Jefferies Sr. v. Bey et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

AUTHE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICARDO ANTHONY
JEFFERIES, SR.,
Plaintiff | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-2435
Vv. (JUDGE MANNION)

JOHN BEY, ef al,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Ricardo Anthony
Jefferies, Sr. (“Jefferies”)'s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
("IFP Application”) and complaint. For the reasons stated below, the Court
will grant the IFP Application, dismiss Jefferies’s complaint, and grant him
leave to file an amended complaint as to some of his claims.

L. BACKGROUND

Jefferies, a convicted and sentenced state prisoner currently
incarcerated at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Phoenix,
commenced this action by filing a complaint, which the Clerk of Court
docketed on August 25, 2026. (Doc. 1.) When he filed his complaint, Jefferies
neither paid the filing fee nor applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis:

as such, an Administrative Order issued requiring him to either remit the fee

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or file an in forma pauperis application within thirty days. (Doc. 2.) Jefferies
timely complied with the Administrative Order by filing his IFP Application
and a certified copy of his prisoner trust fund account statement, both of
which the Clerk of Court docketed on September 16, 2026. (Docs. 4, 5.)

As for Jefferies’s complaint, he names as Defendants four individuals
employed with Dauphin County: (1) John Bey, the Dauphin County Director
of Corrections; (2) Warden Briggs, the warden of the Dauphin County Prison
(“DCP”); (3) Adams, a DCP lieutenant; and (4) Joseph Hoose (“Hoose’), a
DCP sergeant. See (Doc. 1 at 1). Jefferies alleges that he was confined at
the DCP from approximately May 27, 2021, until May 24, 2024, as well as
from approximately May 2025 to August 2025. See (id.)

Jefferies alleges that on or about January 29, 2024, he was suffering
from a “mental health episode/crisis and was allegedly being non-compliant
with orders given by” Adams, Hoose, and other DCP correctional officers.
(/d. at 2.) During this “episode,” Lewis “use[d] a palm thrust technique” on
Jefferies’s forehead while Jefferies was "strapped in a [rjestraint [c]hair that
was utilized to control [his] actions.” (/d.) In addition, while Jefferies was
“sprawled out on the floor in a holding cell,” Hoose, who weighs “well over
300 [pounds],” stood on Jefferies’s ankle “in a wanton fashion,” which caused

“abrasions and bruises.” (/d.) Jefferies asserts that DCP correctional officers

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“are inadequately trained to deal with person having a [mjental [health
[c]risis.” (/d.)

Following these events, Jefferies was charged with four counts of
aggravated assault on DCP correctional officers and a member of the
Dauphin County Sherriff's Department. See (id.). On June 26, 2025, Jefferies
had a trial on these charges, but the trial ended in a mistrial. See (id.).

Jefferies alleges that on or about July 8, 2025, he previously
commenced a civil action relating to the events of January 29, 2024, by filing
a complaint and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County (“CCP”). See (id.). The next day,
the CCP issued an Order stating that it would not “entertain[]” Jefferies’s in
forma pauperis application because he did not use the correct form when
filing it, and the CCP directed the Prothonotary to enter a judgment of non
pros if Jefferies did not file a new application within fourteen days. See (id.;
Doc. 1-2 at 1); see also Docket, Jefferies v. Bey, No. 2025-cv-5149 (Dauphin

Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) ("CCP Dkt.”).' Jefferies then filed another in forma

' The Court takes judicial notice of the docket in Jefferies’s civil case
in the CCP, which is publicly available on Dauphin County’s website
(https://publicaccess.dauphincounty.gov/civil.casesearch/). See In re
Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We take judicial notice
of the state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant.”); Orabj v. Ait’y
Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“We

(footnote continued on next page)

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pauperis application along with a nunc pro func motion. See (Doc. 1 at 2);
CCP Dkt. In the motion, Jefferies explained that he was delayed in filing a
new in forma pauperis application in accordance with the CCP’s Order
because the Order was mailed to him at state prison even though he was
currently confined at the DCP. See (Doc. 1 at 2); CCP Dkt.

On August 6, 2025, the CCP again refused to entertain Jefferies’s in
forma pauperis application because he did not use the proper form when
submitting it. See (Doc. 1 at 2); CCP Dkt. The Court gave Jefferies another
fourteen days to submit an application using the proper form. See CCP DKkt.
Jefferies did not submit a new application, and the CCP entered a judgment
of non pros on August 22, 2025. See (Doc. 1 at 2); CCP Dkt. Jefferies
acknowledges that he never submitted a new application; however, he
alleges that he never received a proper form and did not receive information
(presumably about the status of his case) until approximately June 25, 2026.

