Posey v. Kendall et al

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Case 3:26-cv-00877-MEM-LT Document19_ Filed 10/13/26 Page1of9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AJANI POSEY,
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO, 1:26-877
Vv.
(JUDGE MANNION)
LINDSY KENDALL, et al.,
Respondents
MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 to challenge a denial of parole. The petition
will be dismissed and a certificate of appealability will not issue.

[. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Ajani Posey, is incarcerated in Coal Township State
Correctional Institution (“SCI-Coal Township”) pursuant to a Pennsylvania
criminal conviction. He brings the instant case under 28 U.S.C. §2254 to
challenge the denial of his parole in March 2026 by the Pennsylvania Parole
Board. (Doc. 1). Posey asserts that the denial of parole violated his
constitutional right to due process because the Parole Board based the
denial on a disciplinary charge for which he was acquitted, acted in retaliation
for civil rights actions he filed against prison officials, and improperly

considered his criminal history. (Docs. 1-2).

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Respondents responded to the petition on May 29, 2026. (Docs. 14-
15). Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it
constitutes a second or successive petition; (2) Posey failed to exhaust state
court remedies; and (3) he has not alleged any nonconclusory facts showing
that he is entitled to relief and therefore fails to state a prima facie claim for
habeas corpus relief. (Docs. 10-11). Posey filed a reply brief on August 24,
2026, making the petition ripe for review. (Doc. 17). Posey has additionally
moved for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 14).
ll. § STANDARD OF REVIEW

A challenge to the denial of parole is cognizable under Section 2254.
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001). However, a federal
district court may not grant parole or determine parole eligibility. Billiteri v.
U_S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976). “The only remedy which
the court can give is to order the Board to correct the abuses or wrongful
conduct within a fixed period of time, after which, in the case of non-
compliance, the court can grant the writ of habeas corpus and order the
prisoner discharged from custody.” /d.

lll. Discussion
“[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to

be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” nor has

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the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created such a right. Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, because
the denial of parole “does not implicate any constitutionally [or state]
protected liberty interest,” the scope of federal judicial review of state parole
denials is limited. Diehi-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 13-CV-
2302, 2014 WL 1871509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2014). The federal court is
confined to reviewing the substance of the state parole decision to determine
whether the Parole Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary and
capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner. Block v. Potter, 631
F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980).

To show a violation of substantive due process, a habeas petitioner
must demonstrate that: (1) he was arbitrarily denied parole due to
impermissible reasons such as race, religion, or political beliefs, and/or (2)
the Parole Board failed to apply appropriate, rational criteria in reaching its
determination to deny parole. /d. “However, federal courts are not authorized
by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the
requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for
the challenged decision.” Coady, 251 F.3d at 487. The “relevant ievel of
arbitrariness required to find a substantive due process violation involves not

merely action that is unreasonable, but, rather, something more egregious,

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which we have termed at times ‘conscience shocking’ or ‘deliberately
indifferent.” Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2002).

In this case, Posey seeks a writ of habeas corpus because the Parole
Board purportedly denied parole based on a disciplinary charge for which he
was acquitted, acted in retaliation for civil rights actions he filed against
prison officials, and improperly considered his criminal history. (Docs. 1-2).
Respondents contend the petition should be dismissed because it is a
second or successive petition, because Posey failed to exhaust state court
remedies, and because the petition fails to state a prima facie claim for
habeas corpus relief. (Docs. 11-12).

At the outset, the court does not agree with respondents’ contention
that the petition is an improper second or successive petition. Although the
Third Circuit has not specifically addressed whether a petition addressing a
denial of parole constitutes a second or successive petition when the
petitioner has previously challenged an earlier denial of parole, see
McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 219 n.19 (3d Cir. 2007), the court has
indicated that the key question in such a case is whether the claim
challenging the parole denial could have been brought in the petitioner's
earlier petition. See Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005)

(noting that the “primary question” in determining whether a claim

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challenging a parole denial was a second or successive petition was
“whether [the petitioner] could have raised this challenge to Pennsylvania's
parole procedures in his first habeas petition” challenging his underlying
conviction and sentence”). Thus, a petition challenging a denial of parole is
not second or successive simply because the petitioner previously filed a
petition challenging an earlier parole denial. Goodman v. Kerestes, No. 1:14-
CV-1319, 2015 WL 2131599 at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2015) (Conner, C.J.,
adopting report and recommendation issued by Schwab, M.J.). This is true
even if the result of the challenged parole denial is the same as the earlier
denial; the later parole denial is still a separate judgment and a petition
challenging the denial is therefore not a second or successive petition. /d.
Therefore, even though Posey’s petition raises substantially the same
challenges he raised to his earlier parole denial—and the court ultimately
dismisses the petition based on essentially the same analysis—it is not
subject to dismissal as a second or successive petition.

