MOSLEY v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES MOSLEY, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-7711
:
NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, 	:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM
PEREZ, J. 	OCTOBER 14, 2026
James Mosley, a frequent pro se litigant in this Court, has filed a Complaint naming the
Navy Federal Credit Union (“Navy Federal”) as the Defendant,1 raising state law claims for
breach of contract and negligence and mentioning the words “bias” and “discrimination.” He
also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons stated, the Court will grant him leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Mosley asserts that on or about September 12, 2026 he contacted Navy Federal customer
service to check the balance of his accounts. (Compl. at 3.) He was told his accounts were
deactivated due to “Barbara Mosley” going into the Navy Federal branch office at 2645 Street
Road in Bensalem, Pennsylvania and telling employees there that Mosley was deceased. (Id.)
1 Although Mosley also included in the caption the words “Navy Federal Branch.”
(Compl. at 1), the Court understands him to be naming just Navy Federal since he includes
citizenship information only for the one entity. (Id. at 3.)
2 The factual allegations are taken from Mosley’s Complaint (ECF No. 2). The Court
adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system.. Where the Court
quotes from pro se pleadings, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up
as needed.
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Allegedly, no proof was offered to show Navy Federal that Barbara was his relation or that he
was in fact deceased. (Id.) Employees thus “caused said breach of contract for not contacting
the appropriate authorities.” (Id.) He claims that he has no ties to Barbara. (Id.) As a result, he
has not been permitted to deposit or withdraw from his accounts since the incident, which has
caused him emotional distress. (Id. at 4.) He had to go to another branch in Philadelphia to
provide a notarized statement that he is alive. (Id.) He seeks money damages “for said breach
without proof.” (Id.)
In the part of the form Complaint Mosley used to submit his case that asks for the source
of the Court’s jurisdiction, he did not check any of the available boxes but wrote “breach of
contract, negligence, bias, discrimination.” (Id. at 2.) He also wrote that he is a citizen of
Pennsylvania and Navy Federal has its corporate office in Virginia. (Id. at 3.)
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Mosley leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the
litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se pleading as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in Mosley’s favor, and ask only whether the Complaint contains facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.
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2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d
Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Because Mosley is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt
v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the
complaint has failed to name it.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). However, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting
Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must
abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245);
see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb.
1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law,
irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be [sic] name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d
683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any
possible claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).
Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v.
Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir.
2015) (“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its
existence.”) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006)).
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“Jurisdictional [issues] . . . may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them sua
sponte.” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Federal Law Claims
Mosley uses the words “bias” and “discrimination.” To the extent he uses these words to
attempt to state a civil rights claim against Navy Federal, that claim is not plausible. First, these
kinds of passing references to legal provisions are insufficient to bring a plausible claim before
the Court. See Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 2023)
(quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d
375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue
before this court.”)). Second, as the Court has recently explained to Mosley, private entities are
not “persons” that can be sued in federal court under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Mosley v. Rivers Casino, No. 26-2994, 2026 WL 1975733, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2026) (first
citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”);
then citing Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The color of
state law element is a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under
color of law.”)). Thus, any claim under § 1983 that Mosley sought to assert by using the words
“bias” and “discrimination” would not be plausible for the additional reason that Navy Federal is
not a state actor. Bailey v. Harleysville Nat’l Bank & Trust, 188 F. App’x 66, 68 (3d Cir. 2006)
(holding that “[b]anks, including state employee credit unions, are not ‘state actors’ for § 1983
purposes.”).
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The other statute that might apply is 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 provides that
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981. As the Court has also previously explained to Mosley, “[t]o establish a claim
under § 1981, the plaintiff must allege (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant
intended to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination
concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., make and enforce
contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence, etc.).” Mosley, 2026 WL 1975733, at *3 (quoting
White v. Wireman, No. 16-675, 2018 WL 1278588, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1251786 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2018)). While Mosley
mentions breach of contract, he fails to allege that he is a member of a racial minority or, most
importantly, that Navy Federal intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race when it
froze his accounts. Rather than race, Mosley blames the intervention by Barbara for his accounts
being frozen. Accordingly, any § 1981 claim will also be dismissed.
