Arevalo Castillo v. LNU et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CARLOS JOSE FRANCISCO 	)
AREVALO CASTILLO, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-162-HE
)
FRED FIGUEROA; TODD BLANCHE; 	)
MARKWAYNE MULLIN; TODD LYONS; )
RUSSELL HOLT; DAREN MARGOLIN,1 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
1 	Petitioner 	named 	the 	Warden 	of 	Diamondback 	Correctional 	Facility 	and 	U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement as Respondents. 	(Doc. 1, at 2). 	Fred Figueroa,
warden of Diamondback Correctional Facility, is a proper respondent in this matter.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (“[T]he default rule is that the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney
General or some other remote supervisory official.”). 	And because United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement “is in complete control of detainees’ admissions
and release” and is housed within the Department of Homeland Security, “the [Acting]
Attorney General of the United States [Todd Blanche] and the Secretary of Homeland
Security [Markwayne Mullin]” are also appropriate respondents. 	Rafati v. Barr, No. 20-
CIV-411-JFH, 2020 WL 12968837, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2020) (quoting Calderon v.
Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 944, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)); cf. Castillo-Hernandez v. Longshore,
6 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1212 (D. Colo. 2013) (“[T]his Court concludes that either the Attorney
General or [the Department of Homeland Security] Secretary is the proper respondent.”).
Further, the response brief is filed on behalf of Todd Lyons, Russell Holt, and Daren
Margolin, despite them not being respondents named in the Petition. (Doc. 12, at 1). Thus,
the undersigned adds Todd Blanche, Markwayne Mullin, Todd Lyons, Russell Holt, and
Daren Margolin as respondents. 	See Dopp v. McCoin, No. CIV-18-520-D, 2019 WL
3071984, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 28, 2019) (“If a petitioner names the wrong respondent,
this Court may simply substitute the correct party.”), adopted, 2019 WL 1952693 (W.D.
Okla. May 2, 2019).
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Petitioner Carlos Jose Francisco Arevalo Castillo, a citizen of Venezuela proceeding
pro se,2 filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”)
challenging his detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).3
(Docs. 1, 8).4 	United States District Judge Joe Heaton referred the matter to the
undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	initial 	proceedings 	consistent 	with 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
636(b)(1)(B), (C). 	(Doc. 3). 	In accordance with the briefing schedule, (Doc. 10),
Respondents timely filed a response.5 (Doc. 12). Petitioner did not file a reply. As fully
set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY the Petition.
I. 	Introduction to the Immigration and Nationality Act
Petitioner seeks release from ICE detention or a bond hearing in this matter. (Doc.
1, at 8). 	The two sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) potentially
governing Petitioner’s detention and whether he is entitled to a bond hearing are 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 and § 1226. Section 1225(a)(1) describes an “applicant for admission” as “an alien
2 A pro se litigant’s pleadings are liberally construed “and held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th
Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). 	But the court
cannot serve as Petitioner’s advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. 	See Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
3 Petitioner is housed at Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. (Doc.
8, at 2).
4 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF
pagination.
5 The response was not filed on behalf of Respondent Fred Figueroa, Warden of the
Diamondback Correctional Facility. 	(Doc. 12, at 1). 	The undersigned concludes that a
separate response from Warden Figueroa is not necessary to resolve this matter.
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present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.”
Id. § 1225(a)(1) (citation modified). 	The statute defines “admission” and “admitted” as
“the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by
an immigration officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a.” (Emphasis added). In
other words, the alien is subject to mandatory detention while he awaits removal
proceedings.
On the other hand, § 1226(a) authorizes arrest and detention of an alien “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General.” An alien detained under § 1226(a) is entitled to
a bond hearing at which he can argue to an immigration judge that he should be released
while he awaits removal proceedings because he is not a danger to others or at risk for non-
appearance. 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (“Federal regulations
provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of
detention.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)).
