LYLE v. TRANS UNION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RHONDA LYLE 	: 	CIVIL ACTION
:
v. 	: 	NO. 	25-2647
:
TRANS UNION 	:
MEMORANDUM
MURPHY, J. 	January 8, 2026
This case involves something familiar but sometimes frustrating: credit reporting.
TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, allegedly published incorrect information in its credit
report on Rhonda Lyle, the plaintiff. Ms. Lyle sued TransUnion for this alleged misreporting,
and the parties reached a settlement agreement resolving Ms. Lyle’s claims against TransUnion.
But Ms. Lyle has been unhappy with the settlement agreement and surrounding circumstances.
She filed a new complaint against TransUnion asserting that the settlement agreement was
invalid and unenforceable. TransUnion now moves to dismiss all claims against it, while Ms.
Lyle moves to vacate the dismissal of the prior case against TransUnion pursuant to the
settlement agreement and asks to consolidate her two cases. For the following reasons, we grant
TransUnion’s motion to dismiss and deny Ms. Lyle’s motions for vacatur and consolidation.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
To understand the motions before us, we must first revisit the history of this case. On
April 30, 2024, Rhonda Lyle filed a complaint against TransUnion in this court. No. 24-cv-
1831, ECF 1. In it, she claimed that TransUnion violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
when it failed to: (1) follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, in
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); (2) perform reasonable reinvestigation, in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1681i; and (3) provide her with her TransUnion credit file, in violation of 15 U.S.C.
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§ 1681g. Id. at ¶¶ 193-216. Specifically, Ms. Lyle alleged that, between 2022 and August 2023,
TransUnion mixed her credit file with that of a deceased consumer and published credit reports
to her creditors, which falsely stated that she was deceased and therefore lacked a credit score.
Id. at ¶¶ 3-6, 115-185. She averred that, due to TransUnion’s erroneous reporting, she was
denied a credit card application by Wells Fargo and multiple applications related to a home
mortgage by Rocket Mortgage. Id. at ¶¶ 122-23, 133, 151. Ultimately, Ms. Lyle and
TransUnion reached a confidential settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement) on January 7,
2025, and we closed this case pursuant to the parties’ joint filing of a stipulated dismissal with
prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 22.
Soon after, Ms. Lyle sent us an email, in which she represented that she did not (1)
understand her case to be dismissed, (2) recall signing the Settlement Agreement, or (3) believe
the agreement was fair. No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 29 at 1. We held a video conference on March 26,
2025, to discuss her concerns. No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 28. Following this conference, we
determined that the case should remain closed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement because the
record before us reflected that Ms. Lyle chose to settle this matter. No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 29 at 1.
Her lawyer, Hans Lodge, then moved to withdraw as Ms. Lyle’s attorney on April 1, 2025, citing
an irretrievable breakdown in their attorney-client relationship as evidenced by Ms. Lyle’s
“refusal to appropriately communicate or otherwise cooperate with her counsel and disregard of
her counsel’s advice.” No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 30-1 at 1-2. That day, we granted Mr. Lodge’s
motion to withdraw as counsel. No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 31.
Following the confidential Settlement Agreement, Ms. Lyle filed a new complaint against
TransUnion on May 22, 2025, creating this second case. DI 1. TransUnion filed a motion to
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dismiss (DI 9), to which Ms. Lyle responded in opposition (DI 11). Ms. Lyle then filed several
documents, including (1) a motion for production of documents (DI 19); and (2) an amended
opposition to TransUnion’s motion to dismiss with a request to file such opposition (DI 20, DI
21). TransUnion filed an initial reply in support of its motion to dismiss. DI 23. We denied Ms.
Lyle’s motion for production of documents (DI 19) but granted her request for leave to amend
her opposition and file a supplemental opposition (DI 20, 21), as well as her request to correct a
typographical error (DI 24). DI 25. In this order, we provided TransUnion additional time to file
a reply brief, responsive to Ms. Lyle’s latest filings. Id. Ms. Lyle then filed a motion to set aside
the Settlement Agreement and vacate dismissal (DI 26), which we denied — explaining that any
relief that she sought from final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) pertaining
to No. 24-cv-1831 must be filed on the docket of the first case. DI 27 at ¶ 1. We also ordered
the Clerk of Court to strike Exhibit A to Ms. Lyle’s motion because that exhibit appeared to be
portions of the purportedly confidential Settlement Agreement between the parties in No. 24-cv-
1831. Id. at ¶ 2.
Next, Ms. Lyle filed an amended complaint (DI 28) and amended opposition to
TransUnion’s motion to dismiss (DI 29), so we provided TransUnion time to either file briefing
supplementing its motion to dismiss that addressed Ms. Lyle’s amended complaint, or an answer
and withdrawal of its motion to dismiss. DI 30. TransUnion then filed a letter, in which it
argued that because Ms. Lyle did not name TransUnion as a defendant in her amended
complaint, she abandoned her claims against it. DI 31 at 1-2. That day, we ordered Ms. Lyle to
file a letter confirming whether she intended to dismiss TransUnion as a defendant and, if not, to
respond to TransUnion’s letter. DI 32. After additional filings from Ms. Lyle, we eventually
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gave her until October 8, 2025, to file anything further — either through a response to
TransUnion’s motion to dismiss or a proposed amended complaint. DI 35. Ms. Lyle then filed
three more amended complaints (DI 36, 40, 41) — the last of which is the operative complaint
(DI 41) — a motion to consolidate Nos. 24-cv-1831 and 25-cv-2647 (DI 38), and a motion to
vacate the dismissal of her case at No. 24-cv-1831 (DI 39). She also filed a motion to correct a
clerical error on the docket (DI 44), which we denied as moot (DI 46). TransUnion responded in
support of its motion to dismiss and in response to the entirety of the record. DI 47. Ms. Lyle’s
subsequent reply (DI 48) completes the list of filings now before us.
