Nickischer v. Patient First Pennsylvania Medical Group, PLLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
__________________________________________
BRENT NICKISCHER, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-04748-JMG
:
PATIENT FIRST PENNSYLVANIA MEDICAL 	:
GROUP, PLLC, 	:
Defendant. 	:
__________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GALLAGHER, J. 	January 12, 2026
I. 	OVERVIEW
Plaintiff Brent Nickischer brings claims for discriminatory discharge, retaliation, and
failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Defendant
Patient First Pennsylvania Medical Group, PLLC, arising from the termination of his employment
after he requested a permanent reduction in hours as an accommodation. Plaintiff and Defendant
(together, the “Parties”) have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Because Defendant
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment—his
inability to meet the schedule requirements—and Plaintiff failed to address pretext, the Court will
grant summary judgment on discriminatory discharge and retaliation in favor of Defendant. But
because genuine disputes of material fact remain as to Defendant’s good faith and whether
Plaintiff’s requested accommodation would impose an undue hardship, the Court denies summary
judgment on the failure-to-accommodate claim and request for punitive damages.
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II. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a board-certified internal medicine physician. See Statement of Undisputed
Facts in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Pl.’s SUF”), ¶ 1 (ECF No. 35-1); Def.’s
Statement of Disputed Material Facts (“Resp. Pl.’s SUF”), ¶ 1 (ECF No. 41). He began working
for Defendant as a part-time physician at Defendant’s urgent care facility in Easton, Pennsylvania
on or about June 5, 2018. See Pl.’s SUF, ¶¶ 5, 7 (ECF No. 35-1); Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶¶ 5, 7 (ECF
No. 41). This part-time work allowed him to maintain an active clinical practice. J.A. at 145-46
(ECF No. 36).
The 	Parties 	executed 	an 	Employment 	Agreement 	at 	the 	inception 	of 	Plaintiff’s
employment. J.A. at 192-204 (ECF No. 36); Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in
Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s SUF”), ¶ 4 (ECF No. 34); Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts (“Resp. Def.’s SUF”), ¶ 4 (ECF No. 39). Between June 2018 and
September 2022, part-time physicians like Plaintiff were expected to work 28 weekend hours
during months with eight weekend days and 35 weekend hours during months with nine or ten
weekend days. Def.’s SUF, ¶¶ 6, 8 (ECF No. 34); Resp. Def.’s SUF, ¶¶ 6, 8 (ECF No. 39). On
October 1, 2022, Defendant amended the schedule guidelines for all part-time physicians,
changing the hours to 24 hours and 30 hours, respectively. Def.’s SUF, ¶¶ 7-8 (ECF No. 34); Resp.
Def.’s SUF, ¶¶ 7-8 (ECF No. 39). Specifically, the amended schedule guidelines state:
Physicians and extenders must work a ‘full’ schedule, which is
based on the following precepts:
. . .
Part-time (PT)
• 	24 weekend hours for months with 8 weekend days
• 	30 weekend hours for months with 9 or 10 weekend days.
PRN
• 	12 weekend hours for months with 8 weekend days
• 	18 weekend hours for months with 9 or 10 weekend days
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J.A. at 209 (ECF No. 36). Plaintiff understood these requirements and knew that failing to meet
them could be deemed a breach of the agreement. Def.’s SUF, ¶¶ 12-13 (ECF No. 34); Resp. Def.’s
SUF, ¶¶ 12-13 (ECF No. 39).
Shortly after starting his part-time job with Defendant, Plaintiff began working full-time
for Optum Services, Inc. (“Optum”) as a medical director in December 2018. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 13 (ECF
No. 35-1); Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 13 (ECF No. 41). There, his hours were Monday through Friday,
8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., as well as weekends once every few months. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 14 (ECF No. 35-
1); Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 14 (ECF No. 41). He also made himself available to direct reports from 7:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Def.’s SUF, ¶ 20 (ECF No. 34); Resp. Def.’s SUF, ¶ 20 (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff
worked for Optum exclusively from home, reviewing utilization management cases for patients
who were hospitalized. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 14 (ECF No. 35-1); Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 14 (ECF No. 41).
