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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEYONNA GARLAND, 	: 	Civil No. 1:25-CV-01318
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	:
Commissioner of Social Security 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) make disability determinations using a
five-step sequential analysis which first establishes a residual functional capacity
(RFC) for a claimant and then determines whether an individual with the claimant’s
same age, education, and RFC could perform either their past work or any work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy. ALJs use a number of tools
and experts to aid in this determination, including vocational experts (VEs) whose
testimony often informs and supports the decision of the ALJ as to whether any jobs
exist which the claimant could perform. Indeed, “vocational expert testimony may
provide substantial evidence to support an ALJ’s finding at Step 5.” Evans v.
Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-00554, 2023 WL 2761125, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2023)
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(citing Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 616 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The Commissioner can
also rely on testimony from a VE to meet its step-five evidentiary burden”)). But it
is also axiomatic that an ALJ must address and resolve any material ambiguities and
inconsistencies between vocational expert testimony, the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT), the reference work upon which the expert relies upon when rendering
an opinion, and the ALJ’s decision, or remand may be appropriate. See Boone v.
Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2003); Sanchez v. Dudek, No. 3:24-CV-00240,
2025 WL 924046, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2025); Smith v. Astrue, 961 F. Supp. 2d
620, 658 (D. Del. 2013); Williams v. Barnhart, 424 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (E.D. Pa.
2006).
So it is here. In the instant case, the ALJ based his decision that the plaintiff,
Keyonna Garland, was not disabled upon vocational expert testimony that was
flawed and fatally ambiguous in at least two ways. First, the vocational expert’s
testimony was internally inconsistent in that the VE identified three jobs the plaintiff
could perform if limited to only occasional interaction with others, yet later seemed
to testify that this same limitation would be totally disabling. The VE’s testimony
was also seemingly inconsistent with the DOT since all of the occupations identified
by the ALJ seem to conflict with the RFC’s limitation to no fast-paced production
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work, since they are assembly line occupations which are definitionally fast-paced
production rate work. In our view, the ALJ’s failure to address these ambiguities and
inconsistencies results in a decision which cannot be sustained when viewed
pragmatically in light of economic realities. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
below, we will remand this case for further consideration by the Commissioner.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
On April 27, 2022, Keyonna Garland filed an application for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), alleging disability beginning December 15, 2021, due to
anxiety and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 17, 267). Garland was born on October 22, 1986,
and was thirty-five years old, which is defined as a younger individual under the
Social Security guidelines, on the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 73). She had a
limited education, having left school in tenth grade, but later obtained her GED, and
had past work as a collections clerk. (Tr. 43, 53).
Garland alleges limitations in her ability to perform work-related activity
based upon her mental impairments, specifically, she testified she is unable to get
along with others and deal with social interaction due to anxiety. (Tr. 41). With
regard to her mental impairments, the ALJ aptly summarized the longitudinal
treatment records:
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The claimant has a history of bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, and panic disorder with medication management including
Prozac, Remeron, Mirtazapine, Alprazolam, and Latuda along with
counseling and outpatient therapy services in 2017 and 2018 (Exhibits
1F, 2F, and 3F). She continued with medication management (Exhibit
10F).
In 	February 	2022, 	the 	claimant 	referred 	herself 	for 	worsening
depression and anxiousness when she stopped taking her medications
three months prior. She noted manic episodes with decreased sleep,
rapid 	speech, 	irritability, 	and 	impulsive 	shopping 	and 	depressive
episodes in which she is not capable of doing anything due to a lack of
motivation and increased sleep. The mental status examination was
normal with no abnormal thought content, including paranoia. Memory
and concentration were intact as were judgment and insight. Her
psychiatric 	medications 	were 	restarted 	with 	Latuda 	and 	Vistaril
(Exhibit 	5F/15-19). 	Subsequent 	mental 	status 	examinations 	were
similar. Despite some mental status examinations finding the claimant
with sad mood and anxiousness, her functioning has been intact and
normal for thought content and process. She is oriented to person, place,
time, and situation. Attention and concentration are intact. She denies
serious symptoms of suicidal or homicidal ideation, and her allegations
of paranoia do not match her presentation at the examinations with no
paranoia or delusional thought. Insight and judgment are fair with
medication compliance issues (Exhibits 5F/20-36, 8F, and 14F). The
March 	2024 	examination 	finds 	the 	claimant 	doing 	better 	with
medication compliance including Zyprexa and Vyvanse (Exhibit 14F).
