C & A, S.E. v. PUERTO RICO SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

3:05-ap-00149PrbJun 29, 2006

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IN RE: 	:
:
C & A, S.E., 	: 	CASE NO. 05-05297 (GAC)
:
Debtor 	: 	CHAPTER 11
___________________________________:
:
C & A, S.E., 	:
:
Plaintiff 	:
:
v. 	: 	ADV. NO. 05-00149
:
PUERTO RICO SOLID WASTE 	:
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, 	:
:
Defendant 	:
___________________________________:
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Procedural Background
This 	adversary 	proceeding 	arises 	out 	of 	an 	arbitration
proceeding 	between 	Puerto 	Rico 	Solid 	Waste 	Management 	Authority
(“ADS”) 	and 	C&A, 	S.E., 	(“C&A”) 	for 	breach 	of 	contract. 	The
controversy 	pending 	before 	this 	Court 	is 	C&A’s 	removal 	of 	the
action to vacate the arbitration award (Docket #1) and ADS’ Motion
to Remand and/or Abstain (Docket #6).
In 	June 	of 	2001, 	C&A 	commenced 	an 	arbitration 	proceeding
against 	ADS. 	On 	February 	17, 	2005, 	a 	panel 	of 	arbiters 	issued 	an
arbitration award in favor of ADS. 	On April 22, 2005, ADS filed an
action 	in 	the 	Superior 	Court 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	San 	Juan 	Section 	to
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confirm 	the 	award, 	Civil 	No. 	KAC05-2968 	and 	on 	May 	12, 	2005, 	C&A
filed an action to vacate the award, Civil No. KAC05-3546.
After C&A filed the action to vacate the arbitration award, it
filed 	a 	voluntary 	petition 	under 	Chapter 	11 	on 	June 	9, 	2005. 	The
civil actions were automatically stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 362.
On July 22, 2005, ADS filed a motion for relief from the automatic
stay (Docket #16, legal case), seeking an order from the Court to
modify the automatic stay in order to allow the proceeding seeking
confirmation 	of 	the 	arbitration 	award 	between 	ADS 	and 	C&A 	to
continue in the local court. C&A filed an opposition to the motion
for relief from stay on August 2, 2005 (Docket #21, legal case).
On June 21, 2005, C&A filed the instant adversary proceeding
against ADS removing the local court proceeding to vacate the award
to the bankruptcy court (Docket #1). On July 20, 2005, ADS filed a
Motion to Remand and/or Abstain (Docket #6). C&A filed a Motion in
Opposition to Remand and/or Abstain on August 1, 2005 (Docket #9).
On August 8, 2005, ADS filed a Reply to the Opposition (Docket
#11). Later, C&A file a Motion for Leave to File Sur-reply and on
September 	1, 	2005 	it 	filed 	the 	Sur-reply 	to 	Reply 	to 	Opposition
(Dockets #14 and #15). ADS filed an Opposition to Debtor’s Request
for 	Leave 	to 	Sur-reply 	(Docket 	#17) 	and 	then 	filed 	a 	Reply 	to
Opposition to Motion to Remand and/or Abstain (Docket #30).
The 	Court 	held 	a 	hearing 	on 	the 	matter 	on 	February 	28, 	2006
and took the matter under advisement.
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II. Argument of the Parties
A. C&A
C&A 	filed 	the 	instant 	adversary 	proceeding 	to 	remove 	the
proceeding 	filed 	by 	it 	in 	the 	Superior 	Court 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	San
Juan 	Section 	seeking 	to 	vacate 	the 	arbitration 	award 	issued 	in
favor of ADS on February 17, 2005, by a panel of three arbiters.
C&A 	seeks 	to 	vacate 	the 	arbitration 	award 	pursuant 	to 	P.R.
Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	32, 	§ 	3222(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) 	and 	under 	the
jurisprudence of Puerto Rico, specifically Rivera v. Samaritano &
Co., 	108 	D.P.R. 	604 	(1979), 	8 	P.R. 	Offic. 	Trans. 	640 	(1979). 	C&A
alleges that: (i) there was a lack of impartiality on the part of
one of the arbiters; (ii) the arbiters mistakenly applied the legal
doctrine of “functional ruin,” as interpreted by the Supreme Court
of 	Puerto 	Rico; 	(iii) 	the 	arbiters 	erred 	in 	finding 	that 	ADS
satisfied 	the 	burden 	of 	proof 	regarding 	its 	breach 	of 	contract;
(iv) the arbiters failed to apply the law concerning the ADS non-
compliance with the contract and the clean hands doctrine; (v) the
arbiters 	failed 	to 	apply 	the 	applicable 	definition 	of 	a
construction 	contract 	as 	defined 	by 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	Puerto
Rico; 	(vi) 	the 	arbiters 	required 	parties 	to 	produce 	a 	joint
settlement, 	which 	was 	not 	included; 	(vii) 	the 	arbiters 	made 	a
mistake 	by 	declaring 	some 	change 	orders 	null 	and 	void 	and 	by
finding that C&A over-billed ADS; and (viii) the arbiters erred in
calculating 	the 	amount 	of 	damages. 	C&A 	requests 	that 	this 	Court
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allow 	the 	removed 	action 	to 	proceed 	in 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	and
provide such relief as may be just and proper.
C&A 	maintains 	that 	removal 	is 	proper 	and 	abstention 	is 	not
warranted, 	arguing 	that 	all 	civil 	actions 	arising 	under 	Title 	11
can be removed. In addition, C&A denies forum shopping because it
asserts that it is entitled to remove the case.
C&A 	contends 	that 	mandatory 	abstention 	is 	not 	applicable 	to
the present adversary case because the action to vacate the award
is 	a 	core 	proceeding 	because 	it 	arises 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
157(b)(2)(E), which relates to turn over of property, stating that
ADS 	owes 	C&A 	$2,589,239.52. 	C&A 	maintains 	that 	although 	the 	case
arises under Puerto Rico law, this does not render the proceeding
non-core. 	It 	argues 	that 	the 	action 	to 	vacate 	award 	is 	not 	based
solely on local law, as the Federal Arbitration Act and its federal
precedents 	apply. 	C&A 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	exercise 	its 	full
powers 	of 	judicial 	review 	in 	the 	determination 	of 	whether 	the
arbitration process was flawed.
Likewise, 	C&A 	contends 	that 	permissive 	abstention 	is 	not
warranted. C&A asserts that with respect to the relatedness of the
proceeding 	to 	the 	main 	bankruptcy 	case, 	the 	relief 	sought 	in 	the
adversary 	proceeding 	is 	critical 	to 	its 	ability 	to 	formulate 	a
viable 	plan 	of 	reorganization, 	and 	that 	without 	the 	reversal 	or
modification of the award, C&A will not be able to comply with the
requirements 	of 	Chapter 	11 	of 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Code. 	C&A 	maintains
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that the Court should not abstain on equitable grounds based on the
misconception that the motion to vacate the award is an extension
of 	the 	underlying 	arbitration. 	Thus, 	C&A 	requests 	that 	the 	Court
deny the motion by ADS to remand and/or abstain.
B. ADS
ADS argues that all the issues raised in the complaint arise
under local law and that no federal authority has been implicated
in 	either 	of 	the 	two 	cases 	(the 	one 	for 	the 	confirmation 	of 	the
award 	and 	the 	other 	to 	vacate 	the 	award). 	ADS 	maintains 	that
because 	the 	local 	court 	proceeding 	is 	non-core, 	and 	it 	does 	not
arise under Title 11, the Court should abstain.
ADS asserts that abstention is mandatory pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1134(c)(2), contending that although pre-petition actions are part
of the estate once the petition has been filed, courts must abstain
from 	hearing 	related 	cases 	where 	actions 	are 	commenced 	in 	local
court 	and 	can 	be 	resolved 	there. 	It 	argues 	that 	the 	factors 	for
mandatory 	abstention 	are 	met 	because 	the 	state 	proceeding 	is 	a
“related to case under title 11 but not, arising under title 11",
the local court proceeding could not have been commenced in federal
court and the local court proceeding is already pending and it can
be 	promptly 	adjudicated. 	ADS 	asserts, 	in 	the 	alterative, 	that
permissive 	abstention 	is 	warranted. 	It 	further 	maintains 	that
remand 	is 	proper 	on 	equitable 	grounds 	when 	the 	suit 	involves 	a
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question of local law and the proceedings in local court are in an
advanced stage.