See (Doc. 1 at 2-3).* Jeffries states that he “still wishes to pursue [his

may take judicial notice of the contents of another Court’s docket.”); Wilson
v. McVey, 579 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial
notice of court docket). Jefferies attaches a copy of some of the docket
entries to his complaint. See (Doc. 71-1 at 3).

2 Although not referenced in Jefferies’s complaint, it appears that he
filed a motion seeking relief from the CCP’s judgment of non pros, which was
docketed in the CCP on August 4, 2026. See CCP Dkt. On August 12, 2026,

(footnote continued on next page)

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oJriginal [c]laim as the [dJue [pjrocess (Sixth Amendment) delays were not”
caused by him. (/d. at 3.) Jefferies also “wishes” for “a new complaint form,
a declaration in support of motion to proceed jn forma pauperis, a motion to
alter or amend judgment, memorandum of law forms, . . . a motion for Rule
59(e),... an amended complaint form, and, if necessary, a summons form.”
(id. (cleaned up)). He also requests appointment of counsel. (/d.)

Based on the above allegations, Jefferies appears to assert official-
and individual-capacity claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force
and deliberate in difference in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment,
and Fourteenth Amendment due process violations. See (id.).* He also
appears to assert similar claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See
(id.), For relief, Jefferies seeks a declaration that Defendants violated his

rights as well as nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. See (/d.).

the CCP issued an Order denying Jefferies’s motion and indicating that he
needed to commence a new action if he “desire[s] to proceed.” /d.

3 Jefferies appears to claim that his due process claims fall under the
Sixth Amendment, see (/d.); however, considering that the Sixth Amendment
does not reference due process, the Court construes Jefferies’s due process
claims as falling under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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ll. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), a district court “may authorize the
commencement... of any [civil] suit, .. . without prepayment of fees or
security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a
statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to
pay such fees or give security therefor.”* /d. This statute

“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful
access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Specifically,
Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court
costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone
else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from
pursuing meaningful litigation. [Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §1915(a) allows a
litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in
forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among
other things, that [they are] unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.

PDouris, 293 F. App’x at 131-32.

4 “The reference to prisoners in §1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake.
In forma pauperis status is afforded to all indigent persons, not just
prisoners.” Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 132 n.1 (3d Cir.
2008) (unpublished).

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B. Screening Complaints Under 28 U.S.C. §§1915A and
1915(e)(2)

The Court must “review... a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If such a complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must dismiss the
complaint. See id. §1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar screening
obligation regarding actions filed by individuals proceeding in forma
pauperis. See id. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“TT]he [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at
any time if the [CJourt determines that .. . the action or appeal . . . fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted... .”).

In reviewing legal claims under Sections 1915A(b) or 1915(e)(2)(B),
the Court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, No.
15-cv-1757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (“The legal
standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under
§1915A(b)(1) [and] §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) . . . is the same as that for dismissing
a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3008559 (M.D.
Pa. July 14, 2017); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa.

2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to Section
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1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). To avoid dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set out “sufficient factual matter’ in the complaint to
show that their claims are facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). This plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. “[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” /qba/, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).

When evaluating the plausibility of a compiaint, the Court accepts as
true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
id.; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
However, the Court will not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ will not survive a district
court’s screening under Sections 1915A and 1915(e\(2)(B). Bell Aff. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

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In addition, in the specific context of pro se litigation, the Court must
be mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,
339 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “when presented with a pro se litigant, we
have a special obligation to construe [their] complaint liberally” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, a pro se complaint, “however
| inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Esfelfe, 429 U.S. at 106).
Moreover, when construing a pro se complaint, the Court will “apply the
relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). However, pro
sé litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules
that apply to all other litigants.” /d. at 245.

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress
for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See
42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute states in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

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thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution of laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding forredress....
Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means
through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state
actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa.
2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To
state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Hl. DISCUSSION
A. The IFP Application
After reviewing the IFP Application, it appears that Jefferies lacks the
financial means to prepay the filing fee in this matter. Therefore, the Court

will grant the IFP Application and allow Jefferies to proceed in forma pauperis

in this action.®

5 However, because Jefferies is a prisoner, he is advised that he will
be obligated to pay the filing fees for this case in installments in accordance
with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA"), regardless of the outcome.
See 28 U.S.C. §1975(b).

