Hernandez v. Figueroa et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
YUSELIN CRISTINA OJEDA HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
FRED FIGUEROA, et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. CIV-26-1689-D
ORDER
Petitioner Yuselin Cristina Ojeda Hernandez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1]. Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who
entered the United States on February 5, 2019, “as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure with
authorization to remain until September 9, 2022.” [Doc. No. 13, at 2]. Petitioner was
granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) terminated in November 2025. Id. In March 2026, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement 	(ICE) 	detained 	Petitioner 	after 	she 	was 	arrested 	by Texas 	state 	law
enforcement officers “following an incident at a store.” Id. Petitioner is currently detained
at the Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma.
On April 28, 2026, following a custody determination hearing, an Immigration
Judge denied Petitioner bond because she failed to show she was not a flight risk. On July
17, 2026, the Immigration Court ordered Petitioner removed, and Petitioner’s appeal of the
Immigration Court’s removal order remains pending before the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).
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Petitioner challenges her ICE detention as unlawful and seeks her release from
custody or an individualized custody review before a neutral decisionmaker with the
Government bearing the burden of clear and convincing evidence to justify her detention.
[Doc. No. 1, at 8].
The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin for initial
proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). [Doc. No. 7]. On
September 29, 2026, Judge Erwin issued a Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 13],
recommending that the Court grant Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11], and
dismiss 	the 	Petition 	as 	moot. 	Petitioner 	filed 	a 	timely 	Objection 	to 	Report 	and
Recommendation [Doc. No. 14]. Thus, the Court must “make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made” and “may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED .
R. CIV . P. 72(b)(3).
On de novo review, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections. “Mootness is a
threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional
prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863,
867 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009). And “‘[w]here the
petitioner has received all the relief requested in the petition, [her] claim is moot and should
be dismissed, unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies.’” Perez v. Holt, No.
CIV-25-1151, 2026 WL 597126, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2026) (quoting Riley v. I.N.S.,
310 F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2002)).
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The Court addresses Petitioner’s first and fifth objections together as they relate to
the same issue: Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing as a remedy for her claims. In her
first objection, Petitioner argues that her detention presents a live controversy because she
remains detained and the injury challenged in her Petition continues daily. In her fifth
objection, Petitioner maintains that the existing record before the Court shows that an 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) bond hearing would provide her meaningful, non-futile relief. Petitioner
received an individualized custody review in July 2026 when the Immigration Court held
a bond hearing and denied her bond. Thus, Petitioner’s objections are overruled. To the
extent Petitioner argues that the Court should review the Immigration Judge’s decision to
deny bond, the Court finds it is jurisdictionally barred from doing so under § 1226(e).
Kumar v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. CIV-26-164-R, 2026 WL 753944, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar.
17, 2026) (noting that “‘the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion is not subject to
judicial review’” per § 1226(e) and that “a district court has no jurisdiction to consider a
habeas petitioner’s challenge to the decision to either grant or deny bond.” (quoting
Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 786 (10th Cir. 2012)).
In her second objection, Petitioner asserts that binding Tenth Circuit precedent
establishes that noncitizens detained in the interior are subject to detention under § 1226(a).
Petitioner is correct that the Tenth Circuit has held that the detention of noncitizens detained
in the interior is governed by § 1226(a). Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1251
n.13 (10th Cir. 2026). But the magistrate judge found that Petitioner’s detention is governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). [Doc. No. 13, at 4]. Thus, the Report and Recommendation is not
in conflict with Santillan Quiroz and Petitioner’s objection is without merit.
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In her third objection, Petitioner contends that the Immigration Judge’s removal
order is not administratively final while her BIA appeal is pending. The magistrate judge
found that “[b]ecause Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA is pending, her removal order is not
administratively final, and [as a result,] her detention has not shifted to 8 U.S.C. § 1231.”
[Doc. No. 13, at 5]. Thus, Petitioner’s objection to the report on this ground is also baseless.
In her fourth objection, Petitioner argues that her failure to request a bond
redetermination hearing does not required dismissal of the Petition and that “[t]o the extent
the Report and Recommendation relies on administrative exhaustion or the absence of a
prior bond-redetermination request,” it is also erroneous. [Doc. No. 14, at 6]. The
magistrate judge did not recommend dismissal of the Petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Petitioner’s objection is therefore overruled.
In her sixth objection, Petitioner asks the Court to grant her leave to supplement or
amend the Petition instead of dismissing the Petition. A habeas petitioner may amend or
supplement a § 2241 pleading “as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil
actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. “[T]he standard used by courts in deciding to grant or deny
leave to supplement is the same standard used in deciding whether to grant or deny leave
to amend.” Carter v. Bigelow, 787 F.3d 1269, 1278 n.6 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal citation
omitted). Under FED . R. CIV . P. 15(a)(2), “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend]
when justice so requires.” See also Carter, 787 F.3d at 1279 (authorization to supplement
pleadings should be liberally granted). Leave to amend may be denied on “a showing of
undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Duncan
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v. Manager, Dept. of Safety, City and County of Denver, 397 F.3d 1300, 1315 (10th Cir.
2005) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Burbage, 280 Fed. App’x. 777, 782,
2008 WL 2332137, at *4 (10th Cir. 2008).
Based on Petitioner’s representations, the Court finds that granting Petitioner leave
to amend or supplement the Petition would be futile. Petitioner asserts that “[i]f the Court
concludes that a factual or legal issue remains unresolved, the more efficient course is to
permit a focused supplement, receive the necessary custody/BIA records, or recommit the
matter to the Magistrate Judge for reconsideration in light of Santillan Quiroz, Miranda,
and the current BIA status.” [Doc. No. 14, at 8]. As explained above, the magistrate judge’s
recommendation is in accord with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Santillan Quiroz. In
Miranda, 	the 	Court 	adopted 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendation 	to 	order 	the
Government to provide the petitioner with a bond hearing, while his BIA appeal remained
pending. Miranda v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-1004-D, 2026 WL 2030830, at *1, 3-4 (W.D.
Okla. July 14, 2026), adopted in part, 2026 WL 2390961 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 17, 2026).
Here, Petitioner has already received a bond hearing, and her detention is governed by §
1226(a) while her appeal of the Immigration Court’s removal order is pending. Therefore,
at this time, Petitioner has received all the procedural due process contemplated by the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and granting her leave to amend or supplement
the Petition would be futile. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S.
439, 445 (1988) (“If no additional relief [beyond the statutory claim] would have been
warranted, 	a 	constitutional 	decision 	would 	have 	been 	unnecessary 	and 	therefore
inappropriate.”).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No.
13] is ADOPTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 [Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED AS MOOT. A separate judgment shall be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15 th day of October, 2026.
UNIT ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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