ADS asserts that it has already filed a motion to modify the
automatic stay in the legal case requesting that the Court permit
the local court to enter judgment confirming the award. Therefore,
ADS requests that the Court remand the present adversary proceeding
to the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
The United States Code provide that “the district court shall
have 	original 	but 	not 	exclusive 	jurisdiction 	of 	all 	civil
proceedings 	arising 	under 	title 	11, 	or 	arising 	in 	or 	related 	to
cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). In deciding whether to
allow a removed action to proceed, the bankruptcy court must first
decide if it has subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding.
In 	re 	Santa 	Clara 	County 	Child 	Care 	Consortium, 	223 	B.R. 	40, 	44
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998). In doing so, the court must decide whether
the removed action is one arising under, arising in or related to
title 11. Id. at 44.
The 	“arising 	under” 	and 	“related 	to” 	concepts 	have 	been
extensively 	discussed 	by 	the 	courts. 	“Arising 	under” 	proceedings
are “those cases in which the cause of action is created by title
11.” In re Middlesex Power Equipment & Marine Inc., 292 F.3d 61, 68
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(1st 	Cir. 	2002). 	As 	opposed 	to 	“related 	to,” 	which 	the 	First
Circuit Court of Appeals defines as those cases that:
‘potentially 	have 	some 	effect 	on 	the
bankruptcy 	estate, 	such 	as 	altering
debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or
freedom 	of 	action, 	or 	otherwise 	have 	an
impact 	upon 	the 	handling 	and
administration of the bankrupt estate.’
Id. 	at 	68 	(quoting 	In 	re 	G.S.F. 	Corp., 	938 	F.2d 	1467, 	1475 	(1st
Cir. 1991)).
In the present case, the Court concludes that this adversary
proceeding affects the bankruptcy estate and thus has been properly
removed, granting this Court subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1334(b), 	which 	grants 	the 	Court 	jurisdiction 	over
all 	civil 	proceedings 	arising 	under 	title 	11, 	or 	arising 	in 	or
related to cases under Title 11.
B. Core and Non-core Proceedings
The 	Judicial 	Code 	differentiates 	between 	core 	and 	non-core
proceedings. 	The 	Judicial 	Code 	includes 	a 	non-exhaustive 	list 	of
core 	proceedings. 	See 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	157(b)(2). 	Actions 	“arising
under” 	title 	11 	are 	referred 	to 	as 	“core” 	proceedings 	and 	are
specifically referenced in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) and “related to”
actions are “non-core” proceedings. Mec Steel Bldgs., Inc. v. San
Lorenzo Construction, 136 B.R. 606, 609 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1992). See
also 	In 	re 	Evarts, 	2006 	WL 	696136 	(Bankr. 	D.N.H. 	2006). 	With
respect 	to 	non-core 	proceedings, 	the 	determination 	shall 	not 	be
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made 	solely 	on 	the 	basis 	that 	its 	resolution 	may 	be 	affected 	by
local law. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).
The Supreme Court of the United States decided upon the power
of 	bankruptcy 	judges 	to 	decide 	core 	and 	non-core 	proceedings 	in
the 	seminal 	case 	of 	Northern 	Pipeline 	Constr. 	Co. 	v. 	Marathon
Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). This case involved an adversary
proceeding brought by a debtor-in-possession seeking damages for an
alleged 	pre-petition 	breach 	of 	contract. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	held
that 	the 	proceeding 	could 	not 	be 	finally 	adjudicated 	by 	the
bankruptcy court. The Court explained that while the restructuring
of 	debtor-creditor 	relationships 	is 	at 	the 	core 	of 	the 	federal
bankruptcy power, the adjudication of state-created private rights
is not. Id. at 71.
The 	First 	Circuit 	defines 	non-core 	proceedings 	as 	“claims
‘concerned 	only 	with 	state 	law 	issues 	that 	did 	not 	arise 	in 	the
core bankruptcy function of adjudicating debtor-creditor rights,’”
referring to them as “Marathon-type suits.” 	Arnold Print Works v.
