Hill v. Guffy

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ARTHUR T. HILL,
Petitioner,
v.
BECKY GUFFY, WARDEN,
Respondent.
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Case No. CIV-25-1198-G
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Arthur T. Hill, a pro se Oklahoma prisoner, has filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1.1 United States District Judge
Charles Goodwin referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. After a
careful examination of the 	petition, 	as required by Rule 4 of 	the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Rule 4),2
the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the habeas corpus petition.3
1 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
2 	Rule 4 requires this Court to promptly review habeas petitions and
promptly dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.”
3 	Petitioner has neither paid the filing fee nor moved to proceed in forma
pauperis.
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I. 	Procedural history.
An Oklahoma County, Oklahoma jury convicted Petitioner in Case No.
CF-2014-1471, of robbery with a firearm, kidnapping, and gang association
while in the commission of a gang related offense. See Hill v. Farris, No. CIV-
21-335-C, 2022 WL 16954832, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 7, 2022), adopted 2022
WL 16951674 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 2022).4 On January 30, 2018, the trial court
sentenced 	Petitioner 	to 	consecutive 	sentences 	of 	twenty-five 	years’
imprisonment for robbery, twenty years’ imprisonment for kidnapping, and
five years’ imprisonment for the gang offense. Id.; see also State v. Hill, No. CF-
2014-1471,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=oklahoma&numb
er=CF-2014-1471 (last visited Oct. 29, 2025) (docket entry dated Jan. 30,
2018).5 On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA)
affirmed his convictions and sentences. Id.; see also Hill v. State, No. F-2018-
119,
4 	The state did not charge, and the jury did not convict Petitioner of an
attempt crime in this case.
5 	The undersigned takes judicial notice of the docket sheets in Petitioner’s
underlying state cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192
n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (exercising “discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-
filed records in our court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear
directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”).
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https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe
r=F-2018-119 (last visited Oct. 29, 2025). The OCCA later affirmed the state
district court’s denial of Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief. See
Hill v. Farris, 2022 WL 16954832, at *4; see also Hill v. State, No. PC-2020-
920,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe
r=PC-2020-920 (last visited Oct. 29, 2025).
After his convictions in Case No. CF-2014-1471 were final, Petitioner
filed a timely § 2254 petition in this Court on April 13, 2021, seeking habeas
corpus relief. Hill v. Farris, 2022 WL 16954832, at *1. Magistrate Judge
Amanda Maxfield issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the
Court deny the habeas corpus petition on its merits. Id. at *20. United States
District Judge Robin J. Cauthron adopted the Report and Recommendation
and denied 	the 	habeas corpus 	petition. 	Hill, 	2022 	WL 	16951674, 	at 	*1.
Petitioner did not appeal this decision to the Tenth Circuit.
In two other Oklahoma County cases which the state courts consolidated
for trial and appeal, a jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of robbery with a
firearm. 	See 	State 	v. 	Hill, 	No. 	CF-2014-1708,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=oklahoma&numb
er=CF-2014-1708 (last visited Oct. 29, 2025) (docket entry dated Jan. 12, 2017);
see 	also 	State 	v. 	Hill, 	No. 	CF-2014-1718,
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https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=oklahoma&numb
er=CF-2014-1718 (last visited Oct. 29, 2025) (docket entry dated Jan. 12, 2017).
At the outset of the proceedings in these two cases, Petitioner’s counsel moved
for juvenile certification in opposition to the state’s motion to sentence him as
an adult. See id. (docket entries dated Mar. 26, 2014 & April 25, 2014). The
trial court ordered a juvenile certification study and held a hearing on the
motions. See id. (docket entries dated July 23, 2014, Sept. 12, 2014, & Sept. 19,
2014). The OCCA denied the certification motion on appeal and granted the
state’s motion to sentence Petitioner as an adult. See id. (docket entries dated
Oct. 16, 2014, and Oct. 17, 2014).
After a jury found him guilty in the consolidated jury trial, the trial court
sentenced Petitioner on March 29, 2017, to consecutive sentences of fifteen
years’ imprisonment on the two robbery-with-a-firearm convictions. See id.
(docket entries dated Mar. 29, 2017).6 Petitioner appealed to the OCCA and
that court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See Hill v. State, No. F-2017-
353,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe
r=F-2017-353 (last visited Oct. 29, 2025). The OCCA also later affirmed the
6 	The State did not charge, and the jury did not convict Petitioner in these
cases of an attempt crime.
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state district court’s denial of Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief.
See 	Hill 	v. 	State, 	No. 	PC-2020-919,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe
r=PC-2020-919 (last visited Oct. 29, 2025).