Plaintiff states that he has been suffering from low back pain since 2000. J.A. at 16 (ECF
No. 36). He had an MRI in August 2000, which revealed a “moderate size central to paracentral
disc herniation at L3-L4” and “disc bulging at L4-L5 and L5-S1.” J.A. at 382 (ECF No. 36). After
a car accident in November 2009, Plaintiff had another MRI. Id. at 67. That MRI revealed “[m]ild
degenerative disk [sic] disease and mild posterior element degenerative change at L3-4, L4-5, and
L5-S1,” “[h]igh intensity zones in the midline of the posterior disk [sic] anulus at L3-4 and L4-5,”
and “[v]ery small central disk [sic] protrusion at L5-S1.” Id. at 427. Plaintiff testified that he has
low back pain daily and self-treats with naproxen sodium and home exercises. Id. at 18, 56-57, 69.
By late May 2023, Plaintiff states that his low back pain worsened, so he sought a reduced
work schedule with Defendant. See Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 17 (ECF No. 35-1); Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 17 (ECF
No. 41). Plaintiff engaged his colleague from Optum, Dr. Neil Morgenstern, for assistance. Pl.’s
SUF, ¶ 17 (ECF No. 35-1); Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 17 (ECF No. 41). Dr. Morgenstern is a physiatrist.
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J.A. at 338 (ECF No. 36). In layman’s terms, a physiatrist seeks to “get patients to get back to their
function where they were before.” Id. Dr. Morgenstern and Plaintiff worked directly together at
Optum at the time, but Plaintiff subsequently became Dr. Morgenstern’s supervisor. Def.’s SUF,
¶ 26 (ECF No. 34); Resp. Def.’s SUF, ¶ 26 (ECF No. 39); J.A. at 339 (ECF No. 36).
Dr. Morgenstern reviewed the MRI reports from 2000 and 2009 and a report from a pain
specialist dated January 15, 2010. Def.’s SUF, ¶ 27 (ECF No. 34); Resp. Def.’s SUF, ¶ 27 (ECF
No. 39). Dr. Morgenstern met with Plaintiff via Zoom. J.A. at 347 (ECF No. 36). He asked Plaintiff
for his medical history, primary complaints, and conducted an examination. J.A. at 350 (ECF No.
36). After the appointment, Dr. Morgenstern prepared a letter stating that Plaintiff could not work
more than “a six-hour shift twice a month.” Def.’s SUF, ¶ 29 (ECF No. 34); Resp. Def.’s SUF, ¶
29 (ECF No. 39). To support that recommendation, Dr. Morgenstern specifically explained that
Plaintiff suffered from disc herniation at L3-L4 and disc bulging at L5-S1, as supported by the
2000 and 2009 MRIs. J.A. at 219 (ECF No. 36). He further explained that Plaintiff’s “pain radiates
to the left foot accompanied with tingling of the left foot” and is “exacerbated by prolonged
standing greater than six hours and lifting.” Id.
On June 1, 2023, Plaintiff sent Defendant’s Physician Relations Employment Manager,
Karen Guldenschuh, the accommodation request prepared by Dr. Morgenstern. See Pl.’s SUF, ¶
20 (ECF No. 35-1); Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 20 (ECF No. 41); J.A. at 223; Def.’s SUF, ¶ 31 (ECF No.
34); Resp. Def.’s SUF, ¶ 31 (ECF No. 39). Ms. Guldenschuh asked Plaintiff how long he needed
the accommodation, to which he explained it was a permanent request and provided Defendant a
supplemental letter from Dr. Morgenstern. Def.’s SUF, ¶¶ 33-34 (ECF No. 34); Resp. Def.’s SUF,
¶¶ 33-34 (ECF No. 39). Ms. Guldenschuh then forwarded the new letter to Defendant’s Director
of Physician Relations, Jane Green. J.A. at 222 (ECF No. 36).
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Less than 24 hours later after receiving Plaintiff’s request, Ms. Green emailed Ms.
Guldenschuh: “I’ve discussed with Steve [McCoy] and Eddie [Sowers]. I’ll be sending him a
notice letter next week. ” J.A. at 222, 302 (ECF No. 36). On June 5, 2023, Ms. Green sent
Plaintiff a letter advising that his employment has been terminated, effective August 3, 2023. Id.
at 224. Defendant based this on Plaintiff being “unable to meet the schedule requirements,” which
Defendant deemed an “essential function” of Plaintiff’s position. Id. For Plaintiff’s final weeks
working for Defendant, Plaintiff worked 12 hours per month. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 30 (ECF No. 35-1);
Resp. Pl.’s SUF, ¶ 30 (ECF No. 41).
