Khaddaj v. Grant et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
SHAHER KHADDAJ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-273-SLP
)
SCARLET GRANT, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Shaher Khaddaj, a Syrian citizen proceeding with counsel, filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) challenging his detention
by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).1 	(Doc. 1).2 	United States
District Judge Scott L. Palk referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). (Doc. 3). In accordance
with the briefing schedule, (Doc. 7), Respondents timely filed a Response in Opposition to
1 Petitioner is housed at Cimarron Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma. (Doc. 1, at
2).
2 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF
pagination.
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Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.3 (Doc. 9).4 Petitioner timely filed a Reply.
(Doc. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner be
GRANTED habeas relief and released from custody immediately.
I. 	Factual Background and Procedural History
Petitioner is a citizen of Syria who entered the United States on or around April 28,
2024. (Doc. 1, at 9; Doc. 9, at 1-2). Petitioner sought asylum when he entered the United
States, but an asylum officer and an immigration judge determined Petitioner had not
established a credible fear of prosecution or torture. (Doc. 9, at Ex. 2, at 3; id. at Ex. 3, at
3). On May 28, 2024, ICE issued an expedited order of removal to Petitioner, stating he
was “an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit,
border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Immigration and
Nationality Act.” (Id. at Ex. 1, at 2). This order made Petitioner’s removal final. (See id.
at Ex. 4, at 2). ICE detained Petitioner until June 21, 2024, when Petitioner was released
on an Order of Supervision (“OOS”) “[b]ecause Petitioner’s removal was not significantly
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (Id. at 2; see Doc. 1, at 9).
3 The Response was not filed on behalf of Respondent Scarlet Grant, Warden of the
Cimarron Correctional Facility, because she is not a federal official. (Doc. 8, at 1 n.1). The
undersigned concludes that a separate response from Warden Grant is not necessary to
resolve this matter.
4 Respondents are reminded that, pursuant to Magistrate Judge Amanda L. Maxfield’s
Chamber Procedures for Civil Cases, “Practitioners shall not use footnotes solely for the
purpose of citing legal authority. . . . 	Improper use of footnotes may result in the filing
being 	stricken 	or 	other 	appropriate 	sanctions.”
https://www.okwd.uscourts.gov/sites/okwd/files/ALM_Chamber_Rules.pdf 	(last 	visited
Apr. 2, 2026).
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On or around January 14, 2026, ICE re-detained Petitioner “at a routine check-in
appointment.” 	(Doc. 1, at 9; see Doc. 9, at 2). 	Petitioner states that, at the time of re-
detention, “ICE did not allege any violations of the Order of Supervision, provide any
reasoning for revoking the Order, or allow Petitioner an opportunity to defend himself
against any reasoning for revoking the order.” (Doc. 1, at 9). Respondents state that the
day they re-detained Petitioner, they “served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of
Release, which explained that Petitioner’s removal was reasonably likely.” (Doc. 9, at 2).
II. 	Petitioner’s Claims
In Count One, Petitioner states “Respondents are bound by the Immigration and
Nationality Act and by regulations promulgated pursuant to the INA governing post-order
detention and supervision of noncitizens subject to final orders of removal . . . .” (Doc. 1,
at 10). 	According to Petitioner, Respondents violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13
because they “revoked Petitioner’s Order of Supervision and re-detained him without
providing notice of the reasons for revocation, without affording him any opportunity to
respond, and without articulating any regulatory basis justifying his re-detention after
months of compliance with supervision.” (Id. at 11).
In Count II, Petitioner alleges a violation of due process. (Id.) Petitioner states that
“[b]y 	revoking 	Petitioner’s 	supervised 	release 	and 	detaining 	him 	without 	notice,
explanation, or an opportunity to be heard, Respondents failed to provide even the minimal
procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause.” (Id. at 12).
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Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering his immediate release from
custody. (Id. at 13). He also requests an award of attorney fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).5 (Id.)