II. 	OPERATIVE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Given the numerous filings in this case, we will start by setting out Ms. Lyle’s assertions
in the operative complaint (DI 41). Ms. Lyle asserts the following causes of action: (1) an FCRA
violation by TransUnion due to its: (a) incorrect identification of Ms. Lyle as deceased; (b)
failure to properly reinvestigate its information on Ms. Lyle; and (c) failure to report accurate
information; (2) fraud and misrepresentations by TransUnion and Ms. Lyle’s former counsel on
both Ms. Lyle and this court; and (3) a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) violation
resulting from TransUnion’s collusion with Ms. Lyle’s former counsel. Id. at 3-4. Ms. Lyle
further argues that the Settlement Agreement is unenforceable because it was obtained without
her consent and through collusion, misrepresentation, and duress, and that TransUnion’s res
judicata and breach of contract defenses are invalid due to this fraud and lack of consent. Id. at
3. Regardless, she maintains that the reopening of No. 24-cv-1831 on April 1, 2025, “nullif[ied]
[the] prior termination” of her claims against TransUnion. Id. Ms. Lyle contends that, in 2017,
TransUnion began erroneously reporting her as deceased, which caused her to lose her job and
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suffer financial and personal damage due to the ensuing public humiliation and denials of her
mortgage, loan, and credit card applications. Id. at 2. She alleges that she faces “ongoing harm
and procedural injustices” due to TransUnion’s misconduct, that “[r]egulatory findings document
multiple wrongful TransUnion practices, including deceptive marketing, failure to correct
inaccuracies, and employing dark patterns to trap consumers[,]” and that new evidence exists “of
attorney/TransUnion collusion, with confidential information shared inappropriately.” Id. at 2, 4.
Ms. Lyle asks us to vacate the January 24, 2025 dismissal of her prior case with prejudice,
reinstate her claims, and allow her to proceed pro se or with new counsel. Id. at 5. And, as we
describe below, she also asks us to consolidate this case with No. 24-cv-1831 “for economy and
efficiency, avoiding duplicative motions, discovery, and inconvenience to the parties.” Id. at 5-
6.1
III. 	MOTIONS AT ISSUE
A. 	TransUnion’s motion to dismiss
TransUnion moves to dismiss Ms. Lyle’s claims against it, asserting her claims are barred
by res judicata because they “involve the same parties, the same issues, the same conduct, and
the same damages alleged in the original lawsuit.” DI 9 at 8. It insists res judicata applies
because there is (1) a final judgment on the merits — here, a stipulation of dismissal with
prejudice in No. 24-cv-1831; (2) that final judgment involved the same parties — here,
1 Ms. Lyle states certain allegations against her former counsel, but she has not named
them as defendants. Also, Ms. Lyle lists defense counsel as a defendant, but it does not appear
that the body of the complaint states claims against him individually. It appears to us that the
case is against TransUnion, and TransUnion filed the motion to dismiss. Thus, that is where our
focus will be.
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TransUnion and Ms. Lyle; and (3) the instant lawsuit is based upon the same cause of action —
here, FCRA violations. Id. at 11-17. TransUnion argues that Ms. Lyle’s belief that her prior
counsel made misrepresentations cannot provide a legal basis for bringing a second lawsuit,
against the same party, on the same cause of action. Id. at 14-15. Moreover, it observes that Ms.
Lyle provides no facts supporting her claims that TransUnion and her former counsel committed
misconduct in reaching the Settlement Agreement, that TransUnion’s counsel tampered with her
ECF account in any manner, or that there are new regulatory actions against TransUnion. DI 47
at 4-8. Nor, TransUnion maintains, should we credit Ms. Lyle’s argument that fraud and lack of
consent invalidate its assertions of res judicata and breach of contract.2 Id. at 8. As for her
FDCPA claim, TransUnion contends that Ms. Lyle provides no allegations that a “debt” exists,
that TransUnion is a debt collector, or that TransUnion’s practice involved an attempt to collect a
debt. Id. at 9. TransUnion reasons that, because her original complaint in No. 24-cv-1831
sought actual, statutory, and punitive damages under the FCRA, her claim that she was
undercompensated based on her counsel’s conduct in that prior action cannot shield the instant
case from res judicata. DI 9 at 16. In TransUnion’s view, the only difference between Ms.
