Boudreau v. Petit et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
JASON BOUDREAU, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	C.A. No. 17-301MSM
:
KEVIN PETIT, et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND FOR EXTENSION
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
In his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 232, “SAC”), pro se1 Plaintiff Jason
Boudreau (“Plaintiff”) alleges that, in July 2013, Warwick Police Officer Kevin Petit acted
outside of the scope of his duties as a Warwick police officer to retaliate against Plaintiff for his
having sued Officer Petit in a 2013 civil case (that this Court later found to be without merit).
Plaintiff contends that Officer Petit fabricated, suppressed and concealed evidence and
knowingly relied on false statements, as well as, despite the lack of probable cause, applied for
an overbroad and unauthorized search warrant in October 2013. The SAC asserts that this
wrongful conduct by Officer Petit triggered Plaintiff’s 2014 “fabricated” criminal prosecution by
the State for embezzlement of $34,826.11 from his former employer, Automatic Temperature
Controls, Inc. (“ATC”). ECF No. 232 ¶ 189; see also State v. Boudreau, P2-2015-0095A,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug 28, 2019). Plaintiff’s Monell claim
against Warwick, including its Police Department, rests on his conclusory contention that,
1 The Court has afforded Plaintiff such leniency as is appropriate in his circumstances. E.g., Boudreau v. Petit, C.A.
No. 17-301WES, 2024 WL 4279522, at *1 n.1 (D.R.I. Sept. 24, 2024).
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despite its awareness of analogous prior incidents, Warwick failed to train and supervise Officer
Petit to prevent this conduct, as well as that Warwick’s treatment of Plaintiff’s civilian complaint
about Officer Petit is consistent with a police “[C]ode of [S]ilence” condoning Officer Petit’s
conduct.2 ECF No. 232 ¶ 235.
Now pending before the Court is the motion of Defendants for a protective order. ECF
No. 261. With the close of fact discovery approaching on April 1, 2026,3 the motion is focused
on thirty-three new interrogatories (ECF Nos. 254, 255) and forty-six new document requests
(ECF No. 256) served on Warwick in November 2025 (collectively, the “new discovery”).
Defendants ask the Court to order that they be protected from responding to the new discovery
because (1) as to the new interrogatories, they exceed the permissible number (twenty-five) that
may be served on a single party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1); (2) all of the new discovery
is duplicative of the well more than five hundred requests (including interrogatories, document
requests and requests to admit) as to which Defendants have already responded or the Court has
previously ruled are out-of-bounds (as to some more than once); and (3) like much of the prior
discovery, the new requests are overbroad, not targeted at relevant information or documents and
are disproportionate. Defendants contend that, given Plaintiff’s utter lack of focus on
permissible discovery that has not yet been provided, the Court may find that the new discovery
has been propounded to harass and impose undue burden and expense. They ask the Court to
order that they need not respond pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A).
The motion for a protective order originally sought to protect Warwick entirely from
responding to the new discovery. It was accompanied by Warwick’s motion to extend the time
2 The claim of a “[C]ode of [S]ilence” to cover-up a pattern of police retaliation against individuals exercising First
Amendment rights is a new allegation in the SAC ¶¶ 235-267.
3 Plaintiff has filed a motion to extend the factual discovery deadline to June 30, 2026. ECF No. 271.
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to respond to any of the new discovery (ECF No. 262) until after the ruling on the motion for a
protective order. This motion to extend was granted by Text Order on January 21, 2026. In
issuing this Text Order, the Court relied on the preliminary observation (based on judicial
examination of the new discovery) that the motion for a protective order appeared to have merit
in that the new discovery appeared to be overbroad, disproportional, burdensome and
significantly related to matters that the Court has already addressed in prior rulings. In the Text
Order, the Court also noted its concern about the impact of such an extension on the pretrial
schedule. To address this concern, and mindful that substantial judicial resources had already
been expended in discovery management of this case, particularly to provide guidance regarding
the scope of discovery (rulings that Plaintiff appeared to ignore),4 the Court included in the
January Text Order a judicial directive to Defendants:
[T]o the extent that there are any non-duplicative requests for relevant,
proportional and discoverable information or documents in the new discovery,
Defendants should (but are not ordered to) respond before the protective order
motion is resolved.
Text Order of Jan. 21, 2026 (emphasis added). In response to this directive, on reply,
Defendants represent that, as of February 19, 2026, Warwick “is in the process of responding to
the discovery requests in response to Plaintiff’s Second Request for Production of Documents
addressed to Warwick that are not addressed in this motion.” ECF No. 267 at 9.
For his part, Plaintiff was granted two extensions of time to object to the motion for a
protective order. Text Orders of Jan. 21 and Feb. 4, 2026. In granting the first of these
4 That is, based on the extensive work this Court has already done, Defendants have the benefit of many judicial
rulings to guide them regarding the scope of discovery. See, e.g., Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2024
WL 4771355, at *1-2 (D.R.I. Nov. 13, 2024) (count-by-count analysis of relevancy and proportionality including for
Monell claims); Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2025 WL 437498, passim (D.R.I. Feb 7, 2025) (same).
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extensions, mindful of the observation incorporated in the previous text order issued the same
day and mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court provided additional guidance to Plaintiff:
[Plaintiff’s] response to the motion for protective order should address . . .
whether the new discovery is duplicative of prior requests to which Defendants
have already responded or whether the new discovery has been propounded in
disregard of the Court’s many prior discovery rulings.
