USA v. NIES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
) 	No. 1:26-CR-12
)
v. 	) 	RICHARD A. LANZILLO
) 	United States Magistrate Judge
)
RYAN RICHARD NIES 	) 	MEMORANDUM ORDER
)
) 	RE ECF NO. 26
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Modify Conditions of
Pretrial Release (ECF No. 26). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to
Modify will be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2026, a federal Grand Jury returned a nine-count indictment
charging Defendant Ryan Richard Nies with Receipt and Attempted Receipt of
Material Depicting the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2252(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(l) (Cts. 1-8), and Possession of and Access with
Intent to View Material Depicting the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor in violation
of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2). On April 22, 2026, the Court
released Defendant on a $10,000 unsecured 	bond and conditions of pretrial
release that included special condition no. 7(g), which directed, among other
things, that Defendant have “no direct or indirect contact with any minor except in
the presence of an adult approved in advance by pretrial services who is aware
of the instant federal offenses.” See ECF No. 13. Defendant has moved to modify
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his Conditions of Release to permit him permission to have unsupervised contact
with his infant son with whom he resides. 	Defendant and his wife are also
expecting the birth of Defendant’s second child. 	Defendant similarly requests
permission to have unsupervised contact with his second child upon his or her
birth.
DISCUSSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not
addressed 	whether or under what circumstances a condition of pretrial
release restricting unsupervised contact with minors can properly be applied
to a criminal defendant’s own children. The Court of Appeals has, however,
considered the issue in the context of a supervised release condition imposed
after sentence. 	In United States v. Loy, the Court held that absent a clear
expression from the district court, a supervised release condition comparable
in substance to the one imposed in this case “should be construed to apply
only to other people’s children, and not to [a defendant’s] own.” 237 F.3d 251,
270 (3d Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Mizwa, 345 Fed. Appx. 834, 837
(3d Cir. 2009) (noting that under Loy, absent a clear sign from the district
court, 	a 	condition 	that 	restricts 	a 	defendant’s 	contact 	with 	minors 	is
construed to apply only to other people’s children, not the defendant’s own
children). 	If special condition 7(g) applied to Defendant’s own children, it
would implicate his constitutional right to maintain his familial relationship
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with his children. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Gruenke
v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850,
853–55 (8th Cir. 2013). 	If so applied, the condition must be supported by
evidence and findings that the restriction is reasonably necessary for the
protection of the children. See United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 155 (3d
Cir. 2007).
In Voelker, the Court of Appeals directed that a district court “should
proceed cautiously in imposing any condition that could impact [a defendant’s]
parental 	rights 	absent 	sufficiently 	reliable 	supporting 	evidence.” 	Id.
Specifically, 	such 	a 	condition 	must 	be 	based 	upon 	evidence 	that 	it 	is
reasonably 	necessary 	for the safety 	of the defendant’s 	child. 	Id. 	See also
United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Conditioning 	pretrial 	release 	on 	the 	relinquishment 	of 	constitutionally
protected rights in circumstances where the conditions are not necessary to
satisfy legitimate governmental purposes would constitute excessive bail in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). 	Indeed, several courts have found that
restrictions on a criminal defendant’s association with his or her own children
as a condition of supervised release are subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Henry
v. Abernathy, 647 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1249 & n.7 (M.D. Ala. 2022); United States
v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing between general
restrictions on contact with children and restrictions on contact with the
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defendant’s own children, the latter of which is “subject to stricter scrutiny”);
United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Del
Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48, 51–52, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Worley,
685 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2012).
Whether viewing and sharing of CSAM materials correlates to a risk of
child sexual abuse has been the subject of much debate. See United States v. C.R.,
792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 375–76 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (in-depth discussion of the absence
of “[r]eliable empirical evidence” on the “persistent concern[] that observing child
pornography might lead viewers to themselves sexually abuse children in the
future”), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204
(2d Cir. 2013); United States v. R.V, 157 F. Supp. 3d 207, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
(lengthy discussion of debated “connection between child pornography consumers
and child molesters”); United States v. Cruikshank, 667 F. Supp. 2d 697, 700 (S.D.
W.Va. 2009) (“a link has not been sufficiently established” between “a viewer of
child pornography” being “more likely to physically abuse a child. . . . 	Simply
because pedophiles often collect child pornography does not compel the conclusion
that a possessor of such pornography 	will become a pedophile”) (citing Troy
Stabenow, 	Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed
Progression 	of 	the 	Child 	Pornography 	Guidelines 	31–33, 	July 	3, 	2008,
http://www.fd.org/odstb_Sentencing 	Resource3.htm 	(discussing 	studies)); 	United
States v. Marshall, 870 F. Supp. 2d 489, 492 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“Empirical 	data
strongly 	suggests 	that 	viewing 	child 	porn 	does 	not 	equate 	to 	child
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molestation.”) 	(citing 	Melissa 	Hamilton, 	The 	Efficacy 	of 	Severe 	Child
Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 545, 557 (2011) (citing Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center)),
aff’d, 736 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2013). As the foregoing authorities reflect, courts
have not identified any expert consensus or empirical data to support a judicial
finding that 	viewing child 	pornography 	indicates a heightened 	risk of child
sexual abuse. The record 	in this case 	likewise 	includes 	no evidence 	that
Defendant’s 	viewing of CSAM 	materials presents 	an increased 	risk of child
sexual or other abuse or neglect, and Defendant's criminal record includes no
reports of such misconduct. 	Given this, Defendant’s possession of the CSAM
materials alone does not support a finding that allowing unsupervised contact
with his children would present a danger to them. The record includes no other
evidence upon which the Court could reasonably extend special condition no. 7(g)
to Defendant’s own children.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Modify Conditions of Pretrial Release and hereby modifies special condition
7(g) to apply only to other people’s children and not to Defendant’s own
children.
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SO ORDERED, this 15th day of October, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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