Accordingly, if Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission”
under § 1225(b)(2)(A), he must be detained and is not entitled to a bond hearing. If he is
not an “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” under § 1225, then Petitioner
falls within the confines of § 1226(a), which would entitle him to a bond hearing and
potentially release.
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II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner alleges that he “lawfully entered the United States” on March 13, 2024,
at Miami International Airport “after inspection by U.S. Customs and Border Protection”
and was granted humanitarian parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A), which is codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Doc. 1, at 1, 3). The same day, he was issued a Form I-94 which
authorized his stay through March 12, 2026, under the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela
parole program (“CHNV parole”). (Doc. 1, at 1, 3; id. at Ex. 1, at 4; Doc. 12, at 4). After
entry, Petitioner filed an application for asylum on a Form I-589, which remains pending.
(Doc. 1, at 2, 3; Doc. 12, at 4, 5). Since arriving in the United States, Petitioner completed
vocational training to become a welder and has obtained lawful employment. (Doc. 1, at
3; id. at Ex. 1, at 8, 10).
On March 29, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sent Petitioner
a letter advising that the Department “has exercised its discretion to terminate the
categorical parole programs for aliens who are nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela, and their immediate family members” and that Petitioner’s parole would
terminate April 24, 2025. (Doc. 1, at Ex. 1, at 11; Doc. 12, at 4). The letter warned: “You
should depart the United States now, but no later than the date of the termination of your
parole. Failure to timely depart may have adverse immigration consequences.” (Doc. 1,
at Ex. 1, at 11).
On January 5, 2026, in Abilene, Texas, police stopped Petitioner due to a defective
vehicle light. 	(Doc. 1, at 3; Doc. 12, at 4). 	An hour later, ICE agents took custody of
Petitioner because of his immigration status and transported him to a processing center.
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(Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 12, at 4). 	On January 7, 2026, DHS issued a Notice to Appear to
Petitioner which classified Petitioner as an “arriving alien.” (Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 12, at Ex.
1, at 1). 	It charged Petitioner with being “an alien present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled” and that “at the time of application for admission” he was not
in possession of a valid entry document, travel document, or document of identity.6 (Doc.
12, at Ex. 1, at 4).
Respondents assert that Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2). 	(Doc. 12, at 10-12). 	Petitioner argues that the Notice to Appear did “not
convert [him] into an Entry Without Inspection,” and that he has been “detained . . . without
a custody determination,” which – liberally construed – amounts to an assertion he should
be detained pursuant to § 1226. (Doc. 1, at 5, 6).
III. 	Petitioner’s Claims and Respondents’ Responses
In Section VI of the Petition, Petitioner asserts DHS’s announcement generally
terminating CHNV parole did not revoke individual paroles, invalidate existing Forms I-
94, or authorize detention. (Doc. 1, at 6). In Section VII of the Petition, Petitioner asserts
that the Notice to Appear did not revoke Petitioner’s Form I-94 authorizing his presence in
the United States, did not contain an “arrest or detention order,” and failed to consider his
asylum application (Id.) In Section VIII of the Petition, Petitioner asserts that ICE did not
conduct an individualized analysis of flight risk, danger, parole eligibility, bond eligibility,
6 Respondents assert, without any evidence in support, that “ICE informs counsel that the
court sustained their charge under § 212(a)(7) and Petitioner was found removable.” (Doc.
12, at 5). But Petitioner’s asylum claim remains pending. (Id. at 5-6).
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pending asylum, employment, or community ties, which violated his rights under the Fifth
Amendment and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). (Id. at 7). In Section IX of the Petition, Petitioner
asserts the Notice to Appear – specifically its allegations that Petitioner was unlawfully
present and lacked possession of valid documents – is inconsistent with his entry into the
United States on parole, which required inspection and authorized entry into the United
States. (Id.) As relief, Petitioner seeks either immediate release or an individualized bond
hearing. (Id. at 8).
