JESKEY et al v. TM CARRIER, INC. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH
GEORGE JESKEY, and DIETRA JESKEY, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	) 	Case No.: 2:26-cv-01709-MJH
)
vs. 	)
)
TM CARRIER, INC., a corporation, and 	)
ILSHAT NOKHATBAYEV, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, George Jeskey and Dietra Jeskey, bring this action seeking damages for
personal injury and loss of consortium against individual Defendant, Ilshat Nokhatbayev, and his
employer, Defendant TM Carrier, Inc. (“Defendant Carrier”). Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of an
alleged motor vehicle accident between vehicles driven by Mr. Jeskey and Mr. Nokhatbayev.
Plaintiffs have moved to remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
(ECF No. 9). The matter is now ripe for decision.
Upon consideration of Defendant Carrier’s Notice for Removal (ECF No. 1), Plaintiffs’
Complaint (ECF No. 1-2), Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF No. 9), Defendant Carrier’s
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF No. 13), the parties’ respective
briefs (ECF Nos. 10, 14, and 15), and for the following reasons, the Plaintiffs’ motion will be
denied.
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I. Background
Plaintiffs’s allege that on June 5, 2025, George Jeskey was operating a motor vehicle, and
his wife, Dietra Jeskey, was a front seat passenger. (ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 10, 24). Plaintiffs alleged
that Mr. Nokhatbayev negligently drove through a stop sign and collided head-on with Plaintiffs’
vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 11–16). As a result of the collision, Plaintiffs allege a variety of physical and
emotional injuries and seek damages for the loss of the other spouse’s consortium. (Id. ¶¶ 21(a)–
(i), 25(a)–(g), 28(c), 30(c)).
On April 21, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Defendants in the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 2). Defendant Carrier was served with the
Complaint on May 4, 2026.1 (Id.; ECF No. 13 ¶ 2). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs both assert
individual claims for negligence and loss of consortium demanding damages “in a sum in excess
of FIFTY THOUSAND ($50,000.00) DOLLARS” against both Defendants.2 (ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶
22, 26).
On or about June 19, 2026, Defendant Carrier served Plaintiffs with a Request for
Admission (“RFA”) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4014. (ECF No. 1-3).
Defendant Carrier’s only RFA read as follows: “Plaintiff’s damages, if proven at trial, are valued
in excess of $75,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs.” (Id. at 5). On July 15, 2026, Plaintiffs
served a response Defendant Carrier’s RFA confirming that they were seeking more than
1 To date, Defendant Nokhatbayev has not been served. Defendant Carrier was within its rights to remove the action
prior to Defendant Nokhatbayev being served. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
2 Claims worth less than $50,000 are mandatorily referred to arbitration by local rule. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. C.P. L.R.
1301(1)(a). The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure only require a plaintiff to “state whether the amount claimed
does or does not exceed the jurisdictional amount requiring arbitration referral by local rule.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 1021(c).
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$75,000 in damages. (ECF No. 1-4, at 3). On August 13, 2026, 29 days later, Defendant Carrier
removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1, at 4).
II. Standard of Review
A district court has original subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens
of different states “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Actions that satisfy section 1332, but that
are filed in state court, may be removed to the federal district court in the district where the state
case is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
“Two thirty-day clocks limit the time within which a defendant may remove a case.”
McLaren v. UPS Store Inc., 32 F.4th 232, 236 (3d Cir. 2022); 28 U.S.C. § 1446. The first clock
begins running “after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth
the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
“If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,” the first clock never begins to run.
Id. § 1446(b)(3). Instead, removal is governed by the second clock, which begins to run “after
the receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is . . . removable.” Id. If the defendant fails to
remove the action in a timely manner, upon motion, the case may be remanded back to state
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Berry v. Wal-Mart Stores, East L.P., 583 F. Supp. 3d 671, 675 (E.D.
Pa. 2022). Such motions must be made “within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.”
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Because procedural defects are subject to waiver, a district court may not
remand a case sua sponte for violating one of section 1446(b)’s 30-day time limits. See In re
FMC Corp. Packaging Sys. Div., 208 F.3d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 2000).
