Abdurakhmonov v. Gantt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JASURBEK ABDURAKHMONOV, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-277-SLP
)
SCARLET GRANT et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Jasurbek Abdurakhmonov, a noncitizen appearing pro se,1
seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2 Chief United
States District Judge Scott L. Palk referred the case to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C).
Doc. 3. The Government responded, Doc. 9,3 and Petitioner replied, Doc 10. So
the matter is at issue.
1 	This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	“uses 	the 	term 	‘noncitizen’ 	as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated. This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings . . .
liberally,” holding them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
3 	Pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	25(d), 	the 	Court 	adds 	Department 	of
Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Markwayne Mullin, and Todd Blanche
(the acting Attorney General) as Respondents. The Warden of Cimarron
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For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant
Petitioner’s habeas petition and order his immediate release.
I. 	Factual background and procedural history.
Petitioner is a citizen of Uzbekistan who arrived at a port of entry in
California and applied for admission on August 3, 2023. Doc. 9, at 5 & Ex. 1. A
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) border official inspected him and
charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), because he had
no valid entry documents. Id. DHS issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (NTA)
for 	standard 	removal 	proceedings 	before 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	(IJ) 	on
December 17, 2024, and then paroled him into the United States via an I-94
form through April 18, 2025. Id. at 6 & Ex. 1, at 1-2; Ex. 3; Ex. 7. In 2024 he
sought asylum and withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture. Id. Ex. 2, at 3; Ex. 4. Petitioner’s removal proceedings are still
pending 	with 	an 	individual 	hearing 	scheduled 	for 	May 	5, 	2026. 	See
https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Apr. 28, 2026).
On December 8, 2025, state authorities arrested him at a commercial
vehicle inspection station in El Reno, Oklahoma. Doc. 1, at 4, 6; Doc. 9, at 8 &
Correctional Facility is not a federal official, so the response is not filed on
behalf of the Warden. See Doc. 9, at 1.
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Ex. 5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials then detained
him. Doc. 9, Ex. 5., at 2-3. There is no indication Petitioner has any criminal
history or any outstanding warrants. Id. Ex. 5, at 1.
II. 	Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner raises four grounds for relief:
Ground One: Unlawful arrest and detention after previously
paroled;
Ground Two: Arbitrary arrest and detention;
Ground Three: Continued detention without a bond hearing;
Ground Four: Detention in violation of the Fifth Amendment due
process.
Doc. 1, at 6-7. He seeks his immediate release or in the alternative, an order of
supervision. Id. at 7. He requests an individualized bond hearing where
Respondents bear the burden of proof; an order that Respondents may not re-
detain him unless he violates his conditions of release; a show cause order as
to why this petition should not be granted within three days; and an expedited
decision.4 Id. at 7.
4 	Petitioner’s latter two requests were rendered moot by the Court’s order
for response. See Doc. 7.
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III. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88
(2001)).
IV. 	Discussion.
A. 	The Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner presented himself at a port of entry and was released subject
to conditions. Doc. 1, at 6. Respondents contend they are properly detaining
Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and that the Court has no jurisdiction
to 	review 	the 	discretionary 	decision 	to 	re-detain 	Petitioner 	during 	the
pendency 	of 	his 	removal 	proceedings. 	See 	Doc. 	9, 	at 	9 	(citing 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)). The Court should disagree.
Petitioner does not challenge a discretionary decision to terminate his
parole. He instead argues he was arbitrarily detained in violation of his due
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process rights and the regulations governing his parole. Doc. 1, at 6-7. So the
Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. Cf. Mwangi v. Terry, 465
F. App’x 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]o the extent Mr. Mwangi challenges the
agency’s discretionary bond decision, the magistrate judge was correct that the
court lacked jurisdiction.”).
B. 	Petitioner is entitled to due process.
Section 1225(b)(1) provides that “[i]f an immigration officer determines
that an alien . . . who is arriving in the United States . . . is inadmissible under
section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title, the officer shall order the alien
removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the
alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of
this title or a fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). An individual
detained as inadmissible upon inspection at the border can only be paroled into
the United States “‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A)).
The 	parties 	submit 	Petitioner 	was 	temporarily 	paroled 	under
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) after arriving at the border. See Doc. 9, at 4-6 & Ex. 3, at 2; Doc.
10, at 4. His removal proceedings are ongoing, but Respondents re-detained
him in December 2025. Doc. 1, at 6.
