PIPP v. HEALTH CARE FACILITY MANAGEMENT, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTINE PIPP )
) Civil Action No. 25-210
Plaintiff, ) District Judge Nora Barry Fischer
)
v. )
)
HEALTH CARE FACILITY MANAGEMENT, )
LLC, doing business as COMMUNICARE )
FAMILY of COMPANIES, and )
PAE PANH EMP, LLC, doing business as )
WEXFORD HEALTHCARE CENTER )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
This civil action arises from Plaintiff Christine Pipp’s (“Plaintiff” or “Pipp”) employment
and subsequent termination from Defendants Health Care Facility Management, LLC d/b/a
CommuniCare Family of Companies and Pae Panh Emp, LLC, d/b/a Wexford Healthcare Center
(“Defendants” or “Wexford”). Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination, failure to accommodate,
hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADAAA”) in Count I of the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 33),
Interference and Retaliation pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et
seq. (“FMLA”) in Count II, Common Law Wrongful Discharge (Public Policy Violation) in Count
III, and violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951, et seq. (“PHRA”) in
Count IV. Presently before the Court is the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
60) filed by Defendants on all Counts with supporting documentation. (ECF Nos. 60, 61 & 61-1).
Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion with supporting documentation. (ECF Nos. 64, 64-1
through 64-34). Defendants filed a Reply Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
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and a Reply in Support of their Statement of Facts along with a Supporting Appendix. (ECF Nos.
68, 69 & 69-1). The matter is fully briefed.
Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence in accordance with the standard
governing motions for summary judgment, for the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment will be granted in its entirety.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the parties’ Concise Statements of Material Facts,
Responses thereto (ECF Nos. 61, 64-1, 69), and other record evidence. Where disputed, facts and
all inferences are construed in favor of the Plaintiff. See Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
Plaintiff is Hired by Defendants
Pipp began her employment with Defendants as a licensed practical nurse in January 2020.
(ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶ 1). She initially worked at Baldwin Healthcare Center until around August
2021, when she requested a transfer to Wexford Healthcare Center. (Id. ¶ 2). Plaintiff was an at-
will employee and understood that she could be discharged at any time and for any reason. (Id. ¶
3). The applicable Employee Handbook expressly provided that while discipline generally
followed progressive steps, “[i]ndividual circumstances . . . may warrant bypassing various steps
in the process . . . or not following the process at all. (Id. ¶ 4). The Employee Handbook further
provided that for “serious” violations – including “flagrant poor performance indicating an
irresponsible lack of knowledge or decision-making process, resulting in a measurable loss to the
company” – termination could follow immediately. Plaintiff knew that termination could occur
immediately for serious violations. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5).
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December 4, 2023 Work Error and Discipline
On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff administered the wrong intravenous solution to a Wexford
resident. (Id. ¶ 7). Wexford’s then Director of Nursing (“DON”), Damarla Taylor, suspended
Plaintiff and reported the incident to the Pennsylvania Department of Health, which investigated
and cited Wexford in connection with Plaintiff’s error. (Id. ¶ 9). The Pennsylvania Board of
Nursing opened an investigation and warned Plaintiff that a repeat offense could result in a fine of
up to $10,000. (Id. ¶ 10). The Employee Handbook informed employees that a suspension is the
employer’s “last notice” of the need for improvement. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff agreed in her deposition
that this suspension and discipline were warranted, and that the mistake was a serious infraction,
even though the patient was not harmed. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 20-21).
Plaintiff’s New Position at Wexford
In January 2024, Plaintiff was promoted to the full-time wound nurse position and given a
raise. (ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶ 12).
Plaintiff’s April 5, 2024 Work Injury
On April 5, 2024, Pipp fell from a chair at work and sustained a knee injury. (ECF Nos.
61 & 64-1 ¶ 20). She testified that after her knee injury, she did not request FMLA leave. (Pipp
Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 15, 30). She returned to work on April 11, 2024, with light duty medical
restrictions including sedentary work requiring no bending, kneeling, standing, walking, or lifting,
pushing, or pulling more than 5-10 pounds. (ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶¶ 20-21; Farelli Dep., ECF No.
64-7 at 13). Pipp’s job modifications included desk work such as entering physician orders,
confirming physician orders, completing paperwork for new admissions, preparing discharge
papers, entering residents’ weights, gathering meal consumption information from the aides,
entering that information into the computer, and feeding residents. (Farelli Dep., ECF No. 64-7 at
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14). According to Farelli, Pipp was not expected to push the wound care cart because it was
contrary to her restrictions, but she would still be given the information to document the measuring
of the wounds. (Id.).
The New Director of Nursing, Chinonye Nwadinobi, Arrives at Wexford
The new DON, Chinonye Nwadinobi (“Nwadinobi”), did not arrive on the floor at Wexford
until April 17, 2024, one week after Pipp returned from her injury.1 (Pipp Dep., ECF No.64-3 at
30). Plaintiff had no complaints with Wexford until after Nwadinobi arrived. (Pipp Dep., ECF
No. 64-3 at 11-12). It is undisputed that Nwadinobi was a terrible manager. For instance, she
would regularly scream at Pipp and other staff in the common areas of the unit. As such, other
staff members, residents, and their family members witnessed Nwadinobi’s inappropriate
behavior. (Id. at 11, 12). She treated many nurses badly and many quit or were fired because of
her. (Id. at 27). Staff reported that she would bang her fists on the nurses’ station while yelling in
front of her staff and speaking on the phone in an unprofessional manner. (Katic Dep., ECF No.