Lyle’s original complaint (in No. 24-cv-1831) and her second complaint (the instant complaint)
is that the instant complaint raises patently time-barred FCRA claims — claims regarding
allegations that occurred between 2017 and 2021. Id. at 15. TransUnion explains that the FCRA
carries a two-year statute of limitations such that, because Ms. Lyle filed the instant complaint on
2 The breach of contract issue seemingly arises from Ms. Lyle’s filing of the confidential
Settlement Agreement between her and TransUnion on the No. 24-cv-1831 docket, which we
struck. DI 27 at ¶ 2. As TransUnion explains, TransUnion does not allege a breach of contract
defense in its motion to dismiss. DI 47 at 8.
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May 22, 2025, all claims arising before May 22, 2023, are time-barred. Id. at 16. And because
Ms. Lyle’s complaint demonstrates facial “noncompliance with the statute of limitations
period[,]” TransUnion avers it can properly assert this statute of limitations defense at the motion
to dismiss stage. Id. at 15.
Ms. Lyle urges us to deny TransUnion’s motion to dismiss. DI 48. She argues that res
judicata does not apply because (1) there was no final judgment on the merits; (2) FCRA and
FDCPA claims have distinct factual bases, timelines, and statutory protections; and (3) her
FDCPA claims “arise from new conduct, ongoing violations, and discrete harms” following the
prior case. DI 48 at 2; DI 41 at 5. Ms. Lyle also believes dismissal would be inappropriate
because we expressly allowed her to file a new complaint. DI 48 at 2. She insists that she has
alleged sufficient facts to show that she faces an ongoing injury, rather than “a repeat of settled
issues[,]” highlighting that she is currently homeless and still not financially whole. Id. at 2-3.
Ms. Lyle reiterates that she neither knew nor voluntarily agreed to the prior Settlement
Agreement or dismissal with prejudice, explaining that her former counsel insisted that a two-
year statute of limitations applied and that she had to accept a lower settlement or risk no
recovery. Id. at 3. She contends that such pressure forced her to accept the unsatisfactory
Settlement Agreement, while she also claims that her former counsel signed the dismissal
paperwork without her consent and left her “uninformed and struggling to understand filings and
settlements” throughout her case. Id. at 4.
B. 	Ms. Lyle’s motion to consolidate Nos. 24-cv-1831 and 25-cv-2647
Ms. Lyle seeks consolidation of No. 24-cv-1831 and No. 25-cv-2647 pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). DI 38 at 1. She states that these matters “involve common
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questions of law and fact related to [her] claims against [TransUnion] and [TransUnion’s
counsel] concerning inaccuracies in credit reporting, mishandling of disputes, related financial
and personal damages, and alleged misconduct by Defendants.” Id. Ms. Lyle asserts that “[t]he
factual background of both cases overlaps substantially, including [her] experience beginning in
2017 of being erroneously reported as deceased, credit denials, disputes filed, prior counsel’s
conduct, and Defendant’s actions.” Id. She believes consolidation would advance judicial
efficiency and economy “by avoiding duplication of discovery, testimony, and motions, and by
minimizing inconvenience and expense for the parties and the Court.” DI 38-1 at 1. And she
insists that consolidation would not prejudice either party because “the matters arise from the
same series of events and claims.” Id.
TransUnion resists consolidation, arguing that we should deny Ms. Lyle’s request
because (1) the original case is closed and we have not reopened it; and (2) consolidation would
be futile because her claims are either meritless or barred by res judicata. DI 47 at 9. Nor,
TransUnion advises, should we permit Ms. Lyle to circumvent our order denying her request to
reopen the original matter (No. 24-cv-1831, ECF 29) by means of a consolidation argument. Id.
C. 	Ms. Lyle’s motion to vacate dismissal of No. 24-cv-1831
For similar reasons, Ms. Lyle asks us to vacate the order of dismissal in No. 24-cv-1831
pursuant to Rule 60(b). DI 39 at 1. She asserts that her action in No. 24-cv-1831 “was dismissed
with prejudice, accompanied by a monetary award that was manifestly insufficient and not
reflective of the extent of the damages suffered since 2017[,]” that she “was not properly
informed or consulted prior to critical filings by counsel, including the stipulated protective
order, joint notice of settlement, and ultimate dismissal[,]” and that “[s]erious procedural
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irregularities, new regulatory findings, and evidence of counsel mismanagement” — including
counsel’s “failure to communicate material developments, loss of critical evidence, and
submission of settlements contrary to [her] interests” — justify Rule 60(b) vacatur. Id. at 1-3.
In her view, she meets the Rule 60(b) standard for relief because there are (1) extraordinary
circumstances, given No. 24-cv-1831 was dismissed by her counsel without her informed
consent and premised on misinformation regarding statutory limits and damages; (2) examples of
newly discovered evidence, given the recent regulatory penalties and class action settlements
involving TransUnion which ultimately support her claims; (3) prejudice and severe harm, as she
has lost creditworthiness, financial stability, and employment due to TransUnion’s misconduct,
harm of which her counsel aggravated through their actions and inactions; (4) procedural defects,
because the stipulated protective order and joint settlement notice were filed without her
knowledge or consent and dismissal was entered without addressing all the substantive merits of
her case; and (5) interests of justice implicated, as vacatur is necessary to ensure her right to fully
pursue her valid claims and obtain just compensation for them. Id. at 4-5.
TransUnion opposes Ms. Lyle’s motion for vacatur, again insisting that her allegations of
misconduct related to the Settlement Agreement and of new regulatory actions against
TransUnion are baseless and unsupported by her pleadings. DI 47 at 5-7.