Additionally, the neurology and primary care providers note the
claimant is alert and oriented to person, place, and time and with normal
mood and affect during the examinations (Exhibits 9F, 12F, 13F, and
15F).
(Tr. 24).
In addition to the medical records, three experts opined on Garland’s mental
impairments and all conceded her functional abilities would be limited by her mental
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impairments 	but 	reached 	different 	conclusions 	regarding 	the 	extent 	of 	these
limitations. On this score, her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Ankit Jain, concluded in
December 2022 that Garland’s mental impairments were completely disabling at
least in part due to her inability to interact appropriately with others. According to
Dr. Jain, Garland would be unable to meet competitive standards for sustaining
concentration, persistence, and pace and in getting along with coworkers or peers
without distracting them and had no useful ability to keep social interactions free of
excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness, or suspiciousness or to ignore
or avoid distractions while working. (Tr. 609-10). Dr. Jain also opined that Garland
would frequently be off-task and miss more than four days of work per month. (Tr.
611). Dr. Jain explained that Garland would be unable to sustain work on a full-time
consistent basis because she experiences extreme anxiety and panic attacks and
attends multiple visits and therapy. (Id.)
Two State agency experts also opined on Garland’s mental abilities and
opined that the plaintiff’s mental impairments were severe. Nonetheless, each of
these experts concluded that she was only mildly limited in her ability to understand,
remember, or apply information and adapt or manage herself, and moderately
limited in her ability to interact with others and concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace. (Tr. 75-76, 83). With regard to the plaintiff’s ability to interact with others,
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both experts, who had never examined or interacted with the plaintiff, concluded
that, “although she may have some difficulty in public social interaction due to her
MH impairments, the claimant has the ability to maintain socially appropriate
behavior . . . She also has the ability to get along with others reasonably well, ask
simple questions, and accept instruction/advice.” (Tr. 78, 86).1
Despite these conflicting views of the plaintiff’s ability to interact with others,
the ALJ seemed to embrace her limitations in this arena at the hearing on May 13,
2024, and properly posed hypothetical scenarios to the vocational expert including
these limitations. Thus, when the ALJ asked the VE what jobs an individual of the
plaintiff’s age, education, and RFC, could perform, the hypothetical included mental
1 In considering whether the plaintiff experienced understanding and memory
limitations, these experts also concluded, “Although she might have some difficulty,
understanding, retaining, and following complex, detailed instructions, the claimant
can understand, retain, and follow simple task instructions, i.e., perform one and
two-step tasks. Her basic memory processes are intact for both recent and remote
events. She can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a stable environment.”
(Tr. 77, 85). This RFC narrative explanation was notable since it mentioned the
plaintiff’s ability to perform “one and two-step tasks,” and the unexplained failure
of an ALJ to address, acknowledge or incorporate a one-to-two-step task limitation
set forth in a persuasive medical opinion constitutes error which may compel
remand. See e.g. Cruz v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025). The ALJ did not address the one and two-step task
limitation here, however the plaintiff does not challenge this omission since it
appears all of the jobs identified by the ALJ are reasoning level one, which the
plaintiff could perform even if limited to one-to-two-step tasks. Reep v. Bisignano,
No. 1:24-CV-712, 2025 WL 1508453, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2025).