The Parties now file cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendant moves for summary
judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims and Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.1 See generally
Mem. of L. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem. L. Supp.”) (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff
moves for partial summary judgment as to discriminatory discharge and retaliation. See generally
Mem. of L. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem. L. Supp.”) (ECF No. 35-2).
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) provides that the district court must “grant
summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Essentially, the Court must analyze “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
1 Twice the Court extended the page limit from twenty pages to thirty pages, and twice
Defendant 	ignored 	the 	Court’s 	Policies 	and 	Procedures. 	See 	Policies 	and 	Procedures,
https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/sites/paed/files/documents/procedures/galpol.pdf 	(last 	visited
Dec. 29, 2025) (“Opening briefs filed in support of and in opposition to a motion should be limited
to twenty pages. This includes the table of contents and any attachments or addenda.” (emphasis
added)).
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law.” Id. at 251-52. A genuine issue of fact exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. “A fact is material if it ‘might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v.
Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). At this
stage of litigation, all facts presented are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Daniels v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 22-1790, 2023 WL 2707178, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2023).
To survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must
present affirmative evidence of specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57; Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing Pa. Prot. & Advoc., Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 379 (3d Cir.
2005)) (“Although the non-moving party receives the benefit of all factual inferences in the court’s
consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to some
evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact.”). “[S]ummary judgment is
essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the
motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal
memoranda, or oral argument.” Colkitt, 455 F.3d at 201; FED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring
any party asserting a fact to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record”). Statements of
Disputed Facts are not evidence, so a “district court may not rely solely on” them to justify a
finding that a dispute of material fact exists. Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812,
820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (May 5, 2006) (citation omitted).
In applying this standard, “the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Barton &
Pittinos v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 181 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Meinhardt v.
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Unisys Corp. (In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig.), 74 F.3d 420, 433 n.10 (3d Cir. 1996). At the summary
judgment stage, the Court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and determine the ultimate truth of
the allegations. Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019); see also
InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2003) (“When analyzing the
evidence under this summary judgment standard, a court is not to weigh the evidence or make
credibility determinations; these are tasks left for the fact-finder.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Instead, the Court’s task is to identify and explain the law governing the matter, and
then, in light of that law, determine whether there remains a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id.
When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the standard of review does not
change. See Appelmans v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987). However, if “upon
review of cross motions for summary judgment [the Court] find[s] no genuine dispute over
material facts, then [the Court] will order judgment to be entered in favor of the party deserving
judgment in light of the law and undisputed facts.” Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298,
302 (3d Cir. 1998).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. Discriminatory Discharge
Plaintiff brings a claim for discriminatory discharge in violation of the ADA in Count I of
his Complaint. Discrimination claims under the ADA, like many other discrimination claims, are
governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973); see Law v. Garden State Tanning, 159 F. Supp. 2d 787, 791 n.2
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to employment discrimination
claims under ADA). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Law, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 791. If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of
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discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to “present a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the negative employment decision.” Id. To overcome summary judgment, “the plaintiff
must then show that the reason presented by the defendant is pretextual.” Id.
The 	Parties 	bring 	cross-motions 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	disability
discriminatory discharge claim. Defendant argues that: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish any element
of 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of 	disability 	discrimination; 	(2) 	Defendant 	had 	a 	legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, and (3) Plaintiff cannot establish that
Defendant’s actions are pretextual. Relying on the termination letter, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant discharged him because it “regarded” him as disabled and that his claim is a “direct
evidence” case not subject to McDonnell Douglas.
1. 	Plaintiff’s Prima facie Case
To state a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must show that “(1) he
is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations . . . ; and (3) he has
suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Gardner v.
SEPTA, 824 F. App’x 100, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2020) (omission in original) (quoting Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)). While Plaintiff has established a prima
facie case and survives Defendant’s affirmative motion at this stage, genuine disputes of material
fact still remain.
i. 	Disabled Person Within Meaning of the ADA
A plaintiff is disabled for purposes of the ADA if he (1) has a “physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more” of her “major life activities”; (2) has “a record
of such an impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” Eshleman v. Patrick
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Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). The 2008 amendments
to the ADA provide that “major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). “The question of whether an individual meets the definition of disability
under this part should not demand extensive analysis,” because the statute is to be construed in
favor of the party claiming to be disabled. Woods v. AstraZeneca Pharms., L.P., 659 F. Supp. 3d
512, 532-33, 535 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not “disabled.” Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 18 (ECF No.