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The party seeking removal bears the burden of showing that “the case is properly before
the federal court.” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004).
Furthermore, the statutes governing removal “are to be strictly construed against removal” and
“all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.” Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108,
111 (3d Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s Notice for Removal is procedurally flawed, because it
was filed more than 30 days after Defendant Carrier was served with Plaintiffs’ state-court
Complaint. (Id. ¶ 6). Defendant Carrier admits, and the record before this Court shows, that
Defendant Carrier’s Notice for Removal was filed more than 30 days after being served. (ECF
No. 13 ¶¶ 4–6). Plaintiffs’ state-court Complaint was served on May 4, 2026, and Defendant
Carrier’s Notice for Removal was filed on August 13, 2026––more than 100 days after service.
(ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 3, 6; ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 3, 6). The crux of Plaintiffs’ motion concerns whether the
Complaint placed the Defendants on notice that the case’s amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000, and therefore, that “all the elements of federal jurisdiction [were] present.” McLaren,
32 F.4th at 236. If it did, section 1446(b)(1)’s first clock began running on May 4, 2026, and
Defendant’s August 13, 2026 removal was untimely and procedurally defective, such that the
case requires remand. If it did not adequately put the Defendant’s on notice, then the Court must
determine whether Defendant Carrier’s removal complies with section 1446(b)(3).
A. Whether Section 1446(b)(1)’s Clock Began Running
Plaintiffs argue section 1446(b)(1)’s clock began running because their Complaint
informed Defendants “to a substantial degree of specificity, [that] all the elements of federal
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jurisdiction [were] present.” McLaren, 32 F.4th at 236 (first alteration in original) (quoting
Foster v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48, 53 (3d Cir. 1993)). Plaintiffs contend
their Complaint contained “two separate claims by two individual Plaintiffs,” both seeking
damages “in excess of $50,000.” (ECF No. 10, at 3). Plaintiffs maintain these two demands
“directly and explicitly” state claims for damages “in excess of $100,000.” (ECF No. 9 ¶ 11).
Defendant Carrier denies that Plaintiffs’ Complaint provided “notice that the value of
Plaintiffs’ claims exceeded” $75,000. (ECF No. 14, at 2). Specifically, Defendant Carrier
contends that ad damnum clauses, seeking damages “in excess of $50,000,” are insufficient to
trigger section 1446(b)(1)’s first 30-day clock
The Third Circuit utilizes a “bright-line” approach to determine whether a complaint
triggers section 1446(b)’s first clock. McLaren, 32 F.4th at 237. Under this approach, section
(b)(1)’s clock is triggered where the complaint “informs the reader, to a substantial degree of
specificity, [that] all the elements of federal jurisdiction are present.” Id. at 236 (alteration in
original). Importantly, McLaren sets forth that section (b)(1)’s “inquiry begins and ends within
the four corners of the pleading.” Id. (quoting Foster, 986 F.2d at 53). All this Court may
consider is what the Defendants could “ascertain from the four corners of the plaintiff’s
complaint.” Id. at 239. A complaint may demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 by (1) offering “a clear statement of the damages sought”; (2) alleging “sufficient facts
from which damages [could] be readily calculated”; or (3) “affirmatively reveal[ing] on its face
that [plaintiff] is seeking damages in excess of the minimum jurisdictional amount.” Id. at 237
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Since McLaren was decided, the Third Circuit has not addressed whether ad damnum
clauses demanding “damages in excess of $50,000” constitute “clear statement[s] of the damages
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sought.” 32 F.4th at 237. However, every court in the Third Circuit that has addressed the
question has answered in the negative. Mason v. Sam’s Club #6693, Sam’s E. Inc., No. CV 25-
05038, 2026 WL 1134866, at *6, 8 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2026); Kelley v. Allstate Vehicle &
Prop. Ins. Co., No. CV 25-01298, 2025 WL 2711154, at *1–2. (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2025);
Baucom v. Torres Vidal, No. CV 24-01818, 2024 WL 5108439, at *1, 4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2024);
Foreacre v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 22-04231, 2023 WL 349787, at *1, 3 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
20, 2023); Miller v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. CV 22-02495, 2022 WL 16950265, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2022).
