HICKSON v. PECO ENERGY COMPANY et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL HICKSON 	:
: 	CIVIL ACTION
v. 	: 	No. 25-2980
:
PECO ENERGY COMPANY, et al. 	:
McHUGH, J. 	January 8, 2026
MEMORANDUM
This is a pro se action raising a panoply of claims arising out of plaintiff Michael Hickson’s
disputes with his electrical utility company. Various motions to dismiss were granted on December
17th, 2025, with Plaintiff given leave to amend only Count VI of his complaint, which vaguely
alleged violations of federal privacy law. 	Mr. Hickson now moves for reconsideration and has
belatedly docketed responses to all the motions previously filed.
The motion first contends that the Court unfairly ruled against him on procedural grounds,
without consideration of the merits, denying him due process. Not so. As a preliminary matter,
Plaintiff was in fact granted an extension of time within which to respond to the pending motions
to dismiss. ECF 25. He did not respond within the time allotted. Nonetheless, as required, the
Court engaged in a substantive analysis of all the claims that Mr. Hickson raised, finding merit in
none, and granted him leave to amend to restate his claim of an alleged invasion of his right to
privacy. In short, there was no denial of due process.
Because Plaintiff was given ample opportunity to respond but failed to comply with the
deadline imposed by the order granting an extension, and because the merits were fully considered,
there is no legal or equitable basis on which to grant reconsideration. 	I have, nonetheless, in
consideration of Mr. Hickson’s pro se status, reviewed the three late responses he recently
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docketed. See ECF 29, 30, and 31. Nothing set forth in those responses calls into question the
validity of the analyses set forth in my previous memorandum. ECF 26. Nor does anything in
those responses suggest that granting leave to amend would be anything but futile.
As noted above, the order of dismissal granted leave to amend Count VI. Mr. Hickson has
not complied with the terms of that order. 	He has, however, within the body of his motion for
reconsideration, identified the federal statutes he seeks to invoke: the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a,
and the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809. As to the former, it applies only to
executive agencies of the federal government. As to the latter, although Defendant Philadelphia
Electric Company may have obligations under the Act, it does not provide a private right of action.
Miller v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 23-CV-1910, 2023 WL 4629648, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 18,
2023); see also Ishmael v. GM Fin. Inc., No. 22-CV-1095, 2022 WL 2073821, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June
9, 2022); USAA Fed. Sav. Bank v. PLS Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(citing cases). Mr. Hickson also invokes constitutional privacy rights, but these would not supply
a basis for a claim against PECO, a private entity. Finally, he cites Pennsylvania common law on
invasion of privacy, but there is no diversity jurisdiction here and, in the absence of any viable
federal claim, no basis for supplemental jurisdiction. 	I am therefore satisfied that any further
attempt to state a claim for violation of federal privacy law would be futile and Count VI will
therefore be dismissed without leave to amend.
An appropriate order follows.
/s/ Gerald Austin McHugh
United States District Judge
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