61-1 at 61). Nwadinobi’s managerial style was characterized as dictatorial. (Id.). Nurses reported
that when they were short staffed, Nwadinobi would expect nurses to care for a high number of
patients, compromising patient safety. (Healy Dep., ECF No. 64-27 at 7; Katic Dep., ECF No. 61-
1 at 60). Pipp believed that Nwadinobi was an incompetent manager, ignorant of the rules and
regulations that applied to nursing homes. Accordingly, Pipp and others filed the following
complaint about Nwadinobi with the Board of Nursing:
This letter of concern is written by several nurses: Heather
Spearline, Lorraine Craft, Christine Pipp, Joan Healy, Mary Beth
Katic. On 4/18/24 the new DON Chinonye Nwadinobi (on her first
day working independently) accused a male nurse to be drunk on the
job; she took the med cart keys away from him and handed them to
an LPN on WorksComp [Pipp], knowing she could not work the cart
1 Although Nwadinobi was hired on April 10, 2024, she did not start working the floor independently until April 18,
2024. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 21).
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and the DON did not bother to count the narcotics[;] even when she
asked the DON to come back up to the unit[,] the nurse had to find
another nurse to count the narcotics with. Additionally, medications
in the system were not yet signed off and no one knew if the morning
medication pass was complete. We interviewed the interviewable
[sic] residents and found out that the majority of the entire front
wing did not get their meds. The unit nurses were extremely
concerned and terrified for their own licenses that we feel were in
jeopardy that day through the actions of an incompetent director of
nursing. We asked her how to document the omissions and she
wrote the verbiage on a piece of paper for some, others were
instructed verbally to write in the system that an internal
investigation prevented the med pass to be completed. Most nurses
refused to document considering that over a 100 various
medications were not given to patients, including diabetics. Then,
on 4/28/24 this DON refused to cover a staffing hole, forced two
nurses to have over 30 patients on daylight on one unit and on
another an LPN on [sic] was forced to care for over 40 patients.
When nurses expressed their concern, Ms. Nwadinobi said that
according to the State regulations she could have an RN take care of
250 patients which clearly showed to us that this DON is ignorant
of the rules and regulations.
(ECF No. 64-23). Elena Staroselsky (“Staroselsky”) submitted the complaint. (Id.; see also Pipp
Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 27). According to Plaintiff, Nwandinobi threw the medication cart keys at
her on April 18, 2024, screamed at her, and told her that she had to push the medication cart and
pass medications. (ECF No. 64-1 ¶ 27).
Pipp asserts that on May 2, 2024, while she was still on push and pull restrictions,
Nwadinobi told her again to push a medication cart against her restrictions. (Pipp Dep., ECF No.
64-3 at 12). She testified that she complained multiple times to Janet Lowe, the Human Resources
Manager. (Id.). She also stated that Lowe and Farelli did things to make her work against her
restrictions, although she provides no details relating to Lowe and Farelli. (Id.). As to Nwadinobi,
Plaintiff states that she said multiple times: “Oh, you’re still on crutches, oh, I can find somebody
else to do your job for you.” (Id.).
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Pipp telephoned the corporate hotline but was unable to recall the dates of the calls, or the
persons to whom she complained. (Id. at 13). But after she escalated her complaints to Corporate
that Wexford was not honoring her restrictions, she agrees that things changed, and on May 2,
2024, Plaintiff began receiving daily assignments from Louise Farelli, the Executive Director for
Wexford. These daily assignments followed her restrictions. (Id. at 14; ECF No. 61-1 at 33).
April 24, 2024 Work Error and Wound Care Demotion
On April 24, 2024, when Pipp was assisting with admission orders, she incorrectly entered
a physician order for valproic acid2, causing a resident to receive an extra dose. (Pipp Dep., ECF
No. 64-3 at 26). Pipp signed the Corrective Action Form which constituted a “Final Written
Warning.” (ECF No. 61-1 at 34). A “Performance/Policy” violation was indicated as the reason
for the Corrective Action, specifically detailing the failure to follow nursing admission process,
i.e., medication clarification, diet orders, etc. The Corrective Action Form also noted that
resources were made available to Pipp “in order to maintain nursing process.” (ECF No. 61-1 at
34).
During her tenure as wound nurse from January through April 2024, the number of
residents with wounds at Wexford increased and their wounds deteriorated. (Id. ¶ 13). On April
30, 2024, Executive Director of Wexford Healthcare Center, Louise Farelli (“Farelli”), removed
Pipp from the wound nurse role based upon her performance since January 2024. (ECF Nos. 61 &
64-1 ¶ 16). Although Plaintiff asserts that she was removed from the wound care position because
then DON Nwadinobi was angry that Pipp had medical restrictions and could no longer push the
medication cart (ECF No. 64-1 ¶ 16), a May 2, 2024, email from Farelli to Shannon Schultheis
2 Valproic acid is an anticonvulsant used to treat seizures. It is also used to treat the manic phase of bipolar disorder
and may also be used to prevent migraine headaches. https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/valproic-acid-
oral-route/description/drg-20072931 (last visited October 2, 2026).
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(“Schultheis”), Regional Director of Operations, Pipp, Nwadinobi, and Erika Witherspoon
(“Witherspoon”), a representative from Corporate, with a copy to Wexford Human Resources
Manager Janet Lowe (“Lowe”) provides, in part, as follows:
Christine was informed on 4/30/24 that based on her performance
since Jan 2024 (the time she took over the wound nurse role) up until
her injury, she will no longer be in the wound nurse role. After her
injury, Christine had continued to follow wounds, but was unable to
do rounds. This was when it was discovered that multiple wound
orders input by Christine were incorrect. Erika and Chinonye did
review this with Christine as well. Christine has also been tasked in
the wound/supervisory role to complete and assist in new admission
requirements completion. There have been errors in this portion of
performance, from order verification to actual order entry. Christine
has received coaching and write ups for these as well. Christine also
asked to rearrange the units the supervisors would cover because the
2nd floor was “too much.” In this meeting on 4/30/24, we also
discussed a transition plan over the next 30 days, Christine would
no longer be in a supervisory role. That she was not being
terminated, however, based on our current wound situation and
performance[,] we needed to make the change.