The Plaintiffs’ Complaint also alleges injuries indistinguishable from those compiled in
Bambino-Forte. 2025 WL 3543620, at *4. It alleges that George Jeskey suffered:
Facial Trauma; Dental trauma with multiple loss of teeth; Mandibular trauma with
injury and damage to bones, nerves, and surrounding soft tissue of the mandible;
Right shoulder trauma; Left shoulder trauma; Chest trauma with resulting
cardiovascular injury; Injury and damage to the nerves, joints, discs, cartilage,
surrounding soft tissue and ligaments of the cervical spine; Shock with injury and
damage to the nerves and nervous system; Other serious and permanent injuries.
(ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 21). The Complaint further alleges that Dietra Jeskey suffered:
Injury and damage to the bones, nerves, joints, ligaments, and surrounding soft
tissue of the left hand; Injury and damage to the bones, nerves, joints, ligaments,
and surrounding soft tissue of the left wrist; Injury and damage to the bones,
nerves, joints, ligaments, and surrounding soft tissue of the right wrist; Injury and
damage to the bones, nerves, joints, ligaments, and surrounding soft tissue of the
left ankle; Injury and damage to the nerves, joints, discs, cartilage, surrounding
soft tissue and ligaments of the cervical spine; Shock with injury and damage to
the nerves and nervous system; Other serious and permanent injuries.
(Id. ¶ 25). In addition, both Plaintiffs allege that they suffered emotional harms, and both seek
damages for the loss of the other’s consortium. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30). The court concluded that these
allegations do “not provide enough facts to allow the ready calculation of damages.” Bambino-
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Forte, 2025 WL 3543620, at *4; McLaren, 32 F.4th at 237. As such, plaintiffs did not establish to
a “substantial degree of specificity” that the case’s amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.
McLaren, 32 F.4th at 237. The “case stated by the initial pleading” was therefore not removable,
and the Complaint’s service did not begin section 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day clock. 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b)(3).
Plaintiffs contend that their Complaint “unequivocally demand[ed] damages in excess of
$100,000,” because on its face it contains two claims seeking damages “in excess of $50,000.”
(ECF No. 10, at 3). The Court interprets Plaintiffs’ contention as an argument that the Complaint
affirmatively “reveal[s] on its face” that Plaintiffs were seeking damages in excess of $75,000.
McLaren, 32 F.4th at 237. Other courts in this Circuit have rejected this argument. Baucom, 2024
WL 5108439, at *4; Miller, 2022 WL 16950265, at *3. In Baucom, a wife was operating a motor
vehicle when she was struck from behind by the defendant. 2024 WL 5108439, at *1. In Miller, a
wife fell on an allegedly slippery floor. 2022 WL 16950265, at *1. In both cases, the wife and her
husband brought suit seeking damages for the wife’s injuries and the husband’s loss of
consortium. Baucom, 2024 WL 5108439, at *1; Miller, 2022 WL 16950265, at *1. In both cases,
the plaintiffs’ complaints put forward “two separate claims by two individual Plaintiffs for
damages ‘in excess of $50,000.’” (ECF No. 10, at 3); Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21, Baucom, No. CV 24-
01818 (E.D. Pa. filed May 30, 2024), ECF No. 1-5; Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, Miller, No. CV 22-02495
(E.D. Pa. filed June 27, 2022), ECF No. 1-6. In both cases, the plaintiffs pled serious injuries
“without alleging any monetary amounts.” Miller, 2022 WL 16950265, at *3; Baucom, 2024 WL
5108439, at *3. And in both cases, the court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not put the
defendant “on notice that [the] case was removable.” Baucom, 2024 WL 5108439, at *3; Miller,
2022 WL 16950265, at *3.
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This Court, consistent with this Circuit’s post-McLaren case law, finds that Plaintiffs’
Complaint does not affirmatively “reveal on its face” that Plaintiffs were seeking an amount
above $75,000. 32 F.4th at 237. While Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs suffered
“serious and permanent injuries,” it fails to allege any specific monetary amount of damages.
(ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 21(i), 25(g)). While the Plaintiffs here, unlike those in Baucom and Miller, both
seek damages for negligence and loss of consortium, that fact is a distinction without a
difference. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 26). The Court sees no reason to depart from other district courts in this
Circuit merely because, here, each ad damnum clause seeks damages for two claims rather than
one.
Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not “provide a clear statement of the damages sought or
sufficient facts from which damages can be readily calculated, nor does it affirmatively reveal on
its face that [Plaintiffs are] seeking damages in excess of the minimum jurisdictional amount.”
McLaren, 32 F.4th at 237. Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not identify that this case’s amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000 to a “substantial degree of specificity” as required by McLaren’s
“bright-line” approach; therefore, the Complaint never commenced section 1446(b)(1)’s first 30-
day clock. Id.
B. Whether Defendant Carrier’s Notice for Removal Satisfies Section 1446(b)(3)
The Court now turns its attention to whether Defendant Carrier’s Notice for Removal
satisfied the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Defendant Carrier argues that
Plaintiffs’ July 15 RFA admission was an “other paper” from which it could “first be ascertained
that the case . . . [had] become removable.” (ECF No. 14, at 4); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). It argues
that removal was properly made within section (b)(3)’s 30-day clock because it received the RFA
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on July 15 and filed its Notice for Removal on August 13. (ECF No. 14, at 6). Plaintiffs do not
respond to this argument. See generally (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 15).
Although the Third Circuit has never explicitly defined “other paper,” the term has been
broadly construed to include RFAs. Minissale v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 988 F. Supp. 2d
472, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“district courts in our circuit have interpreted [other paper] to include
requests for admission”). Our sister circuits have agreed with this construction. See Wilson v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 782 (11th Cir. 1989); Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285 F.3d
456, 466 (6th Cir. 2002); Romulus v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 770 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 2014);
Carmardelli v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 595, 600 (W.D. Tex. 2008); Murchison v.
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1314 (E.D. Okla. 2008). Again, Plaintiffs provide
the Court with no reason, nor has it found any reason, to depart from this understanding. The
Court thus agrees with Defendant Carrier’s argument that Plaintiffs’ RFA admission was an
“other paper” within the meaning of section (b)(3).
In addition, the record reveals no other document received by Defendants earlier than the
RFA admission that could trigger section (b)(3)’s 30-day clock. The RFA admission was the first
document that could have put Defendants on notice to a “substantial degree of specificity” that
the case’s amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. McLaren, 32 F.4th at 237. The Court,
therefore, agrees with Defendant Carrier that Plaintiffs’ RFA admission constituted the first
“copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
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Section 1446(b)’s second 30-day clock began upon Defendant Carrier’s receipt of Plaintiffs’ July
15 admission. Its Notice for Removal was filed on August 13, within 30 days of that date.3
IV. 	Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ original Complaint was sufficiently vague that Defendants could not ascertain
whether the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory minimum of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Consequently, the Complaint did not trigger the first clock under section 1446(b). Instead,
section 1446(b)(3)’s second clock began upon Defendant Carrier’s receipt of Plaintiffs’ July 15
RFA admission––which stated unequivocally that the case’s amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000. As Defendant Carrier filed its Notice for Removal before section 1446(b)(3)’s 30-day
clock elapsed, its removal was timely.
The Court finds no procedural defect in Defendant Carrier’s Notice for Removal.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand will be denied.
DATED this 13th day of October 2026
BY THE COURT:
––––––––––––– ––– 	––– 	– –––
MARILYN J. HORAN
United States District Judge
3 Defendant Carrier’s removal also satisfied section 1446(c), which does not permit removal under section
1446(b)(3) “on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than 1 year after commencement of the
action.” The action was commenced on April 21, 2026, and the removal occurred on August 13, 2026, well within
one year of commencement.
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