III. 	Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he primary federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers
jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear . . . challenges to the lawfulness of immigration-
related detention.” 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Soberanes v.
Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.”).
IV. 	Legal Framework for the Detention or Release of Aliens Subject to a Final
Order of Removal
Title 8, Section 1231(a)(2)(A) of the United States Code mandates that “the
Attorney General shall detain” an alien who is ordered to be removed from the country.
However, the length of detention cannot be indefinite: in general, “when an alien is ordered
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a
period of 90 days.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). This is known as the “removal period,” and begins
5 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, he
must seek those separately after a final judgment. 	28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also
Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad language
to unambiguously authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention”).
Accordingly, the Court need not address this request at this juncture.
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at the latest of (1) “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final,” (2) “the
date of the court’s final order” when a removal order is judicially reviewed, or (3) “ the
date the alien is released from detention or confinement” if the alien is detained according
to a non-immigration process (e.g., imprisonment for a crime). Id.; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 682 (“When an alien has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and a
final order of removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures the alien’s
removal during a subsequent 90–day statutory ‘removal period,’ during which time the
alien normally is held in custody.”).
“If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the alien,
pending removal, shall [ordinarily] be subject to supervision.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
However, an exception exists for certain aliens, including aliens who have violated
criminal law, who “may be detained beyond the removal period.” 	§ 1231(a)(6); see
Zadvydas, 	553 	U.S. 	at 682 	(“A 	special 	statute authorizes 	further detention 	if the
Government fails to remove the alien during those 90 days.”) (citing § 1231(a)(6)).
“Related [ICE] regulations add that [ICE] will initially review the alien’s records to decide
whether further detention or release under supervision is warranted after the 90–day
removal period expires.” 	Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 683 (explaining various provisions of 8
C.F.R. § 241.4).
Section 1231(a)(6) does not specify how long criminal aliens may be detained
beyond the removal period. However, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis held that
§ 1231(a)(6), “read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-
period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from
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the United States. 	It does not permit indefinite detention.” 	533 U.S. at 689. 	The Court
further specified that detention is presumptively reasonable for only six months beyond the
original 90-day removal period. 	Id. at 701. 	“After this 6–month period, once the alien
provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to
rebut that showing.” Id.
Following the Supreme Court’s holding, the Zadvydas challenge to continued
detention following the removal period was codified into the immigration regulations
governing the detention review process with amendments to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and the
addition of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.6 The new regulations were in place at the time of Petitioner’s
first ICE detention and release in 2024, and his most recent detention on or around January
14, 2026.
6 See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg.
56967-01, 56968, 2001 WL 1408247(F.R.) (Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
3, 241) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas, this rule revises the
Department’s regulations by adding a new 8 CFR 241.13, governing certain aspects of the
custody determination of a detained alien after the expiration of the removal period.
Specifically, the rule provides a process for the Service to make a determination as to
whether there is a significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Except as provided in this new § 241.13, the existing detention
standards in § 241.4 will continue to govern the detention or release of aliens who are
subject to a final orders of removal. Thus, aliens who are determined not to be a danger to
the community or a flight risk may be released under § 241.4 regardless of whether there
is a significant likelihood of removal.”).
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V. 	Petitioner Is Entitled To Habeas Relief Because ICE Did Not Adhere to Its Own
Regulations.
In Count One, Petitioner alleges Respondents violated his rights under relevant
regulations because “Respondents revoked Petitioner’s Order of Supervision and re-
detained him [1] without providing notice of the reasons for revocation, [2] without
affording him any opportunity to respond, and [3] without articulating any regulatory basis
justifying his re-detention after months of compliance with supervision.” (Doc. 1, at 11).
Respondents contend that “Petitioner’s claim of violation of agency regulations should be
denied because he fails to show a violation.” (Doc. 9, at 10). Respondents also state that
habeas relief is not appropriate on a claim regarding regulatory violations. (Id. at 13-14).