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Rule 12(b)(6) challenges
A party may move to dismiss an action against it by asserting the complaint failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, we must only consider “the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
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matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims
are based upon these documents.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016)
(citation modified). We also shall “accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. (citation modified). Conclusory allegations do not receive the
same presumption of truth. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).
But “even outlandish allegations” receive the presumption of truth so long as they do not
resemble a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a [claim] or other legal conclusion.” Id.
(citation modified); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified).
Though “the clearest indication that an allegation is conclusory and unworthy of weight in
analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint is that it embodies a legal point[,]” some allegations that
do not state ultimate legal conclusions may be “nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that
they fail to cross the line between the conclusory and the factual[.]” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 790
(citation modified).
A plaintiff’s complaint must also state a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Whether the complaint achieves this plausibility standard is a context-specific inquiry,
during which we must utilize our common sense and judicial experience. Id. “[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged — but it has not show[n] — that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
(citation modified).
Additionally, we must liberally construe complaints filed by pro se litigants. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.
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2009) (citation modified). However, the pro se litigant still must plead sufficient facts
supporting her claims to survive dismissal. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245
(3d Cir. 2013) (citation modified). Indeed, here we have endeavored to give Ms. Lyle every
opportunity to fully state her claims and arguments in response to TransUnion.
B. 	Motions to consolidate
A court may consolidate civil actions if the actions “involve a common question of law or
fact.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 42(a)(2). The party seeking consolidation must prove consolidation is
warranted. Borough of Olyphant v. PPL Corp., 153 F. App’x 80, 82 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation
modified). We have broad discretion in determining whether to consolidate actions. Id. (citation
modified). In making this determination, we might consider whether consolidation would cause
inconvenience, inefficiency, or undue prejudice to a party. Robinson v. New Jersey Mercer Cnty.
Vicinage-Fam. Div., 562 F. App’x 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation modified).
C. 	Res Judicata
The principle of res judicata “is founded upon the generally recognized public policy that
there must be some end to litigation and that when one appears in court to present his case, is
fully heard, and the contested issue is decided against him, he may not later renew the litigation
in another court.” Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (citation modified). “[A]
judgment duly rendered in one court will be recognized as res judicata in a suit between the
same parties in a federal court.” Id. (citation omitted). Res judicata serves “to relieve the parties
of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, prevent inconsistent
decisions, and encourage reliance on adjudications.” Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P.,
449 F.3d 542, 551 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation modified). Under this doctrine, “[a] final judgment on
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the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or
could have been raised in that action.” Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398
(1981) (citation modified). To prevail on a res judicata defense, the defendant must show there
was “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) involving the same parties or their
privies; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.” Elkadrawy v. Vanguard
Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation modified). Any dismissal under Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 41(b), except for a dismissal “for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join
a party under Rule 19” constitutes an adjudication on the merits. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(b);
Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173.
If a settlement agreement triggers the dismissal of a matter, and a defendant’s resulting
discharge, then “[a] somewhat modified form of res judicata applies.” Toscano v. Conn. Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 288 Fed. Appx. 36, 38 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation modified). “The
express terms of a settlement agreement, not merely the terms of the judgment, determine the
bounds of preclusion after a settlement.” Id. (citation modified). For claim preclusion (i.e., res
judicata) purposes, judicially approved settlement agreements constitute final judgments on the
merits. Id. (citation modified). But conduct that occurs after the execution of the settlement
agreement that gives rise to a new claim is not barred by res judicata. See Lawlor v. National
Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955) (“While the [] judgment precludes recovery on
claims arising prior to its entry, it cannot be given the effect of extinguishing claims which did
not even then exist and which could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.”);
Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[N]ew facts (i.e. events
occurring after the events giving rise to the earlier claim) may give rise to a new claim, which is
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not precluded by the earlier judgment.”) (citation modified).
D. 	FCRA claims
The Fair Credit Reporting Act aims “to protect consumers from the transmission of
inaccurate information about them, and to establish credit reporting practices that utilize
accurate, relevant, and current information in a confidential and responsible manner.” Cortez v.
Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 706 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Sections 1681n and
1681o permit an individual to bring a private suit for damages against a credit reporting agency
(CRA) who willfully or negligently fails to comply with specific duties it owes to consumers
under the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o; Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 859-60
(3d Cir. 2014). Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA requires a CRA, in preparing a consumer report,
to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); Bibbs v. Trans
Union LLC, 43 F.4th 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2022). To establish a prima facie § 1681e(b) claim, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the “CRA prepared a report containing inaccurate information[.]”
Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342-43 (citation modified). Information that “is technically correct” may still
be inaccurate if, by omission, it generates “a materially misleading impression.” Id. at 343
(citation modified).
A CRA may be liable for negligent noncompliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) if “(1) inaccurate information was included in a consumer’s credit report; (2) the
inaccuracy was due to defendant’s failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy; (3) the consumer suffered injury; and (4) the consumer’s injury was caused by
the inclusion of the inaccurate entry.” Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342 (citation modified). In contrast, a
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CRA willfully violates the FCRA if the CRA knowingly violates the FCRA or acts with reckless
disregard of its FCRA obligations toward the consumer. Fuges v. Southwest Fin. Servs., Ltd.,
707 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation modified). The CRA acts with reckless disregard if its
action (1) constitutes a violation of the FCRA under a reasonable reading of the statute; and (2)
demonstrates that the CRA “ran a risk of violating the law [that was] substantially greater than
the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.” Id. at 248-49 (citation modified).