37). Defendant acknowledges Plaintiff’s 2000 and 2009 MRI scans, a physician’s note from 2010,
and his “brief zoom interaction” with Dr. Morgenstern, but asserts that Plaintiff’s testimony
demonstrates that he has been able to work full-time and beyond twelve hours per month. Id. at
19. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff provided no evidence showing that his low back injury
restricts his ability to work or perform major life activities. Id. at 21.
Plaintiff counters that Dr. Morgenstern’s letter establishes that Plaintiff does suffer from a
painful physical impairment, i.e., disc herniation at L3-L4 and disc bulging at L5-S1, as supported
by the 2000 and 2009 MRIs. Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem. L.
Opp’n”), at 4 (ECF No. 40). Dr. Morgenstern explains that the “pain radiates to the left foot
accompanied with tingling of the left foot” and is “exacerbated by prolonged standing greater than
six hours and lifting.” J.A. at 219 (ECF No. 36). He further explains that the pain persists, even
after taking naproxen, after working more than a twelve-hour shift. Id. Plaintiff also points out that
his job with Optum is fully remote and sedentary, unlike his job with Defendant. Pl.’s Mem. L.
Opp’n, at 4 (ECF No. 40).
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The Court agrees that Plaintiff has pointed to sufficient evidence to show that he is disabled
and survive Defendant’s summary judgment motion. His low back pain interferes with his ability
to stand for extended periods of time, which constitutes a “major life activity.” However, Plaintiff
has not produced evidence to conclusively establish that Defendant “regarded” him as disabled, as
he argues in his affirmative motion. See 11 M OORE’S FED. P RAC . - C IV. § 56.40(1)(c) (“When the
movant bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the movant must produce evidence that would
conclusively support its right to a judgment after trial should the nonmovant fail to rebut the
evidence.”). To be “regarded as” disabled, Plaintiff had to demonstrate that he was “subjected to
an action prohibited under the ADA because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”
Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 245 (emphasis added) (citation modified) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3));
see also Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 989 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2021). “An employer regards a
person as disabled when it misinterprets information about an employee’s limitations to conclude
that the employee is incapable of performing his or her job requirements.” Eshleman, 961 F.3d at
245 (citation modified).
Plaintiff proffers Ms. Green’s letter to show that Defendant undoubtedly “regarded” him
as disabled. See Pl.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 11-12 (ECF No. 35-2). But that is far from showing
Defendant discriminatorily discharged Plaintiff “because of an actual or perceived physical,” such
that “no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); Dunkin
Donuts Franchising LLC v. Claudia III, LLC, No. CIV.A. 14-2293, 2015 WL 4243534, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. July 14, 2015) (quoting 11 M OORE’S FED. P RAC . - C IV. § 56.40(1)(c)). The very evidence
Plaintiff points to could also lead a reasonable jury to conclude Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s
employment because he could not meet the schedule requirements. J.A. at 224 (ECF No. 36).
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Accordingly, neither Party is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff being disabled
or “regarded as” disabled.
ii. 	Qualified to Perform Essential Functions
The Parties dispute whether working four or five 6-hour shifts per month constitutes an
“essential function” of Plaintiff’s job. “A job duty is an ‘essential function’ when it is
‘fundamental’ to the position.” Bevan v. Cnty. of Lackawanna, No. 3:17-CV-0919, 2017 WL
6336595, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). A job function can be
deemed “essential” because, for example, it is “the reason the position exists is to perform that
function,” few employees are available to perform the job function, or the function is highly
specialized such that the person was hired to fulfill that function. See Turner v. Hershey Chocolate
U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 612 (3d Cir. 2006). However, it does not include “marginal” functions. Id.
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).