Respondents 	contend 	that 	this 	Court’s 	review 	of 	Petitioner’s 	claims 	is
jurisdictionally barred. (Doc. 12, at 6-10). As part of this argument, they argue that DHS
was authorized to terminate Petitioner’s parole. (Id. at 8-10). Respondents also assert that
Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 10-12). Respondents
state that Petitioner’s due process argument is premature and without basis. (Id. at 12-14).
IV. 	Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
V. 	Analysis
A. 	Petitioner’s Challenge Regarding the Termination of His Parole Is
Moot.
Petitioner’s claims in Sections VI and VII address the termination of his parole. The
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undersigned finds Petitioner’s claims are now moot and recommends denial of these claims
on that basis.
Under the CHNV parole program, “nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela . . . who met certain categorical criteria could seek discretionary individual
grants of parole into the United States for up to two years.” Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272,
278 (1st Cir. 2025). This parole was authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Id. As
addressed above, Petitioner received this type of parole after inspection at the Miami
International Airport. 	(Doc. 1, at 1, 3; id. at Ex. 1, at 4). 	The I-94 document Petitioner
attached to the Petition lists an “Admit Until Date” of March 12, 2026. (Id. at Ex. 1, at 4).
DHS 	terminated 	the 	CHNV 	parole 	program 	on 	a 	blanket 	basis 	without
individualized determination:
On March 25, 2025, DHS published in the Federal Register the Termination
Notice 	stating 	that, 	effective 	immediately, 	DHS 	was 	“terminating 	the
categorical parole programs for inadmissible aliens from Cuba, Haiti,
Nicaragua, 	and 	Venezuela 	and 	their 	immediate 	family 	members.”
Termination of Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13611. 	The Termination
Notice further specified that “[t]he temporary parole period of aliens in the
United States under the CHNV parole programs and whose parole ha[d] not
already expired by April 24, 2025[,] w[ould] terminate on that date unless
the Secretary ma[de] an individual determination to the contrary.” 	Id.
Accordingly, the Termination Notice explained that the CHNV parolees
would have to “depart the United States before their parole termination date.”
Id. at 13618-19.
Doe, 152 F.4th at 281; (see also Doc. 1, at Ex. 1, at 12-14). 	Petitioner contends the
announced termination of CHNV parole did not apply to his existing grant of parole, and
his detention is not authorized as a result. (Doc. 1, at 6).
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“An ‘actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time
the complaint is filed.’” 	Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009) (quoting Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)). Thus, “[i]f an intervening circumstance deprives the
plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation,
the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” 	Genesis Healthcare
Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013) (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S.
472, 477-78 (1990)). 	So, a case is “moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant
any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” 	Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (citation modified).
Here, Petitioner’s parole was only authorized until March 12, 2026 – a date that has
now passed. So, whether DHS had the authority to revoke his parole is no longer an actual
controversy, as the parole has now expired on its own. 	Therefore, the undersigned finds
Petitioner’s claims regarding the termination of parole are moot and should be denied.7
7 	It 	is 	unclear 	whether 	Respondents 	challenge 	this 	Court’s 	jurisdiction 	to 	review
Petitioner’s claims relating to the termination of his parole. 	(See Doc. 12, at 6-8)
(jurisdiction 	section 	referring 	to 	non-existent 	“Claim 	One” 	and 	“Claim 	Two” 	and
arguments not made by Petitioner before addressing termination). If this matter were not
moot, the undersigned notes that another court within this Circuit found it had jurisdiction
to entertain claims regarding the termination of parole. See Alcide v. de Anda-Ybarra, No.
1:26-CV-00249-KWR-GBW, 	2026 	WL 	622663, 	at 	*3 	(D.N.M. 	Mar. 	5, 	2026). 	In
considering such a claim, the First Circuit 	has indicated that 	Plaintiff’s argument
challenging the termination of parole is without merit. 	See Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272,
287 (1st Cir. 2025) (noting that 8 U.S.C § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not require an individualized
determination to revoke parole and “conclud[ing] that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
a strong likelihood of success in establishing that the statute requires the Secretary to end
grants of parole under the CHNV program on a case-by-case basis”).