The undersigned finds that ICE did not abide by its own regulations with regard to
Petitioner’s re-detention and habeas relief is appropriate.
A. 	Petitioner’s Re-detention is Governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
“‘It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law’ in the context of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025)
(per curiam) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). The Due Process Clause
is also implicated where “an individual has reasonably relied on agency regulations
promulgated for his guidance or benefit and has suffered substantially because of their
violation by the agency.” United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752-53 (1979).
Two separate provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations deal with the revocation
of release with regard to an OOS: 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). 	See
Xayakesone v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2995-JES-BJW, 2025 WL 3229102, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
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19, 2025) (“Supervised release and any revocation of such release thereafter is governed
by either 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.”). “Revocation under § 241.13(i) applies
only to aliens released under § 241.13(g)—where ICE has formally determined that there
is no significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 9, 2025).
While both parties state that at least some portion of § 241.4 applies to Petitioner’s
instant detention, the parties dispute whether Petitioner’s OOS was also revoked pursuant
to § 241.13. 	Petitioner analyzes his re-detention under both regulations, (e.g., Doc. 1, at
11), whereas Respondents contend that “Petitioner’s re-detention [] does not fall within the
scope of Section 241.13.” (Doc. 9, at 12). Here, ample evidence supports a finding that §
241.13 applies.
First, Petitioner’s 2024 OOS states: “Because the agency has not effected your
deportation or removal during the period prescribed by law, it is ordered that you be placed
under supervision and permitted to be at large under the following conditions.” (Doc. 1, at
Ex. 1, at 1). This language suggests the OOS was issued after a determination that there
was no significant likelihood that he would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future. See Lee v. Oddo, No. CV 25-452J, 2026 WL 523154, at *3 n.5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 25,
2026) (“Respondents argue that Petitioner has not established that his [OOS] is governed
by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. This is a truly remarkable assertion, given the scope of the regulation
as stated in subsection (a) thereof, and the language in Petitioner’s 2019 Order of
Supervision (‘Because the agency has not effected your deportation or removal during the
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period prescribed by law, it is ordered that you be placed under supervision and permitted
to be at large under the following conditions.’).”) (citation modified).
Second, Petitioner’s Notice of Revocation of Release notes that Petitioner is “to
remain in ICE custody” “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 / 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.” (Doc. 9, at Ex.
6, at 2). 	Other courts analyzing claims where a petitioner’s OOS included the same
language have applied § 241.13 to their re-detention. See, e.g., Rokhfirooz v. Larose, 804
F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Douglas v. Baker, No. 25-cv-2243-ABA, 2025
WL 2687354, at *1, 6 (D. Md. Sep. 19, 2025). While Respondents concede this language
in Petitioner’s Notice of Revocation of Release, they nevertheless state that “the text of
these regulations—combined with the attached declaration and the reasons listed in the
letter—make clear that Section 241.4[] applies here.” 	(Doc. 9, at 11). 	According to
Respondents, § 241.13 does not apply because Petitioner has not “provided good reason to
believe there is no significant likelihood of removal . . . in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” 	(Id. at 12) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a)). 	But this
justification improperly places the burden on Petitioner to show no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	“[T]he burden [is] on Respondents to
establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future in the
context of re-detention under § 241.13(i)(2).” 	Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-SLP,
2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025).
Third, and most perplexingly, Respondents concede in their Response, citing an
attached ICE affidavit, that Petitioner was previously released on an OOS “[b]ecause
Petitioner’s removal was not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
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(Doc. 9, at 2; see id. at Ex. 2, at 3). 	Section 241.13, by its express terms, applies where
“there is no significant likelihood of removal . . . in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4) (“The custody review procedures in [§
241.4] do not apply after [ICE] has made a determination, pursuant to the procedures
provided in 8 CFR 241.13, that there is no significant likelihood that an alien under a final
order of removal can be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). The undersigned
therefore concludes that Petitioner’s instant re-detention is governed by § 241.13.
B. 	Respondents Failed to Comply with the Revocation Requirements in §
241.13.