“Whether a particular function is essential is a factual determination that must be made on
a case by case basis based upon all relevant evidence, which should typically be left for the jury to
resolve.” Bevan, 2017 WL 6336595, at *4 (citation modified) (quoting Turner, 440 F.3d at 612);
see Ragusa v. Lehigh Univ., No. CV 18-3362, 2021 WL 1175153, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021)
(collecting cases). Evidence to consider may include: “(i) [t]he employer’s judgment as to which
functions are essential; (ii) [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants . . . ; (iii) [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) [t]he
consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) [t]he terms of a collective
bargaining agreement; (vi) [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) [t]he
current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” Turner, 440 F.3d at 612 (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(3)).
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Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant are entitled to summary judgment on this issue. On one
hand, the amended schedule guidelines required Plaintiff to work 24 to 30 hours per month
(depending on the number of weekend days per month), and Defendant considers this to be an
essential function of Plaintiff’s employment. See J.A. at 209, 267-69 (ECF No. 36). On the other
hand, the employment agreement does not set Plaintiff’s hours in stone. J.A. at 194 (ECF No. 36).
Rather, it states Plaintiff’s anticipated hours. Defendant amending the required hours during
Plaintiff’s employment also cuts against the hours requirement being an essential function of his
job. J.A. at 209 (ECF No. 36). Moreover, Plaintiff worked that accommodated schedule for his
remaining two months with Defendant. Def.’s Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Partial Mot. for Summ. J.
(“Def.’s Br. Opp’n”), at 8 (ECF No. 42).
iii. 	Terminated as a Result of Discrimination
The Parties also dispute whether Plaintiff’s termination was the result of discrimination.
To establish causation, “a plaintiff must show that [his] disability was a ‘determinative factor’ in
their employer’s decision to terminate [him].” Smith v. Presidio Networked Sols., Inc., No. CV 22-
736, 2024 WL 3203314, at *18 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2024) (citing Campo v. Mid-Atl. Packaging
Specialties, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 3d 362, 380-81 (E.D. Pa. 2021)). This analysis is “highly context-
specific.” Emmell v. Phoenixville Hosp. Co., LLC, 303 F. Supp. 3d 314, 332 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997). Courts consider
the “(1) temporal proximity between a protected activity and the adverse employment action, (2)
whether there is a pattern of antagonism following protected conduct, and (3) whether the record,
taken as a whole, raises an inference of causation.” Smondrowski v. Edgewood Co., Inc., No. CV
24-1297, 2025 WL 3678885, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2025) (quoting Garcia v. Vertical Screen,
592 F. Supp. 3d 409, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2022)).
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The temporal proximity between Plaintiff submitting his accommodation request and
Defendant deciding to terminate his employment was less than 24 hours. J.A. at 222, 302 (ECF
No. 36). This “unduly suggestive temporal proximity” gives rise to the inference—viewing the
facts 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	favor—that 	Defendant 	terminated 	Plaintiff 	due 	to 	his 	disability. 	See
Smondrowski, 2025 WL 3678885, at *4–5 (quoting Tirk v. Dubrook, Inc., 673 F. App’x 238, 241
(3d Cir. 2016)). Defendant’s quick decision to discharge Plaintiff, coupled with Ms. Green’s use
of a smiley face emoji in her email, are enough for Plaintiff to survive Defendant’s summary
judgment motion. See J.A. at 222 (ECF No. 36).
However, Plaintiff does not prevail on his affirmative motion. Plaintiff points to the
termination letter to show that he could have only been fired because of his injuries. See Pl.’s Mem.
L. Supp., at 11-12 (ECF No. 35-2). But viewing inferences in Defendant’s favor this time, it is
possible that a reasonable juror could find Defendant terminated Plaintiff so quickly simply
because there was no way it could accommodate Plaintiff’s two-shifts-per-month request.
2. 	Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
Because Plaintiff established a prima facie case for discriminatory discharge, the burden
of production shifts to Defendant to state a “facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Plaintiff’s termination.” Slayton v. Sneaker Villa, Inc., No. CV 15-0074, 2017 WL 1048360, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2017) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)). This
“relatively light” burden is satisfied if Defendant “introduces ‘evidence which, taken as true, would
permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment
decision.’” Id. (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763). “At this stage, the defendant need not prove that
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the articulated reason actually motivated its conduct.” Id. (quoting Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d
417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).
Defendant has pointed to a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his
employment: Plaintiff is unable to meet the schedule requirements. Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 25
(ECF No. 37). Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden of production.
