Coreas v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ELVIN ALEXANDER COREAS, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-151-J
)
KRISTI NOEM, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER
Petitioner Elvin Alexander Coreas, a Salvadoran national, filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	The matter was referred to United
States Magistrate Judge Chris M. Stephens consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),(C). Judge
Stephens issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court: (1) grant
Petitioner’s habeas petition, in part, and (2) order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise release him if he has not
received a lawful bond hearing within that period. See [Doc. No. 15]. Respondents filed a timely
objection [Doc. No. 16], and Petitioner filed a partial objection and reply to Respondents’
objections [Doc. No. 17], triggering de novo review, see Quint v. Vail Resorts, Inc., 89 F.4th 803,
808 (10th Cir. 2023).
Respondents object to Judge Stephens’ conclusion that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to
Petitioner’s detention and not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), as asserted by Respondents. This issue is
significant because § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for mandatory detention, but § 1226(a) provides for
conditional parole or release on bond pending a decision in the removal proceedings. Respondents
contend that Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A), which provides:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is
an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
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determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond
a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Respondents assert this provision applies to Petitioner because he is
plainly an “applicant for admission,” which is defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Petitioner,
on the other hand, contends that the detention determination should be made pursuant to § 1226(a),
which provides:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States. 	Except as provided in
subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General –
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on –
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved
by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the
Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner asserts § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to those who have resided
in the United States for many years and are not arriving or recently arrived to the United States
and § 1226(a) applies to aliens who have been unlawfully living in the United States.
Two appellate courts have weighed in on this issue. The Seventh Circuit ruled on a motion
to stay pending appeal that based on a “preliminary record” the respondents “are not likely to
succeed on the merits of their argument that those individuals, whom ICE arrested in Chicago
without a warrant, are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Castanon-Nava v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 2025). 	The Seventh Circuit
concluded Congress “could easily have included noncitizens who are ‘seeking admission’ within
the definition [of ‘applicants for admission’] but elected not to do so.” Id. at 1061. In contrast,
the Fifth Circuit recently applied § 1225 to a similar habeas challenge, agreeing with Respondents’
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position based on “the relevant provisions and structure of the Immigration and Naturalization Act,
the statutory history, and Congressional intent.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026
WL 323330, at *1, *4-9 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
Additionally, the weight of authority in this district and other district courts in Oklahoma
coincides with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis. 	See Perez v. Grant, CIV-25-1560-R, 2026 WL
315065, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 5, 2026); Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, CIV-25-1236-HE, 2026 WL
94641, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2026); Morocho v. Kelly, CIV-25-1247-R, 2026 WL 36452, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026); Cruz-Hernandez v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1378-D, 2026 WL 18932, at
*2-3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 2026); Colin v. Holt, CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *2-5 (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 16, 2025); Leonardo G.Z. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-0600-SHE-MTS, 2025 WL 3755590, at
*8-11 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 2025).1 This Court agrees with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, the
majority of the other courts in this district, the overwhelming number of other courts that recently
addressed this question, and this Court’s prior rulings that “based on § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s plain
language, the Court concludes that the section only applies when a noncitizen ‘applicant for
admission’ is actively ‘seeking admission’ into the United States.” Diaz v. Holt, Case No. CIV-25-
1179-J, 2025 WL 3296310, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2025). Accordingly, because Petitioner has
been unlawfully living in the United States for many years without seeking admission, §
1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply, and § 1226(a), instead, controls Petitioner’s detention.
Noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) are generally entitled to a prompt bond hearing
before an immigration judge. See Hernandez v. Baltazar, Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03094-CNS,
2025 WL 2996643, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (finding similarly situated noncitizen entitled to
a bond hearing under § 1226(a)). 	Here, Petitioner has not received a bond hearing, and
1 The Court recognizes that two Judges in this district have concluded that noncitizens like
Petitioner fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
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Respondents raise no objection challenging their obligation to provide bond hearings for
noncitizens under § 1226(a). Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing,
and Respondents’ failure to provide one violates § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Petitioner objects to Judge Stephens’ recommendation to decline to decide Petitioner’s
constitutional due process claims. 	Because the Court is granting the relief that Petitioner is
requesting based on the applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court concurs with Judge Stephens’
recommendation to decline to decide Petitioner’s constitutional due process claims. 	Petitioner
further objects to Judge Stephens’ recommendation that should this Court order a bond hearing,
the Court decline to require the Immigration Judge to consider Petitioner’s ability to pay when
setting the bond amount. Upon review of Petitioner’s objections, the Court concurs with Judge
Stephens that such a claim is unripe and that it is questionable whether this Court would have
jurisdiction to review such a claim.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation
[Doc. No. 15] on de novo review and GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition to the extent it alleges
Petitioner’s lack of bond hearing violates federal law. 	Accordingly, the Court ORDERS
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days or otherwise release Petitioner. The Court further ORDERS Respondents to certify
compliance by filing a status report within five (5) days of the date of this Order.
A separate judgment will enter.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of February, 2026.
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