ICE may revoke an OOS and “return the alien to custody” if he violates the
conditions of supervised release or “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE]
determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1)-(2). 	Respondents do not allege
Petitioner violated any conditions of release, so Respondents must rely solely on the
“changed circumstances” prong as the justification for revocation.
Respondents’ sole support for their argument that there is now a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future is that from 2024 to 2025, the
United States went from only removing five subjects to Syria to “remov[ing] . . . 34 subjects
to Syria.” 	(Doc. 9, at 10). 	This allegation falls far short of fulfilling Respondent’s
obligation to show “changed circumstances” as of Petitioner’s re-detention on January 14,
2026. 	“Courts have found that such increase in frequency of removals alone does not
demonstrate significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” in part
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because it does not “provide[] . . . evidence of progress . . . made towards removal of
Petitioner himself before re-detention.” Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (emphasis added);
see also Cao v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1403-G, 2026 WL 637617, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 6,
2026) 	(“[A] 	general 	indication 	that removals to 	Vietnam 	were 	likely 	because
removals were occurring more frequently in 2025 than in recent years . . . does not satisfy
the § 241.13(i)(2) determination of a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed
. . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Respondents therefore violated the “changed
circumstances” requirement of § 241.13(i)(2) when they re-detained Petitioner.
Petitioner also alleges he was re-detained without receiving “notice of the reasons
for revocation” or “any opportunity to respond” to the reasons stated in the notice. (Doc.
1, at 11). Both are required under § 241.13(i)(3), which provides, “[u]pon revocation, the
alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release. [ICE] will conduct
an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the
alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.”
Regarding the first allegation, Respondents provide Petitioner’s Notice of Revocation of
Release, (Doc. 9, at Ex. 6), and state that that “Petitioner was given notice and justification
for his re-detention” because “on January 14, 2026, Petitioner was served with a letter
explaining that his Order of Supervision had been revoked because ‘ICE has determined
that his removability is reasonably likely.’” (Doc. 9, at 11) (citations modified) (quoting
id., at Ex. 6, at 2). 	However, Respondents wholly fail to address whether Petitioner
received 	an 	opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	their 	reasons 	for 	revocation 	of 	his 	OOS.
Accordingly, the undersigned concludes ICE did not comply with requirements for an
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“initial informal interview” under § 241.13(i)(3) so Petitioner could respond to ICE’s basis
for his revocation and re-detention.7
C. 	Alternatively, 	Respondents 	Failed 	to 	Comply 	with 	the 	Revocation
Requirements in § 241.4.
Even if Respondents are correct that Petitioner’s present detention is not governed
by § 241.13, they failed to comply with the requirements of § 241.4(l). Respondents state
Petitioner’s re-detention falls under § 241.4(l)(2), which “has no requirements regarding
notice, justification, or an opportunity to respond.” 	(Doc. 9, at 13). 	This is an incorrect
interpretation of that regulation.
Revocation under § 241.4 may occur under the following circumstances:
(1) 	Violation of conditions of release. Any alien described in paragraph
(a) or (b)(1) of this section who has been released under an order of
supervision or other conditions of release who violates the conditions
of release may be returned to custody. . . . Upon revocation, the alien
will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release
or parole. The alien will be afforded an initial informal interview
promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the
alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation
stated in the notification.
(2) 	Determination 	by 	the 	Service. 	The 	Executive 	Associate
Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to
revoke release and return to Service custody an alien previously
approved for release under the procedures in this section. A district
7 At least one court has determined Respondents’ vague statement of removability in their
Notice of Revocation of Release also fails to fulfill the notice requirement in § 241.13(i)(3).
See Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 771-72 (D. Minn. 2025) (“Besides merely
parroting the regulatory text governing re-detention, ICE’s notice to [the petitioner]
provides zero reasons as to what changed circumstances exist such that [the petitioner’s]
removal is now significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. . . . Providing a
notice that simply recites the language of the regulation does not satisfy the Government’s
obligation to provide the ‘reasons’ why [the petitioner’s] Order of Supervision was
revoked.”).
