Thayres v. Guardian Real Estate Services et al

1 – OPINION & ORDER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
SETH THOMAS THAYRES,
Case No. 3:25-cv-00984-AB
Plaintiff,
OPINION & ORDER
v.
GUARDIAN REAL ESTATE SERVICES,
a domestic limited liability corporation; MARCY
LANG; RAFAEL CAMPOS; TISHA GIBSON;
and CARISSA WOODY,
Defendants.
Seth Thomas Thayres
2102 W Superior St. Apt 213
Duluth, MN 55806
Self-Represented Plaintiff
Christopher J. Drotzmann
Davis Rothwell Earle & Xochihua, PC
200 SW Market St. Suite 1800
Portland, OR 97201-5745
Attorney for Defendants
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2 – OPINION & ORDER
BAGGIO, District Judge:
Self-represented Plaintiff Seth Thomas Thayres brings this case against Defendants
Guardian Real Estate Services, Marcy Lang, Rafael Campos, Tisha Gibson, and Carissa Woody.
Plaintiff asserts five claims for relief arising under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
guidance and rules. Compl. ¶¶ 5(20)–(36), ECF No. 1. On June 3, 2026, Defendants moved for
summary judgment. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ MSJ”), ECF No. 34. On June 12, 2026,
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s MSJ”), ECF No. 38. For the
following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denies
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. 	The Parties
Plaintiff was a tenant at Renaissance Court Apartments (“Renaissance”) in Wilsonville,
Oregon. Answer ¶ 3, ECF No. 18. Renaissance is a recipient of HUD funding and is managed by
Defendant Guardian. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Defendant Guardian also manages Cascadian Terrace
Apartments (“Cascadian”). Id. ¶ 4.
Defendant Lang was an “on-site community manager” at Renaissance and was involved
with “lease enforcement, unit inspections, transfers, and complaints filed with governmental
agencies.” Id. ¶ 5. Defendant Campos is the “on-site community manager at Cascadian.” Id. ¶ 8.
Defendant Gibson is an employee of Defendant Guardian. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Woody is a
Portfolio Manager for Defendant Guardian. Compl. ¶ 3(e); Answer ¶ 7.
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3 – OPINION & ORDER
II. 	September Incident
On September 6, 2024, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Guardian about an incident at
Renaissance involving Defendant Lang.1 Woody Decl. Ex. F, ECF No. 35. Plaintiff stated that as
he and his friend were leaving his apartment, Defendant Lang stood in their way and asked if
they needed help with anything. Id. at 1. Plaintiff responded that he lived at Renaissance, and he
and his friend walked around Defendant Lang. Id. As Plaintiff and his friend were walking away,
Defendant Lang “muttered something about ‘faggots’” to a woman standing with Defendant
Lang. Id. When Plaintiff returned to his apartment later that day, “there was an unauthorized
guest and noise violation taped to [Plaintiff’s] door.” Id.
On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff emailed Renaissance that he had reported the incident
“to HUD, FHA, State of Oregon, Clackamas County, City of Wilsonville and ACLU.” Id. On
October 11, 2024, Defendant Woody sent Plaintiff a letter stating that Defendant Guardian had
investigated the incident but could not corroborate Plaintiff’s allegations. See Woody Decl. Ex.
D.
III. 	VAWA Transfer
On December 9, 2024, Plaintiff submitted to Renaissance a VAWA transfer request
related to domestic violence concerns. See Woody Decl. Ex. A, at 6–8. Plaintiff’s VAWA
transfer request was granted the next day. Id. at 6. On December 12, 2024, Plaintiff requested
that he be transferred to a one-bedroom unit at Cascadian. Id. at 5. Defendant Lang responded
the next day that Plaintiff should be moved “asap.” Id. at 4–5.
1 Defendants dispute that this incident occurred. See Defs.’ MSJ 6 (“[Defendants] den[y]
the allegation that [Defendant] Lang used a homophobic slur . . . .”).
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4 – OPINION & ORDER
On December 17, 2024, Defendant Lang emailed Plaintiff a rental application for
Cascadian and a reasonable accommodation request. Id. at 4. Plaintiff returned completed
documents that same day. Id. Defendant Lang then forwarded those documents to Gabrielle
Lang—Defendant Guardian’s Roving Community Manager. Id. at 3–4.