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limitations of no specific production rate pace, such as assembly line work or an
hourly production quota, and only occasional interaction with the public, coworkers
and supervisors. (Tr. 53-54). The VE concluded an individual with the limitations
outlined in that hypothetical could perform the occupations of machine feeder, DOT
583.686-014, line attendant, DOT 920.687-042, and product sorter, DOT 529.687-
186. (Id.)
But, later in the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel had the following exchange with
the vocational expert which raised questions as to whether the plaintiff could
perform any work given this limitation to occasional interaction with others:
Q. 	So let me ask you this, if frequently, and by frequently, I mean
two thirds of the day, an individual was unable to interact appropriately
with the public, coworkers and supervisors would that preclude the
jobs you’ve named in all work?
A. 	Inappropriately is such a broad term. I’m comfortable saying that
it would result in being off task 15% or more of the time, that would
exclude 	all 	occupations, 	which 	could 	reach 	that 	level 	of
inappropriateness.
Q. 	Okay. What if I took out appropriately and just two thirds of the
day, they’re unable to interact with public coworkers and supervisors?
A. 	Inability to interact with others as we outlined would not be
consistent with competitive employment and that would exclude all
occupations.
(Tr. 58). Thus, while the ALJ at first identified the occupations the plaintiff could
perform if limited to only occasional interaction with others, meaning “from very
little up to one-third of the time,” Titles II & Xvi: Determining Capability to Do
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Other Work-the Med.-Vocational Rules of Appendix 2, SSR 83-10 (S.S.A. 1983),
the VE later testified that an inability to interact with others two thirds of the day
would be inconsistent with competitive employment.
The ALJ never rehabilitated or addressed this inconsistency in the vocational
expert’s testimony, and, instead, issued a decision on June 7, 2024, denying
Garland’s disability claim. In that decision, the ALJ first concluded that Garland had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 27, 2022, the application date.
(Tr. 19). At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security cases, the
ALJ found that Garland had the following severe impairments: seizure disorder,
bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and panic disorder. (Id.) At Step 3,
the ALJ determined that Garland did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the disability listing
impairments. (Tr. 20-22). While the ALJ ultimately found that the plaintiff’s
statements about her limitations were not entirely consistent with this medical
evidence, 	the 	ALJ 	concluded 	that 	her 	mental 	impairments 	caused 	moderate
limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information, interacting with
others, concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing
oneself. (Tr. 20-22).
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Having made these findings, between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ then fashioned
a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for the plaintiff which accounted for these
moderate mental limitations, finding that:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full
range 	of 	work 	at 	all 	exertional 	levels 	but 	with 	the 	following
nonexertional limitations: the claimant can never climb ladders, ropes
or scaffolds. She can never tolerate exposure to unprotected heights,
and she can never operate hazardous machinery. The claimant can
understand, remember or carry out simple instructions. The claimant
can perform tasks that do not involve a specific production rate pace,
such as assembly line work or an hourly production quota. 	The
claimant can deal with occasional changes in a routine work setting.
She can make judgments on simple, work-related decisions. 	The
claimant can occasionally interact with the public, coworkers and
supervisors in a routine work setting.
(Tr. 22) (emphasis added).
The ALJ then concluded at Step 4 of this sequential analysis that Garland
could not perform her past work, (Tr. 28), but found at Step 5 that there were other
jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy which Garland
could perform. (Tr. 29-30). In reaching this conclusion the ALJ embraced the
enigmatic testimony of the vocational expert and concluded that Garland could
perform the occupations of machine feeder, bottling line attendant, and product
sorter, despite the VE testimony bringing into question whether an individual limited
to occasional interaction with others would be precluded from performing these jobs.
