Alifax Holding Spa v. Alcor Scientific Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
ALIFAX HOLDING SPA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. WES 14-440
)
ALCOR SCIENTIFIC INC.; and 	)
FRANCESCO A. FRAPPA, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
At 	trial, 	Alifax’s 	claims 	were 	gradually 	whittled 	down.
Alifax 	Holding 	Spa 	v. 	Alcor 	Sci. 	Inc., 	404 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	552, 	558
(D.R.I. 	2019). 	The 	jury 	returned 	a 	verdict 	in 	favor 	of 	Alifax,
but 	the 	Court 	granted 	in 	part 	Defendants’ 	renewed 	request 	for
judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	and 	ruled 	that 	retrial 	was 	necessary
on 	the 	claim 	that 	Defendants 	misappropriated 	Alifax’s 	conversion
algorithm. 	Id. at 582. 	Subsequent attempts at settlement failed
repeatedly. 	During a conference in February, the Court instructed
Defendants to file a motion addressing, inter alia, their request
to file a renewed summary judgment motion and the scope of the new
trial. 	The Court also invited the parties to submit supplemental
memoranda 	regarding 	Alcor’s 	Motion 	for 	an 	Exceptional 	Case
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Determination 	Under 	the 	Patent 	Act 	and 	for 	Attorney 	and 	Expert
Fees (“Alcor’s Motion for Patent Legal Fees”), ECF No. 306.
For 	the 	reasons 	that 	follow, 	Defendants’ 	request 	to 	file 	a
renewed motion for summary judgment is DENIED, Defendants’ request
to limit the scope of the new trial is GRANTED IN PART, and Alcor’s
Motion for Patent Legal Fees is DENIED. 	The parties are instructed
to 	submit 	further 	briefing, 	as 	explained 	below, 	regarding
potential damages on the remaining claim.1
I. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In 	a 	renewed 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	Alcor 	would 	argue
that 	the 	four 	conversion 	constants 	are 	not 	trade 	secrets 	because
they can be derived using simple regression analysis. 	See Defs.’
Request 	for 	Case 	Management 	Order 	Permitting 	Alcor 	to 	File 	Mot.
for Summ. J. and Set the Limited Scope of Any Second Trial (“Defs.’
Mot. for CMO”) 2-5, ECF No. 354. 	However, the Court already ruled
on this issue in its post-trial decision:
The 	jury’s 	finding 	that 	the 	conversion 	algorithm 	was 	a
trade 	secret 	was 	reasonably 	supported 	by 	Alifax’s
evidence. 	. 	. 	. 	Converting 	the 	optical 	data 	into 	a
reliable, 	Westergren-correlated 	[erythrocyte
sedimentation rate (“ESR”)] value is a critical step in
the 	process. 	. 	. 	. 	Duic 	testified 	that 	there 	were 	“no
mathematical 	models 	in 	the 	market” 	for 	correlating
optical 	signal 	data 	to 	Westergren 	results 	when 	Alifax
developed 	its 	conversion 	algorithm. 	. 	. 	. 	Without 	a
1 	This 	decision 	assumes 	familiarity 	with 	the 	case. 	For
additional background, the reader is referred to the Court’s post-
trial 	decision 	on 	Defendants’ 	renewed 	request 	for 	judgment 	as 	a
matter of law. 	See Alifax Holding Spa v. Alcor Sci. Inc., 404 F.
Supp. 3d 552 (D.R.I. 2019).
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correlation 	algorithm, 	Alifax’s 	instruments 	could 	not
generate 	ESR 	results. 	The 	algorithm 	was 	not 	publicly
known and not readily accessible to purchasers of Alifax
instruments.
Alifax, 	404 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	567 	(citations 	omitted). 	Moreover,
Alcor’s arguments regarding the ease of doing regression analysis
via 	publicly 	available 	tools 	would 	likely 	require 	additional
expert 	discovery. 	See 	Defs.’ 	Mot. 	for 	CMO 	5. 	As 	stated 	below,
discovery closed years ago, and no new discovery will be allowed.