In 	this 	habeas 	corpus 	petition, 	Petitioner 	seeks 	relief 	from 	his
“Sentencing/Judgment” 	entered 	“1/30/18.” 	Doc. 	1, 	at 	2. 	Petitioner 	was
sentenced in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2014-1471 on January 30, 2018.
See Hill, No. CF-2014-1471 (docket entry dated Jan. 30, 2018). He raises two
grounds for relief. First, he asserts a “violation of due process and lack of
jurisdiction.” Doc. 1, at 2. He explains that “the adult court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction” to try him “due to [the] failure to conduct a mandatory
juvenile certification hearing” under Oklahoma law. Doc. 1, at 2.7 Second, he
asserts 	his 	“sentence 	is 	illegal, 	violating 	statutory 	maxim[um] 	and 	due
process.” Id. at 3. He states he was “convicted of Attempted Robbery . . . [and]
the sentence imposed (e.g., 20 years) exceeds the statutory maximum” under
Oklahoma law. Id.8
7 	Petitioner’s docket sheet in Case No. CF-2014-1471 does not show any
juvenile certification proceedings. As noted, however, his docket sheets in Case
Nos. CF-2014-1708 and CF-2014-1718 do show the state courts’ denial of
juvenile certification after a hearing and appeal.
8 	Petitioner 	references 	his 	sentences 	for 	three 	counts 	of 	“Attempted
Robbery” as “25 years, 15 years, 15 years.” Doc. 1, at 2. As noted, the records
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II. 	28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
A petitioner must “move in the [Tenth Circuit] for an order authorizing
the district court to consider” a second or successive § 2254 habeas petition
“before” Petitioner files the petition “in the district court.” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A). This statutory requirement is jurisdictional. See In re Cline,
531 	F.3d 	1249, 	1251 	(10th 	Cir. 	2008) 	(“A 	district 	court 	does 	not 	have
jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive [] 28 U.S.C. § 2254
claim until [the Tenth Circuit] has granted the required authorization.”).
A. 	Petitioner did not move for or receive the Tenth Circuit
court’s 	authorization 	before 	filing 	this 	habeas 	corpus
petition.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus after his judgment
and sentence became final in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2014-1471. See
Hill v. Farris, 2022 WL 16954832. The Court denied the petition on the merits.
See id. at *20. In this petition, Petitioner seeks further review of the validity
of 	this 	judgment 	and 	sentence. 	Doc. 	1. 	But 	“any 	later 	habeas 	petition
challenging the same conviction is second or successive and is subject to the
[Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)] requirements.” In
re Rains, 659 F.3d 1274, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011).
in Petitioner’s state criminal cases do not reveal any convictions for attempted
robbery.
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The AEDPA requires a prisoner who has previously challenged his
judgment to obtain authorization from the Tenth Circuit to file a second or
successive § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before a
second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district
court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the application.”). Petitioner has not
confirmed he received prior authorization from the Tenth Circuit to file this
second or successive habeas petition, nor has the undersigned determined that
he has received such authorization.9 The Court, thus, has no jurisdiction to
entertain Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition and the Court should dismiss it
without prejudice. See Young v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., 2025 WL 1014236, at *1
(10th Cir. 2025) (“If a prisoner files a second or successive habeas application
without first obtaining authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to
hear it.” (citing In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1251)); see also Dopp v. Martin, 750 F.
App’x 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2018) (upholding district court’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction of petitioner’s “fourth § 2254 application attacking the same
judgment”).
9 	Petitioner does not reference his prior habeas corpus petition in his
petition.
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B. 	The 	Court 	should 	dismiss 	the 	habeas 	corpus 	petition,
rather 	than 	transfer 	it 	to 	the 	Tenth 	Circuit 	Court 	of
Appeals.
A district court may either dismiss or transfer an unauthorized second
or successive § 2254 habeas application. In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252. Under
28 U.S.C. § 1631, if a district court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, it
“shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any
other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have been brought.”
Factors the Court considers “in deciding whether a transfer is in the interest
of justice include whether the claims would be time barred if filed anew in the
proper forum, whether the claims alleged are likely to have merit, and whether
the claims were filed in good faith or if, on the other hand, it was clear at the
time of filing that the court lacked the requisite jurisdiction.” In re Cline, 531
F.3d at 1251. “Where there is no risk that a meritorious successive claim will
be lost absent a § 1631 transfer, a district court does not abuse its discretion if
it concludes it is not in the interest of justice to transfer the matter . . . for
authorization.” Id. at 1252; see also Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1222-
23 (10th Cir. 2006).
Transferring this case to the Tenth Circuit is not in the interest of justice.
