Hernandez Casallas v. Jones et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
RICARDO ALBERTO HERNANDEZ )
CASALLAS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-53-J
)
DON JONES, Warden, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
ORDER
Petitioner Ricardo Alberto Hernandez Casallas, a noncitizen from Venezuela, filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1]. The matter was
referred to United States Magistrate Judge Chris M. Stephens consistent with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B), (C). Judge Stephens issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the
Court: (1) grant the Petition and (2) order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise release him. (Rep. & Rec.) [Doc.
No. 13]. Respondents filed a timely objection (Obj.) [Doc. No. 15], triggering de novo review.
See Quint v. Vail Resorts, Inc., 89 F.4th 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2023).
For the reasons discussed below, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and the
Petition is GRANTED to the extent it alleges Petitioner’s lack of bond hearing violates federal
law.
I. Background
Petitioner entered the United States on June 12, 2022 and has been living in Cicero, Illinois.
On November 4, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers apprehended
Petitioner, and he was placed into removal proceedings that same day. Petitioner is being detained
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pending those proceedings. While detained at the Kay County Justice Facility in Newkirk,
Oklahoma, Petitioner filed his Petition, asserting that his continued detention without a bond
hearing violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and his Fifth Amendment due process
rights.1
II. Report and Recommendation
Upon review, Judge Stephens concluded that (1) this Court has jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner’s claims, and (2) Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing violates the
INA. See Rep. & Rec. at 4-24. On the latter finding, Judge Stephens found that Petitioner is not
seeking admission as contemplated under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
controls his detention. See id. at 9-11.
III. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
Respondents first object to Judge Stephens’ finding on jurisdiction. Respondents initially
contend that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear “any claim arising from
the decision or action of the Attorney General or DHS to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders.” Obj. at 2. In support, Respondents cite Tsering v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 403 F. App’x. 339, 342–43 (10th Cir. 2010).
In Tsering, the petitioner alleged his substantive and procedural due process rights were
violated when ICE removed him based on a false identity that represented him to be a Nepali
citizen when he was Tibetan. See Tsering, 403 F. App’x at 343. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held
that § 1252(g) precluded jurisdiction because the handling of the petitioner’s travel documents was
“directly and immediately connected to the execution of his removal order.” Id. (agreeing with the
1 Because the Court grants Petitioner relief, it declines to address his constitutional claim.
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Fifth Circuit that “claims that clearly are included within the definition of ‘arising from’ are those
claims connected directly and immediately with a decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders” (cleaned up; citation
omitted).
But eight years after Tsering, the Supreme Court held that § 1252(g) must be read narrowly
and applied only to “those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 294-95 (2018). Specifically, the court instructed against interpreting § 1252(b)(9)’s “arising
from” language in an “expansive” or “extreme” way. Id. at 293. As the court explained, “legal
questions do not ‘arise from’ actions taken to remove a non-citizen simply because the legal
questions exist in the context of removal proceedings[.]” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, Petitioner is simply alleging that his continued detention without a bond hearing is
in violation of federal law (the INA). Hence, his claims do not “arise from” and are not directly
and immediately connected to the Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings, proceed
with the adjudication of Petitioner’s case, or any removal order. As such, § 1252(g) does not strip
this Court of jurisdiction. See Perez v. Grant, No. CIV-25-1560-R, 2026 WL 315065, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 5, 2026) (“Petitioner is not challenging the discretionary decision to commence a
removal proceeding or the process by which his removability will be adjudicated. Instead, he is
challenging the legal question of whether he is subject to mandatory detention under §
1225(b)(2)(A) or detention under § 1226(a). As such, his claims do not fall within the narrow
jurisdictional bar stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)); Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL
3645176, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025) (“Accordingly, because Petitioner does not challenge
Respondents’ decision to commence or adjudicate proceedings or execute removal orders, the
Court concludes that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not jurisdictionally bar consideration of the
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Petition.”); Diaz v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1179-J, 2025 WL 3296310, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2025)
(same); Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 1:25-CV-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 2962908, at *3 (D.
Colo. Oct. 17, 2025) (“[Section] 1252(g) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to consider the
narrow legal questions of whether Mr. Gutierrez’s detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 violates the
INA and whether he is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226’s discretionary detention
framework.”); Salvador F.-G. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-0243-CVE-MTS, 2025 WL 1669356, at *5
(N.D. Okla. June 12, 2025) (“To the extent petitioner’s claims challenge his detention as
unconstitutional and challenge the extent of DHS’s statutory authority to revoke a bond issued by
an immigration judge, the Court finds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
In sum, the Court agrees with Judge Stephens that § 1252(g) does not jurisdictionally bar
the Petition.