Alcor 	also 	argues 	that 	the 	conversion 	algorithm 	had 	no
economic 	value 	in 	non-Alifax 	machines. 	See 	id. 	at 	3-4. 	Again,
this 	argument 	directly 	contradicts 	the 	Court’s 	post-trial
findings: 	“[A]t least one rational interpretation of the evidence
supports 	the 	conclusion 	that 	Alcor 	made 	some 	use 	of 	Alifax’s
algorithm, 	indicating 	that 	the 	information 	confers 	some
competitive 	advantage. 	This 	is 	enough 	evidence 	(if 	barely) 	to
find 	that 	Alifax’s 	conversion 	algorithm 	containing 	four 	specific
constants had independent economic value from not being generally
known or readily ascertainable.” 	Alifax, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 567-
68 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-1).
Alcor’s last argument for summary judgment is that Alifax did
not 	take 	sufficient 	steps 	to 	protect 	its 	purported 	trade 	secret.
See 	Defs.’ 	Mot. 	for 	CMO 	4-5. 	Once 	more, 	this 	contention 	runs
counter 	to 	a 	specific 	ruling 	of 	the 	Court: 	“[The] 	evidence 	was
sufficient 	to 	support 	the 	jury’s 	conclusion 	that 	Alifax’s 	took
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reasonable efforts under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy
of its conversion algorithm.” 	Alifax, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 568.
Thus, 	Alcor’s 	request 	to 	file 	a 	second 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment is, in fact, a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
post-trial 	decision. 	As 	with 	any 	interlocutory 	ruling, 	that
decision 	“‘remain[s] 	open 	to . . . 	reconsideration’ 	until 	the
entry 	of 	[final] 	judgment.” 	Nieves-Luciano 	v. 	Hernandez-Torres,
397 	F.3d 	1, 	4 	(1st 	Cir. 	2005) 	(quoting 	Geffon 	v. 	Micrion 	Corp.,
249 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2001)). 	However, for reasons recounted
here and explained in the post-trial decision, reconsideration is
not warranted. 	Therefore, Alcor’s request for permission to file
a renewed motion for summary judgment is denied.
II. 	SCOPE OF NEW TRIAL
In their Motion, Defendants raise three issues regarding the
scope of the new trial.
A. 	New Evidence
Discovery 	in 	this 	case 	was 	extensive. 	More 	than 	four 	years
elapsed between the filing of the original Complaint and the final
close 	of 	discovery. 	See 	Compl., 	ECF 	No. 	1 	(filed 	Oct. 	7, 	2014);
Jan. 	11, 	2019 	Mem. 	& 	Order 	2, 	ECF 	No. 	212 	(granting 	motion 	to
compel the production of source code). 	The Court has issued dozens
of written decisions regarding discovery disputes and substantive
motions. 	See, 	e.g., 	Jan. 	11, 	2019 	Mem. 	& 	Order 	(reopening
discovery for limited purposes). 	At some point, enough is enough,
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and 	that 	point 	has 	long 	passed. 	For 	reasons 	of 	fairness 	and
judicial 	efficiency, 	no 	new 	evidence 	or 	witnesses 	will 	be
permitted. 	See Fusco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 267 (1st
Cir. 	1993) 	(“[T]he 	discovery 	deadline 	had 	long 	since 	passed 	and
the 	district 	court 	had 	no 	automatic 	obligation 	to 	reopen 	the
discovery period. 	The matter was one for the informed discretion
of the trial judge, and the breadth of that discretion in managing
pre-trial mechanics and discovery is very great.”); Oriental Fin.
Group, 	Inc. 	v. 	Fed. 	Ins. 	Co., 	483 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	161, 	167 	(D.P.R.
2007) (barring new discovery where “the exclusion of new evidence
would not result in manifest injustice to either party”).
B. 	Signal Acquisition Trade Secret
At trial, Alifax sought to prove two software trade secrets,
both of which were contained within the second count of its Second
Amended 	Complaint. 	See 	Second 	Am. 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	61-70, 	ECF 	No. 	68.
