ALLEN-MURPHY v. MURPHY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EUNICE ALLEN-MURPHY, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-1494
:
GYMONE MURPHY, 	:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM
PEREZ, J. 	JANUARY 7, 2026
Plaintiff Eunice Allen-Murphy filed a pro se civil action against her former husband
Gymone Murphy alleging civil rights and state tort law claims. The Court previously granted her
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Upon screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court
dismissed her Complaint in part with and in part without prejudice, and permitted leave to
amend. See Allen-Murphy v. Murphy, No. 25-1494, 2025 WL 1902299, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 8,
2025). After Allen-Murphy filed an Amended Complaint, the Court against dismissed it with
and without prejudice, and granted her leave to amend once more if she could allege a plausible
basis for subject matter jurisdiction over her state claim. Allen-Murphy v. Murphy, No. 25-1494,
2025 WL 2917091, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2025). Allen-Murphy responded by filing a Second
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) on October 16, 2025, and a then Third Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 15) on January 2, 2026. For the reasons stated, the Court will dismiss Allen-Murphy’s
Second Amended Complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Third
Amended Complaint will be stricken as unauthorized.1
1 Under the Federal Civil Rules of Procedure, a party may amend his complaint once as a
matter of course according to the provisions of Rule 15(a)(1), but otherwise it may only amend
with an opposing party’s written consent “or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Allen-
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I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Allen-Murphy alleges that between January 2013 and August 2022, her ex-husband,
Defendant Murphy, injured her wrist, knee, and face. (ECF No. 14 at 3.) She states that her
daughter witnessed the abuse and filed charges against him. (Id.) Allen-Murphy asserts that she
is a citizen of New Jersey, and Murphy is a citizen of Pennsylvania. (Id.)
Allen-Murphy also claims that Murphy made “fraudulent” reports about her to Allen-
Murphy’s then-employer, the Philadelphia Police Department. (Id.) She says that Murphy
“entrapped [her] by slander.” (Id.) Allen-Murphy contends that Murphy submitted frivolous
documents to her employer with the “malicious intent” of causing her termination. (Id.)
Allen-Murphy filed the Second Amended Complaint on October 16, 2025. For injuries,
she notes that she has had surgeries on her hand, wrist, face, and knee, and that she requires
many medications to treat her mental and physical injuries.3 (Id. at 4.) Allen-Murphy checked
the box indicating that she intends to bring claims based on diversity jurisdiction, although she
Murphy neither provided written consent to amend her complaint for a third time nor did she
seek or obtain the Court’s leave. Accordingly, the operative complaint considered for these
purposes is the Second Amended Complaint.
2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the Second
Amended Complaint, which consists of a form complaint the Clerk of Court provides to
unrepresented litigants, and several attached documents. (ECF No. 14.) The Court may also
consult publicly available dockets of which it may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton
Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Where the Court quotes from the Second
Amended Complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up as
needed. The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
3 As in her Amended Complaint, Allen-Murphy has attached apparent hospital records
from 2015 and 2016. (Id. at 6-13.) They are largely unintelligible except for some notes
concerning respiratory and throat illnesses, (id. at 7, 11), and a one-page undated Consent for
Procedure form that lists “surgery,” (id. at 6). Because Allen-Murphy has included medical
records and the name of a possible minor child, the Court will restrict access to ECF Nos. 10 and
14.
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also alleges claims for violations of her due process rights and of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., in addition to her state law claims. (Id. at
2.) She requests declaratory relief and money damages of $1 million per person.4 (Id. at 4.)
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Allen-Murphy was granted in forma pauperis status, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint if it fails to state a
claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the
same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the Second Amended Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will accept the
facts alleged in Allen-Murphy’s Second Amended Complaint as true, draw all reasonable
inferences in her favor, and ask only whether the Second Amended Complaint contains facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.
2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d
Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Allen-
Murphy is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8
F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).
4 The Court has instructed Allen-Murphy in its prior two Memoranda that retrospective
declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct. Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80,
84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to
adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to
another.”)). Allen-Murphy’s improper request is again dismissed.
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Additionally, a court may dismiss a complaint based on an affirmative defense such as
the statute of limitations when the “defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.”
Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017); Whitenight v. Commonwealth of Pa.
State Police, 674 F. App’x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“When screening a complaint
under § 1915, a district court may sua sponte dismiss the complaint as untimely under the statute
of limitations where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual
record is required.” (citations omitted)). Further, the Court must dismiss the matter if it
determines that the action fails to set forth a proper basis for this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). A plaintiff commencing an action in
federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v.
AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
In its two previous Memoranda, the Court explained that Defendant Murphy is not a state
actor and that he is not liable for a claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Allen-Murphy,
2025 WL 1902299, at *1; Allen-Murphy, 2025 WL 2917091, at *3; see also Leshko v. Servis,
423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005). The claim has been dismissed with prejudice—twice. Any
claim alleged under Section 1983 remains dismissed with prejudice for the reasons explained in
the Court’s two prior Memoranda.