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B. Screening of Jefferies’s Complaint

1. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10

Jefferies’s complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 10 insofar as he fails to identify all Defendants in the caption of
his complaint. See (Doc. 1 at 1). Instead, when naming the Defendants in
the caption of his complaint, Jefferies uses the phrase, “et al.” (/d.) The use
of this Latin phrase, which means “[a]nd other persons,” Et a/., BLACk’s LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), in the caption of the complaint, is improper under
Rule 10 because it requires that “[t]he title of the complaint must name aff
the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (emphasis added); see also Jeffers v.
Lycoming Cnty. Prison, No. 25-cv-2394, 2026 WL 657743, at *2 n.2 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 9, 2026) (explaining that pro se plaintiffs use of “et al.” in caption of
complaint was improper and determining that court would consider plaintiff's
claims against only defendants plaintiff identified in the caption). Only “the
title of other pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer
generally to other parties” by using phrases such as “et al.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(a).

Here, because the only Defendant Jefferies identifies in the caption of
his complaint is John Bey, he has not complied with Rule 10 to the extent

that he seeks to assert claims against any other Defendants in this case.
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Due to Jefferies’s failure to comply with Rule 10, the Court could treat the
complaint as asserting only claims against Bey. However, because Jefferies
appears to name only three other Defendants in the body of his complaint,
the Court will construe the complaint as containing claims against Bey,
Briggs, Lewis, and Hoose. If Jefferies files an amended complaint in this
case, he must identify all Defendants he seeks to assert claims against in
the caption and body of any amended complaint.®
2. Section 1983 Official-Capacity Claims

Jefferies indicates that he asserts his Section 1983 claims against
Defendants in their individual and official capacities. See (Doc. 1 at 1). As for
his official-capacity claims, such claims against four Dauphin County
employees are akin to suing Dauphin County itself. See Monell v. Dep’t of
soc. Servs. of NLY., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). To assert a Section 1983
claim against a county by way of an official-capacity claim against a county
employee, a plaintiff must identify a policy or custom fairly attributable to the
municipality that caused their constitutional injury. See id. at 690-91. The
plaintiff must also plausibly plead facts showing that each Defendant is a

decisionmaker endowed with authority to promulgate or establish an official

6 Jefferies appears to contemplate the need for him to file an amended
complaint insofar as he requests, fnfer alia, a “new complaint form” in his
complaint. See (Doc. 1 at 3).

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custom or policy. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481
(1986) (explaining that a decision to adopt a particular course of action made
by the “government’s authorized decisionmakers” represents an act of
official government policy); McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d
Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiff failed to “allege conduct by a municipal
decisionmaker” in his attempt to assert municipal liability under Section
1983).

in this case, Jefferies does not allege any facts showing or reasonably
inferring that either Adams or Hoose have decision-making authority to
establish a custom or policy at the DCP. Moreover, even though it appears
that Bey and Briggs could have such authority by virtue of their positions as
Director of Corrections and Warden, respectively, Jefferies still fails to plead
plausible official-capacity claims against them because he does not allege
any facts identifying a policy promulgated by either Defendant.

It is possible that Jefferies attempts to assert his official-capacity claims
based on an alleged lack of adequate training. See (Doc. 1 at 2 (“Upon
information and belief, DCP correctional officers are inadequately training to
deal with persons having a mental health crisis.” (cleaned up))). Regarding
claims for failure to train:

In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to
train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating

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citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government
policy for purposes of §1983. A municipality’s culpability for a
deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on
a failure to train. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 822-823 (1985) (plurality opinion) (“A ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate
training” is “far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed
from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monel!’).
To satisfy the statute, a municipality's failure to train its
employees in a relevant respect must amount to “deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained
employees come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388 (1989). Only then “can such a shortcoming be properly
thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under
§1983.” /d. at 389.

“Deliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring
proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Byan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Thus, when city policymakers
are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in
their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’
constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately
indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program. /d.
at 407. The city’s “policy of inaction” in light of notice that its
program will cause constitutional violations “is the functional
equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the
Constitution.” City of Canton, 489 U.S., at 395 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). A less stringent
standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim “would result in de
facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities ... .” /d. at
392; see also Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 (“[M]unicipal liability
under §1983 attaches where—and only where—a deliberate
choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by [the relevant] officials ... .”).

