Yarn et al v. Trader Joe's

PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
DONNIE YARN and DESHAWN
MURPHY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TRADER JOE’S,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:25-cv-01403-SB
OPINION AND ORDER
BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs Donnie Yarn (“Yarn”) and Deshawn Murphy (“Murphy”) (together,
“Plaintiffs”), appearing as self-represented litigants, originally filed this case against Defendant
Trader Joe’s (“Trader Joe’s”) in Multnomah County Circuit Court. After Trader Joe’s removed
the case to federal court, Trader Joe’s moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. The
Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For the reasons discussed
below, the Court grants the motion to dismiss.
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BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs allege that they represent a non-profit organization and raise funds from a table
set up on a public sidewalk outside of a Trader Joe’s store in Portland, Oregon. (See Compl.,
ECF No. 1, Ex. 1; Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 1, Ex. 2.) Yarn filed a prior case against
Trader Joe’s that was resolved by settlement and dismissed with prejudice. (FAC ¶ 5.)
Plaintiffs allege that Trader Joe’s materially breached the settlement agreement by
“continuing to harass [Yarn] and falsely asserting that [Yarn] was banned from the premises.”
(Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs also allege that Trader Joe’s “targeted” Murphy “by falsely accusing him of
being a vendor and banning him from the premises, despite his presence being solely for
restroom use and nonprofit representation.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint includes claims for breach of contract, defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and First Amendment violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). (See id. at 3-4.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs originally filed this action in Multnomah County Circuit Court on July 8, 2025,
asserting claims for breach of contract, defamation, IIED, harassment, and civil rights violations,
and seeking $100,000 in damages. (See Compl. at 2-4.) On July 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an
1 The Court assumes these facts are true for the purpose of reviewing the pending motion.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (“[When] ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss a complaint [the court] must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.”) (simplified); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998
(9th Cir. 2010) (noting that when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
court must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, and construe them in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party”) (citation omitted).
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amended complaint, removing the harassment claim but continuing to seek $100,000 in
damages. (See FAC at 1-4.)
On August 7, 2025, Trader Joe’s removed the case to this court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. (Def.’s Notice Removal at 1-4, ECF No. 1.) On August 11, 2025, Plaintiffs moved
to remand to state court. (Pls.’ Mot. Remand, ECF No. 5; see also Pls.’ Opp’n Def.’s Notice
Removal, ECF No. 4.) On August 14, 2025, Trader Joe’s filed its motion to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 6), Plaintiffs
opposed the motion (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pls.’ Resp.”), ECF No. 7), Trader Joe’s
replied (Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 10), and the Court took the motion to dismiss under advisement
without oral argument (ECF No. 12). The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand on
November 3, 2025 (ECF No. 14).
LEGAL STANDARDS
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme Court has explained that
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Thus, “where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Courts “have a duty to read a pro se complaint liberally,” Sernas v. Cantrell, 857 F.
App’x 400, 401 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted), and “[self-represented] litigants should be
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treated with ‘great leniency’ when evaluating compliance with ‘the technical rules of civil
procedure.’” Seals v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 797 F. App’x 327, 327 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986)). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, there
is a “good reason that [courts] afford leeway to [self-represented] parties, who appear without
counsel and without the benefit of sophisticated representation: ‘Presumably unskilled in the law,
the [self-represented] litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who
benefits from the representation of counsel.’” Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 1021 (9th Cir.
2023) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)).
There are, however, limits on the leeway that courts afford to self-represented litigants.
For example, although courts “construe pro se pleadings liberally, . . . [courts] ‘may not supply
essential elements of the claim that were not . . . pled[.]’” Owen v. City of Hemet, No. 21-55240,
2022 WL 16945887, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (first citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010); and then quoting Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014)).
DISCUSSION
Trader Joe’s moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, defamation, IIED, and First
Amendment claims. (Def.’s Mot. at 2-11.) Assuming Plaintiffs’ alleged facts are true, construing
those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and affording them leeway as self-represented
parties, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.
I. 	BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
A. 	Applicable Law
“To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff ‘must allege the existence of a
contract, its relevant terms, plaintiff’s full performance and lack of breach[,] and defendant’s
breach resulting in damage to plaintiff.’” Schoene v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 3d 1248,
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1260-61 (D. Or. 2024) (quoting Slover v. Or. State Bd. of Clinical Soc. Workers, 927 P.2d 1098,
1101 (Or. Ct. App. 1996)).
B. 	Analysis
Plaintiffs allege that a “prior dispute between [Yarn] and Trader Joe’s was resolved by
settlement, creating a binding agreement,” “Trader Joe’s breached the terms of the agreement by
continuing the very conduct the settlement was meant to resolve, including harassment and
misrepresentation,” and “[a]s a result of Defendant’s breach, [Yarn] suffered damages including
reputational harm and emotional distress.” (FAC ¶¶ 16-18.)