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(Tr. 27-28). The ALJ’s adoption of these occupations is also striking in that each of
these jobs requires assembly line work,2 yet the RFC limits the plaintiff to “tasks
that do not involve a specific production rate pace, such as assembly line work or an
hourly production quota.” (Tr. 22). The ALJ explained that there was basis to rely
upon the testimony of the vocational expert, stating:
Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the undersigned has determined that the
vocational 	expert’s 	testimony 	is 	consistent 	with 	the 	information
contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The vocational
expert 	testified 	that 	there 	are 	no 	conflicts 	between 	the 	DOT
requirements and hypotheticals limitations and indicated that matters
covered in testimony not addressed by the DOT include breaks and
absences. The basis of the testimony related to those considerations is
training, education, and professional experience in the vocational
rehabilitation field. Because the vocational expert provided additional
information 	based 	on 	professional 	experience 	about 	the 	above
occupations not addressed by the DOT and the claimant made no
objection to the vocational expert’s qualifications or basis of the
testimony, the undersigned finds that there is a basis for relying on the
vocational expert’s testimony.
2 See Fusing-machine Feeder, DICOT 583.686-014, 1991 WL 684347 (“Aligns
material and garment part on conveyor for feeding into machine that heat seals
materials. Removes finished articles from conveyor belt.”); Bottling-line Attendant,
DICOT 920.687-042, 1991 WL 687971; (“Pastes labels and tax stamps on filled
whiskey bottles as bottles pass on conveyor . . . .”); Sorter, Agricultural Produce,
DICOT 529.687-186, 1991 WL 674781 (“Segregates produce on conveyor belt or
table . . . and places produce in containers or on designated conveyors.”).
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(Tr. 28). Thus, the ALJ relied upon the declaration of the VE that his testimony was
consistent with the DOT, but failed to reconcile or acknowledge the internal
inconsistency in his testimony that Garland could perform these occupations even if
she were only able to interact with others one-third or less of the day but would be
unable to sustain employment if she were unable to interact with others two-thirds
of the day. The ALJ also failed to reconcile the inconsistency between the VE’s
testimony that an individual with the plaintiff’s RFC could perform these jobs and
the DOT which defines them as assembly line work.
This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, Garland argues, inter alia, that the
identified jobs are inconsistent with the RFC limiting her to only occasional
interaction with others. As discussed below, we agree that the ALJ failed to account
for meaningful ambiguities and inconsistencies in the testimony of the vocational
expert with regard to the occupations an individual with Garland’s RFC could
perform. Accordingly, we will remand this case for further consideration by the
Commissioner.
III. 	Discussion
A. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ.
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
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by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20
C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe
physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous
work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42
U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the
insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on
which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a
five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process,
the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether
the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant
is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience
and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4).
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Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able
to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe
impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R.
§404.1545(a)(2).
At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in
engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this
burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show
that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could
perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and
RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the
ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.
Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence
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standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d
Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate
which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for
rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his
decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for
his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
B. The Role of the Vocational Expert and Dictionary of Occupational
Titles in Disability Analysis.
Oftentimes, as in this case, an ALJ turns to the testimony of a vocational
expert based upon data drawn from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to carry
the Commissioner’s burden at Step 5 to show that jobs exist in significant number
in the national economy that the claimant can perform consistent her age, education,
work experience and RFC. In this setting:
Testimony 	of 	vocational 	experts 	in 	disability 	determination
proceedings typically includes, and often centers upon, one or more
hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert. The
ALJ will normally ask the expert whether, given certain assumptions
about the claimant's physical capability, the claimant can perform
certain types of jobs, and the extent to which such jobs exist in the
national economy.
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Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005). When opining on this
question, the vocational expert, in turn, “will generally consult the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT), a publication of the United States Department of Labor
that contains descriptions of the requirements for thousands of jobs that exist in the
national economy, in order to determine whether any jobs exist that a claimant can
perform.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2002).