Apkin 	(In 	re 	Arnold 	Print 	Works), 	815 	F.2d 	165, 	167 	(1st 	Cir.
1987)(quoting 	130 	Cong. 	Rec. 	H1848 	(daily 	ed. 	March 	21,
1984)(statement of Representative Kindness)). 	The court ruled that
bankruptcy courts were empowered to finally determine suits filed
by 	an 	estate 	representative 	to 	collect 	debts 	arising 	after 	the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, but not empowered to finally
determine 	suits 	relating 	to 	debts 	arising 	before 	commencement 	of
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the 	case. 	In 	re 	Arnold 	Print 	Works, 	815 	F.2d 	at 	168. 	While 	the
former was deemed to be core, the latter was deemed non-core. Id.
The court based its decision on Marathon stating that: “[n]on-core
proceedings, those that the statute calls ‘related to’ bankruptcy
cases, concern aspects of the bankruptcy case that Marathon barred
non-Article III judges from determining on their own.” Id. at 167.
In another case, in which a bankruptcy court had to determine
if a pre-petition action was deemed a core or non-core proceeding,
the 	court 	held 	that: 	“[i]f 	an 	action 	survive[s] 	outside 	of
bankruptcy, 	and 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	bankruptcy 	would 	have 	been
initiated 	in 	a 	state 	or 	district 	court, 	then 	it 	clearly 	involves
non-core 	matter.” 	Mec 	Steel 	Bldgs., 	Inc. 	v. 	San 	Lorenzo
Construction, 136 B.R. at 609.
Mec Steel involved a claim by the debtor for the collection of
accounts 	receivable. 	The 	debtor 	argued 	that 	this 	involved
administration of the estate and the turning over of the property
of 	the 	estate, 	both 	core 	proceedings 	under 	28 	U.S.C 	§ 	157(b)(2).
The court in Mec Steel concluded that:
[a]ctions initiated in the bankruptcy court to
collect 	pre-petition 	account 	receivables 	are
clearly 	non-core 	matters 	and 	should 	not 	be
considered 	as 	matters 	affecting 	the
administration 	of 	the 	estate 	or 	actions 	for
the 	turnover 	of 	property 	of 	the 	estate 	in
order to categorize them as core.
Mec Steel Bldgs., 136 B.R. at 609.
Likewise, actions based on pre-petition breach of contract are
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also non-core. See Matter of Candelero San & Gravel, Inc., 66 B.R.
903, 906 (D.P.R. 1986)(holding that action involving pre-petition
contract, 	allegedly 	breached 	both 	before 	and 	after 	the 	filing 	of
the petition, is entirely non-core matter related to a case arising
under Title 11).
Finally, 	the 	District 	Court 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	in 	Goya 	Foods 	v.
Unanue-Casal (In re Unanue-Casal), stated:
[t]he 	contract 	validity 	question 	is 	not 	core
to 	the 	bankruptcy 	proceeding. 	Even 	where 	the
action 	“will 	drastically 	affect 	both 	the
debtor-creditor relationship and the assets of
the 	[e]state” 	it 	cannot 	be 	deemed 	a 	core
proceeding 	if 	it 	arises 	prior 	to 	the
bankruptcy 	filing 	and 	involves 	a 	right
independent 	of 	and 	antecedent 	to 	the
bankruptcy filing.
Goya Foods v. Unanue-Casal (In re Unanue-Casal), 164 B.R. 216, 221
(D.P.R. 1993). See also Matter of Candelero San & Gravel, Inc., 66
B.R. 903, 906 (D.P.R. 1986).
The 	present 	adversary 	proceeding 	relates 	to 	a 	pre-petition
action for breach of contract that commenced outside the bankruptcy
court. 	Although 	this 	Court 	concludes 	that 	it 	has 	jurisdiction
pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1334(b), 	it 	is 	“related 	to” 	jurisdiction
because 	although 	this 	proceeding 	may 	have 	some 	effect 	on 	the
bankruptcy estate it clearly does not arise in or under Title 11.