Trader Joe’s moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim on the ground that they
have failed to plead the relevant terms of the alleged contract, and Murphy lacks standing to
allege a breach of the contract. (Def.’s Mot. at 5-6; Def.’s Reply at 2-3.) Plaintiffs respond that
“the relevant contract terms may be established through discovery” and Murphy has standing to
allege breach as a third-party beneficiary of the settlement agreement. (Pls.’ Resp. at 4-5.)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a breach of contract claim because they
have not alleged the relevant terms of the alleged contract nor how Trader Joe’s breached the
relevant terms. (See generally FAC.) Plaintiffs have also failed to allege Yarn’s own full
performance and lack of breach. (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any facts in
the FAC to support that Murphy was a third-party beneficiary of the settlement agreement
between Trader Joe’s and Yarn.
For these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, with leave to
amend if Plaintiffs are able in good faith to cure these pleading deficiencies.
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II. 	DEFAMATION CLAIM
A. 	Applicable Law
“To establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must show that a defendant made a
defamatory statement about the plaintiff and published the statement to a third party.” Neumann
v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Or. 2016) (citing Wallulis v. Dymowski, 918 P.2d 755, 757-58 (Or.
1996)). The Oregon Supreme Court has explained that “[a] defamatory statement is one that
would subject the plaintiff ‘to hatred, contempt or ridicule[,] tend to diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill or confidence in which [the plaintiff] is held[,] or . . . excite adverse, derogatory or
unpleasant feelings or opinions against [the plaintiff].’” Id. (simplified) (quoting Farnsworth v.
Hyde, 512 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Or. 1973)); Lowell v. Wright, 512 P.3d 403, 411 (Or. 2022)
(describing a defamatory statement in the same manner and finding that such a statement “can be
the basis for a defamation claim”).
“To be actionable, a [statement] must be both false and defamatory.” Reesman v. Highfill,
965 P.2d 1030, 1034-35 (Or. 1998) (citing Harley-Davidson v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1361-62
(Or. 1977)); see also Kolwitz v. Lincoln Cnty. ex rel. Lincoln Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 520 F. App’x
570, 570-71 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the self-represented plaintiffs “failed to raise a triable
dispute as to [the] required elements” of their defamation claim, and noting that “for a statement
to be actionable under Oregon law, the statement at issue must be both defamatory and false”
(citing Reesman, 965 P.2d at 1034)).
B. 	Analysis
Plaintiffs allege that “Trader Joe’s published false statements about Plaintiff and his
associate, including verbal and written assertions that they were banned and engaging in
solicitation,” and that “[t]hese statements were untrue and made with reckless disregard for the
truth.” (FAC ¶¶ 20-21.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Trader Joe’s damaged their reputation
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by placing a sign outside of its store “that falsely implied Plaintiff was an unwanted solicitor.”
(Id. ¶ 10.)
Trader Joe’s moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ defamation claim on the ground that the
challenged statements are not defamatory. (Def.’s Mot. at 6-7.) Specifically, Plaintiffs
acknowledge that Trader Joe’s asked them to leave, which is sufficient under Oregon law to ban
them from the premises, and therefore Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of demonstrating that a
statement by Trader Joe’s implying that Plaintiffs were banned or unwanted on its property was
demonstrably false. (See id., citing State v. Cervantes, 493 P.3d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 2021); see
also Def.’s Reply at 3-5.) Plaintiffs respond that the Court cannot resolve the falsity of alleged
defamatory statements on a motion to dismiss.2 (Pls.’ Resp. at 5-6.)
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to state a defamation claim because they
cannot prove that a statement that they were banned or unwanted at Trader Joe’s was false. See
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990) (holding that, to be actionable, a
declarant’s statement must be provable as false); Reesman, 965 P.2d at 1034 (“The court, rather
than the jury, determines whether a communication is capable of a defamatory meaning.” (citing
King v. Menolascino, 555 P.2d 442 (1976))); see also Dossett v. Ho-Chunk, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 3d
900, 910-11 (D. Or. 2020) (“Several of the specific statements that [the plaintiff] challenges as
defamatory were not false, as demonstrated by the facts he pleads in the complaint. Therefore,
those statements cannot be defamatory as a matter of law.”).
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2 In support of their argument, Plaintiffs cite a case that does not exist and may have been
created by a generative artificial intelligence tool. (See Pls.’ Resp. at 5, citing “Miskew v. Hess,
211 Or. App. 499 (2007).) Plaintiffs’ citation is the subject of an order to show cause why the
Court should not impose sanctions, filed contemporaneously herewith.
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For these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ defamation claim, with leave to amend
if Plaintiffs are able in good faith to cure these pleading deficiencies.