The evidentiary value of this vocational expert testimony and reliance upon
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to carry the Commissioner’s Step 5 burden of
proof is directly a function of how accurately that testimony reflects economic
reality. Recognizing this fact, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles catalogues a
compendium of job titles, describing the responsibilities of myriad tasks, and
assessing the physical, exertional, learning and language requirements for each of
these jobs. And the purpose of the hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert
is to reconcile the limitations in a claimant’s RFC with the requirements of the jobs
as described by the DOT. On this score, “vocational expert testimony may provide
substantial evidence to support an ALJ's findings at Step 5.” Evans v. Kijakazi, No.
1:21-CV-00554, 2023 WL 2761125, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2023) (citing Zirnsak,
777 F.3d at 616) (“The Commissioner can also rely on testimony from a VE to meet
its step-five evidentiary burden”). But “[a] vocational expert's testimony is not
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substantial evidence if the ALJ did not include in the hypothetical to the vocational
expert all the claimant's credibly established impairments,” McMahon v. Kijakazi,
No. 1:20-CV-01320, 2022 WL 801505, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2022), and “[w]hile
the ALJ may proffer a variety of assumptions to the expert, the vocational expert's
testimony concerning a claimant's ability to perform alternative employment may
only be considered for purposes of determining disability if the question accurately
portrays the claimant's individual physical and mental impairments.” Podedworny
v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).
Moreover, it is also well-settled that an ALJ may not allow inconsistencies
between a claimant’s actual skills, a vocational expert’s testimony, and the criteria
set forth in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to go unaddressed and unresolved.
Thus, the Third Circuit has long held that:
To ensure consistency, courts have imposed an obligation on ALJs to
“[i]dentify and obtain a reasonable explanation for any conflicts
between occupational evidence provided by VEs ... and information in
the [DOT].” Id. at *1; Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 556. Specifically, an ALJ
is required to (1) ask, on the record, whether the VE's testimony is
consistent with the DOT, (2) “elicit a reasonable explanation” where an
inconsistency does appear, and (3) explain in its decision “how the
conflict was resolved.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (3d
Cir.2002). An ALJ's failure to comply with these requirements may
warrant remand in a particular case. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 557.
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Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 617. Similarly, a remand is necessary if there are material
ambiguities in the Vocational Expert's testimony that are not adequately addressed
and resolved by the ALJ. Smith v. Astrue, 961 F. Supp. 2d 620, 658 (D. Del. 2013);
Williams v. Barnhart, 424 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
C. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court.
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the
findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200
(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not
substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a
conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.
1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be
“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
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inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]
from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The Supreme Court has recently underscored for us the limited scope of our
review in this field, noting that:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency
factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––,
135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-
evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record
and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the
agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis
deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,
e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)
(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard).
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
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The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is
disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that he is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application
of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.
Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of
a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal
matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this standard of
review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must not
substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d
607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir.
2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence.
However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of
articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial review. Simply put,
“this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision.” Burnett v.
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Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). As the Court of
Appeals has noted on this score:
In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for
his 	decision. 	220 	F.3d 	at 	119. 	Conclusory 	statements 	. 	. 	. 	are
insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and
an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable
meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ
particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use
particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the
ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that
decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is
sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.
This principle applies with particular force to ALJ decisions, like the ruling in
this case, which rest upon unresolved inconsistencies between a vocational expert’s
testimony and the skill requirements prescribed by the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles. When such inconsistencies exist, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to: (1) identify
the inconsistency; (2) address the inconsistency with the vocational expert; and (3)
resolve the inconsistency in the ALJ’s decision. The failure to do so often compels
a remand. Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 617.
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D. 	This Case Will Be Remanded for Further Consideration of the
Inconsistencies 	and 	Ambiguities 	in 	the 	Vocational 	Expert’s
Testimony.
As we have noted, the ALJ’s decision in this case rests upon both ambiguities
with regard to precisely which occupations the vocational expert testified the
plaintiff can perform despite her impairments and inconsistencies between the
identified occupations, the RFC fashioned by the ALJ, and the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. Since the ALJ failed to address and resolve these material
ambiguities and inconsistencies, the ALJ’s reliance upon the VE’s testimony is not
supported by substantial evidence in this case.