C&A’s action survives outside of bankruptcy and in the absence of
bankruptcy, would have been resolved in local court. The action to
vacate 	the 	arbitration 	award 	relates 	to 	a 	pre-petition 	claim
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arising under local law, which is deemed non-core under cited case
law 	and 	specifically 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	decision 	in
Marathon, supra. Cases where courts find that there is “related to”
jurisdiction are deemed non-core. Therefore, this Court concludes
that this is a non-core proceeding.
C. Abstention
ADS 	has 	requested 	that 	the 	Court 	either 	abstain 	from
considering this adversary proceeding or that the Court remand the
case to the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section. In a
decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court explained
when a court should use abstention analysis and when a court should
use 	remand 	analysis. 	See 	Security 	Farms 	v. 	International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers (In re
Teamsters, Chauffeur, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 890), 124
F.3d 	999 	(9th 	Cir. 	1997). 	In 	Security 	Farms, 	one 	of 	the 	parties
removed a state court action to federal district court pursuant to
28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1452(a) 	and 	a 	motion 	for 	abstention 	was 	filed 	in 	the
federal court. The district court denied the motion to abstain. On
appeal, 	the 	Ninth 	Circuit 	concluded 	that 	because 	the 	case 	were
removed 	from 	state 	court 	to 	federal 	court, 	the 	abstention
provisions were inapplicable. Id. at 1009. The court stated:
[a]bstention 	can 	exist 	only 	where 	there 	is 	a
parallel 	proceeding 	in 	state 	court. 	That 	is,
inherent 	in 	the 	concept 	of 	abstention 	is 	the
presence of a pendent state action in favor of
which the federal court must, or may, abstain.
See, e.g., In re S.G. Phillips Constrs., Inc.,
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45 F.3d 702, 708 (2nd Cir. 1995)(including as
a 	requirement 	for 	mandatory 	abstention 	the
presence 	of 	a 	previously 	commenced 	state
action); In re Tucson Estates, 912 F.2d 1162,
1167 	(9th 	Cir. 	1990)(recognizing 	as 	a 	factor
for 	permissive 	abstention 	the 	presence 	of 	a
related proceeding commenced in state court or
other nonbankruptcy court).
To 	require 	a 	pendent 	state 	action 	as 	a
condition 	of 	abstention 	eliminates 	any
confusion 	with 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1452(B), 	which
provides district courts with the authority to
remand 	civil 	actions 	properly 	removed 	to
federal court, in situations where there is no
parallel 	proceeding. 	Section 	1334(c)
abstention should be read in pari materia with
section 	1452(b) 	remand, 	so 	that 	the 	former
applies only in those cases in which there is
a 	related 	proceeding 	that 	either 	permits
abstention in the interest of comity, section
1334(c)(1), 	or 	that, 	by 	legislative 	mandate,
requires it, section 1334(c)(2).
Id. at 1009. The court goes on to conclude that when an action is
removed from state court to federal court, the state proceeding is
extinguished and no related proceeding exists in state court as of
that time. Id. at 1010. The court quoted the bankruptcy court for
the Southern District of Texas which stated: “[i]f [the] Court were
to abstain, nothing would happen because there is only one lawsuit.
What movant really seeks is remand ... back to state court.” Id. at
1010 n.10 (citing In re Duval County Ranch Co., 167 B.R. 848, 849
(Bankr. S.D.Tex. 1994)).
In 	the 	case 	before 	us, 	the 	abstention 	provisions 	are 	not
applicable. 	C&A 	removed 	this 	action 	from 	the 	local 	court 	to 	the
bankruptcy court. Thus, the local court proceeding was extinguished
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and if the court abstained, nothing would happen. ADS is therefore
seeking to remand the proceeding to the local court. Nonetheless,
as 	the 	Court 	will 	explain 	below, 	the 	factors 	pertinent 	to 	a
decision 	to 	abstain 	serve 	to 	determine 	whether 	equitable 	grounds
for 	remand 	exist. 	See 	In 	re 	AK 	Services, 	Inc., 	159 	B.R. 	76, 	83
(Bankr. D.Mass. 1993) and cases cited therein.