III. 	IIED CLAIM
A. 	Applicable Law
“To state a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, a plaintiff must
plead that ‘(1) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress on the plaintiff, (2) the
defendant’s acts were the cause of the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress, and (3) the
defendant’s acts constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable
conduct.’” Babick v. Or. Arena Corp., 40 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Or. 2002) (quoting McGanty v.
Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 849 (Or. 1995)). “Whether conduct constitutes an extraordinary
transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct is a question of law.” Harris v. Pameco
Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 529 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
“The third IIED element . . . is often dispositive.” Upchurch v. Multnomah Univ., No.
3:19-cv-00850-AC, 2021 WL 6066283, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2021), findings and
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 6064027 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2021). “On this element the court
plays a gatekeeper role by determining in the first instance whether actions stated in a claim
might rise to the level of outrageousness demanded for an IIED claim.” Id. “The bar for
extraordinary departure from social acceptability is set very high.” Id. “[M]erely rude, boorish,
tyrannical, churlish, or mean” conduct does not support an IIED claim. Id. (simplified).
B. 	Analysis
Plaintiffs allege that the conduct of Trader Joe’s, including “repeated harassment, false
allegations, interference with a lawful nonprofit, and public humiliation,” was “intentional and
outrageous” and “caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress.” (FAC ¶¶ 24-25.)
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Trader Joe’s moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ IIED claim on the ground that Plaintiffs have
not plausibly alleged that the alleged conduct was “an extraordinary transgression of the bounds
of socially tolerable conduct.” (Def.’s Mot. at 7; Def.’s Reply at 5.) The Court agrees. See Austin
v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1230 (D. Or. 2016) (dismissing IIED claim because the
alleged conduct did not rise to the level of Oregon’s “very high bar [for extraordinary
transgressions]” and noting that “Oregon [c]ourts have found that even patently felonious
conduct does not necessarily rise to the level of an IIED claim” (citing Shay v. Paulson, 884 P.2d
870, 872 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)), aff’d, 925 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019))).
For these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ IIED claim, with leave to amend if
Plaintiffs are able in good faith to cure these pleading deficiencies.
IV. 	FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
A. 	Applicable Law
“[Section] 1983 . . . prohibits interference with federal rights under color of state law.”
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982). “The ultimate issue in determining whether a
person is subject to suit under [Section] 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under
the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the
State?’” Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). “If the action of the
[defendant] is not state action, our inquiry ends.” Id.
B. 	Analysis
Plaintiffs allege that Trader Joe’s “interfered with Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by
suppressing lawful activity on a public sidewalk,” which “constituted viewpoint discrimination
and unlawful retaliation for the exercise of those rights,” and did so “in coordination with
security or other authority figures,” (FAC ¶¶ 27, 29; see also id. ¶ 14, alleging that Trader Joe’s
acted “in cooperation with security and enforcement entities”). Plaintiffs “assert[] a claim under
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[Section 1983] for violation of federal civil rights, if the Court finds that the defendant was
acting in concert with state actors or under color of law.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
Trader Joe’s moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim on the ground that
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged in the FAC that Trader Joe’s is a state actor. (Def.’s Mot. at
9-11; Def.’s Reply at 5-6.) Plaintiffs respond by alleging that Trader Joe’s “coordinated with
security and law enforcement to suppress Plaintiffs’ speech and presence on a public sidewalk”
and that “private parties acting in concert with police to deprive individuals of rights are state
actors.” (Pls.’ Resp. at 6-7, first citing Lugar, 457 U.S. 922; and then citing Franklin v. Fox, 312
F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiffs further allege that “[w]hether such coordination occurred is a
factual issue that discovery will clarify.” (Id. at 7.)
The Court agrees with Trader Joe’s that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any facts to
satisfy the “joint action” test. (Def.’s Reply at 5-6.) As such, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the
state action element of a Section 1983 claim. See Kiss v. Best Buy Stores, No. 3:22-cv-00281-SB,
2022 WL 17480936, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 6, 2022) (“The Court finds that [the plaintiff] has not
plausibly alleged that Best Buy is a state actor under the joint action test.”), aff’d, No. 23-35004,
2023 WL 8621972 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2023)). For these reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’
Section 1983 claim, with leave to amend if Plaintiffs are able in good faith to cure these pleading
deficiencies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Trader Joe’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6),
and dismisses Plaintiffs’ FAC with leave to amend.3 Plaintiffs may file a second amended
3 Although the Court finds that it is unlikely that Plaintiffs can cure the pleading
deficiencies by pleading additional factual allegations, the Court cannot conclude on this record
that it is “impossible.” See Cobb v. Dyemartin, 584 F. App’x 404, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating
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complaint within fourteen days if they are able in good faith to cure the pleading deficiencies
identified herein. If Plaintiffs fail timely to file a second amended complaint, the Court will
dismiss this case with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2025.
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
that a “[self-represented] litigant should be given leave to amend if it appears at all possible that
he or she can cure the deficiencies at issue” (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130)).
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