To be reckless, the CRA’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable given the clearly
established legal rules at the time of its action. Id. at 249 (citation modified).
E. 	Common law fraud and misrepresentation claims
Consumers in Pennsylvania also may bring common law fraud and misrepresentation
claims against CRAs. To sustain a common law fraud or intentional misrepresentation claim, the
consumer must prove (1) there was a representation made; (2) that representation was material to
the transaction at issue; (3) the representation was made falsely, with either the knowledge of its
falsity or recklessness with respect to its truth or falsity; (4) the representation was made with the
intent to mislead another into relying upon it; (5) there was justifiable reliance upon that
misrepresentation; and (6) that reliance proximately caused the resulting injury. SodexoMAGIC,
LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation modified); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647
A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1994). In slight contrast, to prevail on a negligent misrepresentation claim,
the consumer must prove (1) there was a misrepresentation of material fact; (2) the representor
(a) knew of the misrepresentation, (b) made the misrepresentation without knowledge of its
veracity; or (c) made the representation under circumstances in which it should have known of
its falsity; (3) the representor intended the representation to induce another to act upon it; and (4)
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a party justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation, resulting in injury. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 890
(citation modified). Thus, the difference between intentional and negligent misrepresentation in
Pennsylvania is as follows: to commit intentional misrepresentation, the representor must have
known its words were false or acted recklessly with respect to the words’ veracity, whereas to
commit negligent misrepresentation, the representor must have failed to reasonably investigate
the truth of its words, but it need not have known its words were false nor acted recklessly with
respect to the words’ veracity. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 890 (citation modified).
F. 	Contract law claims
State contract law governs the validity and enforceability of settlement agreements.
Shell’s Disposal & Recycling, Inc. v. City of Lancaster, 504 Fed. Appx. 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2009); Mazzella v.
Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999)). Under Pennsylvania law, we assess the enforceability of
a settlement agreement by determining whether both parties manifested an intent to be bound by
the agreement’s terms, and whether the terms were sufficiently definite such that they may be
specifically enforced. Channel Home Centers, Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795
F.2d 291, 298-299 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation modified). The intent inquiry is an objective one: we
ask what a reasonable person would discern the parties’ intent to be, after evaluating the parties’
behavior. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 582 (citation modified). Though “[t]he
presence . . . of a signed writing is relevant to [the intent] determination,” the core question is
“whether the parties agreed to the essential terms of a contract.” Shell’s Disposal, 504 Fed.
Appx. at 201 (citation modified). As for the definiteness of the agreement, we look to whether
the agreement’s essential terms are poorly defined or ambiguous, such that “it is impossible to
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understand what the parties agreed to.” Id. at 202 (citation modified).
G. 	FDCPA claims
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) et seq., constitutes another
source of legal recourse for consumers. This law seeks “to eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive
debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). To
successfully bring an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: “(1) she is a
consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves
an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a
provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Douglass v. Convergent
Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation modified).
V. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claims against TransUnion must be dismissed because they are
either barred by res judicata or insufficiently pled under Rule 12(b)(6)
To the extent that Ms. Lyle brings FCRA claims against TransUnion for its alleged
conduct both preceding and postdating the execution of the Settlement Agreement, such claims
must be dismissed. First, res judicata clearly bars Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claim against TransUnion
for its alleged actions prior to the Settlement Agreement’s execution. As a threshold matter, we
find this Settlement Agreement is enforceable because (1) the parties manifested an intent to be
bound by its terms, as exhibited by the parties’ signatures and conduct, which we examined at
the March 26, 2025 video conference; (2) the essential terms of the agreement were sufficiently
specific (i.e., the amount and manner of compensation agreed to, the parties bound by the
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agreement, the scope of the agreement, and the conditions constituting a breach); and (3) on the
record before us, and as explained further below, we cannot conclude that this agreement was
reached through fraudulent, coercive, or misleading means. Grossman, 795 F.2d at 298-99.
Having decided that the Settlement Agreement is enforceable, we now turn to the terms
of that agreement to determine the scope of res judicata. Toscano, 288 Fed. Appx. at 38. Those
terms clearly bar Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claim against TransUnion for alleged conduct that predated
the agreement’s execution. Without delving into the specifics of the confidential agreement, the
Settlement Agreement broadly covers anything related to the No. 24-cv-1831 matter —
including anything that could have been asserted in that matter but was not so asserted, or which
in any way related to Ms. Lyle’s credit history information reported by TransUnion or
TransUnion’s furnishing of such information to any third parties, prior to the agreement’s
execution. In the instant complaint, Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claim against TransUnion relies upon
TransUnion’s alleged (1) incorrect identification of Ms. Lyle as deceased; (2) failure to properly
reinvestigate; and (3) failure to report accurate information. DI 41 at 3. Because this conduct
served as the very basis for her prior, enforceable agreement with TransUnion and occurred prior
to the execution of that agreement, res judicata bars this FCRA claim.