The first involved the process by which Alifax’s devices gathered
ESR-related 	raw 	data 	through 	signal 	acquisition. 	See 	Charge
Conference 	Tr. 	12-15, 	ECF 	No 	345. 	The 	second 	involved 	the
algorithm that converted that raw data into Westergren-equivalent
values. 	See id.; Alifax, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 567-68. 	At the charge
conference, 	the 	Court 	noted 	that 	all 	of 	the 	pertinent 	evidence
“concern[ed] 	the 	use 	of 	the 	so-called 	four 	constants” 	in 	the
conversion algorithm, and therefore ruled that the evidence would
not 	“support 	a 	finding 	by 	the 	jury 	that 	source 	code 	or 	software
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used 	in 	Alifax’s 	analyzers 	were 	misappropriated 	to 	acquire 	the
photometric measurements.” 	Charge Conference Tr. 12; see also id.
at 15-16.
Defendants 	now 	argue 	that 	this 	limitation 	should 	also 	apply
to 	the 	new 	trial, 	thus 	barring 	Alifax 	from 	advancing 	a 	theory 	of
misappropriation 	of 	a 	signal 	acquisition 	trade 	secret. 	Defs.’
Mot. 	for 	CMO 	9-10. 	In 	response, 	Alifax 	contends 	that 	a 	trial 	on
solely 	the 	conversion 	algorithm, 	without 	a 	signal 	acquisition
claim, 	“would 	inevitably 	cause 	confusion 	and 	uncertainty 	for 	the
jurors, who would wonder why Alifax was not claiming that all its
software 	was 	a 	trade 	secret.” 	Pl.’s 	Mem. 	in 	Opp’n 	to 	Defs.’
Request for Case Management Order (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for
CMO”) 6, ECF No. 355.
A partial retrial is inappropriate “unless it clearly appears
that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the
others 	that 	a 	trial 	of 	it 	alone 	may 	be 	had 	without 	injustice.”
Gasoline 	Prods. 	Co. 	v. 	Champlin 	Refining 	Co., 	283 	U.S. 	494, 	500
(1931). 	Based on its extensive involvement in this case, the Court
concludes 	that 	the 	distinction 	between 	signal 	acquisition 	and
conversion 	can 	be 	readily 	grasped 	by 	a 	lay 	jury. 	Indeed, 	the
complexity of this distinction is dwarfed by that of other concepts
involved in Alifax’s theory of liability. 	The signal acquisition
claim 	“ha[s] 	been 	properly 	and 	conclusively 	resolved,” 	and 	the
remaining 	issue 	of 	the 	conversion 	constants 	is 	“so 	distinct 	and
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separable from the [signal acquisition claim] that a trial [on the
conversion 	constants] 	alone 	may 	be 	had 	without 	injustice.” 	See
Drumgold 	v. 	Callahan, 	707 	F.3d 	28, 	46 	(1st 	Cir. 	2013) 	(quoting
Gasoline 	Prods., 	283 	U.S. 	at 	500); 	see 	also 	Oriental 	Fin. 	Group,
483 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	166 	(holding 	that 	issue 	resolved 	at 	previous
trial 	was 	“sufficiently 	separable 	[from 	remaining 	issues] 	to
permit the former to be submitted to a new jury independently from
the 	other 	issues 	without 	confusion 	or 	uncertainty” 	(citing
Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. at 500)).
Therefore, 	the 	scope 	of 	Alifax’s 	claim 	on 	retrial 	will 	be
limited to the conversion algorithm. 	Alifax will not be permitted
to 	pursue 	its 	theory 	that 	Defendants 	misappropriated 	a 	signal
acquisition trade secret.
C. 	Damages Expert
At 	trial, 	Alifax 	sought 	to 	introduce 	expert 	testimony 	from
Christopher 	J. 	Bokhart 	on 	the 	issue 	of 	damages 	caused 	by 	trade
secret 	misappropriation. 	April 	30, 	2019 	Mem. 	& 	Order 	2, 	ECF 	No.
