Corrales-Umanzor v. Grant et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOSE NAHUN 	)
CORRALES-UMANZOR, 	)
)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. CIV-26-180-JD
)
SCARLET GRANT, 	)
Warden, Cimarron Detention 	)
Center, et al., 	)
)
Respondents.1 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Jose Nahun Corrales-Umanzor seeks a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2 United States District Judge Jodi W. Dishman
referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for proceedings
1 	Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Secretary Markwayne Mullin is substituted for former Secretary Noem
as 	a 	party. 	https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/03/24/us-senate-confirms-
markwayne-mullin-secretary-department-homeland-security 	(last 	visited
April 16, 2026). Todd Blanche is the acting Attorney General and is substituted
for former Attorney General Pam Bondi as a party. https://www.justice.gov/ag
(last visited April 16, 2026). Respondents Warden Scarlet Grant and Rohit Rai,
“Field Office Director” are not federal officials, and the response is not filed on
their behalf. See Doc. 9, at 2 n.1.
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
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consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4. Respondents filed a
response, Doc. 9, and the time for Petitioner to reply has lapsed. See Doc. 5, at
1-2. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant habeas corpus relief and order Petitioner’s immediate release.
I. 	Factual background and Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner is a 34-year-old citizen of Honduras. Doc. 1, at 4. Prior to his
detention, Petitioner did not have a criminal history and he has ties in
Oklahoma through his wife, who is currently non-detained. Id. He entered the
United States with his family in 2021 without inspection at the Texas border.
Id.; Doc. 9, at 2.
DHS 	officials 	released 	Petitioner 	and 	his 	family 	on 	an 	order 	of
supervision (OOS) and placed him in removal proceedings. Doc. 1, at 4.
Petitioner sought asylum, which was denied in October 2025, and Petitioner
has appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Id.3 Petitioner alleges
he was wrongfully detained in July 2025 during an Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) check-in without “adequate notice of the revocation of the
[OOS].” Id.
Petitioner 	alleges 	his 	detention 	violates 	both 	his 	procedural 	and
substantive due process rights. Id. at 5-6. He asks this Court to issue a show
3 	The parties have not provided the Court with an update of the status of
Petitioner’s appeal.
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cause order requiring Respondents to show cause why his petition should not
be granted within three days4; declare that his detention violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1231; and issue a Writ of
Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to release him immediately, or in the
alternative, schedule a bond hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) where
the IJ must “afford Petitioner bond on his own recognizance, or a reasonable
bond amount.” Id. at 6. He also seeks attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Id.
II. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	Analysis.
A. 	Statutory and regulatory framework.
Petitioner argues Respondents violated his Fifth Amendment procedural
due process rights when they revoked his OOS and re-detained him without
4 	The Court addressed Petitioner’s request when it directed Respondents
to respond to the petition. See Doc. 5.
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“adequate notice” and denied him the “opportunity to demonstrate that he
should not be detained.” Doc. 1, at 4-5.5
Petitioner’s allegations require the Court to consider the regulations
Respondents 	are 	obligated 	to 	follow 	in 	revoking 	his 	OOS. See 	Saqib 	v.
Andrews, 2026 WL 350830, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (“Because these
claims require examination of whether the government 	followed its own
regulations that set out procedures in revoking release, procedures that protect
important due process rights, the Court discusses these claims together.”),
adopted, 2026 WL 440566 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2026); see e.g., Kong v. United
States, 62 F.4th 608, 620 (1st Cir. 2023) (“The plain language of the regulation,
however, does not allow a court in the first instance to make the required
individualized 	finding. 	To 	the 	extent 	ICE 	claims 	that 	it 	made 	such 	a
5 	Respondents argue that because Petitioner claims to be “a class member
under Maldonado Bautista” he is “collaterally estopped” from bringing this
action. Doc. 9, at 3-6 (quoting Doc. 1, at 2); see Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, 2026 WL 468284, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026). “District courts
are limited to granting habeas relief ‘within their respective jurisdictions.’”
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)).
The Maldonado Bautista court does not have jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s
custodian, as that court sits in California and Petitioner is held in the Western
District of Oklahoma. See, e.g., Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, 813 F. Supp.
3d 1084, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“The Court cannot order nationwide release or
bond hearings for Bond Eligible class members, especially so to those confined
outside [the Central District of California].”).