As for Ms. Lyle’s argument that we should consider TransUnion’s alleged misconduct
dating back to 2017, because such evidence was not included in the Settlement Agreement, we
find this conduct barred by the FCRA’s statute of limitations. A plaintiff must bring an FCRA
claim within the shorter of (1) two years following the date of her discovery of the FCRA
violation; or (2) five years following the date on which the FCRA violation occurred. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681p. Ms. Lyle’s filings suggest that she only recently discovered the alleged misconduct
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dating back to 2017, such that the earlier of the two time periods — and thus, the one applicable
here — would be five years from the date on which the FCRA violation occurred (i.e., 2022).
Because Ms. Lyle filed this action on May 22, 2025, and because she has not specified whether
and what she disputed with respect to the alleged conduct between 2017 and 2020,3 we conclude
that she is — at least as it appears on this record — past the statutory deadline to seek relief for
any alleged FCRA violations occurring prior to May 22, 2020. Accordingly, any FCRA claims
against TransUnion predicated on its alleged misconduct prior to May 22, 2020, are dismissed
with prejudice.
We turn next to Ms. Lyle’s FCRA claims against TransUnion for alleged misconduct
after the execution of the Settlement Agreement. Though res judicata may not bar such claims,
Rule 12(b)(6) nonetheless requires their dismissal. See Lawlor, 349 U.S. at 328 (holding res
judicata did not preclude claims that did not exist and could not have been brought in the prior
case); Labelle, 72 F.3d at 314 (same). To survive the pleadings stage, Ms. Lyle must plead
sufficient facts to establish that TransUnion either negligently or willfully failed to “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning” Ms.
Lyle, “prepared a report [on Ms. Lyle] containing inaccurate information[,]” and, due to this
inaccurate information, harmed Ms. Lyle. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342-43
3 Federal district courts are split regarding whether each of a consumer’s separate notices
of dispute trigger a CRA’s duty to investigate under the FCRA’s statute of limitations (and
whether the CRA’s failure to investigate thus may constitute an FCRA violation), even if the
consumer previously disputed the same information. Escobar v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ.
Assistance Agency Servs., LLC, 2018 WL 1740364, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (citation
modified). And the Third Circuit has not interpreted this question. Id. at *4. But we need not
decide whether timely disputes regarding 2017-2020 misconduct revive claims involving that
misconduct, given the lack of information in this record about any such notices of dispute.
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(citation modified). She can establish TransUnion was negligent in its FCRA duties to her by
demonstrating that the inaccurate information about her was due to TransUnion’s failure to
follow reasonable procedures to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of its reported
information. Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 342; Fuges, 707 F.3d at 248. Or she can establish TransUnion
acted willfully by pleading sufficient facts to show that TransUnion knowingly violated the
FCRA or acted with reckless disregard of its FCRA obligations toward her. Bibbs, 43 F.4th at
342 n.16; Fuges, 707 F.3d at 248.
Here, Ms. Lyle avers that “ongoing harm and procedural injustices continue to affect
[her] rights and well-being” and that she suffers from “ongoing violations, and discrete harms
post-prior proceedings.”4 DI 41 at 2. In her other filings, which we will consider out of caution
given the numerous complaints and motions in this case, she asserts that she is “still not
identified by TransUnion” even after the Settlement Agreement, citing “Exhibit A” as evidence.
DI 36 at 2; DI 40 at 2. Notably, Exhibit A is a letter to Ms. Lyle from Synchrony Bank, dated
September 9, 2024 — before the Settlement Agreement was executed. DI 36 at 5, Exhibit A; DI
40 at 5, Exhibit A. Thus, in support of her post-settlement-execution FCRA claims, Ms. Lyle
states only bald assertions of ongoing violations and harms, and another vague assertion that
TransUnion has still not identified her to this day — which is purportedly supported by an
Exhibit that predates the settlement’s execution. She has not pled any specific information
regarding how TransUnion allegedly violated, and continues to violate, the FCRA after the
4 Though Ms. Lyle couches these “ongoing violations, and discrete harms post-prior
proceedings” under her FDCPA claims “legal arguments” section, pursuant to our duty to
liberally construe Ms. Lyle’s pleadings, we also will assess these assertions as they relate to her
FCRA claim. DI 41 at 5.
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settlement’s execution. Therefore, and though we would not minimize what we understand to be
Ms. Lyle’s difficult situation, we must conclude that she has not furnished sufficient facts to
establish that TransUnion negligently or willfully violated the FCRA after the execution of the
Settlement Agreement. This FCRA claim is thus dismissed without prejudice.
B. 	Ms. Lyle’s FDCPA and common law fraud and misrepresentation claims must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
Even construing Ms. Lyle’s allegations of fraud and misrepresentation against
TransUnion as occurring after the Settlement Agreement’s execution, we conclude that Ms.
