Watkins v. Myers et al

1 – OPINION & ORDER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
RICHARD WATKINS, No. 3:25-cv-00758-AB
Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER
v.
ANDREW MYERS, an individual;
JUDGE JOHN A. WOLF, in his
individual capacity; KENNETH
THOMAS, an individual; KENDRA
THOMAS, an individual; PEACHY
AND MYERS, an Oregon professional
corporation; JANE DOES 1–6; and
WASCO COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Oregon,
Defendants.
BAGGIO, District Judge:
Self-Represented Plaintiff Richard Watkins brings this action against Defendants Andrew
Myers, Peachey Davies & Myers, P.C.,1 Kendra Thomas, Kenneth Thomas (collectively, the
“Legal Opponent Defendants”), Wasco County, and Wasco County Circuit Court Judge John A.
1 In his pleadings, Plaintiff refers to Peachey Davies and Myers, P.C., as “Peachy and
Meyers.”
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2 – OPINION & ORDER
Wolf alleging constitutional violations and state tort claims arising from an underlying state
court action.
Before the Court is Legal Opponent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Special Motion
to Strike, Defendant Wasco County’s Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Judge Wolf’s Motion to
Dismiss. Legal Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Legal Opp. MTD”), ECF No. 8; Def. Wasco Cnty.’s
Mot. Dismiss (“Wasco Cnty. MTD”), ECF No. 22; Def. Judge Wolf’s Mot. Dismiss (“Judge
Wolf MTD”), ECF No. 29. For the reasons below, the Court grants in part Defendants’ motions
and dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a foreclosure action between Watkins and Defendants Kenneth
and Kendra Thomas. 2 On June 6, 2024, the Thomases filed a civil complaint in Wasco County
Circuit Court against Watkins seeking “to enforce a trustee foreclosure concerning disputed
property rights.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, ECF No. 5. Watkins asserts that he was incarcerated at the
time the underlying complaint was filed and during a “substantial portion” of the litigation. Id.
¶ 8. The Thomases were represented by Defendant Myers of the law firm Peachey Davies &
Myers, P.C. Id. ¶ 6.
Watkins asserts that Legal Opponent Defendants “acted with deliberate timing in an
attempt to secure a judgment before [Watkins’] scheduled release date . . . .” Id. ¶ 9. He alleges
that “this was done to deprive [Watkins] of the opportunity to meaningfully defend himself while
free and capable of directly accessing the court.” Id. ¶ 9. Watkins further alleges that the Legal
2 For clarity, the Court uses Plaintiff’s last name, Watkins, in the background section
because he is the defendant in the underlying foreclosure action.
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3 – OPINION & ORDER
Opponent Defendants “submitted declarations and filings containing false or misleading
information . . . .” Id. ¶ 11.
Watkins also alleges that Defendant Judge Wolf engaged in unconstitutional conduct
throughout the litigation. Watkins alleges that Defendant Judge Wolf deprived Watkins of due
process in denying Watkins’s motions for extension of time “on the basis that [Watkins] lacked
adequate legal resources and therefore could not mount a proper defense.” Id. ¶ 10. He also
alleges that Defendant Judge Wolf failed to hold evidentiary hearings on Legal Opponent
Defendants’ false or misleading filings, denied Watkins’s motion to disqualify Defendant Judge
Wolf due to alleged bias, and denied or ignored other motions “seeking to clarify the vague
complaint, to compel discovery, and to challenge jurisdiction.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Watkins further
alleges that an individual other than Defendant Judge Wolf presided over a telephonic hearing in
his case, even though Defendant Judge Wolf signed the record for that hearing. Id. ¶ 14.
On April 21, 2025, the same day that Defendant Judge Wolf held a summary judgment
hearing, summary judgment was entered in favor of the Thomases. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. Watkins alleges
that Defendant Judge Wolf’s failure to address Watkins’s motions to compel discovery and for
extension of time prior to the April 21 hearing was a “serious procedural deficiency and deprived
[Watkins] of his right to a fair and responsive adjudicatory process.” Id. ¶ 13. Watkins also
alleges that his rights were violated when Defendant Judge Wolf told Watkins at the April 21
hearing that the interrogatories and admissions sought by Watkins were unavailable in civil
cases. Id. ¶ 19.
On April 29, 2025, Watkins sought a final judgment to appeal but was informed that no
such order had been filed. Id. ¶ 15. Three days later, Watkins asserts he filed a motion to compel
the final judgment and “submitted a formal Court Records Request for the final signed judgment
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4 – OPINION & ORDER
order and related documents” that went unfulfilled. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Next, Watkins tried to file a
notice of appeal with the trial court clerk along with a declaration that the “final judgment order
was being wrongfully withheld.” Id. ¶ 18. Watkins alleges that the clerk refused to accept the
filing. Id. ¶ 18.