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director may also revoke release of an alien when, in the district
director’s 	opinion, 	revocation 	is 	in 	the 	public 	interest 	and
circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the
Executive Associate Commissioner. Release may be revoked in the
exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official:
(i) 	The purposes of release have been served;
(ii) 	The alien violates any condition of release;
(iii) 	It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal
proceedings against an alien; or
(iv) 	The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that
release would no longer be appropriate.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) (emphasis added).
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s present detention was initiated pursuant to §
241.4(l)(2), which they argue does not contain language requiring notice of revocation and
the informal interview mandated by § 241.4(l)(1). (Doc. 9, at 12-13). However, “courts
have held that the same requirements” of notice and an interview “constrain revocation of
release under [§ 241.4(l)(2)] as well.” Xayakesone, 2025 WL 3229102, at *3. In reaching
the same conclusion, one court reasoned the following:
While not a model of clarity, the text of 8 U.S.C. § 241.4(l) is inconsistent
with the Government’s argument that Petitioner was not entitled to notice or
an interview. The Government concedes that ICE must follow certain
procedures if it revokes a noncitizen’s release pursuant to paragraph (l)(1)
for violation of a condition of release, but argues that those same procedures
do not apply to noncitizens whose release is revoked pursuant to paragraph
(l)(2) because paragraph (l)(2) provides distinct, discretionary avenues for
the revocation of release. But this argument is in significant tension with the
fact that paragraph (l)(2) also covers circumstances where a violation of a
condition of supervised release is the basis for revoking a noncitizen’s
release. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(ii). This overlap belies the Government’s
argument that these are two separate processes, and suggests that paragraph
(l) sets forth a unified set of procedures for the revocation of removal.
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Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (internal citations omitted); see
also Duong v. Noem, No. 3:26CV1002-JES-BJW, 2026 WL 555597, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb.
27, 2026) (“[R]evocation under . . . either § 241.4(l)(1) or § 241.4(l)(2) . . . requires an
adequate notice of the reasons for the revocation of release and a prompt initial informal
interview to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons given in the notice.”);
Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 163 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Courts . . . have
interpreted section 241.4(l) as requiring [the procedures of § 241.4(l)(1)] upon the
revocation of release regardless of the reason for the revocation.”); Constantinovici v.
Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“District courts have consistently . .
. held that § 241.4(l)(1)’s procedural requirements apply equally to revocation of a
noncitizen’s release pursuant to § 241.4(l)(2).”).
The undersigned agrees that § 241.4(l)(2) requires the government to provide the
notice of revocation and informal interview described in § 241.4(l)(1). In addition to the
above textual reasoning, this conclusion is bolstered by the reality that “[b]oth 8 C.F.R. §
241.4 and 8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	241.13 were 	intended 	to 	provide 	due 	process 	protections 	to
[noncitizens] following the removal period as they are considered for continued detention,
release, and then possible revocation of release.” Constantinovici, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1163
(internal quotation marks omitted). Respondents’ interpretation would result in more due
process protections for non-citizens who violated their OOS than for those who did not,
which is an absurd result. See id. Accordingly, Respondents have violated § 241.4 in their
re-detention of Petitioner without an initial informal interview.
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D. 	Conclusion
The undersigned finds that Respondents have failed to show that ICE abided by its
own regulations in revoking Petitioner’s OOS, making the revocation unlawful. “ICE, like
any agency, has the duty to follow its own federal regulations. 	As here, where an
immigration regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the
Constitution or a federal statute . . . and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged [action]
is invalid.” Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Rombot
v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017)); see Qui v. Carter, No. 25-3131-JWL,
2025 WL 2770502, at *4 (D. Kan. Sep. 26, 2025) (finding that failure to properly revoke
the 	petitioner’s 	OOS 	“pursuant 	to 	the 	applicable 	regulations” 	rendered 	revocation
ineffective). 	The undersigned recommends the Court continue to join the “majority of
district courts [that] have found such regulatory defects amount to due process violations
that entitle a petitioner to habeas relief.” Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1 (collecting cases).