3. 	Pretext
Defendant proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination, so
the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show it was pretextual. Slayton, 2017 WL 1048360, at *9
(citing Willis v. UPMC Child.’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644–45 (3d Cir. 2015)). “[T]he
standard for demonstrating pretext ‘places a difficult burden on the plaintiff[.]’” Matos v. Merck
& Co., 643 F. App’x 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). To avoid summary
judgment, Plaintiff “must point to some evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably either
(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer’s action.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764). He can do this by
“pointing to weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Fuentes,
32 F.3d at 765).
Despite facing a “difficult burden,” Plaintiff opted not to address pretext at all. Rather,
Plaintiff hangs his hat on characterizing his claim as a “direct evidence” case and argues pretext is
irrelevant. See Pl.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 18 (ECF No. 35-2); Pl.’s Mem. L. Opp’n, at 11-13 (ECF
No. 40). In his affirmative motion, Plaintiff insists that Ms. Green’s letter is “direct evidence” of
Defendant’s discriminatory animus. Pl.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 17 (ECF No. 35-2). But viewing Ms.
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Green’s letter in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (i.e., Defendant), Plaintiff was fired
because he would “be unable to meet the schedule requirements.” See J.A. at 224 (ECF No. 36).
Indeed, the plain language of her letter says so. Id. And despite having a second chance to address
pretext in his opposition brief, Plaintiff stopped short at the second stage of McDonnell Douglas.
See Pl.’s Mem. L. Opp’n, at 11-13 (ECF No. 40).
Plaintiff bore the burden of establishing pretext. Because Defendant pointed to a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment (i.e., he could not meet the
schedule requirements) and Plaintiff failed to address pretext at all, summary judgment is
GRANTED for Defendant on Plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim.
B. Retaliation
Plaintiff also brings an ADA retaliation claim in Count II of his Complaint, and the Parties
filed cross-motions on this claim. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to
this claim as well. See Hanafy v. Hill Int’l, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 3d 419, 432 (E.D. Pa. 2023). By
now, the framework is familiar: Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case for retaliation,
Defendant must then offer a legitimate non-discriminatory justification for termination Plaintiff,
and finally, Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s proffered justification is merely pretext. See id.
at 433. A claim for retaliation requires Plaintiff to “show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity
(such as . . . requesting a reasonable accommodation under the ADA . . . ), (2) he suffered an
adverse employment decision, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 438.
Defendant collapses the “causation” and “legitimate non-discriminatory justification”
inquiries by arguing that it established a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating
Plaintiff’s employment. Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 28 (ECF No. 37); Def.’s Br. Opp’n, at 8-11 (ECF
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No. 42). While Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on Plaintiff failing to state a
prima facie case,2 Defendant has pointed to a legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff’s
employment. Specifically, Defendant terminated Plaintiff because he could not meet the schedule
requirements. Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 27 (ECF No. 37); Def.’s Br. Opp’n, at 9 (ECF No. 42).
But once again, Plaintiff did not establish pretext. Rather than explain how Defendant’s
purported legitimate non-discriminatory justification constitutes pretext, Plaintiff focused on
arguing why he does not have to establish pretext. Pl.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 8-9 (ECF No. 35-2).
Plaintiff insists that this is a “direct evidence” case because Defendant discharged him based on
Ms. Green’s review of the letter. See id. at 6-9.
But Ms. Green’s letter is not the smoking gun evidence that Plaintiff thinks it is. The very
letter that Plaintiff submitted to Defendant states that he could not work more than two 6-hour
shifts per month. J.A. at 221 (ECF No. 36). Ms. Green was not jumping to conclusions when she
said that Plaintiff could not meet the schedule requirements. Id. at 224. Plaintiff’s own letter said
so. Accordingly, Ms. Green’s letter to Plaintiff is not unassailable “direct evidence” of retaliation.
Because Defendant stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for terminating
Plaintiff’s employment and Plaintiff declined to address pretext at all, summary judgment is
GRANTED for Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
2 “When the temporal proximity between the protected activity and adverse action is unduly
suggestive, this is sufficient standing alone to create an inference of causality and defeat summary
judgment.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citation modified) (quoting LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d
Cir. 2007)). That is the case here. Defendant decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment within
24 hours’ notice of his accommodation request.
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C. Failure to Accommodate (Count III)3
Plaintiff also brings an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim in Count III of his Complaint.
