Singh v. Johnson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
SUKHVINDER SINGH, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-308-G
)
JOSHUA JOHNSON, Field Office )
Director of Enforcement and Removal )
Operations, Dallas Field Office, )
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, )
et al., )
)
Respondents.1 )
ORDER
Petitioner Sukhvinder Singh filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition,”
Doc. No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging Petitioner’s detention by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Certain Respondents have filed an
Answer (Doc. No. 9). No reply was filed within the time allowed.
I. Background
Petitioner “is a citizen of India,” who “entered the United States on April 05, 2023.”
Pet. ¶¶ 14, 40. Immigration officials charged Petitioner with “being inadmissible under 8
1 Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Todd
Blanche, Attorney General of the United States, and Chris Gantt, Warden of Cimarron
Correctional Facility, are hereby substituted as respondents for Kristi Noem, Pamela
Bondi, and Scarlet Grant, respectively, pursuant to Rules 25(d) and 81(a)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The appearing respondents are: Secretary Mullin; Attorney
General Blanche; and Joshua Johnson, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, Dallas Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
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U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.”
Id. ¶ 41.
According to Respondents, “Petitioner was encountered by the Oklahoma Highway
Patrol (‘OHP’) on August 22, 2025,” at the scene of a motor vehicle collision. Answer at
16. “At the conclusion of the traffic investigation, Petitioner was turned over to ICE.” Id.
“Petitioner was detained by ICE pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is held in
custody at the Cimarron Detention Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma.” Id.; see also Pet. ¶ 42.
As a result of being charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), “DHS denied
[Petitioner] release from immigration custody” because he was “subject to detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.” Pet. ¶¶ 2, 43.
II. Discussion
A. Petitioner’s Claims and Respondents’ Answer
Petitioner argues that Respondents’ detention of him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) “unlawfully mandates his continued detention and violates” the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., and the due process
rights afforded him by the Fifth Amendment. Pet. ¶¶ 39, 46-47, 49-52. Petitioner seeks
habeas relief in the form of an order of release from detention or, alternatively, provision
of a bond hearing. See id. at 22.
Invoking multiple statutory interpretation arguments, Respondents argue that the
“plain language of § 1225(b)(2)(A) straightforwardly applies in this case” and that
“Petitioner’s statutory assertions misread the INA and cannot account for the statutory
definition of ‘applicants for admission.’” Answer at 17, 20-22; see also Munoz v. Holt,
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No. CIV-25-1190-G, 2026 WL 2200433, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2026); Santillan
Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2026).
B. The Inapplicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Following the submission of the Answer, the Tenth Circuit held that §
1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement “applies only to [noncitizens] seeking
admission” at the border of the United States. Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1239-40. The
Tenth Circuit further held “that noncitizens who entered the United States and were
thereafter detained in the interior of the country are,” instead, “usually subject to [8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)] (and thus eligible for bond).” Id. at 1237; see also id. at 1232, 1251 (concluding
that the petitioner, who was detained at a traffic stop in the interior of the country, was
“eligible for release” and “entitled to a bond hearing”).
Respondents’ position is foreclosed by Santillan Quiroz. Here, as in Santillan
Quiroz, Petitioner was taken into custody in the interior of the United States after having
entered the country. See Answer at 16; Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1233-34. And as in
Santillan Quiroz, Petitioner has been held in detention without a bond hearing or other
“opportunity to argue for release.” Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1233-34; see Pet. ¶¶ 2,
43. Accordingly, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is inapplicable. See Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1246-
51. Because Petitioner “can properly be subject to detention under § 1226(a),” he is entitled
to a bond hearing. Id. at 1251 n.13. Given this determination, the Court need not address
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Petitioner’s remaining claim for relief. See Ramos Perez v. Grant, No. CIV-26-721-D,
2026 WL 2033144, at *2 & n.2 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2026).2
C. Petitioner’s Request for Fees and Costs
Petitioner also requests attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). See Pet. at 22.
The EAJA “unambiguously authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging
immigration detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025), petition for
cert. filed, No. 26-146 (U.S. July 30, 2026). Such attorney’s fees must be sought pursuant
to the EAJA and by separate motion, however. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), 81(a)(4);
LCvR 54.2. Any recovery of costs is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 2412(a), Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and Local Civil Rule 54.1.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1)
is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim for relief based upon a violation of the INA.
2 Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s INA violation claim “challenges [the Department
of Homeland Security’s] decision to detain Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore
runs headlong into the INA’s jurisdiction channeling and stripping provisions, depriving
this Court of jurisdiction.” Answer at 17-20 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e), 1252(b)(9), (g)).
Because Petitioner claims Respondents “violate[d] the INA” by “unlawfully” detaining
him pursuant to § 1225(b)(2), Pet. ¶¶ 46-47, Petitioner “challenges one of the many . . .
decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process” “to which § 1252(g) is
inapplicable.” Munoz, 2026 WL 2200433, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(concluding that the relevant statutes do not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to consider a
habeas claim for violation of the INA based upon the detention of a noncitizen); see Reno
v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); Mukantagara v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 67 F.4th 1113, 1116 (10th Cir. 2023).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to, within seven (7) days of the date of this Order,
either provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or
release Petitioner into the United States.
2. Petitioner’s remaining claim for relief is DISMISSED without prejudice; and
3. Respondents shall file a declaration with the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746
within ten (10) days of the date of this Order affirming either that a bond hearing
was conducted or that Petitioner was released from detention into the United
States.
4. The Court will separately enter judgment but retains jurisdiction over this matter
to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2026.
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