The plaintiff argues that the vocational expert’s hearing testimony established
that an individual limited to only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,
and the public would be disabled despite the VE’s earlier testimony that jobs existed
she could perform considering her RFC. While we do not go so far as concluding,
as a matter of law, that an individual who can only occasionally interact with
supervisors, coworkers, and the public would be completely disabled, we agree with
the plaintiff that the vocational expert’s testimony was internally inconsistent and
required clarification by the ALJ. Indeed, plaintiff’s counsel artfully presented the
same limitation prescribed in the RFC to the vocational expert in the negative, thus,
if 	the 	hypothetical 	stated 	the 	plaintiff 	could 	only 	occasionally 	interact 	with
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supervisors, coworkers, and the public, i.e. only up to one-third of the day, then it
follows that such an individual would be unable to interact with others the other two-
thirds of the day. When the plaintiff’s counsel presented this reverse hypothetical to
the vocational expert, the VE testified that, “inability to interact with others as we
outlined would not be consistent with competitive employment and that would
exclude all occupations.” (Tr. 58). This testimony at least created a question as to
the amount of time an individual being unable to interact with others would be
tolerated in the workplace. Indeed, we are not persuaded by the Commissioner’s
argument that the vocational expert’s response to this hypothetical only indicated
that an individual who was off-task fifteen percent of the time or more would be
disabled. This is plainly not what the VE stated since he referenced explicitly that it
was the “inability to interact with others as [ ] outlined” that would be inconsistent
with consistent employment.
Further, the resolution of this inconsistency was essential to determining
whether jobs existed that the plaintiff could perform since the ALJ found the plaintiff
was moderately limited in her ability to interact with others and could only
occasionally (up to one-third of the day) interact with supervisors, coworkers, and
the public. Combined with the opinion of the plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist that the
plaintiff would be entirely disabled due to her inability to interact appropriately with
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others, the ALJ’s reliance on the ambiguous and inconsistent testimony of the
vocational expert as to whether the plaintiff could perform any work with this
limitation was error.
This error was compounded by another latent ambiguity in the vocational
expert’s testimony in that, despite the RFC limiting the plaintiff to no production
rate pace work, all of the jobs identified in the ALJ’s decision involve assembly line
work. On this score, the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE, which was later
incorporated into the RFC, indicated that the plaintiff could only “perform tasks that
do not involve a specific production rate pace such as assembly line work or an
hourly production quota.” 3 But all of the occupations identified by the VE, and later
3 It is also worth noting that ALJs frequently clarify what is meant by “production
rate pace” in hypotheticals posed to vocational experts by referencing assembly line
work because other circuits have held that the term “production rate pace” is not
“especially common—certainly not common enough for us to know what [the term]
mean[s] without elaboration.” Angela S. v. Saul, No. CV TJS-19-2849, 2021 WL
733373, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2021) (quoting Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307,
312) (4th Cir. 2019)). Indeed, these circuits have found remand necessary based
solely upon the failure to explain the meaning of a production rate pace in RFCs and
hypotheticals to vocational experts, explaining that “we do not know what the ALJ
intended when she used that phrase. As a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
evaluate whether restricting [the claimant] to a ‘non-production oriented work
setting’ properly accounted for [the claimant’s] well-documented limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace.” Perry v. Berryhill, 765 F. App'x 869, 872 (4th
Cir. 2019) (citing Thomas, at 311-12; Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir.
2015) (ALJ’s failure to define “fast paced production” made it impossible to “assess
whether 	a 	person 	with 	[the 	claimant’s] 	limitations 	could 	maintain 	the 	pace
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relied upon by the ALJ in finding the plaintiff was not disabled,4 require work on a
conveyor belt, which has been considered assembly line work by many courts in this
circuit and others. Jessica B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 24CV10463 (EP), 2025
WL 3749534, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2025) (collecting cases). See also Reed v. Saul,
No. 119CV01826JPWGBC, 2021 WL 3121484, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-01826, 2021 WL 3115190 (M.D.
