GUZMAN RIVERA v. LYONS et al

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Case 3:26-cv-01579-DSC Document 20 Filed 10/15/26 Pagelof5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
POR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TRINIDAD GABRIEL
GUZMAN RIVERA,
Petitioner,

3:26cv1579
Electronic Filing

Vv.

TODD M. LYONS, WARDEN,
MOSHANNON VALLEY ICE
PROCESSING,

Se a ae ae a eae ae ae ae ae

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

AND NOW this 15 day of October, 2026, upon due consideration of petitioner's motion
to enforce this Court's Judgment Order of September 11, 2026, and the parties’ submissions in
conjunction therewith, IT IS ORDERED that [15] the motion be, and the same hereby is, denied.

Petitioner's central contention is that respondents failed to comply with this court's
Judgment Order because he never was physically released from custody. Instead, respondents
rearrested him before he was able to leave Moshannon Valley Processing Center. This
assertedly runs afoul of being "released" as mandated by the Judgment Order and compliance
requires respondents to permit him to leave Moshannon before rearresting him. And so
petitioner requests the court now order his actual release and "make any further order to ensure
compliance" with the order of release.

Petitioner misreads the nature of the release mandated by the Judgment Order. The
violation upon which the court granted relief was the respondents’ misinterpretation of the scope

and structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and the concomitant denial of the protections afforded by

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the process afforded under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), all of which amounted to petitioner being held in
violation of the laws and constitution of the United States. But the record shows that
respondents have purged that wrongful detention and petitioner is now being detained pursuant
to statutorily authorized process that seemingly passes constitutional muster.
Congress authorized the seizure and detention of aliens who are discovered within the
interior of the Country pending a decision on whether the individual is removable from the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). That authority may be exercised through "a warrant issued
by the Attorney General." Id. And the statute vests a considerable degree of discretion in the
Attorney General as to whether to detain or release the alien on bond with various conditions.
Id. at §§ 1226(a)(1) & (2).
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has promulgated regulations that govern aliens
detained pursuant to § 1226(a). Detainees held pursuant to that authority may be released on
bond by Immigration and Customs Enforcement or an immigration judge "if the detainee
'demonstrate[s] ... that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that [he]
is likely to appear for any future proceeding.'" Borbot v. Warden Hudson County Correctional
Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). If detained at the
initial bond hearing, a § 1226(a) detainee may request a custody redetermination hearing before
an Immigration Judge. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)). A redetermination hearing will be
held "only upon a showing that the alien's circumstances have changed materially." Id. (quoting
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e)). "Both the initial bond determination and subsequent custody decisions
can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)." Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §
236.1(d)(3)).
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Moreover, the Secretary has established regulations which govern the authorization of
detention and the detainee's ability to initiate review of decisions requiring detention. As a
general matter, aliens may be detained under § 1226(a) when "[a]t the time of issuance of the
notice to appear, or at any time thereafter and up to the time removal proceedings are completed,
the [detainee has been] arrested and taken into custody under the authority of Form I–200,
Warrant of Arrest." 8 C.F.R § 236.1(b). The immigration officers authorized to issue such
warrants are identified in 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) and those who are authorized to serve such
warrants are listed in § 287.5(e)(3). 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1). The Secretary has implemented the
established Form I-200 (Warrant for Arrest of Alien) to effectuate a properly authorized arrest
warrant.
Applications for an initial redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge by
those administratively arrested and detained may be made orally, in writing or, if authorized by
the immigration judge, by telephone. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19. Such a request is to be made to 1) the
Immigration Court having jurisdiction over the place of detention; 2) the Immigration Court
having administrative control over the case; or 3) the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge
requesting a designation of the appropriate Immigration Court. Id. (in that order). The Secretary
has promulgated Standard Form I-286 (Notice of Custody Determination) providing a detainee
with notice of detention and the ability to request review of the detention decision by an
immigration judge.
Here, the record demonstrates that the respondents have properly exercised the authority
provided under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to arrest petitioner. As respondents' response to the pending
motion demonstrates, petitioner was "rearrested" at Moshannon pursuant to a valid warrant
issued by the Attorney General, which was served on petitioner. He was then presented with a
Case 3:26-cv-01579-DSC Document 20 Filed 10/15/26 Page 3 of 5

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Notice of Custody Determination, which was also presented. And while petitioner elected to
have an immigration judge review the custody determination accompanying his arrest, his
counsel withdrew that request to prepare for the hearing with evidence.
The above makes clear that respondents no longer have custody of petitioner pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and they have purged that unlawful detention. So at this point there is no
question that petitioner's detention is governed by § 1226(a) and the record does not reflect any
improper statutory or constitutional defect in that detention. In other words, it is clear that the
statutorily unlawful and unconstitutional detention initiated pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) ceased to
exist on September 15, 2026, when respondents released petitioner from detention under that
asserted authority and issued an I-200 Warrant and accompanying I-286 Notice pursuant to §
1226(a). As a result, with regard to the mandate to "release" petitioner, the record lacks any
sound basis for the further relief requested in petitioner's motion to enforce.1
s/ David Stewart Cercone
David Stewart Cercone
Senior United States District Judge
cc: Jerome A. Moschetta, AUSA
Tosca Giustini, Esquire
Jonah Eaton, Esquire
Hannah Schaafsma, Esquire
(Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail)
1 Petitioner's contention that he be able to leave Moshannon and respondents be precluded from
taking him back into custody (in order to demonstrate compliance with the order of release) in
effect asks the court to enjoin respondents from rearresting petitioner. The court made clear in
its Judgment Order that it would not do so. See Judgment Order of September 11, 2026 (Doc.
No. 13) at 3-4 (following the approach of Judge Gallagher in Buele Morocho, who declined to
enjoin respondents from rearresting the petitioner under § 1226(a) following the petitioner's
release).
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