Hopkins et al v. First NLC Financial Services, LLC et al

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re 	: 	Chapter 13
KELLYANN HOPKINS and 	:
ROBERT J. HOPKINS
Debtor 	: 	Bankruptcy No. 06-15503bf
____________________________________
KELLYANN HOPKINS and 	:
ROBERT J. HOPKINS
Plaintiff 	:
v. 	:
FIRST NLC FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC:,
LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP, and
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. 	:
Defendant 	: 	Adversary No. 07-0114
____________________________________
.................................................
MEMORANDUM
.................................................
Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Litton Loan Servicing, LP
filed a renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings in the above-captioned adversary
proceeding. Defendant First NLC Financial Services, LLC later joined in that motion.
Essentially, the defendants seek reconsideration of an order dated June 22, 2007 wherein
their motions for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss for failure to state a claim
were denied, except that Count II was dismissed as to defendants JP Morgan Chase and
First NLC. See In re Hopkins, 372 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007). In the instant
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the defendants ask that “this Court’s prior decision
be revisited in light of” the recent Supreme Court decision, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 14

2
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), which, they argue, materially changed the applicable
pleading standard for motions to dismiss and/or motions for judgment on the pleadings.
The above-captioned adversary proceeding was filed by the debtors on
March 14, 2007, alleging one count under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§
1601, et seq., against defendants First NLC and JP Morgan Chase. A second count under
the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., was
originally asserted against those two defendants as well as defendant Litton, and is now
limited to Litton.
In support of his TILA and RESPA claims, the plaintiff makes the
following factual averments:
On or about September 7, 2005, the Plaintiffs obtained a loan
(Loan Number 5208500839) from First NLC in order to
refinance the outstanding mortgage secured by the Home.
Among the documents which the Plaintiffs received to
memorialize this transaction were a Truth-in-Lending
Disclosure Statement (“the DS”), a Settlement Statement
(“the SS”), and Notices of the Right to Cancel (“the
Notices”), copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibits
“A,” “B,” and “C,” respectively. However, contained
nowhere among the Plaintiffs’ loan documents are the
disclosures required pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 226.19 for loans
containing a variable rate feature, such as the loan at issue.
As such, the Plaintiffs had no idea their loan contained such a
feature until it was explained to them by counsel.
Moreover, an examination of the loan documents which the
Plaintiffs did receive at this time reveals that the Plaintiffs
were charged very high fees for a great many alleged
purposes. Most of the charges on the Settlement Statement
should have been disclosed as part of the “Finance Charge” in
this transaction, but it appears that they were not. For
example, First NLC charged an exorbitant prepaid finance
charge of $8,942.50, and an entity named Express Financial
Services added charges of $320.00 of its own. When these
and all other charges are analyzed, it is clear that charges
properly characterized as part of the Finance Charge in this
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 14

3
transaction have only been partially disclosed as such, if at all,
which renders the disclosure of the Finance Charge and
Annual Percentage Rate of the Finance Charge on the DS
erroneous, which are material violations of the TILA.
On or about November 27, 2006, the undersigned forwarded a
letter to Litton Loan and First NLC a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit “D,” electing to rescind this transaction
pursuant to material violations of the TILA. Moreover, this
letter constituted a qualified written request (“QWR’) under
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C.
2605(5)(e) (“RESPA”), requesting certain information
relative to the underlying loan.
On or about December 14, 2006, a representative of Litton
forwarded a response to this letter, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit “E.” In that letter, Litton acknowledges the
Plaintiffs’ RESPA request and responded to the Plaintiffs
QWR with what seems to be a form response for inquiries
pursuant to the RESPA. However, while producing the DS
and Note relative to the underlying loan, the response to the
QWR failed to address or provide any of the disclosures
mandated by the TILA which had been requested to make
sure the Plaintiffs and their counsel had a full picture of the
loan transaction at issue. Moreover, First NLC failed to
respond to the Plaintiff’s QWR.
Complaint, ¶¶ 5-8.
Based upon these averments, the plaintiff alleged the following TILA
violations:
The failure of First NLC to provide the variable rate
disclosures and booklets required pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §
226.19 constitutes a material TILA violation.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs did not receive accurate disclosures
of certain terms in the transaction as required by the TILA,
including, but not limited to, the actual “Finance Charge” in
the transaction, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a), as the
Finance Charge as disclosed omits many of the charges and
excessive charges referenced in paragraph 6 supra. These,
and possibly other violations of the TILA, exist in their loan
papers.
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 14