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B. 	The Court Has Jurisdiction to Consider Petitioner’s Challenge to His
Detention.
Respondents argue this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s detention-
related claims, based on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9). (Doc. 12, at 6-8). However,
Judges of this District have consistently ruled the INA “does not jurisdictionally bar” a
habeas claim like Petitioner’s because such a claim does not arise from and “does not
challenge Respondents’ decision to commence or adjudicate proceedings or execute
removal orders.” Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 16, 2025); see also Gonzalez Cortes v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1176-SLP, 2026 WL
147435, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026) (same); Alvarado Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-25-
1231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302, at *4-5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025) (same); Valdez v. Holt,
No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL 3709021, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025) (same); Urbina
Garcia v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1225-J, 2025 WL 3516071, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2025)
(same); Li v. Grant, No. CIV-25-1426-HE, 2026 WL 147438, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20,
2026) (same). But see Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344,
at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026) (expressing “grave doubts over whether it has subject
matter jurisdiction” but assuming it had jurisdiction to proceed to the merits). 	The
undersigned agrees with the majority of Judges of this District in finding that jurisdiction
exists to consider Petitioner’s habeas challenge to detention.
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C. 	Because Petitioner Arrived at a Port of Entry as an Applicant for
Admission Seeking Admission and Was Granted Humanitarian Parole,
Detention Is Proper Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
Petitioner’s arguments in Sections VIII and IX of his Petition are liberally construed
to allege that his continued detention under § 1225(b)(2) without an individualized bond
hearing is unlawful and he is entitled to either immediate release or a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). 	Respondents contend that because Petitioner is an “arriving alien,” he is
properly considered an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission,” and
therefore he is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2). (Doc. 12, at 10-12). They also assert
that filing a Form I-589 to seek asylum is “unambiguously a step towards seeking a form
of admission.” (Id. at 10). The undersigned finds that under the specific facts present in
this case – with Petitioner having been granted parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A),
living in the United Status under such parole, and the parole having terminated – Petitioner
is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
Petitioner was granted parole at the border under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), so-
called 	“humanitarian 	parole,” 	which 	is 	discretionary, 	temporary, 	and 	“under 	such
conditions as [DHS] may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit.” The statute further provides that “when the purposes
of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled
and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis
added). 	The INA’s regulations provide that when an alien’s humanitarian parole is
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terminated, “he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.”
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). 	They further provide that an “arriving alien” – meaning “an
applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-
entry” – “remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] of
the Act, and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2; see also
8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q).
Under this framework, when Petitioner presented himself at the Miami International
Airport for entry to the United States, he was:
• 	an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) because he was “an alien
present in the United States who ha[d] not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States;”
• 	an “arriving alien” under 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 because he was “coming or attempting to
come into the United States at a port-of-entry;” and
• 	“seeking admission” because he was a “noncitizen who was presently and actively
seeking lawful entry into the United States . . . at the border.” Escarcega v. Olson,
No. CIV-25-1129-J, 2025 WL 3243438, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (citation
modified).
So, if Petitioner had not been granted parole at the airport, he would have been
properly detained under § 1225 because he was an applicant for admission who was
seeking admission. 	That Petitioner was granted humanitarian parole under the CHNV
program did not make him “admitted” for purposes of the INA. 	See 8 U.S.C §
1182(d)(5)(A) (stating that a grant of parole to an alien under the statute “shall not be
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regarded as an admission of the alien”). 	Despite living in the country for some time on
humanitarian parole, his status as an “arriving alien” did not change on the termination of
his parole. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q). Because he reverted back to the status of an arriving
alien seeking admission at the border, he is properly detained under § 1225.
