Atwood v. Ponca City City of et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JENNIFER LYNN ATWOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PONCA CITY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-25-1521-D
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Ponca City Utilities Authority Board of Trustees’
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 15], Defendant Ponca City Utility Authority’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 16], and Defendants Vance Allen, Craig Stephenson, Don Bohon, John
Gonsalves, Korey Pruitt, and Kylie Newman, in their official capacities, and the City of
Ponca City’s Joint Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 17]. Pro se Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Atwood
filed a combined response to the motions to dismiss [Doc. No. 18], and Defendants filed a
joint reply [Doc. No. 19]. Thus, the matter is fully briefed and at issue.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on or about October 13, 2025, Defendants shut off the water
and electric utilities to her residence. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 5]. She asserts that her utilities were
disconnected because Defendants incorrectly determined that she had not paid her utility
bills. Id. at p. 5-7. Furthermore, she alleges that Defendants violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process because they failed to give her sufficient notice that her
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utilities would be shut off and failed to adhere to their procedures by refusing to provide
her with a hearing to contest the billing disputes. Id.
On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a similar lawsuit seeking a temporary
restraining order and injunctive relief arising from the same underlying facts as this lawsuit
in Kay County District Court. See Atwood v. Ponca City Utility Authority, CV-2025-107
(Kay Cnty. Dist. Ct. Oka. Nov. 21, 2025) (“State Matter”); see also [Doc. No. 16].1 In the
State Matter, Plaintiff requested the court enter an order preventing Defendants from
shutting off her utilities, requiring Defendants to turn her utilities back on, and preventing
Defendants from pursuing legal action to collect the amount that she purportedly owed. Id.
On December 5, 2025, the judge in the State Matter denied her request, granted Defendants’
motion to dismiss, and dismissed the lawsuit on the basis that Plaintiff failed to state a
claim. [Doc. No. 16-6].
Additionally, Defendants assert, and Plaintiff does not contest, that the dispute
regarding Plaintiff’s utilities and Defendants’ enforcement procedures are “currently the
subject of a separate municipal code enforcement proceeding in the Ponca City Municipal
Court.” [Doc. No. 15, at p. 2 (citing Doc. No. 11-3, at p. 4)]. Plaintiff was charged for
violating sections 109.1.2 (unsafe/improper equipment) and 105.1.2 (occupying a home
not suitable for human habitation) of the International Property Maintenance Code, as well
as section 7-1-13 of Defendant the City of Ponca City’s (“the City”) municipal code for
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the State Matter. See United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184,
1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (courts have “discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records
. . . concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.”).
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tampering with or unlawfully using public utility services. [Doc. No. 15, at p. 2-3], [Doc.
No. 16, at p. 15-16].
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from
the disconnection of her utility services and related billing disputes. [Doc. No. 1].
Specifically, she asserts claims that Defendants violated her right to procedural due
process, substantive due process, retaliated against her, denied her access to the courts, and
are subject to municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
463 U.S. 658 (1978). Id.
Defendant the Ponca City Utilities Authority Board of Trustees (“the Board”) filed
a motion to dismiss arguing, in relevant part, that the claims against it should be dismissed
because it is not a separate suable entity. [Doc. No. 15]. Additionally, in their official
capacity, Defendants Vance Allen (“Allen”), Don Bohon (“Bohon”), John Gonsalves
(“Gonsalves”), Kylie Newman (“Newman”), Korey Pruitt (“Pruitt”), and Craig Stephenson
(“Stephenson”) filed a joint motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 17] arguing, in relevant part, that
the claims against them should be dismissed because they are redundant. Moreover,
Defendants Ponca City Utility Authority (“PCUA”) and the City filed motions to dismiss
[Doc. Nos. 16, 17] arguing, in relevant part, that the claims against them should be
dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and because the Court should abstain from presiding over the matter under the
Younger abstention doctrine.
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STANDARD OF DECISION
I. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Rule 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on
the merits of a plaintiff’s case, but only a determination that the court lacks authority to
adjudicate the matter. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise
jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so). A court lacking jurisdiction “must
dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that
jurisdiction is lacking.” Full Life Hospice, LLC v. Sebelius, 709 F.3d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir.
2013). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss must be determined from the allegations and facts
in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction. Smith v.
Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). The burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108,
1110 (10th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Plaintiff in this case bears the burden of establishing
that the Court has jurisdiction to hear her claims.
II. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations ... and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Cassanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United
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States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). Nonetheless, a plaintiff may not rely on mere
labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility refers “to the
scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide
swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247
(10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “The burden is on the plaintiff to
frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is
entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The ultimate duty of the court
is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements
necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest
Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The Court, however, cannot be a pro se litigant’s
advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). Moreover, pro se
parties must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Nielsen v.
Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917
(10th Cir. 1992)).
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ANALYSIS
I. Defendant the Board is not a separate suable entity from PCUA.
Defendant the Board contends that Plaintiff’s claims against it are duplicative of her
claims against PCUA because it lacks capacity to be sued. Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that a non-corporate entity’s capacity to be sued is determined
by the law of the state in which the district court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). As a
public trust, PCUA exists as a legal entity separate and distinct from both its beneficiaries
and its trustees. See Okla. Stat. tit. 60, § 176.1(A)(2) (a public trust “shall be presumed for
all purposes of Oklahoma law to: . . . exist as a legal entity separate and distinct from the
settlor and from the governmental entity that is its beneficiary.”).
The trust is provided with the power to sue or be sued, not the Board. See Barnes v.
Mayes Emergency Servs. Trust Authority, No. 25-cv-117-JDR-JFJ, 2026 WL 579938, at *2
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 2, 2026) (Okla. Stat. tit. 60, § 179 “states that ‘[n]o trustee or beneficiary
shall be charged personally with any liability whatsoever by reason of any act … committed
… in the performance of such trust’ and that, instead, the liability falls upon the trust
itself.”). Moreover, courts applying Oklahoma law have consistently found that boards for
entities like PCUA are not separate suable entities. See Tarrant v. Perry, No. CIV-20-891-
PRW, 2022 WL 989063, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2022) (finding the town board was
“fully synonymous with the actions of the Town” and thus the board was not a separate
legal entity and could not be sued); Silagyi v. Indep. School Dist. No. 12, Okla. Cnty., Okla.,
680 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1242 (W.D. Okla. 2023) (finding that the school board was “not [a]
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separate, suable entit[y]” and “claims against the school board are duplicative of claims
against the school district”).
Here, the Board has no “separate legal identity” from PCUA. Rather, any official
action taken by the Board is fully synonymous with actions taken by PCUA. As such, the
Board does not have a separate legal identity outside of the PCUA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
claims against the Board must be dismissed.
II. The claims against Defendants Allen, Bohon, Gonsalves, Newman, Pruitt,
and Stephenson in their official capacities are redundant.
Although individual capacity suits seek to impose personal liability on a government
actor for actions taken under color of law, official capacity suits “generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citation and quotations omitted). “[A]n
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.” Id. at 166; see also Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir.
1988) (“A suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or
her official capacity are the same.”).
Where a plaintiff sues both a person in his official capacity and the entity, courts
have dismissed the official capacity claims as redundant. See French v. City of Cortez, 361
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1042 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2019) (dismissing official capacity claims against
police officers because they were “duplicative” of the claims against the city); Wash. v. City
of Okla. City, No. CIV-20-266-D, 2022 WL 865833, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2022)
(same).
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The City is a named defendant. Thus, suing Defendants Allen, Bohon, Gonsalves,
Newman, Pruitt, and Stephenson in their official capacities is redundant, and the official
capacity claims against them must be dismissed.
III. 	The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar this Court from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
Defendants the City and PCUA argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires
dismissal of this case against them, because the Court is not permitted to act as an appellate
court for the state court’s determination in the State Matter. Specifically, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff “invites this Court to determine the state court erred” by requesting “this Court
to conclude that Defendants violated her due process rights in disconnecting utilities or
enforcing 	related 	code 	provisions, 	claims 	the 	Kay 	County 	District 	Court 	already
dismissed.” [Doc. No. 16, at p. 14].
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction ‘over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Bruce v. City & Cnty. of
Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 746 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Rooker-Feldman is, accordingly, “a firm
jurisdictional bar,” but this bar “is narrow in scope.” Id. (citing Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.
459, 464 (2006)).
For example, “[w]hen the state-court judgment is not itself at issue, the doctrine
does not prohibit federal suits regarding the same subject matter, or even the same claims,
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as those presented in the state-court action. The doctrine that governs litigation of the same
subject matter” is claim preclusion. Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1139
(10th Cir. 2006). Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal claims “just because” they “could
result in a judgment inconsistent with a state-court judgment.” Bruce, 57 F.4th at 747
(quotation omitted). For Rooker-Feldman to apply, therefore, a plaintiff’s complaint must,
at the very least, make an “allegation concerning the state-court proceedings or judgment.”
