GRAHAM v. FEMA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LILLIAN GRAHAM, :
Plaintiff, :
:
vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-4294
:
FEMA, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
YOUNGE, J. JANUARY 9, 2026
Plaintiff Lillian Graham filed a lawsuit asserting claims in connection with the demolition
of her home and business. In a January 3, 2025 Memorandum and Order, the Court granted
Graham leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed her Complaint in part with prejudice
and in part without prejudice. See Graham v. FEMA, No. 23-4294, 2025 WL 28238, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 3, 2025). Graham was permitted an opportunity to file an amended complaint. In lieu of
filing an amended complaint, Graham filed a notice of appeal of the Court’s January 3 Order.
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, see Graham v. FEMA, No. 25-1222, 2025 WL 2237109 (3d Cir. May 12, 2025), the
Court gave Graham another opportunity to file an amended complaint. In response, Graham
filed a three-page document titled “Jury Trial Demanded” (ECF No. 30), which the Court
construes as her Amended Complaint. For the reasons that follow, Graham’s Amended
Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Graham named nine Defendants in her Complaint: the City of Philadelphia; the
Philadelphia Police Headquarters; France Henriques; the Federal Emergency Management
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Agency (“FEMA”); the PA Dept. of Aging; the “Human Relations Dept.,” which the Court
construed as the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”); the “Harrisburg and
Pittsburg Fair Housing, which the Court construed as the Fair Housing Council of the Capital
Region, Inc.;” the “Dept. of Justice;” and the “District Attorney.” (ECF No 2.) Graham’s
Complaint was rambling and difficult to understand. As best as the Court could discern, Graham
alleged that she “had a 33-room building that was ‘severely damaged’” during three major
storms. Graham, 2025 WL 28238, at *3. She stated that FEMA and other agencies
discriminated against her by denying her assistance for the damage. Id. Graham further alleged
that after an investigation into her property, the City of Philadelphia’s Department of Licenses
and Inspections (“L&I”) obtained a permit to demolish it. Id. She stated that members of L&I
broke into her home and stole money and personal property and that her home was ultimately
demolished without Graham first receiving a hearing. Id. Graham also stated that many of the
named Defendants ignored her complaints, refused to enforce her rights, or failed to investigate
the issues she encountered with the damage and demolition of her property.
In its January 3 Memorandum, the Court dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted
against the Philadelphia Police Headquarters, the Pennsylvania Department of Aging, the PHRC,
the Philadelphia District Attorney, FEMA, and the Department of Justice. See Graham, 2025
WL 28238, at *4-6. Defendants Fair Housing Council of the Capital Region, Inc., France
Henriques, and the City of Philadelphia were dismissed without prejudice to Graham filing
amended claims. Id. After Graham’s appeal was dismissed, the Court gave Graham until
October 2, 2025 to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 29.) On September 17, 2025, she filed
the three-page document she labeled “Jury Trial Demanded.” (ECF No. 30.) The time to file an
amended complaint has now expired without Graham filing any additional pleadings.
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Accordingly, the Court construes the three-page “Jury Trial Demanded” document as her
Amended Complaint.
The Amended Complaint contains very little information. It purports to name FEMA, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and “Henrique Demo. Co.” as Defendants and asserts claims
under the First Amendment and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (the “Stafford Act”).1 (Id. at 1-3.) The Amended Complaint states only that
Graham is an adult resident of Pennsylvania and that, “at all relevant times, Defendants acted
under the color of law.” (Id. at 1, 3.) The Amended Complaint makes no other allegations and
asserts no requests for relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Graham is proceeding pro se, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires
the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint
fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to
motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this
early stage of the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true,
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint
contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366,
374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115
1 The Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq., among other things, authorizes the President
to provide assistance to states in response to disasters. See id. at § 5131.
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F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As
Graham is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8
F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d
Cir. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION
Graham’s Amended Complaint suffers from many defects, the most notable being that
she asserts no factual allegations to support her claims. Aside from listing three Defendants,
naming two claims, and stating in conclusory fashion that the Defendants acted under color of
law, the Amended Complaint contains no other facts to support her claims. In the Court’s
September 11, 2025 Order, Graham was advised that any amended complaint she chose to file
must “state the basis for [her] claims against each defendant,” and could not rely on the initial
Complaint or other papers to state a claim. (ECF No. 29 at 2.) Simply put, the Amended
Complaint fails to contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. The Amended Complaint is deficient for other reasons. First, to the extent that
Graham intended to assert a claim under the Stafford Act, there is no private cause of action
under that statute. See Ameika v. Moss, 628 F. App’x 86, 89 n.15 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The District
Court also properly dismissed the Stafford Act claim, which addresses federal disaster relief and
assistance, because the Act does not create a private right of action.”); see also Graham v. Fed.
Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1001 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The plaintiffs’ attempt to
fashion causes of action out of two parts of the Stafford Act is unavailing.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, (2010)). Second, it is not clear how
the allegations asserted by Graham in this lawsuit give rise to a First Amendment claim. The
First Amendment protects an individual’s rights to free speech, religious activity, and to petition
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government for redress of grievances. Nothing alleged in the Complaint or the Amended
Complaint supports a plausible First Amendment claim, including any redress claim since there
is no private cause of action under the Stafford Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Graham’s Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Because the Court concludes that further
amendment would be futile, the dismissal will be entered with prejudice. See Jones v. Unknown
D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that amendment
by pro se litigant would be futile when litigant “already had two chances to tell his story”);
Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A District Court
has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the
deficiencies in [her] complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”). An Order that dismisses this
case will be entered separately. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).
BY THE COURT:
/s/ John Milton Younge
JOHN MILTON YOUNGE, J.
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