Pa. July 22, 2021) (Court and ALJ referred to production rate pace as assembly-line
work); Maxwell v. Kijakazi, No. CV 22-4465, 2023 WL 3674335, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
May 25, 2023) (same); Baca v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-246 WPL, 2017 WL 3267745,
at *4 (D.N.M. July 31, 2017) (“’Production rate pace’ is a commonly used term to
refer to assembly line work”). Thus, it appears the testimony of the VE that an
proposed”)). Here, the ALJ provided “assembly line work or an hourly production
quota” as an example of the type of production rate pace work the plaintiff could not
perform, yet the DOT seems to define each of the identified occupations as assembly
line work. This further compounds our conclusion that the testimony of the
vocational expert in this case is simply too unreliable to constitute substantial
evidence.
4 Fusing-machine Feeder, DICOT 583.686-014, 1991 WL 684347 (“Aligns material
and garment part on conveyor for feeding into machine that heat seals materials.
Removes finished articles from conveyor belt.”); Bottling-line Attendant, DICOT
920.687-042, 1991 WL 687971; (“Pastes labels and tax stamps on filled whiskey
bottles as bottles pass on conveyor . . . .”); Sorter, Agricultural Produce, DICOT
529.687-186, 1991 WL 674781 (“Segregates produce on conveyor belt or table . . .
and places produce in containers or on designated conveyors.”).
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individual who could not perform production rate pace positions could perform these
assembly line positions was inconsistent with the DOT.
Faced with both the internal inconsistency in the VE’s own testimony, and the
inconsistency between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, the ALJ then failed to (1)
identify the inconsistencies; (2) address the inconsistencies with the vocational
expert; and (3) resolve the inconsistencies in the ALJ’s decision, as the ALJ was
required to do under governing Third Circuit standards. This failure of analysis, in
turn, prejudiced the consideration of Garland’s disability claim since the ALJ found
that Garland could work in these occupations which do not comport with the
limitations in her RFC.
Thus, we are presented with an administrative record that discloses a
cascading array of unresolved conflicts between a vocational expert's testimony and
the ALJ's findings, which is unexplained and unacknowledged by either the expert
or the ALJ. Boone, 353 F.3d at 209; Minichino, 955 F.Supp.2d at 380. Further, in
this case there are material ambiguities in the Vocational Expert's testimony that are
not adequately addressed and resolved by the ALJ. Smith, 961 F.Supp.2d at 658;
Williams, 424 F.Supp.2d at 802. These factors strongly suggest the need for further
consideration and clarification regarding how the additional mental limitations
incorporated into Garland’s RFC may erode her employment prospects.
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Simply put, more is needed here. It is axiomatic that the ALJ's decision must
be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it
rests.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704. This means that there must be a logical nexus between
the ALJ's factual findings and legal conclusion. That logical bridge is missing here.
On the current record, where the hypothetical questioning of the Vocational Expert
by the ALJ was both internally inconsistent, ambiguous, and inconsistent with the
DOT, and those inconsistencies and ambiguities were not acknowledged, addressed,
and resolved by the ALJ, the ALJ's burden of articulation is not met. Therefore, this
matter will be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner.
Yet, while we reach this result, we note that nothing in this Memorandum
Opinion should be deemed as expressing a judgment on what the ultimate outcome
of any reassessment of this evidence should be. Rather, this task should remain the
duty and province of the ALJ on remand. Further, having found that a remand is
justified on these grounds, we have not addressed any other claimed errors because
the ALJ may in the first instance address them upon remand. See McMillan v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-313, 2018 WL 6617841, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2018);
Lawrence v. Colvin, No. 15-2851, 2016 WL 1644622, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2016).
An appropriate order follows.
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S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: 	October 15, 2026
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