E. 	ICE’s Failure to Abide by its Regulations Warrants Immediate Release.
Based on ICE’s violation of its own regulations, the undersigned concludes that
Petitioner’s detention is unlawful and that his release is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3).8 This Court has found that “by mandating minimum procedures, the regulation
8 Respondents cite two cases supporting their argument that “release is not a corresponding
remedy” to regulatory violations. (Doc. 9, at 14 & n.57) (citing Bahadorani v. Bondi, No.
CIV-25-1091-PRW, 2025 WL 3048932, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2025), and Nguyen v.
Bondi, No. CIV-25-1204-JD, 2025 WL 4114231, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 31, 2025)). The
undersigned respectfully disagrees with the analysis in Nguyen. 	“In Bahadorani, the
petitioner underwent a particularized interview process regarding their removal after being
detained. Here, . . . Respondents only provided a perfunctory and generalized statement to
Petitioner regarding the reason for revocation of his release. The Court finds the present
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ensures the individual is afforded the basic due process protections guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment. 	A wholesale failure to provide . . . the mandated interview—thereby
depriving the individual of any meaningful opportunity to contest the revocation of
release—implicates those constitutional protections directly.” 	Li v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-
1480-J, 2026 WL 475133, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 19, 2026); see also Ye v. Bondi, No.
CIV-25-1230-D, 2025 WL 3485420, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2025) (ordering release
where 	Respondents 	failed 	to 	show 	petitioner 	was 	detained 	following 	changed
circumstances). 	Thus, “Respondents are mistaken in concluding that this Court may not
grant habeas relief solely because the text of § 2241(c)(3) fails to contain an explicit proviso
authorizing the writ for violations of a federal regulation.” 	Li, 2026 WL 475133, at *3.
“ICE’s failure to abide by its own regulations in making the decision to revoke Petitioner’s
OOS renders the revocation unlawful, and . . . his release is therefore appropriate.” 	Ye,
2025 WL 3485420, at *3.
VI. 	The Court Should Decline to Address Petitioner’s Due Process Claim.
Because the undersigned recommends habeas relief based on Petitioner’s Count
One, the Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining argument as to how the
revocation of his release or his detention is otherwise unlawful. See Sanchez v. Bondi, No.
1:25-cv-02287-CNS, 2025 WL 3484756, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2025) (declining to reach
petitioner’s Zadvydas claim after agreeing with him on his regulatory violation claim); see
also Ye, 2025 WL 3485420, at *2 n.2 (acknowledging the Magistrate Judge did not
matter to be factually distinguishable from Bahadorani . . . .” Pham, 2025 WL 3243870,
at *1 n.2 (internal citations omitted).
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consider petitioner’s remaining arguments for habeas relief after recommending habeas
relief on the regulatory violation).
VII. 	Recommended Ruling and Notice of Right to Object
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be GRANTED to the extent it
requests habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	The undersigned recommends that the
Court order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody immediately, subject to an
appropriate OOS. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (“The choice, however, is not between
imprisonment and the alien ‘living at large.’ It is between imprisonment and supervision
under release conditions that may not be violated.”). The undersigned further recommends
that the Court order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status report within five
business days of the Court’s order.
The court advises the parties of their right to object to this Report and
Recommendation by April 13, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2).9 	The Court further advises the parties that failure to make timely objection to
this report and recommendation waives their right to appellate review of both factual and
9 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has reduced the typical
objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory
committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that rule establishing 14-day response time “does
not extend to habeas corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to
proceedings under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484
F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he Rules Governing § 2254
Cases may be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they need not be
in every instance – particularly where strict application would undermine the habeas review
process”).
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legal issues contained herein. 	See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir.
1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates the referral
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2026.
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