On December 26, 2024, however, it was discovered that Plaintiff had not yet completed a
waitlist application for Cascadian. See id. at 2–3. Accordingly, that same day, Defendant Lang
emailed Plaintiff directing him to complete one as soon as possible. Pl.’s MSJ Attach. 12,2 ECF
No. 38-1. Plaintiff responded that evening: “I’m about to be homeless. I need to move ASAP or
I’m going to be either freezing cold or back in the abusive situation.” Id.
By December 30, 2024, Plaintiff appears to have completed the Cascadian waitlist
application. See Woody Decl. Ex. E. Defendant Gibson thus inquired into Plaintiff’s availability
to meet with the Cascadian property manager and visit a unit. See id. at 1. Plaintiff responded
two days later, however, that he was out of town; Plaintiff also asked if it was “possible to meet
on zoom or on the phone.” Id.
By January 3, 2025, Plaintiff’s Cascadian screening had been denied. See Woody Decl.
Ex. A, at 1. Plaintiff appealed his screening denial and was successful. See Woody Decl. Ex. B,
at 4–6. Thus, on January 15, 2025, and January 16, 2025, Defendant Campos emailed Plaintiff
asking whether he was available to visit Cascadian to complete documents. Woody Decl. Ex. C,
at 1–2. Plaintiff responded on January 31, 2025, that he was out of town but that he could return
by February 12, 2025, to complete any necessary paperwork to obtain the Cascadian unit. Id. at
1.
2 Pincites to Plaintiff’s Attachment refer to the ECF-generated page number.
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5 – OPINION & ORDER
On January 20, 2025, Defendant Lang emailed Plaintiff that the Cascadian manager had
been trying to contact Plaintiff about his VAWA transfer. Pl.’s MSJ Attach. 11. Plaintiff
responded on January 28, 2025, that he thought he was disqualified but that he could be back in a
few days. Id. at 10. Defendant Lang replied on January 30, 2025, asking whether Plaintiff would
be returning and whether there was an unauthorized occupant living in Plaintiff’s Renaissance
apartment. Id. Plaintiff responded that same day that the unauthorized occupant was no longer
living in Plaintiff’s Renaissance apartment; Plaintiff also asked whether he could return to his
Renaissance apartment and live there. Id. at 9–10. Defendant Lang replied that she did not
believe Plaintiff could return to Renaissance due to the eviction notice and the approval of the
VAWA transfer request. Id. at 9. Defendant Lang stated, however, that the transfer to Cascadian
was still an option. Id.
On February 19, 2025, Defendant Lang emailed Plaintiff asking whether he had an
anticipated return date. Id. at 8. Defendant Lang also stated that Plaintiff will “receive a notice to
quit or cure” and that Plaintiff needed to complete his recertification to secure his housing. Id.
STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion, and
identifying those portions of “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
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6 – OPINION & ORDER
Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present “specific facts”
showing a “genuine issue for trial.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927–28
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party must go beyond the
pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Suever v.
Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). The court draws inferences from the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108,
1112 (9th Cir. 2011). If the factual context makes the nonmoving party’s claim as to the existence
of a material issue of fact implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support its claim than would otherwise be necessary. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Both parties move for summary judgment as to all counts. See Defs.’ MSJ 13; Pl.’s MSJ
10.3 Finding no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on all counts. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion and
denies Plaintiff’s Motion.
I. 	Count One
Plaintiff’s first claim for relief alleges Defendants violated VAWA. Compl. ¶¶ 5(20)–
(23); see also Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ MSJ (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) 5, ECF No. 36. But there is no civil
3 Pincites to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment refer to the ECF-generated page
number.
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7 – OPINION & ORDER
remedy under VAWA. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). Accordingly,
the Court grants Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s VAWA claim. See Beverly v. County of
Orange, No. 22-55080, 2022 WL 14003695, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2022) (affirming the district
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s VAWA claim because there is no civil remedy).
II. 	Count Two
Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleges Defendants created a hostile housing
environment in violation of the FHA. Compl. ¶¶ 5(24)–(27); see also Pl.’s Opp’n 5–6. Plaintiff
specifically points to Defendant Lang’s homophobic comment from September 6, 2024. See Pl.’s
MSJ 7 (“When Defendant . . . Lang used a targeted homophobic slur against Plaintiff and his
guest, . . . [i]t stripped a disabled, vulnerable tenant of his right to the quiet enjoyment of his
dwelling, establishing an FHA violation.”). The Court finds Defendant Lang’s conduct
insufficient to support a hostile housing environment claim.