Watkins “asserts that these events, collectively and individually, constitute a coordinated
effort between [Defendants] to deprive him of his constitutional rights under color of law.” Id.
¶ 21. Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants, asserting Defendants
violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Claim One) and acted in
concert to violate his civil rights (Claim Two). Compl. ¶¶ 23–24, ECF No. 2.3 Plaintiff also
brings Oregon tort claims for Abuse of Process (Claim Three), Fraud and Misrepresentation
(Claim Four), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Claim Five), and Malicious
Prosecution (Claim Six) against Defendant Myers and Defendant Peachey Davies & Myers, P.C.
Id. ¶¶ 25–34. Plaintiff brings his final Oregon tort claim for Negligent Supervision (Claim
Seven) against only Defendant Peachey Davies & Myers, P.C. Id. ¶¶ 35–37. Plaintiff seeks
damages along with injunctive and declaratory relief. Am. Compl. V; Compl. V.
STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of the claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When evaluating the
sufficiency of a complaint’s factual allegations, the Court must accept all material facts alleged
in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). A motion to dismiss under
3 On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint incorporating the claims in his
original complaint. Am. Compl. 3 (stating “[c]laims remain unchanged”). Accordingly, the Court
considers both documents in its analysis here.
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5 – OPINION & ORDER
Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted if a plaintiff alleges the “grounds” of their “entitlement to relief”
with nothing “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. In other words, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief and contain “well-
pleaded facts” that “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct . . . .”
Id. at 679.
Courts must liberally construe pleadings from self-represented parties. Wolfe v.
Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Munoz v. Superior
Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 91 F.4th 977 (9th Cir. 2024). Additionally, a court cannot dismiss a complaint
from a self-represented party without first explaining to that party the deficiencies of the
complaint and providing an opportunity to amend. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th
Cir. 1992). Dismissal of a complaint from a self-represented party without leave to amend is
proper only if the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep’t
of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. Legal Opponent Defendants argue:
(1) they are private actors and, therefore, not subject to suit under Section 1983; and (2)
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6 – OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff’s tort claims are barred by the absolute litigation privilege.4 Legal Opp. MTD 8, 12.
Defendant Wasco County argues that it is not the proper defendant for Plaintiff’s claims
involving Wasco County Circuit Court employees. Wasco Cnty. Def. MTD 3. And Defendant
Judge Wolf argues Plaintiff’s claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity. Judge Wolf MTD
4. The Court agrees with Defendants.5
I. Legal Opponent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Legal Opponent Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. First, Legal
Opponent Defendants argue that they are not subject to suit under Section 1983 because they are
private actors. Legal Opp. MTD 12. Second, they argue that Plaintiff’s tort claims against
Defendants Myers and Peachey Davies & Myers, P.C., (“Law Firm Defendants”) are based
solely on Defendant Myers’s conduct in the course of the underlying litigation and therefore
protected by Oregon’s absolute litigation privilege. Legal Opp. MTD 8, 14.
A. Section 1983
“[P]rivate parties are not generally acting under color of state law.” Price v. State of
Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). Only in “exceptional cases” will a private entity
be treated as a state actor under Section 1983. O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1155–56 (9th
Cir. 2023) cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 2715 (2024).
A private party may act under color of state law “where there is significant state
involvement in the action.” Lopez v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1991).
4 Legal Opponent Defendants also ask the Court to take judicial notice of the court
documents from the underlying action. Legal Opp. MTD 15-16. Because the documents are not
necessary to the Court’s resolution of these motions, the Court declines to further address Legal
Opponent Defendants’ request.
5 Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for the reasons discussed herein, the
Court declines to address the remainder of the parties’ arguments.
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7 – OPINION & ORDER
The plaintiff must allege that the private party “is a willful participant in joint action with the
State or its agents.” Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008); see
also Children’s Health Defense v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 112 F.4th 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2024)
(describing the “state policy” and “state actor” requirements to bring a Section 1983 claim
against a private party). In other words, the court must determine “whether the nature of the
relationship between the private party and the government is such that ‘the alleged infringement
of federal rights is fairly attributable to the government.’” Children’s Health Defense, 112 F.4th
at 754 (brackets omitted) (quoting Pasadena Republican Club v. Western Just. Ctr., 985 F.2d
1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021)).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Legal Opponent Defendants—all private parties—have
acted under color of state law. Plaintiff’s claims are conclusory in this regard, broadly claiming
that the events described in Plaintiff’s pleadings “constitute a coordinated effort between”
Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Am. Compl. ¶ 21. But all of
Plaintiff’s allegations against Legal Opponent Defendants involve unilateral actions by Legal
Opponent Defendants, including the timing of Legal Opponent Defendants’ actions and the
submission of “declarations and filings containing false or misleading information.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.