Respondents also invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) to argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction. See
Obj. at 3. Again, the Court disagrees. Section 1226(e) states that “[t]he Attorney General’s
discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No
court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.” “But 1226(e) does not
preclude habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law, such as those at issue
here.” Martinez Rodriguez v. Castro, No. 2:25-CV-01294-KG-JFR, 2026 WL 252503, at *2
(D.N.M. Jan. 30, 2026); Salvador F.-G. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-0243-CVE-MTS, 2025 WL 1669356,
at *5 (N.D. Okla. June 12, 2025) (“Congress has placed various limits on the exercise of this
jurisdiction [including § 1226(e)]. Nonetheless, federal courts retain jurisdiction under § 2241 to
review habeas claims by noncitizen detainees who either challenge their detention as
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unconstitutional or raise questions of law regarding the extent of the government’s statutory
authority to detain them.”).
B. Section 1225
Regarding the merits of Petitioner’s INA claim, Respondents object to Judge Stephens’
conclusion that § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s detention. Respondents insist that § 1225(b)(2)(A)
controls because Petitioner is an applicant for admission and the section unambiguously requires
all applicants for admission to be subject to mandatory detention.
The relevant statute here provides:
[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Respondents insist the section unambiguously requires all applicants for admission to be
subject to mandatory detention and urges the Court to find that any applicant for admission is
automatically deemed an alien seeking admission. But the Court agrees with Judge Stephens that
if all applicants for admission are also “seeking admission,” then § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s inclusion of
the phrase “seeking admission” would be redundant and courts should avoid statutory
interpretations that “make any part [of the statute] superfluous.”2 Fuller v. Norton, 86 F.3d 1016,
1024 (10th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). As the Seventh Circuit recently held:
[A]dmittedly, this argument has some superficial appeal. After all, a person does
not apply for something they are not seeking. Moreover, § 1225(a)(3) . . . refers to
noncitizens “who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission,” 8
2 Respondents also argue that Judge Stephens relied too heavily on § 1225’s title and statutory
headings. But a court may only consider extrinsic evidence to “resolve [textual] ambiguities.”
McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493, 499 (10th Cir. 2006). And as the Court finds § 1225(b)(2)(A)
unambiguous, it need not address this objection.
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U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added), suggesting that “applicants for admission”
are those “seeking admission.” But it is Congress’s prerogative to define a term
however it wishes, and it has chosen to limit the definition of an “applicant for
admission” to “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or
who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). It could easily have
included noncitizens who are “seeking admission” within the definition but elected
not to do so.
What is more, Defendants’ construction would render § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s use of the
phrase “seeking admission” superfluous, violating one of the cardinal rules of
statutory construction.
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025); see also
Maldonado v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1379-J, 2026 WL 160950, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026)
(“This Court agrees with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, the majority of the other courts in this
district, and this Court’s prior rulings that based on § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s plain language, the Court
concludes that the section only applies when a noncitizen applicant for admission is actively
seeking admission into the United States.” (cleaned up)).
C. Section 1226
Having found § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable to Petitioner, the Court agrees with Judge
Stephens that § 1226(a) controls his detention. See Maldonado, 2026 WL 160950, at *2-3 (holding
that because “Petitioner has been unlawfully living in the United States for many years without
seeking admission, § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply, and § 1226(a), instead, controls Petitioner’s
detention.”). And “[n]oncitizens detained under § 1226(a) are generally entitled to a prompt bond
hearing before an immigration judge.” Id. at 3; see also Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-CV-
03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (finding similarly situated
noncitizen entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a)). Here, Petitioner has not received a bond
hearing, and Respondents raise no objection challenging their obligation to provide bond hearings
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for noncitizens under § 1226(a). Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to a bond
hearing and Respondents’ failure to provide one violates § 1226(a) of the INA.3
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the thorough and well-reasoned Report and
Recommendation [Doc. No. 13] on de novo review and GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition in so far as
it finds Respondents violated the INA. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to provide
Petitioner with a prompt bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or otherwise release Petitioner.
Respondents shall certify compliance within seven business days of this Order’s date.
A separate judgment will enter.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of February, 2026.
3 In their last objection, Respondents complain that Judge Stephens improperly advanced
arguments for Petitioner. See Obj. at 5. Having reviewed the Petition and Judge Stephens’ Report
and Recommendation, the Court disagrees.
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