4
The failure of First NLC to properly disclose certain terms of
the transaction, particularly the finance charges, and any other
violations of the TILA, constitute “material” disclosure
violations of the TILA which entitle the Plaintiffs to rescind
the instant loan transaction. Moreover, [the] fact that the
violations at issue are apparent on the face of the loan
documents renders any subsequent assignee liable for the
TILA violations arising therefrom.
The Plaintiffs have validly exercised their right to rescind this
transaction, but neither JP Morgan, believed to be the current
holder of the mortgage, nor any other party, have
appropriately responded to same, nor have they recognized
same or performed any of the duties imposed under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(b) of the TILA. As a result, the Defendants are not
only obliged to perform those duties, but are liable to the
Plaintiffs for statutory damages for refusing to do so as well.
Complaint, ¶¶ 12-15.
The plaintiff also asserted the following RESPA violations founded upon
the above-quoted averments:
The Defendants are not only obliged to respond to the
Plaintiffs’ qualified written request concerning the instant
transaction, First NLC specifically having failed to respond
with an acknowledgement of receipt of the request within 20
days of said request and Litton, JP Morgan’s apparent agent,
failing to respond to the most fundamental aspect of same, but
also should not have provided information regarding any
overdue payment, owed by the Plaintiffs and relating to such
qualified written request, to any consumer reporting agency.
The failure of the Defendants to comply with 12 U.S.C. §§
2605(e) and (f) of the federal Real Estate Settlement Practices
Act (“RESPA”), renders them liable for damages and costs
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(f)(l) and (f)(3).
Complaint, ¶ 17.
In denying the defendants’ earlier motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) and a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 7012 incorporates Rule 12(b)-(h) into bankruptcy adversary proceedings), I
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 14

5
applied standards long-applicable to those motions. As explained by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, a trial court may not grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings
unless the movant clearly establishes there are no material
issues of fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. . . . We must view the facts presented in the pleadings
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
Sikirica v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005). Similarly:
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted
only if, accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint
as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Bartholomew v.
Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir. 1986). “The issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 . . . (1974).
In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997).
Thus, when a defendant files a Rule 12(c) motion, the appropriate standard
for determination is identical to that used in deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action: that is, either motion
can only be granted if, after accepting as true the plaintiffs’ factual averments and
reasonable inferences, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, 2007 WL 2389770, at *3 (7th Cir. 2007); Institute for
Scientific Information, Inc. v. Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d
1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1991).
In my June 22nd determination of defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions, I
referred to the decision Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), for the proposition
that dismissal of a claim for failure to plead a cause of action is inappropriate “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of that claim
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 14

6
which would entitle him to relief.” In re Hopkins, 372 B.R. at 741. Shortly prior to my
decision, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(2007), which decision clarified the standard of pleading required by Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) (incorporated into adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008(a)) to
withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
That procedural rule “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The Court emphasized that while a
complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it does need to go beyond “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. . . .” Twombly, at 1965.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Id.
After noting that one of the antitrust elements of the cause of action alleged
by the plaintiff in Twombly was agreement between the defendants, the Court stated
“[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely
consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the
‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Id., at 1966. “[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 1974.
In its analysis of the pleading requirements imposed by Rule 8 (and thus
also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008 for adversary proceedings), the Twombly court rejected its
statement in Conley v. Gibson that “‘a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 14

7
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Id., at 1968 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46). The court observed that “[t]his ‘no set of facts’ language can
be read in isolation as saying that any statement revealing the theory of the claim will
suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings. . . .”
Twombly, at 1968. Accordingly, the Court determined that “this famous observation has
earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported
by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id., at 1969.
Based upon Twombly’s retirement of the Conley language just quoted, the
defendants in this adversary proceeding contend that reconsideration of their motions is
appropriate. They analogize their reconsideration request to one made under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b) (incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024) as “‘involve[ing] an intervening change
of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.’” Burton v. Janda, 2007 WL 130319, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Jan.
16, 2007) (quoting Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5
(9th Cir. 1989)); see Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Geoservices Corp., 2005
WL 196411, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2005) (same).
The plaintiff counters that since the Twombly decision predated my earlier
ruling and was not relied upon by any of the defendants prior to that ruling, there has been
no change of controlling law warranting reconsideration. While perhaps a technically
correct reading of Rule 60(b), all of the parties overlook that Rule 60(b) motions only
concern “final” judgments or orders. See Baker v. Fair, Isaac and Co., 2007 WL 641539,
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 14