“‘[M]erely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a
[private] party a joint actor with the judge.’” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-29 (1980)). In other words, Plaintiff’s
allegations that Legal Opponent Defendants “[i]nvok[ed] state legal procedures” is not sufficient
to allege that Legal Opponent Defendants jointly participated with Defendant Judge Wolf to
violate Plaintiff’s rights. See id. As Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Legal Opponent
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8 – OPINION & ORDER
Defendants acted under color of state law, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims
against Legal Opponent Defendants.
B. State Tort Claims
The scope of the absolute litigation privilege is liberal: “[I]t encompasses actions taken
and statements made in connection with a judicial proceeding, and it embraces anything that may
possibly be pertinent.” Triem v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Case No. 3:21-cv-00710-AN, 2024
WL 4349113, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2024) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The
privilege applies to ‘statements or writings made during or as part of the litigation itself’ and to
‘similar statements which are made by a lawyer outside of the pleadings and actual trial of the
case’ if the statements or writings have ‘some relation’ thereto.” Davoodian v. Rivera, 327 Or.
App. 197, 216, 535 P.3d 309 (2023) (quoting Chard v. Galton, 277 Or. 109, 113, 559 P.2d 1280
(1977)). The absolute privilege applies to “any tort action.” Wollam v. Brandt, 154 Or. App. 156,
162 n.5, 961 P.2d 219 (1998) (2023).
There is one exception to the privilege: “An actor’s conduct is so egregious as to be
deprived of the protections of the absolute privilege when that conduct satisfies the elements of
wrongful initiation.” Mantia v. Hanson, 190 Or. App. 412, 429, 79 P.3d 404 (2003) (finding that
a claim for tortious interference with economic relations may be excepted from a claim of
absolute litigation privilege where the “improper means” of interference is alleged to have been
the “prosecution of unfounded litigation”). The elements for wrongful initiation are:
(1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial proceeding
against the plaintiff; (2) The termination of the proceeding in the plaintiff’s favor;
(3) The absence of probable cause to prosecute the action; (4) The existence of
malice, or as is sometimes stated, the existence of a primary purpose other than that
of securing adjudication of the claim; and (5) Damages.
Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or. 255, 259-60, 381 P.2d 499 (1963).
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9 – OPINION & ORDER
Here, all of Plaintiff’s tort claims against Law Firm Defendants are based on actions and
statements made during judicial proceedings. Plaintiff alleges that Law Firm Defendants “acted
with deliberate timing in an attempt to secure a judgment before Plaintiff’s scheduled release
date . . . .” Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff also alleges that Law Firm Defendants “submitted
declarations and filings containing false or misleading information . . . .” Id. ¶ 11. These
allegations all relate to actions and statements made in connection with the underlying
foreclosure proceedings.
In addition, Plaintiff has not alleged that Law Firm Defendants’ conduct is so egregious
as to be deprived of the protections of the privilege. Plaintiff does not—and cannot—plausibly
allege the elements for wrongful initiation. To succeed on a claim for wrongful initiation,
Plaintiff must allege that the underlying proceeding terminated in his favor. But Plaintiff
concedes in his pleadings that summary judgment was granted in favor of the Thomases. Am.
Compl. ¶ 15. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s tort claims against Law Firm Defendants are
barred by Oregon’s absolute litigation privilege.
II. Defendant Wasco County’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Wasco County moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it on the grounds it
cannot be liable under Monell for the acts of trial court employees because they are employees of
the State of Oregon. Wasco Cnty. MTD 4. Oregon’s Court Reform Act of 1983 unified the court
system and transferred the employment of trial court staff and judges from counties to the state.
ORS 8.235; see also Or. AFSCME Council 75 v. Or. Jud. Dep’t – Yamhill Cnty., 304 Or.App.
794, 796–98, 469 P.3d 812 (2020) (“Beginning in 1983, the legislature consolidated Oregon’s
trial courts . . . into a single unified court system funded directly by the state and administered
centrally on a statewide basis.”). As a result of this statutory change, “[t]rial court employees
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10 – OPINION & ORDER
ceased to be employees of the individual counties in which they worked and instead became
employees of the state.” AFSCME, 304 Or. App. at 797, 801-803 (describing internal court
administration); see also ORS 1.001 (“[I]t is in the best interests of the people of this state that
the judicial branch of state government, including the . . . circuit courts, be funded and operated
at the state level.”).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because Defendant Wasco
County is not the appropriate defendant in this matter. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges no
facts regarding improper conduct by Defendant Wasco County. See generally Am. Compl.