(ECF No. 61-1 at 33). In addition, Farelli confirmed in deposition that it was she as Executive
Director, along with the Director of Nursing, and Human Resources Manager, who discussed
“what would be most appropriate to fit within [Pipp’s] accommodations.” (Farelli Dep., ECF No.
64-7 at 14).
Plaintiff’s Termination from Employment
After Pipp’s August 24, 2024 Final Written Warning (ECF No. 61-1 at 34), more order
errors followed. On April 29, 2024, Pipp was issued another Corrective Action Form indicating
that she was terminated. (ECF Nos. 64-19). Plaintiff’s termination was formalized on May 10,
2024, by a Termination Checklist signed by Human Relations Manager Janet Lowe. (ECF Nos.
61 & 64-1 ¶ 25; ECF No. 61-1 at 35). Plaintiff was officially terminated on May 21, 2024. The
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documented basis for termination was her nursing errors, including the April 24, 2024, Corrective
Action. (ECF No. 61-1 at 35).
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint for violation of the ADA, the
FMLA and Pennsylvania common law. (ECF No. 1). Defendants filed their Answer on April 14,
2025. (ECF No. 11). On May 16, 2025, Defendants filed an Amended Answer. (ECF No. 23).
On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, adding a count for violation of
the PHRA. (ECF No. 33). Defendants filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint on
September 2, 2025. (ECF No. 36). On March 20, 2026, after three (3) extensions of the discovery
deadline, Defendants filed their initial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57). On March
24, 2026, the Court denied the Motion without prejudice and Defendants were ordered to refile
their Motion by March 30, 2026, in compliance with the Local Rules for the Western District of
Pennsylvania and this Court’s Practices and Procedures. Defendants timely filed their renewed
Motion on March 27, 2026 (ECF No. 60). After Plaintiff filed her Response to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment on April 24, 2026 (ECF No. 64), Defendants filed their Evidentiary
Objections to Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 67). Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ Objections (ECF No. 71), to which Defendants
filed a Second Set of Evidentiary Objections on May 27, 2026 (ECF No.72). Plaintiff filed her
response to Defendants’ Second Set of Objections on June 11, 2026 (ECF No. 77). On October
14, 2026, the Court overruled Defendants’ evidentiary objections (ECF No. 78).
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary Judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
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Fed. R. Civ P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the
litigation. Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). However, “[w]here the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial.” N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir.
2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S. at 587).
The initial burden is on the moving party to adduce evidence illustrating a lack of genuine,
triable issues. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). Once the moving party satisfies its burden,
the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue, in rebuttal. Santini, 795
F.3d at 416 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 475 U.S. at 587). When considering the
parties’ arguments, the court is required to view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962)).
Nonetheless, a well-supported motion for summary judgment will not be defeated where
the non-moving party merely reasserts factual allegations contained in pleadings. Betts v. New
Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Borough of West
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)). The non-moving party must resort to affidavits,
deposition testimony, admissions, and/or interrogatories to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue. Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). But “conjecture and speculation” cannot create a genuine issue
of material fact. Wiest v. Tyco Electronics Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 328 (3d Cir. 2016). The Court
must be mindful that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
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[nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Termination in Violation of the ADA and PHRA (Counts I and IV)3
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against “a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual” with a disability includes “an
individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “The
term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-
(C). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A).
1. Direct Evidence
A plaintiff may prove disability discrimination by direct evidence under a “mixed motive
theory” as described in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), or indirectly through
the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “Direct
3 The PHRA is governed by the same analytical framework as the ADA and “federal courts should continue to interpret
the PHRA in harmony with the ADA.” See Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 221 n.21 (3d
Cir. 2024). Accordingly, the Court analyzes the ADA and PHRA claims together.
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evidence” of discrimination is “evidence that is ‘so revealing of discriminatory animus that it is
not necessary to rely on any presumption’ from the plaintiff’s prima facie case to shift the
applicable burden of production to the defendant.” Norfolk v. GEO Grp., Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-
204, 2020 WL 1873991, at *6 n.3 (W.D. Pa. April 15, 2020) (quoting Starceski v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995)). Pursuant to Price Waterhouse, “if a
‘plaintiff offers “direct evidence” of unlawful discrimination … the plaintiff need only show that
the unlawful motive was a substantial motivating factor in [the employer’s] decision’ to take an
adverse employment action against the plaintiff.” Wright v. Providence Care Center, 2:17-cv-
747, 2019 WL 4643592, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2019), aff’d, 822 F. App’x 85 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quoting Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 594 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing Price Waterhouse
concurrence by Justice O’Connor)). If plaintiff carries this initial burden, “[b]oth the burden of
production and the risk of non-persuasion are shifted to the defendant who … must persuade the
factfinder that even if the discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse employment
decision, it would have made the same employment decision regardless of its discriminatory
animus.” Wright, 2019 WL 4643592, at *5 (quoting Neustein v. PNC Bank, NA, No. 15-1045,
2017 WL 3173956, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 2017) (other citation omitted)).
At the outset, Plaintiff contends that she has offered direct evidence of disability
discrimination through Nwadinobi’s statement: “Oh, you’re still on crutches; if you can’t perform
the job, then we’ll find someone who can.”4 (ECF No. 64 at 11).
Plaintiff, in attempting to prove discrimination with direct evidence faces a “high hurdle.”
Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1999), quoted in, Neustein, 2017 WL
3173956, at *7. This “high hurdle” consists of demonstrating that the evidence is “strong enough
4 Considering same, this statement could also be construed as accommodating Plaintiff’s disability.
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to permit the factfinder to infer that a discriminatory attitude was more likely than not a motivating
factor in the [defendants’] decision,” and that the evidence is “connected to the decision being
challenged by the plaintiff.” Wright v. Providence Care Center, LLC, 822 F. App’x 85, 90 (3d
Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778-79,
782 (3d Cir. 1994) (analogizing direct evidence to the proverbial “smoking gun”). Moreover, stray
remarks in the workplace or derogatory comments that are unrelated to the decisional process,
even when uttered by decision makers, do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
As argued by Defendants, Nwadinobi’s statement, which references Plaintiff’s inability to
push the medication cart, reflects no discriminatory animus when viewed in context of the record.