8
at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 27, 2007); In re Stanley, 185 B.R. 417, 421 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995).
As the June 2007 order was interlocutory, Rule 60(b) is not applicable.
However, federal trial courts have the inherent power to reconsider
interlocutory orders prior to the conclusion of the case. See Johnson v. Dollar General
Corp., 2007 WL 2746952, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sep’t. 20, 2007) (“‘District courts have
inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of a case before
entry of a final judgment.’”) (quoting Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir.
1991), which was citing Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. U.S., 320 U.S. 1, 47-48
(1943)); Baker v. Fair, Isaac and Co., 2007 WL 641539, at *2 (“‘[I]nterlocutory
judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the rule, but rather they are left
subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford such relief from them
as justice requires.’”) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946
Amendments)).
Accordingly, since I did not consider the Twombly decision when issuing
my earlier ruling, I consider it appropriate to revisit that June decision, as requested by the
defendants. See Hyland v. Homeservices of America, Inc., 2007 WL 2407233 (W.D. Ky.
Aug. 17, 2007) (court reconsidered its prior order after publication of Twombly).
Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, the result is the same.
Shortly after Twombly was decided, the Supreme Court issued another
decision involving the pleading requirements under Rule 8 in Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.
Ct. 2197 (2007). In Erickson, the Court explained:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Specific facts are not necessary; the
statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 14

9
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. —, —, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929, — (2007) (slip op., at 7-8) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d
80 (1957)). In addition, when ruling on a defendant’s motion
to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
supra, at —, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (slip op., at 8-9) (. . .)
Id., at 2200 (citations omitted).
With Erickson as a backdrop to Twombly, the the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recently summarized the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) thusly:
The Supreme Court has interpreted [Rule 8(a)(2)’s] language
to impose two easy-to-clear hurdles. First, the complaint must
describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant
“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1964 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). Second, its allegations must plausibly suggest that
the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above
a “speculative level”; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself
out of court. Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 1973 n.14.
EEOC v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007); see
Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2007 WL 2406859, at *4
(7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007) (“Taking Erickson and Twombly together, we understand the
Court to be saying only that at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so
sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the
defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”).
Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Iqbal v. Hasty,
490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007): “After careful consideration of the Court’s opinion
[in Twombly and Erickson] and the conflicting signals from it that we have identified, we
believe the Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 14

10
instead requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a
claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed
to render the claim plausible.” (Emphasis in original.) See Behrend v. Comcast Corp.,
2007 WL 2221415, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) (agreeing that Twombly did not impose
a heightened pleading standard, but that a plaintiff must plead facts suggestive enough to
render the claim plausible); Pikitus v. West Mahonoy Township Sewer Project Officers,
2007 WL 2768518, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sep’t. 20, 2007) (“Plaintiff must now nudge her
claims ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible’ to avoid dismissal thereof.”)
(quoting Twombly, at 1960).
Twombly did not alter the trial court’s role in deciding a motion to dismiss.
It is still limited to “whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the
claims . . . and not to consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail.” Unite Nat’l
Retirement Fund v. Rosal Sportswear, Inc., 2007 WL 2713051, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sep’t. 14,
2007). Resolution of that issue simply requires that the complaint contain sufficient
allegations to provide fair notice to the defendant of the claim asserted and that render the
existence of that claim plausible. See Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d
1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205
(5th Cir. 2007). Twombly does not require that a plaintiff plead every fact upon which
his claim is based. See Erickson, at 2200.
In this proceeding, the allegations in the complaint quoted above state
claims under the standard enunciated by the Twombly court. The defendants are given
fair notice that the plaintiffs have made an allegation under TILA regarding the
understatement of the Finance Charge, violative of section 1638(a). Although the general
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 14