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Petitioner argues there was no reason to re-detain him and Respondents
violated 	their 	own 	regulations 	and 	his 	due 	process 	rights 	when 	they
“arbitrarily” revoked his parole. Doc. 1, at 6-7; Doc. 10, at 4. Respondents argue
Petitioner’s mandatory detention under § 1225(b) does not implicate any due
process rights because, “[u]pon termination of his parole, [he] was subject to
detention pursuant to Section 1225 as an ‘applicant for admission.’” Doc. 9, at
8-9, 12. The Court should agree with Petitioner.
Because Petitioner had been released on humanitarian parole for over
two years, “it is illogical to suggest that his re-detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(1), which . . . governs procedures for the inspection of aliens arriving
in the United States who have not been admitted or paroled.” See Rafibaev v.
Noem, 2026 WL 607559, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2026). Nonetheless, even if the
Court 	assumed 	Petitioner 	was 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	upon
termination 	of 	his 	parole, 	“Respondents 	must 	still 	comply 	with 	the
requirements of due process.” E-D-S-O- v. Hernandez, 2026 WL 1067036, at *3
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2026).
“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to
deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
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U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. Trump v.
J.G.G., 	604 	U.S. 670, 673 (2025) 	(“‘It is 	well 	established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal
proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Individuals who have been
conditionally 	released 	from 	detention 	have 	a 	protected 	interest 	in 	their
“continued liberty.” Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147 (1997). “This is true
even when the released individual is subject to extensive conditions of release.”
Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025).
When the government promulgates regulations “with the force and effect
of law,” agencies are bound to follow their own “existing valid regulations.”
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265, 268 (1954).
Pertinent here, “[t]he statutes and regulations governing immigration and
removal proceedings afford important procedural safeguards to detainees.”
Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 698-99.
1. 	Statutory and regulatory framework.
Upon inspection at the time of his request for admission through a port
of entry Petitioner was at first detained and then “paroled” into the United
States under § 1182(d)(5). Doc. 9, Ex. 3, at 2-3. Section 1182(d)(5) grants
discretion to DHS officials to “parole into the United States temporarily under
such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent
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humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for
admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Any revocation of
this parole must be based on a decision by a DHS official that either “the
purpose for which parole was authorized” has been accomplished or that
“neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued
presence of the [noncitizen] in the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (stating the DHS Secretary may revoke parole
“when the purposes of such parole . . . have been served”). And the parole will
only be terminated when “written notice” of this decision is served on the
noncitizen. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).
Respondents argue Petitioner’s parole expired so the regulations did not
require notice to Petitioner. See Doc. 9, at 10; see also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)
(stating parole is automatically terminated without written notice “at the
expiration of the time for which parole was authorized”). But Petitioner
remained on parole even after the date of expiration.
“[T]he applicable regulatory scheme requires that, where parole has
automatically terminated upon expiration and the noncitizen is not returned
to custody for either the timely execution of a removal order or upon an
individualized 	decision 	by 	an 	authorized 	DHS 	official, 	continuation 	of
humanitarian parole may be implied and, thereafter, the procedures for on-
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notice termination apply.” Caisa Telenchana v. Hermosillo, 2026 WL 696806,
at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 12, 2026). So Respondents cannot rely on the automatic
termination clause to justify Petitioner’s parole revocation.
2. 	Respondents 	did 	not 	comply 	with 	the 	applicable
regulations before revoking Petitioner’s parole.
Respondents 	do 	not 	submit 	that 	an 	appropriate 	official 	made 	a
discretionary decision to revoke Petitioner’s parole. They provide a charging
document (NTA), but this was issued to Petitioner when he was initially
paroled. 	Doc. 	9, Ex. 1. So 	it provided no notice to 	Petitioner about 	the
termination of his parole when he was detained in December 2025. The lack of
an individualized determination was in violation of the regulations governing
the 	termination 	of 	parole. 	See, 	e.g., 	E-D-S-O-, 	2026 	WL 	1067036, 	at 	*4
(“Nothing in the record shows Respondents provided Petitioner with written
notice of revocation of his humanitarian parole, that the original purpose of his
parole was accomplished, or that a DHS official with authority determined
‘neither 	humanitarian 	reasons 	nor 	public 	benefit’ 	warranted 	continued
parole.”); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804 F. Supp. 3d 395, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(“Respondents provide no indication that an individualized determination was
made as to the revocation of Munoz Materano’s parole; nor do they articulate,
even now, either that the purpose for which Munoz Materano’s parole was
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authorized has been accomplished, nor that neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants his continued presence in the United States.”); see also
Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1137-38 (D. Or. 2025) (“This is a
grant of discretionary authority, but it has a mandatory requirement—parole
may be terminated or revoked only when in the Secretary’s opinion the parole’s
purposes have been met.”).