“Under the ADA, an employer has a duty to provide reasonable accommodations to people with
disabilities.” Lewis v. Univ. of Pa., 779 F. App’x 920, 923 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Colwell v. Rite
Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2010)). Once an employer knows its employee wants
accommodations 	for 	a 	disability, 	“the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the 	employer 	to engage 	in 	the
accommodation process.” Campo, 564 F. Supp. 3d at 389. An employer breaches its duty to
provide reasonable accommodations if it “fail[s] to provide an accommodation that is reasonable”
or “fail[s] to engage in a good faith interactive process to identify accommodations.” Parrish v.
Cnty. of Del., No. CV 22-4552, 2024 WL 3295585, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2024) (quoting Lewis,
779 F. App’x at 923).
To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim for failure to engage in the interactive
process, Plaintiff must prove: (1) Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s disability; (2) Plaintiff “requested
accommodations or assistance for her disability;” (3) Defendant failed to “make a good faith effort
to assist [Plaintiff] in seeking such accommodations or assistance; and (4) [Plaintiff] could have
been reasonably accommodated but for [Defendant’s] lack of good faith.” Arana v. Temple Univ.
Health Sys., No. CV 17-525, 2018 WL 2063600, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2018) (citing Capps v.
Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319-20) (other
3 	In 	Defendant’s 	brief 	supporting 	its 	affirmative 	motion, 	Defendant’s 	failure-to-
accommodate arguments fall within the section arguing that Plaintiff’s discrimination claim fails.
See Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 10-17 (ECF No. 37). To the best of the Court’s understanding, this
should have been a standalone section of the brief. See id. at 6 (“As it relates to his failure to
accommodate claim, Patient First engaged in the interactive process questioning as to the duration
of Dr. Nickischer’s limitation but could not accommodate Dr. Nickischer’s request without
suffering undue hardship, nor was it required to under established law.”). Accordingly, the Court
will treat it as such.
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citations omitted). Defendant claims that: (1) Plaintiff’s accommodation request is unreasonable;
(2) it had no obligation to make a good-faith effort to assist Plaintiff, or alternatively, it did make
such an effort; and (3) the requested accommodation would cause undue hardship to Defendant.4
See Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 11-17 (ECF No. 37).
Start with the accommodation being “unreasonable.” Defendant maintains that granting
this request would “remove the essential function of the part-time physician role, which included
working four or five weekend shifts per month.” Id. at 12. This accommodation was unreasonable,
Defendant argues, because it purportedly would require other physicians to regularly exceed their
hours. Id. at 13.
But Congress already recognized that job restructuring, modified work schedules, and
reassignment to a vacant position all can constitute a “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA.
See Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2005)) (holding “there is nothing
inherently unreasonable” about “requiring an employer to furnish an otherwise qualified disabled
employee with assistance related to her ability to get to work,” given Congress’s stated views on
what can qualify as a reasonable accommodation). Moreover, Defendant hinges its argument on
the hours requirement being an “essential function,” which is a question of fact for the jury. Bevan,
2017 WL 6336595, at *4 (citation modified) (quoting Turner, 440 F.3d at 612); see Ragusa, 2021
WL 1175153, at *3 (collecting cases). Accordingly, a jury could find that Plaintiff’s permanently
modified schedule request was reasonable.
Next, Defendant insists that it did not have to participate in the interactive process because
no reasonable accommodation exists. See Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 13 (ECF No. 37). Alternatively,
4 To the extent that Defendant does challenge Plaintiff’s disability, the Court has already
addressed that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has introduced
evidence that he is disabled.
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Defendant asserts that inquiring whether the accommodations would be temporary or permanent
qualified as “engaging in the interactive process.” See id. at 13-14.
Once Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s disability and desire for accommodations, Defendant
was obligated to engage in the accommodation process and “make a good-faith effort to seek
accommodations.” See Campo, 564 F. Supp. 3d at 389 (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 315, 317)
(other citations omitted). The regulations explain that “it may be necessary for the covered entity
to initiate an informal, interactive process with the” employee to “determine the appropriate
reasonable accommodation.” Doe v. Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, 472 F. Supp. 3d 115, 141 (E.D.