Plaintiff admits that it was Nwadinobi, as the DON, who was responsible for ensuring that
Wexford residents received the care that they required. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 7). To this
end, Nwadinobi’s “dictatorial” management style is undisputed, and the record reflects that she
treated those she supervised at Wexford with equal hostility and rancor. See Staroselsky Dep.,
ECF No. 64-6 at 11 (Nwadinobi’s demeanor was demeaning, hostile, and obnoxious); Katic Dep.,
ECF No. 61-1 at 61 (describing Nwadinobi yelling and pounding her fists while expressing anger);
Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 23 (Nwadinobi was condescending to everyone); Lowe Dep., ECF
No. 64-8 at 27 (Nwadinobi’s behavior listed as a factor to Human Resources for staff members’
resignations); Healy Dep., ECF No. 64-27 at 11 (Nwadinobi raised her voice to Healy and treated
her disrespectfully). In context, her inappropriate management style had nothing to do with
Plaintiff’s disability, but with her efforts to run the unit. See Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 7 (Pipp
agreed that the DON is ultimately responsible for the delivery and quality of care to residents).
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Most importantly, record evidence does not reflect that Nwadinobi’s statement was related to the
decisional process of Executive Director Louise Farelli, Human Resources Manager Janet Lowe,
and Nwadinobi to terminate Plaintiff for poor performance. (Farelli Dep., ECF No. 64-7 at 25).
As such, in construing all disputed facts in favor of Plaintiff and affording her every favorable
inference, the Court finds that Nwadinobi’s statement does not clear the “high hurdle” of proof to
constitute direct evidence of disability discrimination.
2. Circumstantial Evidence
Because the Court finds that there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the Court applies
the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see also Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661,
667-68 (3d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff carries the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v.
Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 759 (3d Cir. 2004)). To establish a prima facie
case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action
because of her disability. Fowler v. AT&T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2021). A plaintiff’s
burden at the prima facie stage is “not onerous.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981), cited in, Mitchell v. City of Pittsburgh, 995 F. Supp.2d 420, 431 (W.D. Pa.
2014).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not regarded as disabled within the meaning of the
ADA because her knee sprain was transitory, lasting only seven weeks, and minor, because she
did not require surgery or ongoing treatment. (ECF No. 60 at 4). The United States Court of
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Appeals for the Third Circuit clarified, however, that “[a]n impairment lasting fewer than six
months is transitory, but may not be minor, and therefore may still be regarded as a disability.”
Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 224 (3d Cir. 2024). The Third Circuit
noted that “minor” is not statutorily defined, and whether an impairment is minor must be made
on a “case-by-case basis[.]” Id. As in Morgan, the Court considers Plaintiff’s medical restrictions
in finding that her impairment was not minor: her restrictions required sedentary work, no bending,
kneeling, standing, walking, or lifting/pushing/pulling more than 5-10 pounds. (ECF Nos. 61 &
64-1 ¶¶ 20-21; Farelli Dep., ECF No. 64-7 at 13). See Morgan, 114 F.4th at 224 (finding Morgan’s
back pain which caused “difficulty bending lifting, walking, and turning left or right” was more
than minor pain). Moreover, Pipp required crutches until April 25, 2024. (Pipp Dep., ECF No.
64-3 at 13). As such, the Court finds that contrary to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiff satisfies the
first element of her prima facie case.
As to the second element, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that she was qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations. She testified that
she earned an associate degree to become a medical assistant, obtained her LPN license in 2018,
and began working for Defendants in 2020. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 7). To this end, she carried
the appropriate training and credentials necessary for her position with Defendants. In addition,
even though she was no longer pushing the medication cart when she returned to work on April
11, 2024, she continued to track/document wounds as a wound care nurse.5 (Id. at 13).
5 Defendants interpret this element as to whether Pipp “was performing her job satisfactorily at the time.” (ECF No.
60 at 5). This is not the appropriate application of this element. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (A qualified individual is
someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that [she] holds or desires.”). Plaintiff must show that she “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education
and other job-related requirements of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Skerski v. Time
Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
She must also show that she, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
position held or sought.” Id.
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As to the final element of the prima facie case, Plaintiff argues that she has introduced
evidence to create an inference that she was terminated because of her disability. (ECF No. 64 at
16-20). Plaintiff directs the Court to the following: 1) Nwadinobi’s statement to Pipp that if she
couldn’t push the medication cart, Nwadinobi would find someone who could; 2) evidence
concerning other allegedly similarly situated non-members of Plaintiff’s protected class that
Defendants treated more favorably; 3) that after she was terminated, Pipp was replaced by someone
outside her protected class; 4) that Pipp was terminated soon after she reported her injury; and 5)
Defendants’ alleged departure from their discipline policy. (ECF No. 64 at 17-20).
The Court will assume that Plaintiff has carried her burden to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination because the burden at the prima facie stage is “much less onerous than proving
pretext with similar evidence.” Rhoden v. Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 2:14-0411, 2017 WL
4224655, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Opsatnik v. Norfolk S. Corp., Civil Action No.
06-81, 2008 WL 763745, at *4 (W.D. Pa. March 20, 2008), aff’d, 335 F. App’x 220 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998)). See also Moussa v. Pa. Dep’t
of Pub. Welfare, Civil Action No. 07-9, 2010 WL 1333333, at *8 (W.D. Pa. March 31, 2010)
(analyzing the plaintiff’s claims at the pretext stage where the defendant’s prima facie case and
pretext-based arguments each relied on the same evidence).