Lyle’s pleadings do not survival dismissal on her remaining claims. We begin by examining the
allegations in Ms. Lyle’s third amended complaint, which she acknowledges “incorporates and
supersedes all previous complaints.” DI 41 at 1. Regarding TransUnion’s post-settlement-
execution conduct, or conduct that arguably occurred post-settlement-execution, Ms. Lyle
alleges the following: (1) she faces “ongoing harm and procedural injustices [which] continue to
affect [her] rights and well-being”; (2) there exist “[r]egulatory findings” which “document
multiple wrongful TransUnion practices, including deceptive marketing, failure to correct
inaccuracies, and [the] employing [of] dark patterns to trap consumers”; and (3) TransUnion
engaged in fraud alongside and colluded with Ms. Lyle’s former counsel to obtain the settlement
without Ms. Lyle’s consent, which included “the manipulation of discovery and intentional
misrepresentation[,]” “abusive and deceptive collection conduct[,]” subjecting of Ms. Lyle to
duress, and inappropriate sharing of confidential information. DI 41 at 2-4. And looking beyond
Ms. Lyle’s final amended complaint to her other filings, she alleges the following arguably post-
settlement-execution conduct by TransUnion: (1) submission of the settlement agreement to the
Court which purportedly contained, but did not actually contain, Ms. Lyle’s signature; (2) filing
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of a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, without Ms. Lyle’s knowledge or consent; (3) failure
to disclose that No. 24-cv-1831 was reopened on April 1, 2025, constituting a misrepresentation
to this court; (4) false statements regarding Ms. Lyle’s employment termination; (5) collusion
with Ms. Lyle’s former attorneys “to coerce Plaintiff into a fraudulent settlement agreement
regarding a consumer debt” and their coordinated efforts to reach a nominal settlement amount,
minimize Ms. Lyle’s damages, and obstruct the full and fair adjudication of her claims; (6)
“attempt to enforce a void settlement”; (7) failure to properly identify Ms. Lyle in its credit
reporting of her; and (8) interference, through the actions of its attorney, with Ms. Lyle’s ECF
account by hacking and accessing the account without authorization, as demonstrated by
opposing counsel sending Ms. Lyle “personal AI communications[.]” DI 28 at 1; DI 29 at 2-3;
DI 33 at 2-4; DI 36 at 2; DI 40 at 2-3.
The aforementioned allegations against TransUnion do not state a claim for relief under
the FDCPA — which requires Ms. Lyle to prove that (1) she is a consumer; (2) TransUnion is a
debt collector; (3) TransUnion’s challenged practice involved an attempt to collect a “debt” as
understood in the FDCPA; and (4) TransUnion violated an FDCPA provision in attempting to
collect that debt. Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303 (citation modified). On the present record, Ms. Lyle
does not provide facts that, if construed as true, would establish these elements. For example,
Ms. Lyle has not plausibly alleged, nor can she, that TransUnion is a debt collector. TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 419 (2021) (describing TransUnion as “one of the ‘Big Three’
credit reporting agencies” which creates and sells consumer reports regarding an individual’s
creditworthiness); Burry v. Cach LLC, 2015 WL 328182, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2015)
(explaining that TransUnion constitutes “a corporation that provides credit reports to consumers”
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rather than a debt collector). Nor has she demonstrated that TransUnion violated the FDCPA in
its attempt to collect a debt, as understood in the FDCPA. Rather than relating to an FDCPA
violation, Ms. Lyle’s allegations against TransUnion regarding its post-settlement-execution
conduct revolve around TransUnion’s alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and collusion with Ms.
Lyle’s former counsel in an effort to obtain her non-consensual settlement agreement.
But these allegations are not enough to state a claim for relief for fraud or
misrepresentation, either. Ms. Lyle avers that, through its collusion with her former attorneys,
TransUnion has made misrepresentations to, and defrauded, both her and this court. DI 41 at 3-
4. To survive dismissal on her fraud or intentional misrepresentation claim respecting herself,
she must plead sufficient facts that, if taken as true, would prove (1) TransUnion made a
representation; (2) that was (a) material to the settlement agreement, (b) made falsely, either with
the knowledge of its falsity or recklessness regarding its veracity, and (c) made with the intent to
mislead her or another into relying upon the representation; and (3) she justifiably relied upon
that misrepresentation, resulting in her injury. SodexoMAGIC, 24 F.4th at 205 (citation
modified); Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 889. Regarding her negligent misrepresentation claim, she must
plead the same elements with the exception of the second one: instead, she must establish that
TransUnion made a misrepresentation material to the settlement agreement that it either knew
was false, should have known was false, or made without knowledge of its veracity. Gibbs, 647
A.2d at 890.
For her claim that TransUnion defrauded or made intentional misrepresentations to this
court, Ms. Lyle must plead sufficient facts that, if construed as true, would prove (1) TransUnion
made a representation; (2) that was (a) material to the court’s acceptance of the settlement
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agreement and dismissal of this case, (b) made falsely, either with the knowledge of its falsity or
recklessness regarding its veracity, and (c) made with the intent to mislead this court into relying
upon the representation; and (3) this court justifiably relied upon that misrepresentation, resulting
in injury. SodexoMAGIC, 24 F.4th at 205 (citation modified); Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 889. Again,
regarding her negligent misrepresentation claim, she must plead the same elements with the
exception of the second element: instead, she must establish that TransUnion made a
misrepresentation material to this court’s acceptance of the settlement agreement and dismissal
of this case that it either knew was false, should have known was false, or made without
knowledge of its veracity. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 890.