Bolden, 441 F.3d at 1145.
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	do 	not 	“rest 	on 	any 	allegation 	concerning 	the 	state-court
proceedings or judgment.” Id. A comparison to Bolden’s facts helps demonstrate this point.
In Bolden, the plaintiff purchased property in Topeka, Kansas; before he purchased the
property, however, the City of Topeka deemed the property “unfit for human habitation”
and ordered the property to be demolished. Id. at 1132. The plaintiff sued in state court for
an injunction prohibiting the City of Topeka from tearing down his new acquisition, but
the state court denied his request for an injunction. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the
City of Topeka, its mayor, and two City of Topeka employees in federal court. Id. The
plaintiff’s federal suit sought, among other claims, a temporary restraining order to prevent
the City from demolishing his property and raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The
federal district court invoked Rooker-Feldman and dismissed the claims. Id. at 1132-33.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court should not have dismissed his
claims under Rooker-Feldman, and the Tenth Circuit agreed. Id. at 1138. The Tenth Circuit,
explained that the district court erroneously invoked Rooker-Feldman, because the
plaintiff’s “federal suit did not seek to overturn the state-court judgment.” Id. The Court
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reasoned that while “the allegations underlying [the plaintiff’s] federal-court claims are
identical to what they would have been had there been no state-court proceeding[,] none of
his claims rests on allegations that the state-court proceedings or judgment violated federal
law, or that the judgment itself inflicted an injury.” Id. The Court explained that “[t]he
doctrine that governs litigation of the same subject matter or the same issues is res
judicata—specifically, claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” Id. at p. 1139. Moreover,
the Court emphasized that Rooker-Feldman “is inapplicable, regardless of whether a
favorable judgment in federal court would be inconsistent with that judgment and would
‘den[y] a legal conclusion that [the] state court has reached.’” Id. at 1145 (quoting Exxon
Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292).
Although, like the plaintiff in Bolden, Plaintiff asserts claims she already asserted
in the State Matter, Plaintiff does not allege that the judgment in the State Matter violates
federal law or “itself” inflicts an injury on her. Rather, she alleges that Defendants’
generalized actions regarding the utilities—that were also at issue in the State Matter—
amount to a violation of her constitutional rights and support a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. She is not directly challenging the correctness of, or the constitutionality of, the state
court’s denial of her temporary restraining order or the dismissal of her action. Accordingly,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable.
IV. Pursuant to the Younger doctrine the Court will abstain from hearing
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants PCUA and the City.
As another threshold issue, the Court analyzes whether it should refrain from
hearing the case concerning Defendants PCUA and the City under the Younger abstention
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doctrine. Under Younger, a plaintiff may not request a federal district court to interfere
before a state court judgment is final. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971).
“Generally, federal courts must exercise their jurisdiction when available. However,
principles of ‘equity, comity, and federalism’ motivate a ‘longstanding public policy
against federal court interference with state court proceedings.’” Rocky Mountain Gun
Owners v. Williams, 671 F. App’x 1021, 1024 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (quoting
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974), and citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45;
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013)).
For Younger abstention to be appropriate, the Tenth Circuit directs that three
conditions must be present: (i) interference with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (ii)
involvement of important state interests; and (iii) an adequate opportunity afforded in the
state court proceedings to raise the federal claims. See J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d
1280, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). “Younger abstention is not discretionary once the [three]
conditions are met, absent extraordinary circumstances that render a state court unable to
give state litigants a full and fair hearing on their federal claims.” Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v.
Oklahoma, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). See Taylor v. Jaquez, 126
F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1997) (Because “‘application of the Younger doctrine is absolute
... when a case meets the Younger criteria,’ there is no discretion for the district court to
exercise.”). When the Younger abstention elements are met, a district court should dismiss
the claims before it, unless a petitioner has brought claims which “cannot be redressed in
the state proceeding,” in which case the district court should stay the federal proceedings
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pending the conclusion of the state litigation. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202
(1988).
1. 	Plaintiff has ongoing civil enforcement proceedings that are akin to
criminal proceedings.