Next, the burden shifts to Defendants “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for its employment decision. Fowler, 19 F.4th at 299 (citing Walton, 168 F.3d at 668). In
the instant case, Defendants have articulated several reasons for Plaintiff’s suspension and
termination, accompanied by contemporaneous written documentation of her performance
failures. First, in December 2023, Plaintiff administered the wrong intravenous fluid to a resident.
(ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶ 7). Wexford was cited by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, and
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Plaintiff was warned by the Pennsylvania Board of Nursing that a repeat offense could result in a
substantial fine. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10). Plaintiff was suspended by Wexford’s then DON Damarla Taylor.
(Id. ¶ 9).
Second, on April 24, 2024, Plaintiff signed a Corrective Action Form confirming that she
incorrectly entered an order for valproic acid, causing a resident to receive an extra dose. (ECF
No. 61-1 at 34; Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 26).
Third, from January 2024 through April 2024, when Plaintiff was the full-time wound care
nurse, the number of residents with wounds at Wexford increased and their wounds deteriorated.
(ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶ 13). The Executive Director of Wexford, Farelli, removed Pipp from the
wound care role on April 30, 2024. (ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶ 16). A May 2, 2024 email from Farelli
to Pipp and various management, describes that multiple wound care orders input by Pipp were
incorrect, and that new admission requirements contained errors in order verification and actual
order entries. (ECF No. 61-1 at 33).
With Defendants’ articulation of its nondiscriminatory business reasons for Pipp’s
termination, Plaintiff must point to some evidence that might cause a factfinder to either “(1)
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer’s action.” Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (other citation omitted)). Plaintiff must do more than
“simply show that the employer’s decision is wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue
is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise,
shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citations omitted). She must provide
evidence that could “allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the employer’s proffered
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non-discriminatory reasons . . . was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually
motivate the employment action.” Id. at 764 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
As to the first prong, Plaintiff “must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [Defendants’] proffered legitimate reasons for
its actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’”
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fuentes,
32 F.3d at 765). “The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound,
business decision; it is whether the real reason is [disability discrimination].” Keller v. Orix Credit
Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Carson v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82
F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Plaintiff admitted in deposition that she made the performance errors relied upon by
Defendants as the bases for her termination. Pipp agreed that the suspension and discipline
accompanying the December 2023 medication error were warranted and that the mistake in
administering the wrong intravenous fluid to a resident was serious, even though the patient was
not harmed. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 20-21). Relating to the April 24, 2024, Corrective
Action where she incorrectly entered an order for valproic acid, causing a resident to receive an
extra dose, she disputed the mistake in deposition, but then agreed after questioning that she
entered the order incorrectly. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 26). At some point, a Performance
Improvement Plan (“PIP”) was discussed because of her performance from January through April.
To this end, she admitted that the discussion occurred because of her performance and not because
of her injury. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 23). Concerning her tenure as wound care nurse from
January through April 2024, where the number of wounds increased and wounds deteriorated,
Plaintiff initially attempted to dispute these assertions with her own deposition testimony (Pipp
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Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 78-79), and the deposition testimony of a nurse who worked opposite shifts
(Spearline Dep., ECF No. 64-34 at 6). But the May 2, 2024 email from Regional Director of
Operations, Shannon Schultheis, to Pipp and Wexford Leadership stated that “when it comes to
Wound Care[,] this Center ranks near the bottom of the 129 Centers that Communicare has. I have
expressed my concerns with Leadership on the continued decline with wound care and
prevention.” (ECF No. 61-1 at 32). Plaintiff admitted that these criticisms of the wound care
decline had nothing to do with her knee injury. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 24). With these
admissions, Plaintiff is unable to meet the first prong of the Fuentes analysis as a matter of law.
Under prong two, “a plaintiff must provide evidence that allows the factfinder to infer that
discrimination was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s decision.” Surman v. UPMC
Presbyterian Shadyside, Civ. A. No. 17-184, 2018 WL 4901107, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2018)
(quoting Anderson v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 723, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citation
omitted)). In the instant case, Plaintiff advances several arguments as to why Defendants’
proffered reasons for her termination are pretext for disability discrimination. At the outset,
Plaintiff contends that discriminatory comments establish that she was terminated because of her
disability. As discussed above, Nwadinobi’s abusive comments and behavior, however, reflect
her abrasive managerial style, and go to her insistence that residents’ needs be met. See discussion,
supra, at Section V.A.1. Plaintiff further argues that there are factual disputes relating to Plaintiff’s
work performance issues. As noted, the record reflects that Plaintiff admitted that she made the
performance errors relied upon by Defendants as the bases for her termination, including the
December 2023 medication error, (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 20), and her incorrect entry of an
order for valproic acid. (ECF No. 64-3 at 26).
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Plaintiff also advances a disparate treatment theory to establish pretext. Plaintiff may do
so by showing “that the employer treated other, similarly situated persons not within [her] class
more favorably, or that the employer discriminated against other members of [her] protected
class.” Moussa, 2010 WL 1333333, at *9 (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). See also Wright, 822
F. App’x at 92 (citing Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645) (“[P]laintiff can demonstrate pretext by presenting
evidence that similarly situated persons not within plaintiff’s protected class were treated more
favorably by defendant employer.”)). See also Zahavi v. PNC Fin. Serv. Group, Inc., Civil Action
No. 07-376, 2009 WL 904699, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009) (citing Wheeler v. Aventis Pharm.,
360 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2004)). Employees are “similarly situated” when they “dealt with the
same supervisor [and] engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.”