288. 	In 	his 	expert 	report, 	Mr. 	Bokhart 	opined 	that 	Alifax 	was
entitled (based on a theory of unjust enrichment) to all of Alcor’s
earned 	revenue 	from 	iSED 	sales. 	Id. 	at 	3-4. 	The 	Court 	excluded
this 	theory 	because 	it 	“rest[ed] 	on 	an 	unsound 	factual 	basis.”
Id. at 7. 	Additionally, Alifax sought to introduce Mr. Bokhart’s
opinion that Alifax was entitled to one year of iSED revenue based
on 	a 	“head-start” 	theory. 	Id. 	at 	4. 	However, 	the 	head-start
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theory 	was 	dependent 	on 	Dr. 	Bryan 	Bergeron’s 	statement 	that 	the
software 	would 	take 	at 	least 	one 	month 	to 	create 	from 	scratch
(which Mr. Bokhart expanded to a one-year head start based on trade
show schedules). 	Id. at 10-11. 	As the Court noted, Dr. Bergeron
never 	discussed 	the 	amount 	of 	time 	necessary 	to 	develop 	the
conversion software; rather, he opined that the signal acquisition
software would take a month to produce. 	Id.2 	Therefore, the Court
excluded 	Mr. 	Bokhart’s 	head-start 	testimony 	as 	“unreliable 	and
inadmissible.” 	Id. at 13.
As 	discussed, 	no 	new 	discovery 	will 	be 	allowed 	on 	retrial.
Therefore, 	the 	Court’s 	rulings 	on 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Exclude
the 	Opinions 	of 	Expert 	Witness 	Christopher 	J. 	Bokhart, 	ECF 	No.
230, will apply with full force at the second trial.
Defendants 	argue 	that, 	without 	Mr. 	Bokhart’s 	testimony,
Alifax has no evidence that the alleged misappropriation of trade
secrets 	caused 	damages. 	See 	Defs.’ 	Mot. 	for 	CMO 	10, 	13. 	Alifax
does not provide a substantive response. 	See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’
Mot. for CMO 12-13. 	Instead, Alifax argues that the Court did not
solicit briefing on this issue and that the matter should be left
until 	later. 	See 	id. 	The 	Court 	disagrees. 	Within 	one 	week 	of
the issuance of this decision, Alifax shall articulate its theory
2 	The 	Court’s 	decision 	to 	exclude 	parts 	of 	Mr. 	Bokhart’s
testimony 	was 	issued 	after 	the 	liability 	phase 	(during 	which 	the
signal 	acquisition 	claim 	was 	tossed 	out), 	but 	before 	the 	damages
phase.
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of damages in a filing of no more than five pages, with citations
to 	any 	evidence 	that 	supports 	its 	theory. 	Moreover, 	if 	there 	is
no admissible evidence regarding damages stemming from the alleged
misappropriation of the conversion algorithm, Alifax must explain
why 	it 	should 	not 	be 	limited 	to 	seeking 	nominal 	damages.
Defendants 	shall 	file 	a 	reply 	of 	no 	more 	than 	five 	pages 	within
three business days of the filing of Alifax’s brief.
III. PATENT LEGAL FEES
Under 	35 	U.S.C. 	§ 285, 	“[t]he 	court 	in 	exceptional 	[patent]
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”
Invoking this provision, Alcor submitted a post-trial request for
the 	legal 	fees 	it 	incurred 	defending 	the 	patent 	claims. 	See
Alcor’s Mot. for Patent Legal Fees 1. 	The Court denied the Motion
as 	moot, 	stating 	that 	it 	could 	not 	ascertain 	which 	party 	had
prevailed 	until 	after 	the 	new 	trial. 	Sept. 	5, 	2019 	Text 	Order.
However, 	at 	the 	February 	25, 	2021 	conference, 	the 	Court 	invited
the 	parties 	to 	submit 	supplemental 	briefing 	on 	the 	fee 	request.
The 	Court 	has 	reconsidered 	its 	previous 	determination. 	As
explained below, Alifax’s patent claims were not exceptional, and
Alcor’s 	Motion 	for 	Patent 	Legal 	Fees 	must 	therefore 	be 	denied 	on
the merits.