The court also finds respondents’ exhaustion argument unavailing.
This court recently rejected an essentially identical argument for failure to
exhaust state court remedies in Mathis v. Rivello, No. 3:23-CV-225, 2025
WL 524301, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2025) (Mannion, J.). In Mathis, the

court held that Defoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 2005),

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remains good law and compels the conclusion that habeas petitioners
chalienging the denial of parole are not required to exhaust remedies through
Pennsylvania state courts before they may file in federal court. Mathis, 2025
WL 524301, at *8. The court does not see any sound basis to reach a
contrary conclusion in this case and accordingly holds that dismissal of
Posey’s petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies is not warranted.

Turning to the merits, the court first finds no merit to Posey’s contention
that he was denied parole based on disciplinary charges for which he had
been acquitted. The Parole Board’s written rationale for the denial of parole
states that it denied parole based on his institutional behavior, the level of
risk Posey posed to the community, his “unsatisfactory” supervision history,
his failure to demonstrate motivation for success, his minimization of the
seriousness of his criminal offenses and the nature of the offenses, and his
lack of remorse for his crimes. (Doc. 2-6 at 2). Although his “reported
misconducts” are mentioned as part of his institutional history, there is no
indication that the parole board considered—or was even aware of—any
disciplinary charges for which Posey was acquitted, and he has offered
nothing other than speculation to the contrary. (/d.)

The court similarly finds Posey’s argument that he was denied parole

in retaliation for filing civil suits unavailing. A petition for writ of habeas corpus

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filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must “state the facts supporting each
ground.” Rule 2(c)(2), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Following 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A petition is subject to dismissal without an evidentiary
hearing if it offers nothing more than “bald assertions” and “conclusory
allegations.” Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 395 (3d. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2008)). The petition must
present a prima facie claim for habeas corpus relief by making “sufficient
‘factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal
habeas relief.” /d. at 392 (quoting Schiro v. Landigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474
(2007). “[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” /d. at 395 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

In his petition and supporting brief, Posey asserts that the Parole Board
denied him parole in retaliation for various civil rights suits he filed against
prison officials, but he offers no factual allegations whatsoever to establish
that there is a causal connection between his civil suits and the denial of his
parole. There is no allegation that members of the Parole Board were even
aware of Posey’s civil suits. (See Docs. 1-2).

Finally, Posey argues that the parole board improperly considered his

criminal history when he “does NOT have a prior criminal history.” (Doc. 1 at

:

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4). This argument is meritless. Nothing in the board’s decision indicates that
it relied on Posey’s criminal history in any manner. (See Doc. 2-6 at 2).

Thus, all of petitioner's claims for relief are plainly meritless and
unsupported. Although Posey has requested an evidentiary hearing, a
petition must offer more than mere speculation in the hopes of conducting a
fishing expedition to determine whether there is a “factual basis” for the
petition’s claims. See Palmer, 592 F.3d at 395 (noting that petition must
make “sufficient ‘factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant
to federal habeas relief.” (quoting Schiro, 550 U.S. at 474). Posey’s petition
plainly fails to assert any factual basis for his claim. As the court noted in the
dismissal of his previous habeas petition, the proper course in this situation
is not development of the record. It is dismissal of the petition.
[V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss the petition for writ of
habeas corpus. A certificate of appealability will not issue because no
reasonable jurist would disagree with this ruling or conclude that the issues

presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Buck

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v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003)). Petitioner's motion for an evidentiary hearing will also be

denied. An appropriate order shall issue.

Mi P=

“Malachy E. Mannion
United\States District Judge

Dated: fofighs |

26-877-01