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011) (cleaned up).

Here, Jefferies alleges in a conclusory manner that DCP correctionai

| officers were not adequately trained to address inmates’ mental health

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crises. In other words, he fails to allege specific facts relative to his failure-
to-train claim. He does not allege facts showing that Bey or Briggs had notice
that any procedures were inadequate and likely to result in a violation of an
inmate's constitutional rights. Rather, he simply expresses his belief that the
DCP correctional officers were inadequately trained. Accordingly, the Court
will dismiss Jefferies’s Section 1983 official-capacity claims against
Defendants for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to Sections
1915(e)(2)(B){ii) and 1915A(b)(1).’
3. Request for Declaratory Judgment

Jefferies seeks a declaration that Defendants violated his rights. See
(Doc. 1 at 3). The Court will dismiss this claim for relief because Jefferies
cannot seek a declaration pertaining to past conduct by Defendants.
Declaratory relief is “prospective in nature,” CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Phila.,
703 F.3d 612, 628 (3d Cir. 2013), and therefore cannot be applied to seek
“retrospective relief.” Bond v. DiClaudio, No. 22-3010, 2023 WL 1990532, at

*1 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2023) (unpublished). Thus, because Jefferies seeks to

’ Because the Court will dismiss Jefferies’s Section 1983 official-
capacity claims, the Court need not address his specific requests for relief
relative to those claims. However, the Court notes that Jefferies may not
seek punitive damages against Defendants in their official capacities. See
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (‘[We hold
that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.
§1983,”),

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address actions by Defendants that have already occurred, he fails to state
a plausible claim for declaratory relief in his complaint. See, e.g., Corliss v.
O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (explaining that a
“[djeclaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct”
and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another’).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Jefferies’s claim for declaratory relief for
failure to state a claim under Sections 1915(e)(2)(BY\ii) and 1915A(b) 1).
4. Claims for Violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution
Jefferies claims that Defendants violated his rights under the
Pennsylvania Constitution and seeks monetary damages for those
violations. See (Doc. 1 at 3). However, there is no private right of action for
monetary damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Plouffe v.
Cevallos, 777 F. App’x 594, 601 (3d Cir. 20719) (unpublished) (“[NJor is there
a private right of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”);
Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x
681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“No Pennsylvania statute establishes,
and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for
damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”); Jones v. City of
Philadelphia, 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (‘[Njeither

Pennsylvania statutory authority nor appellate case law has authorized the

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award of money damages for violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”).
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Jefferies’s claims for violations of the
Pennsylvania Constitution for failure to state a claim under Sections
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
5. Claims for Excessive Force

The only claims in this case for which Jefferies clearly alleges
supporting facts are excessive force claims against Lewis and Hoose. See
(Doc. 1 at 2-3). Initially, the Court notes that Jefferies does not state whether
he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted and sentenced prisoner while in the
DCP on January 29, 2024, the date of the alleged use of excessive force.
Jefferies’s incarceration status is significant in this case because it affects
whether the Eighth Amendment, which applies to individuals already
convicted and sentenced, or the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to
pretrial detainees, governs his excessive-force claims. See Hubbard v.
Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard !’) (explaining that the
Eighth Amendment applies to individuals who have been convicted and
sentenced); Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir.
2014) ("As a pretrial detainee, Thomas is not subject to the Eighth
Amendment's protections; rather, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause governs.” (citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr.,

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372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2004))); see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment “has
no application” until the government obtains a “formal adjudication of guilt,”
and that pretrial detainees' rights “are at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to ... convicted prisoner[s]”).

Even though Jefferies does not identify his incarceration status in his
compiaint, the publicly available docket entries for a criminal case Jefferies
had in Dauphin County during the relevant period shows that he was still
awaiting his criminal trial as of January 29, 2024. See Docket,
Commonwealth v. Jefferies, No. CP-22-CR-2567-2021 (Dauphin Cnty. Ct.
Com. PI.).° It also shows that he was not convicted until April 15, 2024, and
sentenced until July 14, 2024. See id. Therefore, presuming that Jefferies
was incarcerated pursuant to his criminal charges in the aforementioned
case at the time of the alleged events on January 29, 2024, he would have

been incarcerated as a pretrial detainee, and the Fourteenth Amendment,

§ The Court takes judicial notice of the entries on this criminal docket.
See Mickell v. Lycoming Cnty. Cent. Collections Off. & Admin., 821 F. App’x
74, 75 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (taking judicial notice of Court of
Common Pleas criminal docket). These dockets are publicly accessible
through the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal
(hitps://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch). See Zedonis v. Lynch, 233 F.
Supp. 3d 417, 422 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial System
provides online access to the docket sheets for criminal cases, and this Court
may take judicial notice of those public dockets.” (citations omitted)).