11
averment that “[m]ost of the charges on the Settlement Statement should have been
disclosed as part of the ‘Finance Charge’ in this transaction,” as well as the allegation that
“possibly other violations of the TILA” may exist, might not withstand the Supreme
Court’s directive that allegations include supporting facts, the plaintiffs followed these
conclusory averments with examples of specific charges they believe should have been
included in the disclosed finance charge. See Villasenor v. American Signature, Inc.,
2007 WL 2025739, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2007) (denying motion to dismiss where
plaintiff established plausible entitlement to statutory damages in alleging that the loan
disclosures he received did not advise him that a finance charge might be imposed at the
time of purchase); see also Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 440 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007)
(finding that allegations that one day after the sellers learned that plaintiffs were black,
the sellers terminated the contract, stated a claim for relief that gave rise to a ‘reasonably
founded hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support their
claims” of housing discrimination) (quoting Twombly, at 1967). Compare Peterson v.
Argent Mortgage Co., 2007 WL 1725355, at *2 (D. Minn. June 14, 2007) (dismissing
complaint alleging untimely receipt of TILA notices to cancel, where plaintiff alleged
only that the defendants failed to deliver all material disclosures without any supporting
factual allegations, and without disputing signed acknowledgment that had received the
notices).
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant Litton failed to properly
respond to plaintiffs’ qualified written request as required by RESPA. This sufficiently
puts the defendant on notice of the claim against it—no further supporting facts are
necessary. See Boudin v. Residential Essentials, LLC, 2007 2023466, at *3 (S.D. Ala.
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 14

Pursuant to an Initial Pretrial Order dated July 26, 2007, the discovery deadline in1
this proceeding is October 24, 2007. No party has requested an extension of this deadline in light
of these motions or otherwise.
12
July 10, 2007) (declining to dismiss a RESPA count under 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) that
alleged that the plaintiff had been overcharged a recording fee with the defendant
retaining the difference, while concluding that the plaintiff failed to state an additional
RESPA claim by alleging only that “many fees” were “marked up” without alleging
specific fees or asserting that the defendant engaged the services of a third party and
wrongly retained a portion of the fee).
Therefore the plaintiffs have stated two plausible claims for relief sufficient
to give the defendants fair notice of their claims, above the speculative level, entitling
them to discovery on the matter. 	See EEOC v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d1
at 780 (“Second, a plaintiff might sometimes have a right to relief without knowing every
factual detail supporting its right: requiring the plaintiff to plead those unknown details
before discovery would improperly deny the plaintiff the opportunity to prove its claim.”).
Accordingly, the movants’ renewed motions for judgments on the pleadings shall be
denied. See Village of Riverdale v. 138th Street Joint Venture, 2007 WL 2893655, at *6
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (application of the Twombly standard does not render plaintiff’s
complaint more susceptible to dismissal).
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 12 of 14

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re 	: 	Chapter 13
KELLYANN HOPKINS and 	:
ROBERT J. HOPKINS
Debtor 	: 	Bankruptcy No. 06-15503bf
____________________________________
KELLYANN HOPKINS and 	:
ROBERT J. HOPKINS
Plaintiff 	:
v. 	:
FIRST NLC FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC:,
LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP, and
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. 	:
Defendant 	: 	Adversary No. 07-0114
____________________________________
.................................................
ORDER
.................................................
AND NOW, this 22nd day of October 2007, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ordered that the defendants’ renewed motions
for judgment on the pleadings are denied.
____________________________________
BRUCE FOX
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 13 of 14

Copies to:
David A. Scholl, Esquire
Regional Bankruptcy Center of SE PA
6 St Albans Avenue
Newtown Square, PA 19073
Sandhya M. Feltes, Esquire
Kaplin Stewart Meloff Reiter & Stein, P.C.
Union Meeting Corporate Center
910 Harvest Drive
Blue Bell, PA 19422
Jonathan J. Bart, Esquire
Wilentz Goldman & Spitzer P.A.
Two Penn Center Plaza, Suite 910
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Case 07-00114-bif Doc 33 Filed 10/22/07 Entered 10/22/07 15:51:11 Desc Main
Document Page 14 of 14