3. 	Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights
when they summarily revoked his parole.
This Court analyzes Petitioner’s due process claim to determine whether
he has a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and what
process is necessary to ensure any deprivation of that liberty interest aligns
with the Constitution. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989). In examining the necessary process, the Court turns to the three factors
set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute 	procedural 	safeguards”; 	and 	(3) 	“the 	Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976).
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“When the government grants [a noncitizen] parole into the country, it
creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment.”
Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); see also
Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“Individuals
released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest
in their ‘continued liberty.’” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972))); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 27,
2026) (finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from
immigration detention”). Petitioner’s interest in physical freedom “is the most
elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004);
see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an individual’s interest in
being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]
Clause protects”). Respondents deprived Petitioner of his protected status
when they revoked his parole and placed him in custody.
Turning to the Mathews factors, the Court finds that Petitioner has a
significant private interest in remaining free from detention after spending
years on parole. To be sure, “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).
But that power remains “subject to important constitutional limitations.”
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Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. And it does not erase Petitioner’s significant
interest in remaining free from detention.
Respondents 	do 	not 	challenge 	Petitioner’s 	assertions 	that 	he 	was
“previously paroled” and did not violate any laws or conditions of his parole.
Doc. 1, at 6. During his parole, Petitioner’s interest in release grew even
stronger 	as 	he 	worked 	and 	presumably 	“form[ed] 	the 	other 	enduring
attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The first Mathews
factor favors Petitioner.
Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The
risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is considerable
where he has not received any notice of the reason for his parole revocation
and simple procedures exist which would mitigate those risks.
“Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally
inadequate opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be
meaningful to be constitutionally sufficient.” Saqib v. Andrews, 2026 WL
350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026). Petitioner received no procedural
safeguards to determine whether the revocation of his parole and his detention
were justified, and thus Respondents have detained him without any stated
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cause. This factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley,
795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the Government may
believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its
obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due
process.”); see also Gualpa-Lumbi v. Hoover, 2026 WL 452351, at *11 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 18, 2026) (“[Petitioner] was previously released and permitted to go
about 	living 	for 	years 	in 	the 	United 	States 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	his
immigration proceedings before being detained in 2025. . . . [which] show[s]
that [Petitioner] is at risk of being erroneously deprived of his freedom.”).
Finally, the Court considers the Government’s interest, including any
fiscal or administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While this Court
recognizes that the government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws,
the government’s interest in re-detaining [P]etitioner without adequate notice
and an opportunity to challenge the revocation of his release is low.” Saqib,
2026 WL 350830, at *6; see, e.g., Diaz v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T[he Court concludes that the government’s interest in
re-detaining Petitioner . . . is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that
Petitioner[] has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). And the
Court can discern no significant administrative or fiscal burden associated
with placing the burden on the government to follow its own regulations. See,
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e.g., Iza, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (“An alien’s opportunity to be heard regarding
the revocation of his parole is only meaningful if the government comports with
its own internal standards regarding parole revocation.”). Especially given that
Petitioner’s detention was not deemed necessary for over two years.
The undersigned concludes Respondents breached their own regulations
and violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they summarily revoked his
parole. Based on these findings, the undersigned recommends the Court grant
the habeas corpus petition and release Petitioner from detention subject to the
same conditions that governed his earlier parole.
V. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant 	Petitioner’s 	habeas 	petition 	and 	order 	his 	immediate 	release
subject to the same conditions that governed his earlier parole. The
undersigned also recommends that the Court order the Government
to certify compliance by filing a status report within ten business days
of the Court’s order, and to promptly provide a copy of this order to Counsel
for the Warden of the Cimarron Correctional Facility. Finally, the Court should
order that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing before a neutral decision-maker.
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The undersigned advises Respondents of their right to file an objection
to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by May 4,
2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72.5 The undersigned further advises the Government that failure to make
timely objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to
appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v.
United 	States, 	950 	F.2d 	656, 	659 	(10th 	Cir. 	1991). 	This 	Report 	and
Recommendation disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2026.
5 	Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that
rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus
petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under
Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x
227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be
applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they
need not be in every instance – particularly where strict application would
undermine the habeas review process”).
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