“[T]he proceedings must be ongoing and they must be the type of proceedings
afforded Younger deference.” Hunter v. Hirsig, 660 F. App’x 711, 715 (10th Cir. 2016)
(unpublished). Younger’s application is limited to three types of ongoing proceedings: “(1)
ongoing state criminal prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to
criminal prosecutions; and (3) ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts ability to perform their judicial functions.’” Escalante v.
Burmaster, No. 23-cv-2130-TC-TJJ, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74762, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr.
28, 2023) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns., Inc., 571 U.S. at 73); see also Elna Sefcovic, LLC v.
TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 670 (10th Cir. 2020) (recognizing the three
categories of state proceedings to which Younger abstention applies).
Here, Defendants the City and PCUA assert, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that she
is involved in ongoing municipal proceedings regarding her unlawful use of the utilities.
Indeed, she admits that has been charged in Ponca City Municipal Court with multiple
municipal code violations related to her failure to pay for her use of the utilities.2 [Doc.
No. 17, at p. 16-17 (citing Doc. No. 11-2, at p.4)].
2 The record before the Court provides that these proceedings are ongoing, and the Court
has not been informed otherwise.
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Moreover, Defendants argue that the municipal proceedings are the “type” of
proceeding to which Younger applies, because it is akin to criminal prosecutions. Indeed,
it fits within the second category (i.e. certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal
prosecutions). A civil enforcement proceeding akin to criminal prosecution is one that is
“initiated by the State, it involves an investigation by one or more state agencies, and it
potentially involves a sanction against a private party for a wrongful act.” Byrd v. Pirrong,
No. CIV-25-747-SLP, 2025 WL 2963220, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Sprint
Commc’ns, Inc., 571 U.S. at 79).
Here, Defendants initiated the municipal proceeding, conducted an investigation
regarding Plaintiff’s unlawful use of the utilities, and charged her for violating sections
109.1.2 and 105.1.2 of the International Property Maintenance Code, as well as section 7-
1-13 of the City’s municipal code for tampering with or unlawfully using public utility
services. [Doc. No. 17, at p. 16-17 (citing Doc. No. 11-2, at p.4)]. If Plaintiff is found to
have violated these sections, then she may be fined or imprisoned. See Ponca City, Okla.,
Municipal Code § 1-4-1. Thus, the municipal proceeding is not only ongoing, but is also
the type of proceeding to which Younger applies.
2. 	The municipal proceeding involves an important state interest.
“A city has an important interest in enforcing its municipal code.” Lofland v. City of
Shawnee, No. 16-02183-CM, 2016 WL 5933514, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 12, 2016). Moreover,
“[t]he regulation of utilities is one of the most important of the functions traditionally
associated with the police power of the States.” Arkansas Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983).
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Defendants argue, and the Court agrees that they have an important interest in
enforcing the City’s municipal code and regulating the use of its utilities.
3. 	The municipal court is an adequate forum to hear Plaintiff’s federal
claims.
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the state court is not an adequate
forum to hear the constitutional challenges. See Chapman v. Okla., 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th
Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff had “not shown that the state court is not an adequate
forum to hear his constitutional challenges ….”). Generally, “a plaintiff has an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims in state court ‘unless state law clearly bars the
interposition of the [federal statutory] and constitutional claims.’” Crown Point I, LLC v.
Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003) (original brackets)
(quoting J.B. ex rel. Hart, 186 F.3d at 1292); see also Speihs v. Allen, No. 25-2111-DDC-
GEB, 2026 WL 482318, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2026) (finding abstention under Younger
proper as the “ongoing municipal proceeding does afford an adequate opportunity to raise
some of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims.”); Trackwell v. Miller, No. 12-4107-JAR/KGS,
2012 WL 5228669, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 22, 2012) (finding abstention under Younger proper
because in the ongoing municipal court proceedings the plaintiff “has the opportunity to
raise constitutional issues and appeal those issues to the state district court.”); Watts v. City
of Cleveland Heights, No. 25 CV 1582, 2025 WL 2615846, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10,
2025) (plaintiff failed to show that the municipal court was not an adequate forum under
Younger); Thunderbird Downtown, LLC v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-19-05287, 2021 WL
4133972, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2021) (the municipal court was an adequate forum
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because the plaintiff could raise its constitutional defenses and appeal the municipal court’s
determination). A plaintiff’s failure to present the federal claims in the state forum does not
render the state forum inadequate. See Lofland, 2016 WL 5933514, at *3 (citing Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 330 (1977)).