B. 	State Law Claims
Mosley’s state law claims for breach of contract and negligence will also be dismissed
because the Court lacks an independent source of jurisdiction to hear them.3 The only
independent basis for jurisdiction would be 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court
jurisdiction over a case “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
3 Having dismissed the federal law claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med.
Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A court may [decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction] under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) when it dismisses all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”).
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exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” While Mosley
alleges he is a Pennsylvania citizen and that Navy Federal is has its corporate headquarters in
Virginia (Compl. at 3), the amount in controversy he claims, $5 million for emotional damages
resulting from negligence and an alleged breach of contract due to his inability to access his
accounts, is entirely unexplained, legally implausible, and therefore deficient to meet the
jurisdictional requirement.
Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.
Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006). The amount in controversy “is determined from the good faith allegations
appearing on the face of the complaint.” Elansari v. Tinder, Inc., 784 F. App’x 114, 115 (3d Cir.
2019) (per curiam) (quoting Spectacor Mgmt. Grp. v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1997));
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he sum
claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a
legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”
(internal quotations and citation omitted)). “Making a claim in good faith means a plaintiff’s
estimations of the amounts recoverable must be realistic and objective, not based on fanciful,
pie-in-the-sky, or simply wishful amounts.” Grossinger v. GoDaddy.com, LLC, No. 26-4700,
2026 WL 2719148, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2026) (quoting Hafer v. Farmers Ins. Agency, No.
22-0808, 2022 WL 17555522, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2022)).
It appears to a legal certainty that Mosley’s claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount. In Pennsylvania, the measure for contract damages is a party’s expectation interest, that
is, having the benefit of its bargain by being put in as good a position as it would have been in
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had the contract not been breached. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 544 F.3d 229, 252
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Ferrer v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 825 A.2d 591, 609 (Pa. 2002)). Mosley does
not allege the amount of funds he was unable to access but, the Court notes, financial
information he provided in in forma pauperis applications he filed in other cases started in 2026
indicated he had no significant balance on deposit. See Mosley v. Rivers Casino, No. 26-5111
(ECF No. 1) (reporting zero cash and listing no bank accounts); Mosley v. Rivers Casino, No. 26-
2994 (ECF No. 1) (reporting zero cash and listing no bank accounts).
Damages for emotional distress are not ordinarily allowed in actions for breach of
contract. Rittenhouse Regency Affiliates v. Passen, 482 A.2d 1042, 1043 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
There are only two exceptions: (1) where the emotional distress accompanies bodily injury and
(2) where the breach is of such a type that serious emotional disturbance is a particularly likely
result. Id. Neither circumstance is a plausible inference from Mosley’s inability to access his
bank account. Finally, to a legal certainty the damages from his negligence claim also does not
amount to the $5 million “pie-in-the-sky” value Mosley asserts. Stated simply, there is reason to
doubt that the damage claim has been made in good faith, considering that Mosley provides no
facts shedding light on how he suffered the amount of damages he claims. Neat-N-Tidy Co. v.
Tradepower (Holdings) Ltd., 777 F. Supp. 1153, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing action for
lack of jurisdiction where “although the complaint’s ad damnum requests damages in excess of
$1,000,000 and $5,000,000 on the Third and Fourth Claims, respectively, the complaint, liberally
construed, contains no allegations from which the Court may infer a good faith basis for recovery
of damages in such an amount”); Grossinger, 2026 WL 2719148, at *3 (finding that the
allegation that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 was not made in good faith where
the breach of contract claim was based on a two month disruption in services provided by the
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defendant at a rate of $65.98 per month). Since, as a legal certainty, Mosley did not sustain
damages exceeding the amount in controversy to support the exercise of diversity jurisdiction,
the state law claims will be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Mosley’s federal law claims will be dismissed as implausible. Because the Court has
provided Mosley with the elements of the federal law claims in previous decisions dismissing
equally terse discrimination allegations as implausible, the Court finds that any attempt at
amendment would prove futile and no leave to amend will be granted. The state law claims will
be dismissed without prejudice so that Mosley can reassert them in a state court where the
amount in controversy will not be implicated.4
BY THE COURT:
__________________________________________
HON. MIA R. PEREZ
4 The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of any state law claim.
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