MACK v. PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONTAY MACK, 	: 	CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	NO. 	25-4224
:
OFC SEAN BURNETT, et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM
MURPHY, J. 	January 9, 2026
Dontay Mack filed this pro se action asserting civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 based on an alleged illegal search and seizure. Mr. Mack was previously granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. Upon screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court dismissed
his original Complaint asserted against the Philadelphia Police Department and three of its police
officers and permitted him to file an amended complaint. See Mack v. Phila. Police Dep’t, No.
25-4224, 2025 WL 2825587, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2025). Mr. Mack returned with the pending
Amended Complaint. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Mr. Mack’s Amended
Complaint.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
In his initial Complaint, Mr. Mack alleged that defendants Detective Sean Burnett,
Sergeant Benjamin Baynard, and Sergeant Francis Lowry conducted an “illegal search and
seizure” and stole his property while he was in Philadelphia Police Department custody. (DI 2 at
5.) The Court dismissed the Complaint, concluding that Mr. Mack had failed to provide any
1 Unless otherwise stated, the factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken
from Mr. Mack’s Amended Complaint. (DI 9.) The Court adopts the sequential pagination
assigned to the Amended Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.
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timeframe or factual context for the alleged search and seizure involving the defendants. See
Mack, 2025 WL 2825587, at *3. The Court also dismissed with prejudice all claims against the
Philadelphia Police Department, as it was not a proper defendant. Id. at 2. Mr. Mack returned
with an Amended Complaint, again naming Burnett, Baynard, and Lowry as defendants. (DI 9
at 6.)
Mr. Mack alleges that he was arrested on December 31, 2020 in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and transported to the Philadelphia central detective’s division pending charges
when, following an altercation with another individual, a non-defendant police officer recovered
a firearm from Mr. Mack’s car. (Id. at 2, 3.) Mr. Mack’s personal belongings that were
recovered from his car during the arrest, including a combination-locked safe seized from his
trunk, were also transferred to the detective’s division. (Id. at 4.) While Mr. Mack was being
processed and charged, defendants Burnett, Baynard, and Lowry allegedly cut the hinge off Mr.
Mack’s safe to search it. (Id.) Mr. Mack had refused to tell them the passcode. (Id. at 4-5.) The
officers did not have a warrant but nevertheless broke into the safe, damaged it, and “stole” some
of the contents, such as jewelry, money, and personal paperwork. (Id. at 5, 10.) Mr. Mack did
not discover that the safe had been damaged and that his property had been taken until the
property was returned pursuant to a “return of property proceeding.” (Id.)
Based on these allegations, Mr. Mack asserts Fourth Amendment unreasonable search
and seizure claims, Fifth Amendment deprivation of property claims, and Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims. (Id. at 8-11.) He seeks money damages and for the police
officers to be terminated from their employment. (Id. at 12.)
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Mr. Mack is proceeding pro se, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires
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the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint
fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to
motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this
early stage of the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true,
draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint
contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366,
374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115
F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Additionally, a court may dismiss a complaint based on an affirmative defense such as the statute
of limitations when the “defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher,
857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). As Mr. Mack is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his
allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Mack asserts constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. Based on the
allegations in the Amended complaint, Mr. Mack’s § 1983 claims are time barred. See
Whitenight v. Commw. of Pa. State Police, 674 F. App’x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(“When screening a complaint under § 1915, a district court may sua sponte dismiss the
complaint as untimely under the statute of limitations where the defense is obvious from the
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complaint and no development of the factual record is required.” (citations omitted)). Section
1983 claims, such as those brought by Mr. Mack, are subject to the state statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that
limitations period is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. A claim accrues “when a plaintiff
has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when [he] can file suit and obtain relief.”
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). In general,
this means that the statute of limitations will start running at the time the plaintiff “knew or
should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City
of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
Mr. Mack’s claims accrued when he was detained, searched, and had his personal
belongings seized. See Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that
illegal search claims accrue at “the moment of the search”); Ojo v. Luong, 709 F. App’x 113, 116
(3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Most of [plaintiff's claims] accrued when defendants conducted
their searches and seizures on July 11, 2011, because [plaintiff] knew or should have known the
basis for these claims at that time.”); Wilson v. City of Newark, No. 06-5219, 2007 WL 1135301,
at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2007) (observing that deprivation of property claims are subject to a two-
year statute of limitations). Mr. Mack states that he was arrested during the early morning hours
of December 31, 2020 and that the alleged illegal search of his safe occurred within “twelve or
so hours” after he arrived at the central detective’s division. (DI 9 at 4.) Thus, he was required
to bring his claims by December 31, 2022. Since Mr. Mack did not file this lawsuit until July 31,
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2025, over two and a half years after the statute of limitations expired, it is apparent from the
face of his Amended Complaint that his claims must be dismissed as time barred.2
To the extent that Mr. Mack contends that his claims did not accrue until the safe was
returned to him at the conclusion of the Return of Property proceedings, the claims would
nevertheless be time barred. The public docket reflects that Mack’s Return of Property
proceedings commenced on April 14, 2022 when he filed a Motion for Return of Property and
concluded on April 28, 2022, when an Order granting the return of his property was entered. See
In re: Dontay K. Mack, CP-51-MD-001434-2002. Accordingly, even if the claims accrued on
April 28, 2022, Mr. Mack would have had to have filed his Complaint on or before April 28,
2024 for it to be timely, which he did not do.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint as time barred.
Since Mr. Mack cannot cure the fact that his case is untimely, he will not be given leave to
amend. A final order follows.
2 Moreover, there are no allegations in the Amended Complaint that would support a
basis for equitable tolling of the claims. See Lloyd v. Ocean Twp. Counsel, 857 F. App’x 61, 64
(3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (stating that equitable tolling is generally appropriate where: (1) a
defendant actively misleads a plaintiff regarding a cause of action; (2) a plaintiff has been
prevented from asserting a claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) a
plaintiff has timely asserted her claims, but in the wrong forum).
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