Rather, Plaintiff claims that he is “invok[ing] Monell liability for failure to supervise or train
court employees who obstructed appellate rights.” Pl’s Resp. Wasco Cnty. MTD 1, ECF No. 31.
But, as stated above, Wasco County Circuit Court employees are employees of the State of
Oregon, not the County. Therefore, Defendant Wasco County does not have a responsibility to
supervise or train these employees. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Wasco County.
III. Defendant Judge Wolf’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Judge Wolf moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, arguing that he
is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.6 “It is well settled that judges are generally immune
from suit for money damages.” Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2021). There are only
two circumstances where judicial immunity does not apply: nonjudicial actions and judicial
actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Acres Bonusing, Inc v. Marston, 17
F.4th 901, 915 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.
6 Though Defendant Judge Wolf’s reply brief refers to cases cited by Plaintiff in response
to his motion to dismiss, Judge Wolf Reply MTD 2-5, ECF No. 42, no such response was filed in
the docket in this case.
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11 – OPINION & ORDER
1988) (“Judges are absolutely immune from damages actions for judicial acts taken within the
jurisdiction of their courts.”).
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 generally bars requests for injunctive relief against judicial
officers: “[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” “The phrase declaratory relief in the current
version of [Section] 1983 refers to the ability of a litigant to appeal the judge’s order.” Weldon v.
Kapetan, No. 1:17-cv-01536-LJO-SKO, 2018 WL 2127060, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2018)
(internal quotations and brackets omitted). Courts have also determined that only claims for
prospective declaratory relief against judges—not claims seeking a declaration of past liability—
are permitted under Section 1983. See LaTulippe v. Harder, 574 F.Supp.3d. 870, 884 (D. Or.
Nov. 23, 2021) (citing cases from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits concluding that Section 1983
“provides only for prospective—not retrospective—declaratory relief”) (citing Just. Network,
Inc. v. Craighead Cnty., 931 F.3d 753, 763 (8th Cir. 2019) and Lawrence v. Kuenhold, 271 F.
App’x 763, 766 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendant Judge Wolf are barred by the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. First, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Wolf all
stem from judicial actions. An act is judicial where (1) it was a “function normally performed by
a judge,” and (2) when the parties “dealt with the judge in [their] judicial capacity.” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). A judge retains absolute immunity from liability for
judicial acts “even if [their] exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave
procedural errors.” Id. at 359; see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“[J]udicial
immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice . . . .”). Here, all of Plaintiff’s
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12 – OPINION & ORDER
allegations against Defendant Judge Wolf concern actions taken as the presiding judge in the
underlying foreclosure case. See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 10-15, 19. As all of Plaintiff’s allegations
concern functions normally performed by a judge, Defendant Judge Wolf is absolutely immune
from suit for money damages.
Second, Defendant Judge Wolf’s actions were not taken in the absence of all jurisdiction.
To determine whether a judicial action is taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, the
Court determines whether the judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter the time the judge
took the challenged action. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (“[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction
must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.”). Here, because Wasco
County Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction, Defendant Judge Wolf did not act in the
complete absence of jurisdiction in presiding over the underlying foreclosure case. Accordingly,
absolute judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims for damages.
The statute also prohibits Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. As noted
above, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are barred by Section 1983 “unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiff has not
plausibly alleged that Defendant Judge Wolf violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory
relief—i.e. his ability to appeal—was unavailable. While Plaintiff alleges that there was a delay
in entering a final judgment in the underlying case, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-18, 20, Plaintiff does not
plausibly allege that said delay foreclosed Plaintiff’s ability to appeal altogether. Plaintiff’s claim
for declaratory relief also fails because it seeks retrospective relief. Am. Compl. V (seeking “[a]
declaratory judgment that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights”). Accordingly, the
Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Wolf.
///
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13 – OPINION & ORDER
IV. Leave To Amend
Because it is “absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect[s]” in Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant Wasco County, Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854
(9th Cir. 2016), the Court dismisses Defendant Wasco County with prejudice.
The Court, however, cannot conclude that no amendment could cure the defects in
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Wolf and Legal Opponent Defendants. The Court
therefore allows Plaintiff to file a motion to amend his complaint that explains how Plaintiff’s
second amended complaint cures the defects addressed in this Opinion & Order. Plaintiff shall
file his proposed second amended complaint with his motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART Legal Opponent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [8],
Defendant Wasco County’s Motion to Dismiss [22], and Defendant Judge Wolf’s Motion to
Dismiss [29]. Defendant Wasco County is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion to amend
his complaint is due within 30 days of this Opinion & Order. Plaintiff shall include a proposed
second amended complaint with his motion. Failure to file this motion will result in dismissal of
this action without prejudice and without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ____ day of November, 2025.
_______________________
AMY M. BAGGIO
United States District Judge
6th
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