B. ADA Claim
Allen-Murphy lists the ADA among the bases of federal jurisdiction for her claims in her
complaint form. (ECF No. 14 at 2.) The ADA has four subchapters, covering employment,
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public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, and
“miscellaneous.” See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12203. To the extent that Allen-Murphy
seeks to add a new claim in her Second Amended Complaint, however, the bare mention of the
ADA—without any factual allegations of discrimination based on disability in employment,
public services, public accommodations or otherwise—fails to set forth a plausible claim or basis
of federal jurisdiction. See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining
that under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must assert that “(1) [s]he is a qualified individual; (2)
with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity or was subjected to discrimination by any such
entity; (4) by reason of her disability.” (cleaned up)); cf. Campbell v. LVNV Finding, LLC and
Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022)
(explaining that a “‘passing reference’ . . . without more does not bring that issue before the
Court in that it provides no basis for a ruling one way or the other.” (citing Laborers’ Int’l Union
of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))). In any
event, an ADA claim is not plausible here because the proper defendant in a Title II claim is a
public entity or an official acting in his official capacity, and Allen-Murphy’s ex-husband is not a
public entity or official. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B) (providing that “public entity” includes
“any State or local government” or “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government”); Rix v. McClure, No. 10-1224, 2011
WL 166731, at *6 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2011) (dismissing ADA claim against husband because
plaintiff did not allege facts showing that husband qualified as a “public entity”). To the extent
Allen-Murphy has alleged an ADA claim, it will be dismissed with prejudice.
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C. State Law Claim
The Second Amended Complaint is Allen-Murphy’s third opportunity to allege a
plausible state law claim subject to this Court’s jurisdiction, but she once again is unsuccessful.5
When the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint earlier, it allowed Allen-Murphy to file a
second amended complaint if she could allege a plausible state law claim over which the Court
could exercise subject matter jurisdiction. See Allen-Murphy, 2025 WL 2917091, at *3-4. The
Court instructed that, if she chose to amend her pleading, Allen-Murphy would be required to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and provide “more than just vague and
conclusory references” to mental and physical abuse. Id. at *3 n.5. The Court also specifically
warned her that Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations to allege claims for personal
injuries applies, and “thus any claims for injuries alleged before March 18, 2023 may be time-
barred. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.” Id.
In her Second Amended Complaint, Allen-Murphy alleges that her state of citizenship is
New Jersey and that Murphy is a citizen of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 14 at 3.) She claims
monetary damages of $1 million. (Id. at 4.) Although she may have sufficiently pleaded
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) for screening purposes, Allen-Murphy has still
failed to allege a plausible tort claim under Pennsylvania law. She devotes only two sentences in
her factual summary to the allegation that Murphy harmed her. (See ECF No. 14 at 3, III.C.
(alleging that Murphy injured her wrist, knee, and face, and that her daughter witnessed abuse).)
Allen-Murphy now claims for the first time that Murphy “slandered” her character by “filing
frivolous documents” with her employer to have her fired. (Id.) She further states that the
5 As the Court has previously explained, with her federal claims dismissed, the Court
will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims.
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events alleged in the Second Amended Complaint occurred between January 2013 through
August 2022. (Id.)
As the Court has explained, the statute of limitations for personal torts in Pennsylvania is
two years, and her claims of injuries that occurred prior to March 18, 2023 are time-barred. See
Oldham v. Pa. State Univ., 138 F.4th 731, 751 (3d Cir. 2025) (explaining that a two-year period
of limitation applies for actions for battery and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(1), (7)). In light of Allen-Murphy’s pro se status, the
Court will construe the “slander” allegation as a claim for defamation, but that does not assist her
either since, in Pennsylvania, a cause of action for defamation is subject to a one-year limitations
period, meaning that this claim is time-barred as well. See Oldham, 138 F.4th at 751 (noting that
a one-year limitations period under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5523(1) applies for actions alleging
defamation). Nowhere has Allen-Murphy asserted that her claims are subject to tolling, nor
could she plausibly do so.6 Accordingly, because Allen-Murphy has brought her state law
claims well beyond the two- and one-year limitations periods for such actions under
Pennsylvania law, they will be dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
As set forth more fully above, Allen-Murphy’s Second Amended Complaint will be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Because Allen-
6 The Court takes judicial notice of another civil action filed by Allen-Murphy in 2016 in
which she sued Murphy and other individuals. Allen v. FOP Member John McGrody, Vice
President, et al., Civ. A. No. 16-2756 (E.D. Pa.). In that lawsuit, she stated that her hand surgery
took place on March 19, 2015, and that Murphy had illegally recorded her that day and then
provided the recording to “a number of individuals and agencies.” Id., ECF No. 1 at 2-4. She
attached documents reflecting her 2015 termination from the Philadelphia Police Department.
Id., ECF No. 1 at 10-32. In short, she has already alleged in another matter in this Court that the
injuries occurred in 2015, and a lawsuit filed in 2016 confirms that she knew of the injuries by
that time, at the very latest.
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Murphy was already given two opportunities to amend the defects in her claims and was unable
to do so, the Court concludes that further attempts to amend would be futile. Jones v. Unknown
D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by pro se
litigant would be futile when litigant “already had two chances to tell his story”). An appropriate
Order follows, which dismisses this case.
BY THE COURT:
__________________________________
HON. MIA R. PEREZ
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