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not the Eighth Amendment, would apply to his excessive force claims. See
Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 247 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)). Accordingly, the Court will analyze
Jefferies’s excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees are entitled to at
least as much protection from excessive force as prisoners who have already
been convicted of a crime. See Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 91 (3d Cir.
2018) (citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993)).
However, unlike prisoners who have been convicted of a crime, who may not
be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, pretrial detainees “cannot be
punished at all under the Due Process Clause.” Hubbard |, 399 F.3d at 166
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535). Thus, prison officials may not subject pretrial
detainees to “excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Jacobs v.
Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)).

Unlike excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment, which
require plaintiffs to establish both an objective element and a subjective
element to prove excessive force, excessive force claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment are based exclusively on an_ objective-

reasonableness standard. See id. (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.

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Case 3:26-cv-02435-MEM-SH Document6- Filed 10/13/26 Page 20 of 36

389, 396-400 (2015)). Therefore, a pretrial detainee seeking to establish that
the use of force was excessive “must show only that the force purposely or
knowingly used against [them] was objectively unreasonable.” /d. (citing
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97). A plaintiff can establish that the force used
was excessive if they show that the force was “not ‘rationally related to a
legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or that the force used was
“excessive in relation to that purpose.” /d. (quoting Bel/, 441 U.S. at 561).
There is no mechanical formula for determining when force is
objectively unreasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kingsley,
576 U.S. at 397 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850
(1998)). Instead, the particular facts and circumstances of the case govern
the inquiry, including, but not limited to:
the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort
made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the
severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably

perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively
resisting.

id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).° These facts and circumstances should

be considered “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

° The Supreme Court did “not consider this list to be exclusive.” /d.
Instead, the Court “mention[ed] these factors only to illustrate the types of
objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive
force.” /d.

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including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” /d. This consideration “adequately protects an officer who acts in
good faith,” insofar as it recognizes that “[rJunning a prison is an inordinately
difficult undertaking, . . . and that safety and order at these institutions
requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial
discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.” /d. at
399 {internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, “a court
must take account of the legitimate interests in managing a jail,
acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness analysis that
deference to policies and practices needed to maintain order and institutional
security is appropriate.” /d. at 399-400.

Applying the above standard for Fourteenth Amendment excessive
force claims to Jefferies’s allegations in his complaint, he fails to allege
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. Jefferies alleges that Lewis used a
“palm thrust technique” to his forehead while he was strapped in a restraint
chair and that Hoose stepped on his ankle in a “wanton fashion.” (Doc. 1 at
2). However, Jefferies includes no other allegations describing the
circumstances preceding these two instances of alleged force. As such,
Jefferies’s allegations are insufficient to show that the amount of force Lewis

and Hoose allegedly used was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the

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Court will dismiss Jefferies’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims
against Lewis and Hoose for failure to state a claim under Sections
1915(e)(2)(B\ ii) and 1915A(b} 1).

As for any excessive force claims against Bey and Briggs, Jefferies
fails to plead excessive force claims against them because he does not
allege any facts showing that they were personally involved in any use of
force against him. For a plaintiff to plead a plausible Section 1983 claim
against an individual defendant, they must sufficiently allege that defendant's
personal invoivement in the alleged constitutional violation. In other words,
“[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongdoing ... .” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988). Jefferies’s failure to allege any personal involvement by Bey and
Briggs in the use of force is fatal to any excessive force claims against them.