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determination, the court should review that claim in light of the regulations
instructing ICE on how it should make such a determination.”).
Agencies must follow their own regulations. United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1954); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602
n.7 (1988)). When a noncitizen has been detained pursuant to a final order of
removal, ICE is required to release the noncitizen on an OOS if ICE determines
there is no significant likelihood of the noncitizen’s removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g)-(h); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001) (“[I]f removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court
should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by
statute.”).
Once a noncitizen is released under an OOS, as Petitioner was, his OOS
may be revoked in two circumstances: (1) for violations of “conditions of
release” specified in the OOS or (2) “if, on account of changed circumstances,
[ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen]
may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1)-
(2).
The decision to revoke an OOS on account of changed circumstances
must 	be 	based 	on 	an 	individualized 	determination 	that 	those 	changed
circumstances render removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future. See Kong, 62 F.4th at 619-20 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)). ICE should
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make this determination based on the following factors:
[T]he history of the [noncitizen’s] efforts to comply with the order of
removal, the history of [ICE's] efforts to remove [noncitizens] to the
country in question or to third countries, including the ongoing nature of
[ICE’s] 	efforts 	to 	remove 	this 	[noncitizen] 	and 	the 	[noncitizen’s]
assistance with those efforts, the reasonably foreseeable results of those
efforts, and the views of the Department of State regarding the prospects
for removal of [noncitizens] to the country or countries in question.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f). The regulations place the burden to establish changed
circumstances on ICE. See Saqib, 2026 WL 350830, at *3 (“The regulations at
[] § 241.13(i) . . . . indicate that when ICE revokes release to effectuate removal,
‘it is [ICE’s] burden to show a significant likelihood that the alien may be
removed.’” (quoting Escalante v. Noem, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
2, 2025))).
If ICE elects to revoke an OOS, the noncitizen must “be notified of the
reasons for revocation of his or her release,” and ICE must “conduct an initial
informal interview promptly after [the noncitizen's] return to [ICE] custody to
afford the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation
stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). The “reasons for revocation”
that ICE must provide when revoking a noncitizen’s OOS cannot be mere
conclusory assertions about changed circumstances but must contain specific
facts supporting ICE’s decision to revoke the OOS.6 And at the interview, the
6 	“Courts across the country have repeatedly held that . . . boiler plate
language is simply insufficient to give notice under § 241.13.” Ahmed v. Olson,
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noncitizen “may submit any evidence or information that he or she believes
shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable 	future.” 	Id. 	ICE 	must 	then 	consider 	the 	contested 	facts 	and
determine whether revocation of release was warranted. Id.
B. 	ICE violated Petitioner’s procedural due process rights by
revoking his OOS without following its own regulations
and giving him adequate notice and the opportunity to
respond.
Respondents do not specify why Petitioner’s OOS was originally issued
and agree he was released in 2024, so it is reasonable to infer that ICE must
have determined that “there was no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future” when it released him. See Pham v. Bondi, No.
CIV-25-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3477023, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025), adopted,
2025 WL 3243870 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025). Respondents do not allege that
Petitioner violated any conditions of release, so it appears that Respondents
rely on the “changed circumstances” prong as the justification for revocation.
Id. at *4.
“Individuals released on parole or other forms of conditional release have
a liberty interest in their ‘continued liberty.’” Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at
*3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972)). “The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government
2026 WL 836123, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2026) (collecting cases).
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to deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Individuals
who have been conditionally released from detention have a protected interest
in their “continued liberty.” Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147 (1997). “This
is true even when the released individual is subject to extensive conditions of
release.” Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025). And the
Due Process Clause is also implicated where “an individual has reasonably
relied on agency regulations promulgated for his guidance or benefit and has
suffered substantially because of their violation by the agency.” United States
v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752–53 (1979).
Petitioner’s Notice of Custody Determination provides no reason for the
revocation of his OOS. See Doc. 9, Ex. 2. The Government had the opportunity
to apprise the Court of all facts relating to the revocation of Petitioner’s OOS
when Respondents responded to the petition, but provide the Court with no
reasons for the revocation. Respondents do not suggest there are changed
circumstances 	present that necessitated revoking 	Petitioner’s OOS. 	As 	a
result, Respondents failed to comply with ICE’s revocation procedures when
they re-detained Petitioner after his release on an OOS. See Pham, 2025 WL
3243870, at *1 (“ICE[] failed to comply with § 241.13(i)(2) in establishing a
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change of circumstances that demonstrated a significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention.
