JOHNSON v. MACFARLANE et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VINCENT JULIAN JOHNSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) Civil Action No. 2:25-1255
)
vs. 	) Chief Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
)
JORDAN R. MACFARLANE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Vincent Julian Johnson (“Johnson”) brings this pro se civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and related claims under state law arising out of his arrest on May 19, 2024,
which was supposedly based on a warrant but the affidavit of probable cause was not completed,
sworn to or attached until the following day.
He names as Defendants Pennsylvania State Trooper Jordan R. MacFarlane, who arrested
him; Magisterial District Judge Jennifer L. Jeffries, who signed a criminal complaint and set bail
at a preliminary arraignment; and Magisterial District Judge Nathan A. Henning, who signed a
fingerprint order, and allegedly “furthered a conspiracy” and “failed to stop a malicious
prosecution.”
Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint, one
brought by Trooper MacFarlane (ECF No. 34) and the other by Defendants Jeffries and Henning
(together, “the Judicial Defendants”) (ECF No. 27). For the reasons that follow, the Judicial
Defendants’ motion will be granted and Trooper MacFarlane’s motion will be granted in part
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and denied in part.1
I. 	Procedural History
Johnson commenced this action by submitting a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on August 18, 2025. (ECF No. 1). His motion was granted, and the Complaint was
docketed. (ECF No. 5). An Amended Complaint was then filed on September 19, 2025 (ECF
No. 8). Federal question subject matter jurisdiction is based on the civil rights claims asserted,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. As noted, Johnson raises claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.2 The Amended Complaint also references state law claims of false arrest, false
imprisonment, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, “discrimination,” “trespass” and “emotional
distress.” (ECF No. 8 § VI.)
The Judicial Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 27) on May 4, 2026. Trooper
MacFarlane filed a motion to dismiss on June 24, 2026 (ECF No. 34). On September 18, 2026,
Johnson filed a response to both motions (ECF No. 44).
Of note, Johnson had previously commenced an action at Civ. A. No. 24-1248, raising
the same claims and naming the same Defendants. The case was assigned to Judge Horan. On
May 14, 2025, Judge Horan entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 25) that
granted the motion to dismiss of the Judicial Defendants (ECF No. 21) and dismissed them from
the case with prejudice.
1 The parties have consented to full jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (ECF Nos. 3, 40, 45).
2 The Amended Complaint also mentions the Eighth Amendment (ECF No. 8 § II(B).) However,
that provision only applies to individuals who have been convicted of a crime, and Johnson was
not convicted. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005). In his response to the
motions to dismiss, Johnson does not refer to the Eighth Amendment.
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Also in the previous case, Trooper MacFarlane filed an Answer (ECF No. 23) and Judge
Horan scheduled an Initial Case Management Conference (ECF No. 28). Johnson did not appear
for the conference (ECF No. 30) and did not respond to an order to show cause that Judge Horan
subsequently issued (ECF No. 31). Therefore, on July 22, 2025, Judge Horan filed an order
dismissing the case without prejudice based on Johnson’s failure to prosecute (ECF No. 33).
Johnson filed three motions to reopen the case (ECF Nos. 34, 36, 38), but Judge Horan
denied them. In orders denying the second and third motions (ECF Nos. 37, 39), Judge Horan
noted that because Johnson had commenced this action (Civ. A. No. 25-1255), in which he
named the same Defendants and asserted the same causes of action, any further filings should be
made in this case and not in the closed case.
II. 	Facts Alleged in Amended Complaint
Johnson’s Amended Complaint alleges that on May 19, 2024, he was arrested by Trooper
MacFarlane, allegedly based on a warrant, but the arrest occurred before the affidavit was
written. Magisterial Judge Jeffries set his bail at $10,000 “with only hearsay as evidence.”
Because he could not afford this amount, he was sent to jail. Magisterial Judge Henning issued
a fingerprint order on May 20, 2024. Johnson was incarcerated for 63 days before the charges
were dropped and he was released.
The affidavit of probable cause, which Johnson has attached to the Amended Complaint,
states that Trooper MacFarlane was responding to a report by Johnson’s ex-girlfriend and her
son. They indicated that Johnson approached them outside a gym and threatened to kill them
while holding a small silver knife, which was found on Johnson’s person when he was arrested.
He was charged with terroristic threats and harassment. (ECF No. 8-1.) According to Johnson,
the documents were “whited out” with the dates changed from 5-19-24 to 5-20-24 in an attempt
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to cover up the fact that he was arrested before the affidavit was written.
III. 	Standard of Review
“Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v.
Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555-56 (2007)). “This requires a plaintiff to plead “sufficient factual matter to show that the
claim is facially plausible,” thus enabling “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). While the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
As noted by the Third Circuit in Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), a
12(b)(6) inquiry includes identifying the elements of a claim, disregarding any allegations that
are no more than conclusions and then reviewing the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint
to evaluate whether the elements of the claim are sufficiently alleged. If a claim “is vulnerable
to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment
would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted).
When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court typically must
allow a plaintiff to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless
doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors,
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Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would
not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”
Alston v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to
liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is well-established.”).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts generally consider only the complaint,
attached exhibits and matters of public record. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir.
2014). Johnson has attached to the Amended Complaint the documents that relate to his arrest
and his claims. Thus, the Court can consider them in reviewing the motions to dismiss.
IV. 	Analysis
Johnson’s claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source
of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those
parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). “The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). See also
Baker, 443 U.S. at 140; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
The Amended Complaint alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” including his alleged arrest without probable cause.
Johnson has also brought a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for malicious prosecution.
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A. Judicial Immunity
Johnson alleges that Magisterial Judge Jeffries set his bail with “hearsay evidence” and
Magisterial Judge Henning issued a fingerprint order on May 20, 2024. The Judicial Defendants
argue that based on these allegations, they must be dismissed because they are immune from suit
for acts undertaken in their judicial capacity. This argument is meritorious, as “judges are
immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.”
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
This immunity applies “even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged
to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)
(citation omitted).3
Among other things, magisterial district judges are vested with jurisdiction to issue
search warrants and conduct arraignments in criminal proceedings. Richardson v. Wilkinsburg
Police Dep’t, 2016 WL 4141084, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016) (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 1515(a)(1)).
See also Pa. R. Crim. P. 200 (magisterial district judges may issue search warrants); Pa. R. Crim.
P. 540 (describing the procedure for preliminary arraignments). Thus, these are judicial acts
entitled to immunity. See Friend v. Vann, 614 F. App’x 593, 596 (3d Cir. 2015); Moore v.
Pennsylvania, 2022 WL 1128992, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022), aff’d, 2022 WL 7375509 (3d
Cir. Oct. 13, 2022).
In addition, setting bail and related orders such as issuing fingerprint orders are judicial
acts entitled to immunity. See Sheffer v. Centre Cnty., 818 F. App’x 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2020)
3 Indeed, given that Judge Horan dismissed the Judicial Defendants from the prior action with
prejudice, they should have not been named in this case at all. See Papera v. Pennsylvania
Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2020) (“A dismissal with prejudice ‘operates
as an adjudication on the merits,’ so it ordinarily precludes future claims.”)
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(setting bail is a judicial act); Finnegan v. Mikielski, 2024 WL 3013738, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June
14, 2024) (rejecting argument that judge “violated his due process rights by ordering fingerprints
before the case concluded.”)
While judges are not immune for any actions taken in a non-judicial capacity, or “in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction,” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768-69, Johnson’s claims do not relate
to such acts. Regardless of Johnson’s views about the judges’ decisions or the way they handled
his case, the decisions rendered by the Judicial Defendants were made in a judicial capacity in a
case in which the judges had jurisdiction. See Kaplan v. Miller, 653 F. App’x 87, 89-90 & n.3
(3d Cir. 2016). Therefore, judicial immunity applies.
The Judicial Defendants cannot be sued based on their actions, all of which were made
in judicial capacity. Therefore, their motion will be granted and as amendment would be futile,
they will be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Official Capacity Claims
Johnson has named Trooper MacFarland in both his official and individual capacities.
Trooper MacFarlane argues that any official capacity claims must be dismissed based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity. He is correct.4
The Supreme Court has stated that, under the Eleventh Amendment, “federal jurisdiction
over suits against unconsenting states was not contemplated by the Constitution when
establishing the judicial power of the United States.” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal citation omitted). The immunity applies not only to the state itself,
but also to state agents and state instrumentalities. Thus, courts must examine the essential nature
4 The Judicial Defendants also make this argument but given that they will be dismissed based
on judicial immunity, the Court need not address it with respect to them.
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and effect of the proceeding, the nature of the entity created by state law or whether a money
judgment against the instrumentality would be enforceable against the state to determine whether
the instrumentality should be treated “as an arm of the state.” Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v.
Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997). A suit against an individual in his official capacity is deemed
a suit against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991).
Trooper MacFarlane is entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See
Atkin v. Johnson, 432 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) (state trooper sued in his official capacity
had immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment); Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Corr., 224
F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Ellington v. Cortes, 532 F. App’x 53, 56 (3d Cir. 2013)
(noting that, when acting in their official capacity, state troopers are not “persons” for purposes
of § 1983).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that Eleventh Amendment immunity
is subject to three primary exceptions: (1) congressional abrogation, (2) waiver by the state, and
(3) suits against individual state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to end
an ongoing violation of federal law, that is, the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.
Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed.714 (1908). Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297
F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania has not consented to waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity to being sued in federal court. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521(b); Chittister
v. Department of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has
also held that § 1983 does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 339-46 (1979).
As for the Ex parte Young exception, “a court need only conduct a straightforward
inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief
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properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of Md., 535
U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (citation omitted). Johnson seeks only monetary damages. Therefore, the
Ex parte Young exception does not apply.
Thus, with respect to the § 1983 claims in the Amended Complaint against Trooper
MacFarlane in his official capacity, his motions to dismiss will be granted with prejudice and
without leave to amend.
C. Claim Splitting
Trooper MacFarlane also argues that, because the claims asserted against him are the
same as those asserted in the prior action, they should be dismissed based on the doctrine of
claim splitting.5 He contends that even though Judge Horan has denied Johnson’s motions to
reopen that closed case three times, Johnson should submit his filings in Civ. A. No. 24-1248.
Federal courts recognize a prohibition against splitting of claims relating to the same
transaction or occurrence. See Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977)
(recognizing that a plaintiff has “no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same
subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.”) (citation
omitted).
Here, however, Johnson is not attempting to maintain two separate actions at the same
time. Rather, the prior action is closed and it was dismissed as to Trooper MacFarlane without
prejudice, thereby enabling Johnson to reassert his claims against him. Moreover, as noted
above, Judge Horan explicitly rejected Johnson’s attempts to reopen the prior case based on the
fact that he filed this new action. For this Court to dismiss Johnson’s claims on the ground that
5 Trooper MacFarland does not allege alternative arguments for dismissal of the civil rights
claims against him. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis is limited to his contention about claim
splitting.
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he should file them in the prior closed case would directly contradict Judge Horan’s orders and
leave Johnson unable to assert his claims in any proceeding.
Therefore, the federal claims against Trooper MacFarlane in his individual capacity will
not be dismissed.
D. Sovereign Immunity
In addition, Trooper MacFarlane contends that all state law claims against him should be
dismissed based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As noted above, Johnson identifies state
law 	claims 	of 	false 	arrest, 	false 	imprisonment, 	conspiracy, 	malicious 	prosecution,
“discrimination,” “trespass” and “emotional distress” in his Complaint.6
Under Pennsylvania law, “the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting
within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official
immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive
the immunity.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310. “Exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be narrowly
construed.” Dean v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 751 A.2d 1130, 1134 (Pa. 2000).
There are ten exceptions to sovereign immunity for certain negligent acts. 42 Pa. C.S.
§ 8521(a), § 8522(b). The exceptions do not include trespass, which is the only potential
negligence claim asserted by Johnson. Moreover, Pennsylvania courts have held that “intentional
tort claims . . . are not within the narrow exceptions set forth in 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b).” Faust v.
Commonwealth Dep’t of Revenue, 592 A.2d 835, 839 (Pa. Commw. 1991). See also Justice v.
Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057, 1067 (Pa. 2019). “Even where a plaintiff asks for monetary damages
6 Some of these alleged torts are not recognized claims at all, such as “discrimination.”
Regardless, virtually all of them are (or are clearly intended to be) intentional torts and they do
not fall within any of the exceptions for negligence claims listed in § 8522(b).
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against a defendant in his individual capacities, sovereign immunity applies.” Mitchell v.
Luckenbill, 680 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). “Sovereign immunity
applies to intentional and negligent torts.” Id. (citation omitted).7
Thus, Trooper MacFarlane is immune from liability for the state law claims asserted by
Johnson. This cannot be remedied by amendment and therefore the dismissal will be with
prejudice and without leave to amend.
V. 	Conclusion
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Jennifer L. Jeffries and Nathan
A. Henning (ECF No. 27) will be granted.
The Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Jordan MacFarlane (ECF No. 34) will be granted
in part as follows:
1. 	All claims against MacFarlane in his official capacity will be dismissed with
prejudice;
2. 	All state law claims against MacFarlane will be dismissed with prejudice;
Defendant MacFarland’s motion will otherwise be denied.
Appropriate orders follow.
October 14, 2026 	/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7 By contrast, in an action against a local agency or employee, immunity is lost when their actions
represent a “crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550. This
statute is not applicable in this case because MacFarland is a state employee, not a local
employee. See Yakowicz v. McDermott, 548 A.2d 1330, 1333 & n.5 (Pa. Commw. 1988)
(Commonwealth employees are immune from liability even for intentional torts but that local
agency employees lose their immunity defense where their actions constitute a crime, actual
fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct), appeal denied, 565 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 1989).
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