The Court also notes that, considering that Jefferies does not allege
that Bey and Briggs used any force against him, it is possible that he
attempts to hold them liable simply because they are supervisory officiais. If
so, Jefferies’s claims are implausible because liability under Section 1983
cannot be predicated on respondeat superior. See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[Plaintiff] cannot predicate liability

on her §1983 claims on a respondeat superior basis.” (emphasis omitted)

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(citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)); Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022
WL 17248100, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) ("We agree with the District Court
that Robinson's second amended complaint did not state a plausible claim
for relief. First, he failed to allege the defendants’ personal involvement, and
he cannot predicate liability on his §1983 claims on a respondeat superior
basis.” (internal citations omitted)). Instead, if Jefferies seeks to hold Bey and
Briggs liable for unconstitutional acts by their alleged subordinates, his
allegations must satisfy one of two theories of supervisory liability: First,
“LiJndividual defendants who are policymakers may be liable under §1983 if
it is shown that such defendants, with deliberate indifference to the
consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom
which directly caused [the] constitutional harm[;]’ and second, “a supervisor
may be personally liable under §1983 if he or she participated in violating the
plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge,
had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex
rel. . M.K., 372 F.3d at 586 (citation omitted); see Barkes v. First Corr. Med.,
Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining requirements for
supervisory liability in Section 1983 claim and describing “two general ways

in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts

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undertaken by subordinates”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Taylor v.
Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).

To allege a plausible claim for supervisory liability under the first
theory—the policy-and-practice strand of supervisory liability—a_ plaintiff

must

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the
supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing
custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or
procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3)
the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4)
the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s
violation resulted from the supervisor's failure to employ that
supervisory practice or procedure. Put another way, the inmate
must identify the supervisors specific acts or omissions
demonstrating the supervisors deliberate indifference to the
inmate’s risk of injury and must establish a link between the

supervisor, the act, and the injury.
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d
205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). For the second theory of supervisory liability—
participating in, directing others to, or knowledge and acquiescence of
constitutional violation—generalized allegations that a supervisory
defendant is “in charge of’ or “responsible for’ an office or facility are
insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional
violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020)

(unpublished) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were in charge of

agencies that allowed this to happen, and that liability stemmed merely from
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Case 3:26-cv-02435-MEM-SH Document6- Filed 10/13/26 Page 25 of 36

defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, “a
director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of [their] position as the head
of the [agency].” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir.
2005))); Zigler v. Warren, No. 21-cv-19474, 2022 WL 903383, at *2 (D.N.J.
Mar. 28, 2022) ("In simpler terms, a supervisor is not liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of his employees solely because he is a
supervisor.”). Additionally, “[a]lthough a court can infer that a defendant had
contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances
surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.”
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186,
1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6).

Here, Jefferies’s allegations do not satisfy the second theory of
supervisory iiability because there are no allegations that Bey and Briggs
participated in violating his rights, directed Lewis or Hoose to violate them,
or, despite knowing what was happening to Jefferies, acquiesced in any
violation. In addition, as already explained, Jefferies’s allegations do not
satisfy the first theory of supervisory liability because he has not sufficiently
alleged a policy, practice, or custom either Bey or Briggs established that led
to the violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court will also

dismiss Jefferies’s Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive force

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claims against Bey and Briggs for failure to state a claim under Sections
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
6. Deliberate Indifference Claims

Jefferies asserts that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.
See (Doc. 1 at 3). However, it is unclear what type of claim he attempts to
assert here. As such, the Court will dismiss these claims.

Deliberate indifference claims generally arise under the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and such claims
relate to a prisoner-plaintiff's allegation that a prison official consciously
disregarded a substantial risk of harm to them. See Rouse v. Plantier, 182
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that deliberate indifference requires
“obduracy and wantonness,” such as “a conscious disregard of a serious
risk” (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986))). “There are
several types of Eighth Amendment claims, including claims alleging: denial
of, or inadequate access to, medical care; exposure to adverse conditions of
confinement; the use of excessive force; and failure to protect from assaults
by other inmates.” Smith v. McGinley, No. 22-cv-1382, 2024 WL 2725041,
at “4 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-2173, 2024 WL 4589233 (3d Cir.
Oct. 28, 2024). Pretrial detainees may raise similar claims, albeit potentially