Because Petitioner’s petition does not meet the statutory requirements for
authorization, it would be a waste of judicial resources to transfer this case to
the Tenth Circuit. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252; see also Johnson v.
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Allbaugh, 742 F. App’x 395, 396 n.2 (10th Cir. 2018) (noting the Tenth Circuit
will grant authorization “only if [petitioner] is able to demonstrate that he has
new 	claims” 	that 	meet 	the 	statutory 	requirements 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), a court “shall” dismiss “[a] claim presented
in a second or successive habeas corpus application under § 2254 that was
presented in a prior application. And, under § 2244(b)(2), a court may consider
claims presented in a second or successive habeas corpus petition that were
not presented in a prior application if:
(A) 	[T]he applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review 	by 	the 	Supreme 	Court, 	that 	was 	previously
unavailable; or
(B) 	(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence;
and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
“The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive
application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). Petitioner has not made the required prima facie
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showing. He asserts no new rule of constitutional law or new evidence to
support a second or successive petition.
Because a transfer to the Tenth Circuit would result in dismissal in any
case, the interest of justice does not require it. The Court should therefore
dismiss Petitioner’s latest § 2254 habeas petition challenging his judgment and
sentence in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2014-1471 rather than transfer it
to the Tenth Circuit.
III. 	Exhaustion.
A state prisoner must exhaust all available state-court remedies before
seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus unless exhaustion would be futile—
that is, unless no state-court remedy exists or such a remedy would be
ineffective to protect the prisoner’s rights, under the circumstances. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Selsor v. Workman, 644 F.3d 984, 1026 (10th Cir.
2011). “To exhaust a claim, a state prisoner must pursue it through ‘one
complete round of the State’s established appellate review process,’ giving the
state courts a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to correct alleged constitutional
errors.” Selsor, 644 F.3d at 1026 (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
845 (1999)). And “[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State[ ] . . . if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (emphasis added); see also Ellis v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064,
1076 (10th Cir. 2017).
It is unclear whether Petitioner is challenging his robbery convictions in
Case Nos. CF-2014-1708 and CF-2014-1718. Doc. 1, at 2-3. As noted, he
references 	“attempted 	robbery” 	convictions 	and 	the 	lack 	of 	juvenile
proceedings. Neither of which applies to these cases. Nevertheless, if he is
seeking 	habeas 	corpus 	relief 	on 	these 	two 	cases, 	he 	admits 	he 	has 	not
attempted to exhaust his state court remedies on the identified issues. See id.
at 5. He states exhaustion is excused because it would be futile and because “a
structural error cannot be cured by exhaustion” Id. But Petitioner does not
explain why the state appellate process is unavailable to him or ineffective to
protect his rights. Simply claiming a lack of jurisdiction does not excuse
§ 2254’s exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Blanket v. Watkins, 44 F. App’x 350,
351 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[The petitioner’s] proffered reason for not exhausting—
that the State . . . lacks jurisdiction over these claims—lacks merit. . . . [H]e
must exhaust 	his 	state remedies prior to seeking federal habeas corpus
relief.”). And because the Oklahoma courts have a mechanism in place for
granting a post-conviction appeal out-of-time upon a showing of good cause,
Petitioner cannot claim futility. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1080 (allowing
post-conviction claims for lack of jurisdiction and a “sentence [that] exceeds the
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maximum authorized by law”); id. § 1081.1 (imposing a one-year limitation
period with exceptions for cause).
Because any claims challenging the judgments and sentences in Case
Nos. CF-2014-1708 and CF-2014-1718 are unexhausted, the Court should
dismiss Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief in those cases. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of petition for habeas relief for failure to exhaust
state court remedies where petitioner’s failure to exhaust “was clear from the
face of his petition”).10
IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
dismiss the habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction as a second or
successive petition related to claims arising from Oklahoma County Case No.
CF-2014-1471, and for lack of exhaustion related to claims arising from
Oklahoma County Case Nos. CF-2014-1708 and CF-2014-1718.
10 	The undersigned’s decision to raise sua sponte Petitioner’s failure to
exhaust does not present a due process problem because Petitioner may
present his position by objecting to this Report and Recommendation. See
Allen, 568 F.3d at 1203 (noting that in allowing petitioner “an opportunity to
respond to a problem obvious from the face of his pleadings,” the district court
“abided 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	instruction 	that 	‘before 	acting 	on 	its 	own
initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to
present 	their 	positions’” (quoting 	Day 	v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210
(2006))).
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The undersigned advises Petitioner of his right to file an objection to this
Report 	and 	Recommendation 	with 	the 	Clerk 	of 	this 	Court 	on 	or 	before
November 21, 2025, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Petitioner that failure to make a
timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to
appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. See
Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2025.
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