Zahavi, 2009 WL 904699, at *12 (quoting Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp.2d 588, 603
(M.D. Pa. 2002)) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, a plaintiff attempting to establish
pretext based upon inconsistent disciplinary actions must show that the comparator’s misconduct
“[was] of comparable seriousness to [her] own infraction” and that no “differentiating or mitigating
circumstances” existed. Tyler v. SEPTA, Civ. A. 99-4825, 2002 WL 31965896, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 8, 2002), aff’d, 85 F. App’x 875 (3d Cir. 2003). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where
there is no evidence from which a jury could conclude the parties were similarly situated.” Abdul-
Latif v. Cnty. of Lancaster, 990 F. Supp.2d 517, 526 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Opsatnik, 335 F. App’x
at 223-24).
In attempting to meet this heavy burden, Plaintiff relies upon four (4) non-disabled
comparators: 1) Joan Healy (“Healy”); 2) Cheryl Parkinson (“Parkinson”); 3) Grace Laxamana
(“Laxamana”); and 4) Chinonye Nwadinobi. None of these individuals are valid comparators. At
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the outset, and as noted by Defendants, the relevant supervisory time frame is the Taylor-
Nwadinobi period from October 2023 through July 9, 2024. (Damarla Taylor Dep., ECF No. 69-
1 at 45-46 (Taylor hire and resignation dates); Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 21 (Nwadinobi hire and
resignation dates)). Joan Healy has worked at Wexford since 2011. The Healy disciplines
reflected at ECF No. 64-26 at 2-17, were all issued outside of the relevant supervisory period, and
are not probative of how Taylor or Nwadinobi treated comparable conduct. See ECF No. 64-26 at
2-17. Many occurred early in her tenure with Wexford from 2012 through 2018 and involved
absenteeism or tardiness. (ECF No. 64-26 at 7-9, 11, 16). None of them were as serious as
Plaintiff’s December 2023 infraction where she administered the wrong intravenous medication
that triggered a state agency citation against Wexford, and a nursing license investigation. (ECF
Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶¶ 9, 10). Moreover, unlike Pipp’s December 2023 medication error, the record
reflects no further Healy disciplines after her lone medication error, only a “Concern Form” and
“Employee Coaching Session Form” relating to leaving patient medications at beside. See ECF
No. 64-26 at 2-17 & 3-4.
Similarly, only two of Parkinson’s corrective actions occurred during the Taylor-
Nwadinobi supervisory period, both of which involved absenteeism, which are hardly comparable
to the Plaintiff’s intravenous medication mistake. See ECF No. 64-25 at 2-17.
As to Laxamana, Plaintiff relies on the deposition of Elena Staroselsky for the alleged
misconduct of Laxamana. Laxamana was never deposed, and Plaintiff directs the Court to no
documents to substantiate Staroselsky’s accounts.6 According to Staroselsky’s deposition
testimony, Laxamana refused to confer with other unit nurses as to who would cover the middle
6 In deposition, Starolesky admits that in April 2024, Laxamana filed a complaint against her for race discrimination
and that the complaint was investigated. When asked if that complaint was the basis for her (Starolesky’s) suspension,
she could not remember whether the complaint was the reason but was not aware of any other act that would have led
to her suspension. (Starolesky Dep., ECF No. 64-6 at 27).
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section of the unit. When questioned by Staroselsky as to whether she spoke to the nurse on the
adjacent unit to work out the assignment, she refused to respond and walked away. (Staroselsky
Dep., ECF No. 64-6 at 8-9). When Staroselsky attempted to give her a coaching on the issue,
Laxamana started screaming and making a scene, saying that Staroselsky was “picking on her.”
(Id. at 9). Laxamana was not issued a discipline for this behavior. (Id.). Based upon Staroselsky’s
deposition testimony, it appears that she held some type of supervisory role over Laxamana at the
time, not Taylor or Nwadinobi, although the record is unclear. More importantly, the testimony
does not reflect serious patient medication errors as those committed by Plaintiff. Laxamana is
simply not a valid comparator.
Finally, Nwadinobi cannot be a valid comparator if she was Plaintiff’s supervisor; they had
entirely different responsibilities in their respective roles at Wexford and cannot be similarly
situated as a matter of law. See Langley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 21-2962, 2023 WL
1433609, at **4-5 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2023) (subordinate and supervisor are not similarly situated).
Plaintiff also contends that her replacement by individuals outside her protected class, i.e.,
those who did not request modified duties because of a disability, is evidence of pretext. (ECF
No. 64 at 21). Pipp states that after her termination, Defendant replaced her with Christine
Fitzgerald and Parkinson, neither of whom were disabled. Replacement by members outside the
protected class does not necessarily raise an inference of discrimination. See Pivirotto v.
Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352-53 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s
replacement argument in the healthcare setting where sufficient staffing is critical for patient
safety. See id.
Plaintiff also submits the testimony of corroborating witnesses Spearline and Staroselsky
as evidence of Defendants’ discriminatory conduct. (ECF No. 64 at 21). Conversely, Staroselsky
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unequivocally testified that she understood that Pipp would be performing modified duties after
her knee injury, that she never witnessed anyone at Wexford making negative comments about her
work injury, or her accommodation needs. (Staroselsky Dep., ECF No. 64-6 at 16-17). Moreover,
she never witnessed Nwadinobi in conversations with Pipp about her work injury or about her
modified duties. Rather, she testified that other nurses filled in and pushed the medication cart for
Pipp, and that after her injury on April 5, 2024, Plaintiff no longer pushed the wound care cart.
(Id. at 17, 26). Although she stated that Plaintiff continued to perform satisfactorily after her injury
(id.), she also testified that she never audited Plaintiff’s electronic orders for which Plaintiff was
disciplined. (Id. at 26). Likewise, Spearline’s testimony reflects that she and Pipp worked opposite
shifts, and that she did not directly observe Pipp in the performance of her job functions. (Spearline
Dep., ECF No. 64-34 at 6, 11). Regarding her familiarity with Pipp’s documentation, Spearline
testified that she would see Pipp’s progress notes, but she did not audit Plaintiff’s documentation
in the PointClickCare electronic system at Wexford. (Id. at 11). In this Court’s estimation, the
testimony of Spearline and Staroselsky do not corroborate Plaintiff’s claims of disability
discrimination.