under different standards, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,

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Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (expressing requirements for pretrial detainees’
conditions-of-confinement claims under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 n.23 (3d Cir. 2023)
(“Because the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections
at least as great as those available to inmates under the Eighth Amendment,
we will review Sherelle Thomas's claims for failure to render medical care
under the Fourteenth Amendment by applying the same standard used to
evaluate claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.”); Stewart-
Richardson v. Corr. Officer Yorks, No. 25-cv-1646, 2026 WL 1760281, at *1
(M.D. Pa. June 18, 2026) (noting that “pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth
Amendment failure-to-intervene claims are evaluated under the same
standards as convicted prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims” (citing Gorrio
v. Briggs, No. 23-cv-1697, 2025 WL 2177826, at *26 (M.D. Pa. July 31,
2025))); Carr v. Boran, No. 24-cv-2192, 2025 WL 259384, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 21, 2025) (‘Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claims are
governed by the same substantive standard as failure to protect claims
asserted pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.” (citing Thomas, 749 F.3d at
223 n.4)).

Here, although Jefferies alleges facts relating to the use of excessive

force, he does not include any other allegations in his complaint that would

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plausibly establish any other type of constitutional claim against any
Defendant. For example, he does not allege any facts establishing that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (setting forth requirements for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims); Durmer v.
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing factual circumstances
in which deliberate indifference could exist (citing Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987))). He also does not
allege any facts relating to the conditions of his confinement other than his
placement in a restraint chair; however, even then, he admits that he was
suffering from a “mental health episode.” (Doc. 1 at 2 (cleaned up)).
Accordingly, as the Court cannot discern the factual basis for any Fourteenth
Amendment claim other than an excessive force claim, the Court will dismiss
the complaint to the extent that Jefferies seeks to assert deliberate
indifference claims against Defendants for failure to state a claim under
Sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
7. Due Process Claims

Jefferies also claims in his complaint that Defendants violated his due

process rights. See (Doc. 1 at 3). Given that Jefferies’s likely status as a

pretrial detainee results in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to

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his excessive force claim, the Court construes his reference to “due process”
as a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.'° So construed,
the Court will dismiss Jefferies’s complaint to the extent he asserts such a
claim.

Jefferies, as with all prisoners, is “not completely deprived of the
protections of the Due Process Clause simply because [he is a] prisoner|].”
id.; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (explaining that
although prisoners “do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate,
lawful incarceration ‘brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Jones v.

N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977))). Thus,

10 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that: “No State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. Cons. amend. XIV, §1. “The core concept of due process is
protection against arbitrary government action [and, aJs that concept has
developed, it has come to have both substantive and procedural
components.” Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 658 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845). The substantive component “limits
what government may do regardiess of the fairness of procedures that it
employs,” Boyanowski v. Cap. Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399
(3d Cir. 2000), whereas the procedural component “governs the manner in
which the government may infringe upon an individual's life, liberty, or
property.” Evans, 645 F.3d at 662. “Claims of excessive force of pretrial
detainees are analyzed under substantive due process principles.” Dewa/ld
v. French, No. 22-cv-317, 2022 WL 17669716, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2022)
(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10).

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“[p]Jrocedural protections must be afforded to [prisoners] before they are
stripped of the rights they still retain while incarcerated.” Evans, 645 F.3d at
662-63 (citation omitted).

There are two scenarios in which a prisoner holds a liberty interest
triggering due process protections:

(1) when “state statutes and regulations create a liberty interest

in freedom from restraint that imposes an atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life,” and (2) when “severe changes in conditions of
confinement amount to a grievous loss that should not be
imposed without the opportunity for notice and an adequate
hearing.”
Evans, 645 F.3d at 663 (quoting Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 325
(3d Cir. 2010)). These two scenarios are characterized as a “so-called state-
created liberty interest” and a “so-called independent due process liberty
interest,” respectively. /d. (quoting Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 325).

With respect to independent due process liberty interests, “[a]s long as
the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is
within the sentence imposed upon [them] and Is not otherwise violative of
the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an
inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Montanye v.

Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Thus, an independent due process

liberty interest arises only “when severe changes in conditions of

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confinement amount to a grievous loss that should not be imposed without
the opportunity for notice and an adequate hearing.” Renchenski, 622 F.3d
at 325. Examples of such severe changes in conditions of confinement
include, infer alia, “forced administration of antipsychotic medication,
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-—22 (1990), or involuntary transfer
to a mental hospital, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980), or, for a
prisoner not convicted of a sex offense, forced participation in sex-offender
therapy, Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 326.” Evans, 645 F.3d at 665 (first two
citations altered from original).