District courts in the Tenth Circuit facing this same issue have found that a
failure to establish changed circumstances amounts to a due process violation
that justifies release.”) (collecting cases).
There is also no indication in the record that Petitioner received formal
written notification of the reasons for his renewed detention when he was
detained in July 2025, or at any time thereafter. Under § 241.13(i)(3), “[u]pon
revocation, the [noncitizen] will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his
or her release,” after which the noncitizen will be afforded “an initial informal
interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the
[noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in
the notification.” Id (emphasis added).7
“The essence of due process is notice and an opportunity to respond.”
Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 772 (D. Minn. 2025). But Petitioner
7 	This requirement of written notice tracks the requirements of another
ICE regulation, § 241.4(d), which provides:
A copy of any decision by the district director, Director of the
Detention 	and 	Removal 	Field 	Office, 	or 	Executive 	Associate
Commissioner to release or to detain an alien shall be provided to
the detained alien.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d).
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“cannot be expected to ‘respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the
notification’ 	if 	the 	notification 	does 	not 	actually 	state 	any 	reasons 	for
revocation.” 	Id. 	And 	the 	Notice 	of 	Custody 	Determination 	provided 	to
Petitioner 	contains 	no 	allegations 	of 	changes 	in 	circumstances 	nor 	of 	a
violation of the conditions of release in his OOS. See Doc. 9, Att. 2.
In 	sum, 	Respondents 	fail 	to 	show 	that 	ICE 	made 	the 	proper
determination when it revoked Petitioner’s OOS and the Notice provided to
Petitioner did not provide him with the reason behind the revocation of his
OOS. 	Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, 2025 WL 2444087, at *8 (D. Md. Aug.
25, 2025) (“[T]he record is clear that ICE’s revocation of release violated its
own regulations by failing to have an authorized official make the revocation
decision, failing to provide [the petitioner] with notification of the reasons for
his re-detention, failing to provide [the petitioner] with an informal interview,
or some combination of these deficiencies.”).
C. 	Appropriate remedy.
Petitioner’s 	procedural 	due 	process 	rights 	were 	violated 	when 	ICE
ignored 	its 	own 	regulations, 	depriving 	him 	of 	adequate 	notice 	and 	the
opportunity to respond to any reasons for the revocation. So, the Court must
determine what the adequate remedy shall be. The undersigned concludes the
only appropriate remedy is immediate release pursuant to the conditions of
Petitioner's preexisting OOS. See Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1 (collecting
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cases 	granting 	immediate 	release 	where 	ICE 	“failed 	to 	comply 	with 	§
241.13(i)(2) in establishing a change of circumstances that demonstrated a
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future at the
time of . . . re-detention”); Ahmed, 2026 WL 836123, at *5-6 (collecting cases
granting immediate release where ICE detainees were denied notice under §
241.13).8
V. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Petitioner’s request for habeas relief, and order his immediate release
from 	custody 	subject 	to 	the 	terms 	of 	his 	unlawfully 	revoked 	OOS. 	The
undersigned further recommends that the Court order Respondents submit a
declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 affirming that Petitioner has been
released from custody within ten business days of the Court’s order.9
The undersigned advises the parties of their rights to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before
8 	The undersigned does not address Petitioner’s remaining argument
about 	the 	alleged 	violation 	of 	his 	substantive 	due 	process 	rights 	under
Zadvydas, see Doc. 1, at 5-6, because this Report and Recommendation, if
adopted, will moot these requests.
9 	To the extent that Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as
a 	prevailing 	party, 	Petitioner 	must 	seek 	those 	separately 	after 	a 	final
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152,
1166 (10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad language to unambiguously
authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention”).
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April 21, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(b)(2).10 The undersigned further advises the parties that
failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives
the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained
herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This report and recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates
the referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2026.
10 	Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation to five
days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition
(noting that rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas
corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings
under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484
F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
may be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that
“while 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	may 	be 	applied 	in 	habeas
proceedings, they need not be in every instance – particularly where strict
application would undermine the habeas review process.”).
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