Plaintiff further relies on deviations from the Employee Handbook’s discipline procedures
as evidence of pretext. Record evidence reflects, however, that Plaintiff was suspended in
December 2023, issued a final written warning on April 24, 2024 (ECF No. 61-1 at 34), followed
by termination after additional order entry errors on April 29, 2024 (ECF Nos. 64-19; 61-1 at 35).
See Katz v. UPMC, 835 F. App’x 664, 667 (3d Cir. 2020). Moreover, it is undisputed that the
Employee Handbook provides that individual circumstances, including performance records, prior
disciplines, and the nature of an offense, may warrant bypassing steps in the progressive
disciplinary process, or not following the procedures at all. (Employee Handbook, ECF No. 61-1
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at 24; ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶ 4). Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged deviation from
disciplinary procedures does not support Plaintiff’s argument that discrimination was the real
reason for her termination.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the timing of her suspension within 30 days of her injury, and
just a few weeks after Nwadinobi made her April 18, 2024 comments about her inability to push
the medication cart is evidence of invidious discrimination. (ECF No. 64 at 21). Record evidence
is undisputed, however, that the termination process began with the December 2023 medication
error, several months before Plaintiff’s April 5, 2024, knee injury. With her suspension, Plaintiff
was placed on notice that her patient care practices needed to improve. Defendants provided
Plaintiff with an opportunity to improve with her wound care promotion, but wounds at Wexford
continued to decline, and the decision was made to remove her from the position of wound care
nurse. See ECF Nos. 64-20 at 2. Plaintiff admitted that the wound care decline was real, and that
criticisms of her as the wound care nurse had nothing to do with her knee injury. (Pipp Dep., ECF
No. 64-3 at 24). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to raise an issue of material fact as to the second prong
of the Fuentes analysis.
As such, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude on this record that Plaintiff was
terminated because of her disability, and summary judgment must be granted on Plaintiff’s claim
for termination in violation of the ADA and PHRA in Counts I and IV of the Amended Complaint.
B. Retaliation in Violation of the ADA and PHRA (Counts I & IV), and Common Law
Wrongful Discharge (Count III)
The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision states that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter
or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
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investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The same is true
under the PHRA. 43 P.S. § 955(d).
To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged
in protected activity; (2) her employer subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (3) “a
causal connection [existed] between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse
action.” Williams, 380 F.3d at 759; see also Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp. Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68
(3d Cir. 2002). Making a request for a disability accommodation in good faith is a protected
activity. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that
the right to request an accommodation in good faith is protected conduct), cited in, Kieffer v. CPR
Restoration & Cleaning Servs, Inc., 733 F. App’x 632, 638 n.26 (3d Cir. 2018).
As to causation, a plaintiff may establish a causal connection by showing that the temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is “unusually suggestive,” or
through a combination of timing and other evidence of ongoing antagonism or retaliatory animus.
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000). “It is important to emphasize
that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of plaintiff's prima facie case,
and temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference can be
drawn.” Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997). If Plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the court proceeds to the subsequent steps of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).
Relatedly, in 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that under Pennsylvania law, an
at-will employee may not be discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
Shick v. Shirey Lumber, 716 A.2d 1231, 1237-38 (Pa. 1998). See also Villard v. Whitemarsh
Continuing Care Ret. Cmty., Civi Action No. 10-7230, 2012 WL 6562767, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
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17, 2012) (“[A]n employee engages in protected activity under Pennsylvania law when her injury
causes the filing of a worker’s compensation claim . . . .”). “The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has directed district courts to apply the Title VII framework for a retaliation claim to a worker’s
compensation retaliation claim brought under Pennsylvania law.” Id. (citing Theriault v. Dollar
Gen., 336 F. App’x 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiff argues that she can establish that Defendants retaliated against her for requesting
accommodations for her April 5, 2024 knee injury; complaining about disability discrimination;
and for filing a worker’s compensation claim after her work-related injury. She directs the Court
to the temporal proximity between her protected activities and her subsequent termination. (Id. at
24-25).
Undisputed record evidence does not support Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, despite this
temporal proximity. She cannot demonstrate a causal connection between her termination and
requests for accommodations/complaints of disability discrimination, or for filing a worker’s
compensation claim. To this end, Defendants have articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons
for her termination by way of Plaintiff’s documented and repeated nursing errors that compromised
patient safety. See discussion, supra, at V.A.2. Plaintiff is unable to show that these reasons are
pretext for retaliation. Importantly, one of her most egregious medical mistakes, administering the
wrong intravenous medication to a Wexford resident in December 2023, occurred well before her
knee injury and the alleged protected activities that followed. Accordingly, her retaliation claims
are defeated by the same disciplinary record that defeated her claim of disability discrimination.
No reasonable jury could conclude on this record that Plaintiff’s suspension and
termination were in retaliation for requesting accommodations for her knee injury, complaining
about perceived discrimination, or filing a worker’s compensation claim. Therefore, Defendants’
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Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation in violation of the ADA and
PHRA in Counts I and IV, and under Pennsylvania common law for filing a workers’
compensation claim in Count III must be granted.
C. Failure to Accommodate in Violation of the ADA and PHRA (Counts I & IV)
To prove that an employer failed to provide reasonable accommodations by failing to
engage in good faith in an interactive process, a plaintiff must show that “1) the employer knew
about the employee’s disability; 2) the employee requested accommodations or assistance for his
or her disability; 3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking
accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the
employer's lack of good faith.” Colwell, 602 F.33d at 504 (quoting Williams v. Philadelphia Hous.
Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772 (3d Cir. 2004)). See also Franzi v. UPMC Presbyterian
Shadyside, Civil No. 12-1432, 2014 WL 4384545, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014).
Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff received accommodations for her disability.
Plaintiff returned to work after her knee injury on April 11, 2024, with light duty medical
restrictions. (ECF Nos. 61 & 64-1 ¶¶ 20-21; Farelli Dep., ECF No. 64-7 at 13). She testified that
she had no complaints upon her return until after Nwadinobi arrived on the unit on April 17, 2024.7
(Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 11-12). After Plaintiff escalated her concerns to Corporate, the
parties agree that things changed, and by May 2, 2024, Plaintiff began receiving daily assignments
from Farelli, which followed her restrictions. (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 14; ECF No. 61-1 at
33). Other record evidence reflects that after Pipp returned to work, other nurses filled in and
pushed the medication cart for her. (Staroselsky Dep., ECF No. 64-6 at 17, 26).
7 It wasn’t until Nwadinobi’s first day working independently, on April 18, 2024, that Nwadinobi threw the medication
cart keys at Plaintiff and told her to push the cart. See Board of Nursing Complaint re Nwadinobi, ECF No. 64-23.
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Accordingly, judgment as a matter of law must be granted on Plaintiff’s claim for failure
to accommodate in violation of the ADA and PHRA in Counts I & IV of the Amended Complaint.
D. Hostile Work Environment in Violation of the ADA and PHRA (Counts I & IV)
To establish a claim for hostile work environment pursuant to the ADA and PHRA, a
plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) [she] is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA;
(2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment
was based on her disability or a request for an accommodation; (4)
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of her employment and to create an abusive working
environment; and (5) that [defendants] knew or should have known
of the harassment and failed to take prompt effective remedial
action.
Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing McConathy
v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998). The ADA “‘does not make all
harassment, or every unpleasant working environment, actionable under the law.’” Campo v. Mid-
Atlantic Packaging Specialties, LLC, 564 F. Supp.3d 362, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting Barclay
v. Amtrak, 435 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448-49 (E.D. Pa. 2006)). See also Gabriel v. DSM Biomedical,
Inc., 187 F.4th 77, 82 (3d Cir. 2026) (“Sporadic instances of bullying or microaggressions by [a
supervisor] do not rise to the level of a hostile work environment as a matter of law.”); Dreshman
v. Henry Clay Villa, 733 F. Supp.2d 597, 612-13 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (alleged harassment consisting
of sporadic instances of slight touching or pinch was not severe or pervasive). “In determining
whether a plaintiff has established a case of hostile work environment sufficient to defeat summary
judgment, a court must consider the record as a whole.” Barclay, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (citing
Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2001)).
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The record in this case does not reflect that Pipp was harassed because of her disability.
Rather, her supervisor, Nwandobi, appears throughout the record as an abrasive, dictatorial
manager who behaved inappropriately to her staff members in general. She was indiscriminate in
her selection of targets. See Staroselsky Dep., ECF No. 64-6 at 11 (Nwadinobi’s demeanor was
demeaning, hostile, and obnoxious); Katic Dep., ECF No. 61-1 at 61 (Nwadinobi yelling and
pounding fists while expressing her anger); Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 23 (Nwadinobi was
condescending to everyone); Lowe Dep., ECF No. 64-8 at 27 (Nwadinobi given as a factor for
some staff members’ resignations); Healy Dep., ECF No. 64-27 at 11 (Nwadinobi raised voice to
Healy and treated her disrespectfully). As recently noted by Judge Bibas in Gabriel, “[n]o law or
employment term forbids having an intense or stressful workplace ….” 187 F.4th at 79.
Accordingly, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Nwadinobi harassed Pipp
because of her disability. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s
hostile work environment claim in violation of the ADA and PHRA in Counts I & IV of the
Amended Complaint.
E. Family Medical Leave Act--Interference and Retaliation (Count II)
In order to prevail on an FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she
invoked her right to FMLA leave, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that the
adverse action was causally related to her invocation of rights under the FMLA. Fritz v. Allied
Servs. Foundation, No. 3:21 cv 1996, 2024 WL 843918, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2024) (citing
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2012) (other citation
omitted)). An employee must ask for a medical leave. Hileman v. West Penn Allegheny Health
Sys., Inc., 182 F.4th 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2026). An employer is not “required to hunt for a possible
accommodation request that was never made.” Id.
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To make out a claim of interference pursuant to the FMLA, a plaintiff must establish that
“[s]he was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that [s]he was denied them.” Callison v. City
of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005). A plaintiff may also establish an interference claim
where the employer takes any action that could chill the desire to take FMLA leave. Fritz, 2024
WL 843918, at *6 (citing Kimes v. Univ. of Scranton, 126 F. Supp. 3d 477, 501 (M.D. Pa. 2015)
(other citations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff stated unequivocally that she knew she had a right to family medical leave
if she wanted to take it, and that she never requested FMLA leave because “a portion of [her
income] doesn’t pay the bills.” (Pipp Dep., ECF No. 64-3 at 30). She further agreed that nothing
Nwadinobi could have said to her would have prevented her from requesting leave. (Id.). With
these admissions, judgment as a matter of law must be entered for Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim
for interference and retaliation under the FMLA. See Hileman, 182 F.4th at 287.
I. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Plaintiff has failed to direct the Court to any record evidence to create an
issue of material fact that her termination was the product of unlawful discrimination or retaliation.
Her conjecture and speculation are not enough to create an issue for trial on any of her ADA claims.
See Wiest, 812 F.3d at 328. Instead, the record reflects that Plaintiff was terminated because of
her repeated documented nursing errors, many of which compromised patient safety. Similarly,
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s FMLA and hostile work
environment claims, as no rational trier of fact could find in favor of Plaintiff on this record.
Summary judgment is therefore appropriate on each of Plaintiff’s claims.
Appropriate Orders follow.
Dated: October 14, 2026
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s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
Senior U.S. District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record
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