“[A]n 	‘exceptional’ 	case 	is 	simply 	one 	that 	stands 	out 	from
others 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	substantive 	strength 	of 	a 	party’s
litigating 	position 	(considering 	both 	the 	governing 	law 	and 	the
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facts 	of 	the 	case) 	or 	the 	unreasonable 	manner 	in 	which 	the 	case
was 	litigated.” 	Octane 	Fitness, 	LLC 	v. 	ICON 	Health 	& 	Fitness,
Inc., 	572 	U.S. 	545, 	554 	(2014). 	“District 	courts 	may 	determine
whether 	a 	case 	is 	‘exceptional’ 	in 	the 	case-by-case 	exercise 	of
their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”
Id. 	Relevant 	factors 	include 	“frivolousness, 	motivation,
objective 	unreasonableness 	(both 	in 	the 	factual 	and 	legal
components 	of 	the 	case) 	and 	the 	need 	in 	particular 	circumstances
to 	advance 	considerations 	of 	compensation 	and 	deterrence.” 	Id.
(quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994)).
Absent 	misrepresentation 	regarding 	the 	evidence, 	a 	plaintiff’s
success on summary judgment indicates that its patent claims were
not 	frivolous 	or 	unreasonable. 	See 	Medtronic 	Nav., 	Inc. 	v.
BrainLAB 	Medizinische 	Computersysteme 	GmbH, 	603 	F.3d 	943, 	954
(Fed. 	Cir. 	2010), 	and 	cases 	cited. 	The 	party 	seeking 	fees 	must
prove 	exceptionality 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence. 	Octane
Fitness, 572 U.S at 557-58.
Alcor’s basic argument is that Alifax pulled a bait and switch
regarding 	its 	theory 	of 	patent 	infringement. 	Alcor’s 	Mot. 	for
Patent 	Legal 	Fees 	15-16. 	According 	to 	Alcor, 	Alifax 	represented
to the Court that it would show literal infringement, all the while
pursuing 	a 	theory 	based 	on 	the 	doctrine 	of 	equivalents.3 	Id.
3 	Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	equivalents, 	“a 	product 	or 	process
that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent
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Furthermore, 	Alcor 	contends, 	Alifax 	was 	estopped 	from 	pursuing 	a
doctrine-of-equivalents 	claim 	due 	to 	its 	actions 	during 	patent
prosecution. 	Id. at 3.
Alifax’s 	argument 	for 	literal 	infringement 	was 	always
tenuous. 	However, 	the 	Court 	was 	well 	aware 	of 	the 	creativity
inherent in Alifax’s theory. 	The Court’s summary judgment decision
explains 	the 	needle 	that 	Alifax 	was 	attempting 	to 	thread 	and 	why
the 	Court 	allowed 	the 	patent 	claims 	to 	go 	forward. 	Prior 	to
summary 	judgment, 	the 	Court 	had 	construed 	the 	limitations 	in 	the
two 	patents 	to 	mean 	“processing 	the 	acquired 	optical 	density 	or
absorbance 	data 	to 	obtain 	the 	speed 	of 	sedimentation, 	viscosity,
elasticity 	and 	density.” 	Mar. 	26, 	2019 	Mem. 	& 	Order 	10, 	ECF 	No.
244 	(citation 	and 	quotations 	omitted). 	And 	at 	summary 	judgment,
the 	Court 	recognized 	that 	“the 	iSED 	does 	not 	measure, 	record, 	or
report 	any 	measurement 	for 	the 	viscosity, 	elasticity, 	or 	density
of blood.” 	Id. 	However, the Court rejected Alcor’s argument that
“[o]btaining 	a 	parameter 	in 	the 	context 	of 	the 	patents-in-
suit . . . 	means 	obtaining 	a 	numerical 	value 	for 	that 	parameter”
and “that the iSED [therefore] does not ‘obtain’ these parameters.”
claim 	may 	nonetheless 	be 	found 	to 	infringe 	if 	there 	is
‘equivalence’ 	between 	the 	elements 	of 	the 	accused 	product 	or
process 	and 	the 	claimed 	elements 	of 	the 	patented 	invention.”
