SHANK v. JUSHI HOLDINGS INC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ELIZABETH L. MCNULTY SHANK, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-5234
:
JUSHI HOLDINGS INC, et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 2026, upon consideration of Plaintiff
Elizabeth L. McNulty Shank’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No. 1),
Complaint (Dkt. No. 2), and Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 4), it is ORDERED
that:
1. 	Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915.
2. 	The Complaint is DEEMED filed.
3. 	The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons
in the
Court’s Memorandum.
4. 	Shank may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date
of this Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of
the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended
complaint and shall state the basis for Shank’s claims against each defendant. The
amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial
Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting her
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amended complaint, Shank should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the
claims in her initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Upon the
filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED
by the Court.
5. 	The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Shank a blank copy of this
Court’s current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing an
employment discrimination action bearing the above-captioned civil action number.
Shank may use this form to file her amended complaint if she chooses to do so. Shank
is advised that merely checking boxes on the form complaint will generally be
insufficient to state plausible claims. Rather, she should include a short plain
statement of the facts supporting her claims in narrative form.
6. 	If Shank does not wish to amend her Complaint and instead intends to
stand on her Complaint as originally pled, she may file a notice with the Court within
thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court
will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to
Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber
v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to
amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to
stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be
appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)));
In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the
otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims”
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when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the
remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
7. 	If Shank fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude
that Shank intends to stand on her Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing
this case.1 See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand
on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing her
to take action to cure a defective complaint).
8. 	The Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
Gerald J. Pappert, J.
1 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863
(3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on
her complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint”
doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure
to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also
Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an
analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes
adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her
complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F.
App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates
that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so
contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of
the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D.
171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors
in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the
matter impossible.” (citing cases)).
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