This conclusion based on the text of the statutes and regulations has been endorsed
by other courts. A district court recently explained that “[p]arole ‘into the United States,’
under section 1182(d)(5)(A), permits a non-citizen to physically enter the country, subject
to a reservation of rights by the Government that it may continue to treat the non-citizen
‘as if stopped at the border.’” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 215 (D. Mass. 2025)
(quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020)), appeal
dismissed, No. 25-1902, 2025 WL 4670604 (1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2025). Thus, “[n]on-citizens
fictively paroled into the United States are in a fundamentally different and less protected
position than ‘those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its
legality.’” Id. at 216 (quoting Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)).
This analysis is in accord with a case from the Tenth Circuit addressing a Cuban
who came to the United States during the 1980 Mariel boat lift, was paroled into the United
States, but later had his parole denied under a regulation specific to individuals who were
part of the Mariel Boat Lift. 	Sierra v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 258 F.3d 1213,
1215-16, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Suarez-Tejeda v. United States, 85 F. App’x 711,
712 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the parole given to an individual arriving in the United
States in the Mariel boat lift was granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The court noted
that “[a]lthough he has been physically present in the United States for more than twenty
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years, Sierra is legally considered to be detained at the border and hence as never having
effected entry into this country.” Sierra, 258 F.3d at 1218 (citation modified).
The undersigned also finds persuasive a recent case from another district court in
this Circuit which decided that “parolees revert to the same legal status as an alien at the
border once their parole lawfully ends.” Fuenmayor v. Mullin, No. 1:26-CV-00622-MIS-
LF, 2026 WL 963297, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 9, 2026) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287-88;
Sierra, 258 F.3d at 1218). Thus, the court found that Ҥ 1182(d)(5)(A) means Petitioner
falls under § 1225 because, once his parole lawfully terminates, he reverts to the same legal
status he had before entering the country.” Id. The court recognized that it had “previously
based its determination between whether a petitioner should be subject to §§ 1225 or 1226
on whether they were present in the United States,” and so the petitioner’s “legal status,
after lawful parole termination, as having never effected entry into the country means he is
subject to § 1225” and he was not entitled to a bond hearing. Id. at *4 (citation modified);
see also Borisov v. Castro, No. 2:25-CV-01315 JB-GJF, 2026 WL 926278, at *17 (D.N.M.
Apr. 6, 2026) (recognizing in a report and recommendation that the District of New Mexico
“has held that detention for noncitizens generally detained in the interior of the country is
pursuant to § 1226,” but recognized that “[i]n those cases, however, there was no evidence
that DHS released the noncitizen under § 1182(d)(5) parole” and that where a noncitizen
is paroled under § 1182(d)(5), “[o]nce the grant of parole terminates, the noncitizen is
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required to return or be returned forthwith to the custody under § 1225 from which he was
paroled.”).8
The undersigned also finds persuasive a case from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, in which a petitioner entered the United States at a port
of entry, was taken into custody, and later released on humanitarian parole. Bobomirzaev
v. Bondi, No. 5:25-CV-00297, 2026 WL 972331, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2026). 	The
petitioner’s parole expired in April 2025, and he was taken into ICE custody in October
2025. Id. The court found that “humanitarian parole does not change arriving alien status”
and the petitioner’s “expired humanitarian parole does not preclude him from being
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) because he remains classified as an arriving alien.” Id.
at *4.
Given the statutory, regulatory, and case law in support of finding Petitioner is
properly detained under § 1225, and thus not entitled to a bond hearing, the undersigned
recommends the Petition be denied.
VI. 	Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Petition
(Doc. 1) be DENIED.
The Court advises the parties of their right to object to this Report and
Recommendation by May 11, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 The Magistrate Judge ultimately determined that Petitioner was not paroled under §
1182(d)(5)(A), and so he was detained under § 1226. Borisov, 2026 WL 926278, at *17.
Here, Petitioner’s parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) is uncontroverted.
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72(b)(2). The Court advises the parties that failure to make timely objection to this report
and recommendation waives their right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues
contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.
ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2026.
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