Plaintiff did not argue that the municipal proceeding will not afford her claims full
and proper consideration. Rather, in her declaration she stated that the hearings regarding
the utility disputes and ordinance violations have been continued due to her assertion that
Defendants’ failure to provide her notice regarding the disconnection of her utilities
constituted a violation of her constitutional right to due process. [Doc. No. 11-2 at p. 4].
Moreover, to the extent the municipal court finds against Plaintiff and her constitutional
right to due process was not violated, she may appeal to the district court, and then appeal
the district court’s de novo proceeding to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. See
Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 27-132. Thus, the municipal proceeding does afford Plaintiff’s claims
full and proper consideration as she has raised them as defenses to the charges against her.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Younger abstention applies to Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants the City and PCUA.3
V. 	Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	against 	Defendants Allen, 	Bohon,
Gonsalves, Newman, Pruitt, Stephenson in their individual capacities.
3 Defendants the City and PCUA raise several arguments in support of their motions to dismiss.
[Doc. Nos. 16, 17]. However, because the Court agrees that the Younger abstention doctrine applies
to the claims against them, the Court does not address their alternative arguments. See Goings v.
Sumner Cnty. Dist. Atty’s Office, 571 F. App’x 634, 637 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (noting that
“[a]fter reaching its conclusion to abstain under Younger . . . the district court should not have gone
further and ruled on the merits of Defendant’s 12(b)(6) challenge. We have held that this additional
inquiry is improper.” (citing D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir.
2004))).
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When Plaintiff has brought a § 1983 claim against more than one defendant for
violation of her constitutional rights “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint
make clear who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair
notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective
allegations against the state.” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250. Plaintiff has failed to do so, and
the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint
or construct a legal theory on plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170,
1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).4
Plaintiff’s failure to link any of the individuals to any specific act or omission
renders the Complaint legally deficient. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at
Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that,
to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the
pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed (the
plaintiff); and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”).
Indeed, she fails to identify what each Defendant did, when that Defendant acted, how that
Defendant harmed her, and which of her constitutional rights were violated. Rather, she
4 The Court analyzes the Complaint under its inherent power to manage its docket. See McKinney
v. State of Okl., Dep't of Hum. Servs., Shawnee OK, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
“a sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not reversible error when it is ‘patently obvious’
that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, see Baker, 916 F.2d at 727, and allowing
him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile.”); see also 5B Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure—Civil § 1357 (3d ed. 2004) (“Even if a party
does not make a formal motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the district judge on his or her own initiative
may note the inadequacy of the complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim as long as the
procedure employed is fair to the parties.”).
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asserts all of her allegations collectively against all Defendants. This is insufficient to state
a claim.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	Defendants Allen, 	Bohon, 	Gonsalves,
Newman, Pruitt, and Stephenson in their individual capacities, warrant dismissal.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Ponca City Utilities Authority
Board of Trustees’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 15] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Ponca City Utilities Authority Board of Trustees are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Vance Allen, Don Bohon, John
Gonsalves, 	Kyle 	Newman, 	Korey 	Pruitt, 	and 	Craig 	Stephenson’s, 	in 	their 	official
capacities, Joint Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 17] is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants Vance Allen, Don Bohon, John Gonsalves, Kyle Newman,
Korey 	Pruitt, 	and 	Craig 	Stephenson, 	in 	their 	official 	capacities, 	are 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Vance
Allen, Don Bohon, John Gonsalves, Kyle Newman, Korey Pruitt, and Craig Stephenson,
in their individual capacities, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.5
5 Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her Complaint in her response to Defendants’ motions to
dismiss is improper and does not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) or LCvR 15.1. A district court
may properly require a plaintiff to file a motion that complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and LCvR
15.1 before considering whether to allow an amendment. See Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC,
985 F.3d 1272, 1283 (10th Cir. 2021).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Ponca City Utility Authority’s
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 16] and Defendant City of Ponca City’s Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. No. 17] are GRANTED IN PART as set forth herein. The adjudication of Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants Ponca City Utility Authority and City of Ponca City are
STAYED pending the final conclusion of Plaintiff’s municipal court proceedings. An
appropriate Administrative Closing Order shall be entered.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order Directing
Service by United States Marshal [Doc. No. 10] is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15 th day of July, 2026.
Case 5:25-cv-01521-D Document 20 Filed 07/15/26 Page 18 of 18