Pa. 2020) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). “This process should identify the precise limitations
resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). “An employer fails to engage in the interactive
process when it knows of the employee’s disability and desire for accommodations but nonetheless
offers no accommodations or assistance in finding them and simply sits back and continues to
document the employee’s failures.” Campo, 564 F. Supp. 3d at 389 (citation modified) (quoting
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 315).
Here, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant made a good-faith effort. Not even
24 hours after Plaintiff submitted his accommodation request, Ms. Green wrote: “I’ve discussed
with Steve [McCoy] and Eddie [Sowers]. I’ll be sending him a notice letter next week,” followed
by a smiley face emoji. J.A. at 222, 302 (ECF No. 36). Indeed, the timing of Ms. Green’s email
exchange with Ms. Guldenschuh, coupled with Ms. Green’s lack of communication with the
Easton 	clinic, 	raises 	a 	factual 	question 	as 	to 	whether 	Defendant 	investigated 	Plaintiff’s
accommodation request at all. Id. at 222, 302, 317-18; see Parrish, 2024 WL 3295585, at *7
(denying summary judgment where employer did not investigate alternative accommodations once
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it determined employee could not work mandatory overtime hours). Ms. Green’s use of a smiley
face emoji when discussing Plaintiff’s termination further muddies Defendant’s claim of good
faith. This dispute over good faith alone makes summary judgment is inappropriate. See Parrish,
2024 WL 3295585, at *6 (“[W]here there is a genuine dispute about whether the employer acted
in good faith, summary judgment will typically be precluded.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Lewis, 779 F. App’x. at 923)).
Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s accommodation request would impose an undue
hardship on Defendant. Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 16 (ECF No. 37). Claiming a requested
accommodation would be an “undue hardship” on the entity’s business operations is a defense to
a discrimination charge.5 Dinger v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., No. CV 19-2324-WB, 2022 WL 6746260,
5 “The term ‘undue hardship’ means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense”
in light of several factors:
i. 	the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
chapter;
ii. 	the overall financial resources of the facility 	or facilities
involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on
expenses 	and 	resources, 	or 	the impact 	otherwise of 	such
accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
iii. the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its
facilities;
iv. the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce 	of 	such 	entity; 	the 	geographic 	separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities
in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)-(B)).
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at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2022) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d)). Defendant asserts that providing
Plaintiff a permanently reduced schedule would require other physicians to work more shifts than
they agreed to work, and finding employees to take on additional responsibilities would have been
difficult. Def.’s Mem. L. Supp., at 16 (ECF No. 37). But Ms. Green’s testimony is the sole factual
basis of those arguments. That would require the Court to take Ms. Green at her word. And, as
Plaintiff has countered, Ms. Green did not confer with the Easton clinic before coming to that
determination. Pl.’s Mem. L. Opp’n, at 18 (ECF No. 40). The record also shows that Defendant
offered a “PRN” position at 12 weekend hours per month for months with eight weekend days, or
18 weekend hours per month for months with nine or ten weekend days. See J.A. at 209 (ECF No.
36). A jury could infer that it would not be, in fact, an undue hardship for Defendant to offer the
same hours to Plaintiff.
There is a genuine factual dispute as to Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim. The Court
therefore DENIES Defendant’s motion.
D. Punitive Damages
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for all of his claims. The only claim that survives
summary judgment is his failure-to-accommodate claim, so the Court will only consider this claim.
“Punitive damages are available under the ADA when the complaining party demonstrates
that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or with reckless indifference.”
Gagliardo v. Connaught Lab’ys, Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation modified)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)) The “employer must at least discriminate in the face of a
perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.” Id. (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n,
527 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1999)) (holding employee produced sufficient evidence for punitive
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damages where employer knew she had Multiple Sclerosis, employee requested accommodations
on multiple occasions, and employer refused to act).
At this juncture, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
There is a factual dispute as to whether Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference.
Again, Defendant was not only quick to fire Plaintiff upon receiving his accommodation request
for his low back pain, Ms. Green’s email can be construed as she was happy to do so.
V. 	CONCLUSION
The Court finds that no reasonable fact finder could reach a judgment for Plaintiff as to his
discriminatory discharge and retaliation claims. However, Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute of
material fact for his failure-to-accommodate claim.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s claims
for discriminatory discharge and retaliation claims. The Court DENIES summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ John M. Gallagher
JOHN M. GALLAGHER
United States District Court Judge
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