Warner-Jenkinson 	Co. 	v. 	Hilton 	Davis 	Chem. 	Co., 	520 	U.S. 	17, 	21
(1997) 	(quoting 	Graver 	Tank 	& 	Mfg. 	Co. 	v. 	Linde 	Air 	Products
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)).
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Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 	This was because “[n]one
of 	the 	asserted 	claims, 	as 	construed 	by 	the 	Court, 	include 	the
limitation 	that 	the 	iSED 	measures, 	calculates, 	records, 	reports,
or 	obtains 	a 	‘numerical 	value’ 	for 	the 	parameters 	of 	viscosity,
elasticity, and density of blood.” 	Id. at 10-11.
But how could the iSED obtain those parameters if it did not
produce 	a 	numerical 	value 	for 	them? 	The 	Court 	accepted 	(for 	the
purposes 	of 	summary 	judgment) 	Dr. 	Bergeron’s 	answer: 	the
parameters 	“are 	a 	function 	of 	data 	obtained 	from 	the 	[iSED’s]
optical 	density 	readings; 	thus 	by 	processing 	optical 	density
measurement data the iSED obtains the correlated parameters.” 	Id.
at 	11 	(citations 	and 	quotations 	omitted). 	At 	trial, 	though,
Alifax’s theory did not pan out. 	Dr. Bergeron testified, arguably
inconsistently 	with 	his 	previous 	conclusions, 	that 	the 	iSED 	did
not 	obtain 	viscosity, 	elasticity, 	or 	density, 	and 	Alifax 	decided
to drop the patent claims. 	Trial Tr., Vol. 4, at 88:5-18, ECF No.
341; Trial Tr., Vol. 5, at 4-6, ECF No. 342.4
4 The parties had trouble agreeing on a method for disposing
of 	the 	patent 	claims, 	and 	the 	Court 	decided, 	with 	the 	parties’
approval, 	to 	reconsider 	its 	summary 	judgment 	decision 	and 	grant
judgment for Defendants on the patent claims. 	See Trial Tr., Vol.
5, at 76:22-78:7, ECF No. 342. 	This decision does not cast doubt
on 	the 	Court’s 	original 	decision 	to 	allow 	the 	patent 	claims 	to
proceed to trial. 	Rather, the mid-trial reconsideration was based
on Dr. Bergeron’s trial testimony and Alifax’s resulting decision
to abandon those claims. 	See id.
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Alcor thus argues that there was never a legitimate theory of
literal infringement because the iSED did not actually obtain those
parameters; 	instead, 	the 	iSED 	merely 	accomplished 	an 	equivalent
task. 	Alcor’s Mot. for Patent Legal Fees 8, 15. 	But this argument
rehashes 	arguments 	that 	were 	rejected 	on 	summary 	judgment, 	where
the Court ruled that Dr. Bergeron’s opinion created a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the iSED literally infringed on the
patents. 	Moreover, Alcor has not shown that Alifax misrepresented
its 	evidence 	to 	the 	Court. 	Rather, 	the 	evidence 	shifted 	between
summary 	judgment 	and 	trial. 	Thus, 	through 	its 	summary 	judgment
decision, the Court indicated that the patent claims were “suitable
for resolution at trial.” 	Medtronic, 603 F.3d at 954.
Based on its extensive involvement – lasting the better part
of a decade – with this litigation, the Court determines that this
case 	does 	not 	“stand[] 	out 	from 	others 	with 	respect 	to 	the
substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering
both 	the 	governing 	law 	and 	the 	facts 	of 	the 	case) 	or 	the
unreasonable 	manner 	in 	which 	the 	case 	was 	litigated.” 	Octane
Fitness, 	572 	U.S. 	at 	554. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	withdraws 	its
previous decision to defer ruling. 	See Sept. 5, 2019 Text Order.
Alcor’s Motion for Patent Legal Fees is denied on the merits.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons contained herein, Defendants’ request to file
a 	renewed 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	is 	DENIED, 	Defendants’
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request 	to 	limit 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	new 	trial 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART,
and 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Patent 	Legal 	Fees, 	ECF 	No. 	306, 	is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: 	July 16, 2021
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