The FHA “prohibits the creation of a hostile housing environment based on ‘race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.’” Morris v. W. Hayden Ests. First Addition
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 104 F.4th 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
3604(b)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1127 (2025). To prevail on a hostile housing environment
claim, a plaintiff must show that they were “subjected to (1) severe or pervasive harassment (2)
that was based on a protected characteristic . . . , and (3) that the defendant is responsible for the
resulting hostile housing environment.” Id. at 1147; see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2). The
Ninth Circuit looks to Title VII’s discrimination analysis “in examining [FHA] discrimination
claims.” Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, courts consider
“all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
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8 – OPINION & ORDER
unreasonably interferes with [the plaintiff’s environment].” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 23 (1993); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2)(i)(A). “Whether unwelcome conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to create a hostile environment is evaluated from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the aggrieved person’s position.” 24 C.F.R. §
100.600(a)(2)(i)(C).
Here, even assuming Defendant Lang made a homophobic comment to Plaintiff and his
friend, see Woody Decl. Ex. F, at 1, the Court finds such conduct insufficient to support a hostile
housing environment claim. The Court finds the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Westendorf v. West
Coast Contractors of Nevada, Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 2013) controlling. In Westendorf,
the plaintiff was subjected to “offensive sexual remarks” by a coworker on about four occasions,
including remarks related to women’s breasts, tampons, and orgasms. Id. at 419, 422. The
plaintiff was also subjected to comments related to wearing a maid’s costume by the same
coworker and inaction by her supervisor. Id. at 419–20. Despite this conduct, the Ninth Circuit
held that “the evidence, viewed favorably to her, did not show sexual harassment that was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of [plaintiff’s] employment and subject her to
an abusive environment.” Id. at 422. The court emphasized the limited number of remarks, that
the harassment was not physical, and that the plaintiff did not say her work was impacted. See id.
Here, along the same lines, Defendant Lang’s conduct was a single instance of
harassment. See Woody Decl. Ex. F, at 1. In addition, Defendant Lang did not speak directly to
Plaintiff; she “muttered” her comment to another person. Id. And though Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant Lang tried to stand in Plaintiff’s way, Plaintiff identifies no physical harassment;
indeed, Plaintiff and his friend were able to walk around Defendant Lang. See id. The Court
acknowledges that “harassment by someone in a position of authority is more likely to be
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9 – OPINION & ORDER
emotionally and psychologically threatening,” Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1293
(E.D. Cal. 2013); however, the Court finds that Defendant Lang’s conduct—a single offensive
utterance—would not “interfere with or deprive” a reasonable person of their “right to use” and
“enjoy [their] home,” id. at 1290. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant Lang’s
conduct, as alleged by Plaintiff—though hurtful and highly inappropriate—does not give rise to a
triable hostile housing environment claim under the law of this circuit. See Dominguez-Curry v.
Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Simple teasing, offhand comments,
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in
the terms and conditions of employment.” (citation modified)). Accordingly, the Court grants
Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s second claim.
III. 	Count Three
Plaintiff’s third claim for relief alleges Defendants failed to provide reasonable
accommodations in violation of the FHA. Compl. ¶¶ 5(28)–(30); see also Pl.’s Opp’n 6. Plaintiff
specifically points to Defendant Campos’s failure to meet with Plaintiff virtually. See Pl.’s MSJ
9 (“Defendant Campos’s rigid insistence that Plaintiff appear in person on January 16, 2025, to
complete standard paperwork directly ignored the physical reality of his displacement and the
limitations of his disabilities.”). The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate Defendants
denied his requests for accommodation.
The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with such dwelling, because of a handicap” of that person. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A).
Discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
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10 – OPINION & ORDER
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). To prevail on a reasonable
accommodation claim, a plaintiff must establish the following elements:
(1) that the plaintiff . . . is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h);
(2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the
handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the
handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the
accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested
accommodation.
Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants refused to provide him
a reasonable accommodation. See id. (affirming summary judgment because the defendant
“never refused to make the requested accommodation”). Plaintiff points to Defendant Campos’s
January 15, 2025, and January 16, 2025, emails inquiring into Plaintiff’s availability to sign
paperwork related to the transfer in-person, but nowhere in those emails did Plaintiff request an
accommodation that Defendant Campos refused. See Woody Decl. Ex. C, at 1–2; Pl.’s MSJ
Attach. 15–16. The closest Plaintiff gets is his January 1, 2025, email to Defendant Gibson
requesting that he be able to meet with the Cascadian property manager “on zoom or on the
phone.” Woody Decl. Ex. E, at 1. But again, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Defendants
refused this request or even that Plaintiff’s request was causally related to his handicap. See
Howard v. HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]here must be a causal
link between the requested accommodation and the plaintiff’s disability.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to establish his reasonable
accommodation claim, and the Court grants Defendants’ Motion as to this claim.
IV. 	Count Four
Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief alleges Defendants retaliated against him for exercising
his rights under the FHA. Compl. ¶¶ 5(31)–(34); see also Pl.’s Opp’n 7. Plaintiff specifically
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11 – OPINION & ORDER
points to the delays in processing his VAWA transfer request and Defendants’ service of a notice
to quit or cure. See Pl.’s MSJ 8. The Court finds Plaintiff fails to establish retaliation.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, it is “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or
enjoyed, . . . any right granted or protected by” the FHA. See Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272
F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that
they “engaged in a protected activity, . . . an adverse housing consequence is causally linked to
that activity, and . . . there was resulting damage.” Jay v. Grand Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 783 F. Supp.
3d 1257, 1276 (D. Or. 2025). The adverse action “must be in the form of coercion, intimidation,
threats, or interference.” Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128 (citation modified). “If a plaintiff has
presented a prima facie retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Id.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that any of his purported adverse
housing consequences were causally linked to his exercise of rights under the FHA. To start,
Plaintiff argues that “by December 22, 2024,” his VAWA transfer was “stalled,” and that “in
January 2025,” Cascadian denied his VAWA transfer request “using a background history that
had already been accommodated.” Pl.’s MSJ 8. But Plaintiff puts forth no evidence that these
purported housing consequences were causally linked to his exercise of rights under the FHA.
By contrast, Defendants put forth evidence demonstrating that they sought to process Plaintiff’s
VAWA transfer request as quickly as possible, see, e.g., Woody Decl. Ex. A, at 5 (Defendant
Lang acknowledging Plaintiff’s decision to transfer to Cascadian and stating that “we will be
able to move you asap”), and that Plaintiff’s screening denial was successfully appealed, see
Woody Decl. Ex. B, at 4–6. Plaintiff also points to Defendants’ service of a notice to quit or cure
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12 – OPINION & ORDER
as an adverse housing consequence, Pl.’s MSJ 8, but again, Plaintiff does not put forth any
evidence demonstrating that Defendants’ conduct was causally related to his exercise of rights
under the FHA. By contrast, the evidence shows that the notice to quit or cure was related to
Plaintiff’s failure to complete his recertification. See Pl.’s MSJ Attach. 8.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established his prima facie
retaliation claim. Moreover, even assuming Plaintiff did establish a prima facie claim, the Court
finds that Defendants have articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions and that
Plaintiff has not shown those reasons were merely pretexts for discrimination. See Walker, 272
F.3d at 1128. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s fourth claim.
V. 	Count Five
Plaintiff’s fifth claim for relief alleges Defendants violated HUD rules and guidelines.
See Compl. ¶ 1(f). Plaintiff’s Motion specifically notes 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(e)(5), which provides
that, under VAWA, an emergency transfer plan “must allow a tenant to make an internal
emergency transfer . . . when a safe unit is immediately available.” See Pl.’s MSJ 10. Plaintiff’s
Motion also emphasizes Defendants’ conduct more generally. See id. (“[W]eaponizing
administrative delays against a domestic survivor with known mental health disabilities
constitutes discriminatory negligence under the FHA.”). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s fifth
claim for relief reasserts his claims under VAWA and the FHA. Accordingly, the Court grants
Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s fifth claim.
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13 – OPINION & ORDER
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [34] and DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [38].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ____ day of October, 2026.
_______________________
AMY M. BAGGIO
United States District Judge
14th
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