State-created liberty interests are “generally limited to freedom from
restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected
manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own
force, .. . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
i inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at
484 (internal citations omitted); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005)
(stating that, “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into
the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding
restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations
regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at

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Case 3:26-cv-02435-MEM-SH Document6- Filed 10/13/26 Page 32 of 36

484)), Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 559 (3d Cir. 2017)
(explaining that, “in the conditions of confinement context,” the liberty interest
must be “substantial”: “the right alleged must confer freedom from restraint
which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmaie in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life” (internal quotations omitted)). A two-
factor inquiry informs whether prison conditions impose “atypical and
significant hardship”: “(1) the duration of the challenged conditions; and (2)
whether the conditions overall imposed a significant hardship in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Willams, 848 F.3d at 560 (citing Shoafs
v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000)). Additionally, when determining
whether a state-created liberty interest exists, courts are not to “compare the
prisoner's own life before and after the deprivation.” Powell v. Weiss, 757
F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2014). Instead, “[t]he baseline for determining what is
atypical and significant—the ordinary incidents of prison life—is ascertained
by what a sentenced inmate may reasonably expect to encounter as a result
of his or her conviction in accordance with due process of law.” /d. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, it does not appear that Jefferies expressly asserts a procedural
due process claim in his complaint. He has not identified a protected liberty

interest triggering due-process protections; instead, he chailenges the

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alleged excessive force used against him by Lewis and Hoose. Even if the
Court presumed that the use of excessive force could give rise to a
protectable liberty interest, Jefferies does not indicate in his complaint how
he received constitutionally insufficient process relating to the events on or
around January 29, 2024. See, e.g., Green v. Mergen, No. 23-3037, 2025
WL 284628, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2025) (“Green brings this lawsuit to
challenge the alleged excessive force used against him by Defendants and
their deliberate indifference to his safety. Even assuming the use of
excessive force or deliberate indifference could give rise to a liberty interest,
Green nowhere challenges any lack of process in the events leading up to
or following the events on May 24, 2022.”"). Therefore, to the extent that
Jefferies attempts to assert procedural due process claims against
Defendants in his complaint, the Court will dismiss these claims for failure to
state a claim under Sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
8. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Jefferies asserts that Defendants unlawfully retaliated against him in
his complaint, see (Doc. 1 at 3), and the Court presumes that he attempts to
plead a First Amendment retaliation claim. To plead a plausible First
Amendment retaliation claim, Jefferies must allege that: “(1) his conduct was

constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of

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prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discipline [thern].” Watson
v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Here,
Jefferies does not allege in his complaint that he engaged in any
constitutionaily protected conduct. As such, he fails to plead plausible First
Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants, and the Court will dismiss
these claims for failure to state a claim under Sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(il) and
1915A(b)(1).

C. Leave to Amend

Before dismissing all or part of a civil rights complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, a district court must permit a
curative amendment unless the amendment would be inequitable or futile.
see Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, iInc., 482 F.3d 247,
252 (3d Cir. 2007) (‘[l]n civil rights cases district courts must offer
amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a
case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or
futile.”); Grayson v. Mayview Sf. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)
(stating general rule that court should grant leave to amend unless doing so
would be futile). Here, the Court finds that it would be futile to grant Jefferies

leave to file an amended complaint regarding (1) his request for declaratory

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relief and (2) his claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In all
other respects, the Court does not find that it would be futile for Jefferies to
attempt to amend his Section 1983 claims if he can allege sufficient facts to
support those claims. As such, the Court will grant Jefferies leave to file an
amended complaint as to his Section 1983 claims.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will: (1) grant the IFP Application
and allow Jefferies leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case; (2)
dismiss with prejudice Jefferies’s claims for violations of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and request for declaratory relief; (3) dismiss without prejudice
Jefferies’s Section 1983 claims for monetary relief against Defendants in
their individual and official capacities; and (4) grant Jefferies leave to file an
amended complaint should he seek to replead those Section 1983 claims
that the Court will dismiss without prejudice. If Jefferies does not file an
amended complaint, the Court will presume that he intends to stand on his
complaint, see Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2019)

(discussing stand-on-compiaint doctrine), and the Court will issue an Order

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Case 3:26-cv-02435-MEM-SH Document6- Filed 10/13/26 Page 36 of 36

directing the Clerk of Court to close this case without further notice to him.

—

MALAGHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge

An appropriate Order follows."

DATE: polafe

26-2435-01

"! The Order will provide Jefferies with more information on the filing of
an amended complaint.

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