On the record before us, we must conclude that Ms. Lyle has not sufficiently pled that
TransUnion either defrauded or made misrepresentations to her or this court. First, it is unclear
to us what, if any, representation or representations TransUnion made to Ms. Lyle respecting the
Settlement Agreement. Ms. Lyle does not allege any specific statements made to her, by
TransUnion, related to the signing or execution of the agreement. Instead, she essentially
provides a conclusory recitation of the elements of fraud and misrepresentation, asserting that
TransUnion engaged in “fraud” and “intentional misrepresentation” by colluding with her former
counsel to reach the agreement. DI 41 at 3. Without knowing what was allegedly said to her, we
are constrained to conclude that the facts, as pled, do not establish that (1) any such
representations were material to the Settlement Agreement; (2) TransUnion made false
representations with the requisite knowledge, recklessness, or negligence; or (3) Ms. Lyle
justifiably relied upon these representations and suffered an injury caused by that reliance.
Nor has Ms. Lyle pled sufficient facts to establish that TransUnion defrauded or made
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misrepresentations to this court. Ms. Lyle’s alleged facts regarding representations to this court
involve TransUnion’s (1) submission of the Settlement Agreement to us; (2) filing of a
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice to us; (3) failure to disclose that No. 24-cv-1831 was
reopened on April 1, 2025; (4) false statements regarding her employment termination; and (5)
accessing of her ECF account. DI 28 at 1; DI 29 at 2-3; DI 33 at 2-4; DI 36 at 2; DI 40 at 2-3.
Even assuming, arguendo, that these representations were material to our decision to accept the
Settlement Agreement and dismiss this case with prejudice, Ms. Lyle has not plausibly shown
that these representations were false, that we relied upon these representations, or that our
reliance upon these representations resulted in an injury. To the contrary, after Ms. Lyle alerted
us that she did not understand her case to be dismissed, remember signing the settlement
agreement, or believe the agreement was fair, we held a case management conference. No. 24-
cv-1831, ECF 28. During that conference, we reviewed the Settlement Agreement in camera
and heard from Ms. Lyle, her now-former counsel, and defense counsel. Following this, we
concluded that the Settlement Agreement appeared to be in order and signed by Ms. Lyle,
because the record before us indicated that Ms. Lyle chose to settle that matter. No. 24-cv-1831,
ECF 29. Inherent in that assessment was our conclusion that neither TransUnion, nor Ms. Lyle’s
former counsel, made any misrepresentations respecting the Settlement Agreement to Ms. Lyle
or us. Moreover, our decision to accept the Settlement Agreement, close the case, and keep the
case closed, was based on our independent assessment of the agreement, the statements of Ms.
Lyle, her former counsel, and defense counsel, and the entirety of the record. As explained
above, nothing in the record, as presented by Ms. Lyle, changes our assessment. Nor has Ms.
Lyle sufficiently pled that defense counsel gained unauthorized access to her ECF account, as
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she provides no specific allegations regarding what defense counsel has done to demonstrate
such access other than her vague assertion that counsel sent her “personal AI communications[.]”
DI 40 at 2-3. Because she has not explained what those alleged communications are, we cannot
assess whether those communications indicate unauthorized access of her ECF account. Finally,
TransUnion’s discussion of No. 24-cv-1831 as closed does not in any way affect our decision
today — our decision is based upon our assessment of the law as applied to the record before us,
and we are well aware that we provided Ms. Lyle the opportunity to challenge the Settlement
Agreement achieved in No. 24-cv-1831 pro se through a Rule 60(b) motion. Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
60(b).
C. 	Ms. Lyle’s motions to vacate the dismissal under No. 24-cv-1831 and consolidate
Nos. 24-cv-1831 and 25-cv-2647 are denied
We also deny Ms. Lyle’s motions for vacatur and consolidation. The dismissal in No.
24-cv-1831 was based on the valid Settlement Agreement, and we see no reason to disturb it.
Accordingly, we deny Ms. Lyle’s motion for vacatur. As for consolidation, Ms. Lyle has not
shown that consolidation is appropriate. Given our conclusion that her claims against
TransUnion must be dismissed, consolidation of No. 24-cv-1831 (in which TransUnion was a
party) and No. 25-cv-2647 (in which TransUnion is no longer a party) would unduly prejudice
TransUnion. Consolidation also would create further inconvenience and inefficiencies, as Ms.
Lyle’s only remaining claims regard not the substance of TransUnion’s allegedly erroneous
credit reporting, but rather her former counsel’s alleged misconduct and ineffectiveness. And
these claims against her former counsel in the present action are sufficiently distinct from those
asserted in the prior action. Thus, consolidation is not warranted.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
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The claims against TransUnion barred by res judicata are dismissed with prejudice. The
other claims, which were insufficiently pled under Rule 12(b)(6), are dismissed without
prejudice. Moreover, there is no reason to disturb the dismissal of Ms. Lyle’s prior action
against TransUnion in No. 24-cv-1831, so we deny her motion for vacatur. Finally, we deny
Ms. Lyle’s motion to consolidate Nos. 24-cv-1831 and 25-cv-2647 because such consolidation is
not appropriate. In an accompanying order, we will provide Ms. Lyle with a deadline for filing a
fourth amended complaint if she can address the pleading deficiencies outlined above.
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