosky, No. CIV-11-815-HE, 2016 WL 4775739,
at *20 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2016) (citing Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232,
1234-36 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation when prison
officials failed to provide a prisoner with toilet paper for five days, and soap, a
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toothbrush, and toothpaste for ten days)); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d
1178, 1192 (10th 	Cir. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations of a
deprivation of hygiene items for twenty-five hours and a lack of access to
hygiene 	items 	for 	four 	weeks 	were 	insufficient 	“to 	conclude 	that 	a
constitutional violation [was] plausible, rather than merely possible”). So the
Court should also dismiss this part of Claim 5 for failure to state a claim.
J. 	The Court cannot grant all the relief Plaintiff seeks.
In 	part, 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	reinstatement 	to 	his 	“Level 	4” 	security
classification. Doc. 13, at 27. He alleges he was not provided with the required
due process throughout the disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 22-24. That suggests
a challenge to the execution of his sentence, which he may only bring in a 28
U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus proceeding. McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115
F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining “[p]etitions under § 2241 are used to
attack the execution of a sentence,” including the “deprivation of good-time
credits 	and 	other 	prison 	disciplinary 	matters”). 	The 	Court 	cannot 	grant
Plaintiff’s requested relief.
IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. Doc. 13. The undersigned
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further recommends the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. Doc.
16.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this
Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by April 27, 2026, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The
undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make timely objections to
this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both
factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d
656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation disposes of the
issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2026.
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