D. Remand
Section 1452(b) of title 28 permits the court to which a claim
or cause of action has been removed to remand the claim or cause of
action on any equitable ground. 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b). The following
equitable grounds for remand have been identified:
(1) 	the 	effect 	of 	the 	action 	on 	the
administration 	of 	the 	bankruptcy 	estate; 	(2)
the 	extent 	to 	which 	issues 	of 	state 	law
predominate; 	(3) 	the 	difficulty 	of 	applicable
state 	law; 	(4) 	comity; 	(5) 	the 	relatedness 	or
remoteness 	of 	the 	action 	to 	the 	bankruptcy
case; 	(6) 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	right 	to 	a 	jury
trial; 	and 	(7) 	prejudice 	to 	the 	party
involuntarily removed from state court.
In re Santa Clara County Child Care Consortium, 223 B.R. at 44. See
also In re Evarts, 2006 WL at 696136.
The present adversary proceeding involves a removed action to
vacate 	an 	arbitration 	award 	that 	arose 	from 	a 	breach 	of 	contract
between 	C&A 	and 	ADS. 	C&A 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	vacate 	the
arbitration 	award. 	ADS 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	remand 	it 	to 	the
local court. As previously explained, this Court has “related to”
jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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1334(b).
This Court finds that in the present case, there are numerous
equitable 	grounds 	for 	remand. 	First, 	the 	action 	to 	vacate 	the
arbitration 	award 	does 	not 	affect 	the 	administration 	of 	the
bankruptcy 	estate. 	The 	breach 	of 	contract 	action 	is 	remotely
related to the bankruptcy case. Moreover, all of the issues involve
only 	local 	law. 	For 	comity 	reasons, 	this 	Court 	concludes 	that
because 	this 	adversary 	case 	involves 	a 	post-arbitral 	proceeding,
the local court should finally determine the outcome of the action
under 	local 	law 	and 	enter 	judgment. 	And 	finally, 	ADS 	does 	not
consent to the removal of the action.
Furthermore, 	although 	the 	abstention 	provisions 	are 	not
directly 	applicable, 	courts 	consider 	them 	in 	deciding 	when 	to
remand a case. 	The bankruptcy court in In re Interamericas Turkey
Development Co., Inc., 94 B.R. 9 (D.P.R. 1988), held that:
Pursuant to section 1334(c)(2), the “district
court must abstain from hearing a purely state
law 	claim 	where 	there 	is 	no 	other 	basis 	for
federal 	jurisdiction 	other 	than 	its
relatedness 	to 	a 	bankruptcy 	proceeding
(including 	one 	where 	the 	debtor 	is 	a 	party)
and where the claim can be timely adjudicated
in a state court.”
Id. at 13,(quoting Matter of Candelero San & Gravel, Inc., 66 B.R.
at 	906 	and 	Sate 	Bank 	of 	Lombard 	v. 	Chart 	House, 	46 	B.R. 	468, 	472
(N.D.Ill. 1985)).
This Court concludes that mandatory abstention would apply if
there were a parallel local court proceeding. The present adversary
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case is one based on breach of contract, which is purely a matter
of local law. It is a case “related to” Title 11, which is the only
basis 	for 	federal 	jurisdiction. 	The 	action 	was 	commenced 	outside
the bankruptcy court. Finally, the arbitration proceeding is over
and 	what 	remains 	pending 	in 	the 	local 	court 	are 	post-arbitral
proceedings 	that 	can 	be 	timely 	adjudicated 	by 	the 	local 	court.
Thus, 	remand 	is 	warranted 	because 	the 	criteria 	for 	mandatory
abstention are met.
ORDER
WHEREFORE 	IT 	IS 	ORDERED 	that 	ADS’ 	Motion 	to 	Remand 	and/or
Abstain 	(Docket 	#6) 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1452(b) 	is 	GRANTED.
This 	action 	is 	hereby 	remanded 	to 	the 	Superior 	Court 	of 	Puerto
Rico, San Juan Section.
SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29th day of June, 2006.
S/Gerardo A. Carlo-Altieri
_____________________________
GERARDO A. CARLO-ALTIERI
Chief, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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