Text Order of Jan. 21, 2026.
In his opposition, Plaintiff disregarded this guidance to the extent that he failed to address
any specifics regarding what he still needs that is relevant to this case. Instead, he asks the Court
to focus on the filing of the SAC on April 9, 2025; without adverting to any new factual
allegations to justify new discovery,5 he contends that this amendment triggered his right to
propound discovery duplicative of that to which Defendants have already responded, as well as
that the Court’s prior orders are mooted by the amendment. He also argues that the Court’s
Monell orders are unduly restrictive with respect to post-incident discovery and that his new
discovery should be allowed to address that deficiency; that he should be provided a privilege
log listing every document he has requested that is covered by privilege (despite the Court’s
prior orders that a privilege log is not required)6 ; that he should be allowed double the number of
allowable interrogatories because he named the Warwick Police Department separately from the
5 Plaintiff does point to the SAC’s conclusory paragraphs alleging that Warwick operated its Police Department
pursuant to a “[C]ode of [S]ilence.” ECF No. 232 ¶¶ 235-267. However, apart from Plaintiff’s allegation that
Warwick did not react appropriately to the formal complaint Plaintiff made in 2012 and/or 2013, the only “facts” are
Plaintiff’s citation to two cases in the SAC – Wheeler v. Nelson, C.A. No. 18-cv-687-MSM and United States v.
Pavao, No. 1:22 CR-00034-MSM-PAS, 2023 WL 3934555 (D.R.I. June 9, 2023), rev’d and remanded, 134 F.4th
649 (1st Cir. 2025) (per curiam). As noted infra, these cases simply do not supply facts supportive of the allegation
that, during the relevant period, Warwick’s Police Department was operated based on a policy of silence and cover-
up to protect an officer who intentionally fabricated evidence to bring a criminal charge not based on probable cause
for the purpose of retaliation against a person exercising a First Amendment right.
6 E.g., Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2025 WL 437498, at *4 (D.R.I. Feb. 7, 2025) (“Warwick’s
assertion of the attorney-client privilege/work product doctrine is sustained. No privilege log is ordered because the
documents sought are not relevant”).
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municipality of Warwick; and that Defendants failed to meet and confer before filing the motion
for a protective order. Plaintiff asks the Court to allow him to prosecute this overbroad and
disproportionate discovery in significant reliance on out-of-district decisions that, for the most
part, are based on the now-obsolete version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 that was tightened-up in 2015.
On reply, Defendants counter that they have already provided Plaintiff with the core
discovery he propounded earlier in the fact phase of this case; that, in those instances where
Plaintiff challenged the adequacy of their responses, they have long-since complied with the
Court’s orders requiring them to provide more; and that, in compliance with the Court’s
directive, they are in the process of responding to some of the document requests in ECF No.
256.
The motion for a protective order has been referred to me for determination.
I. 	BACKGROUND
From September 2009 to June 2011, Plaintiff was employed as the Finance Manager at
Cranston-based ATC, overseeing ATC’s financing statements, payroll, salaries and bonuses.
Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301 WES, 2024 WL 665546, at *1 (D.R.I. Feb. 16, 2024).
Plaintiff was fired in June 2011 when ATC discovered that he was using its computer to possess
child pornography. Id. Because he served on a state-wide task force focused on internet crimes
against children, Warwick Police Officer Petit participated in the criminal investigation of
Plaintiff’s use of ATC’s computer to possess child pornography. Id. Based on this criminal
investigation, Plaintiff was charged by the State and convicted in 2014 on a plea of nolo
contendere to possession of child pornography. United States v. Boudreau, 58 F.4th 26, 29 (1st
Cir. 2023).
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Meanwhile, after ATC discovered Plaintiff’s use of its computer for possession of child
pornography and fired him, ATC also allegedly discovered and advised Officer Petit that it
believed that Plaintiff had been embezzling from it by periodically taking “bonus[es]” to which
he was not entitled. ECF No. 79-1 at 7; see also Boudreau, 2024 WL 665546, at *2 . In May
2013, while the State child pornography charge was pending but before Plaintiff was
adjudicated, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against ATC and various persons including Officer Petit
whose conduct arguably triggered the child pornography prosecution.7 Boudreau v. Lussier, 13-
cv-00388-WES. In the 2013 lawsuit, Plaintiff claimed that he was the victim of wrongful
interception of electronic communications that formed the basis for the state child pornography
prosecution.8 Id. Additionally, in 2012 and/or 2013, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a formal
complaint with Warwick regarding misconduct by Officer Petit yet Warwick’s investigation of
this complaint “did not comport” with Warwick Police Department policies. ECF No. 232 ¶¶
252-53.
Meanwhile, on July 30, 2013, Officer Petit interviewed an ATC principal about ATC’s
allegation that Plaintiff had embezzled from it by paying bonuses to himself to which he was not
entitled. See generally ECF No. 232 ¶¶ 71-72; Boudreau, 2024 WL 665546, at *2. In June
2014, based on an investigation performed by the Rhode Island State Police, Plaintiff was
7 The judicial officer presiding over the 2013 case (and other civil lawsuits brought by Plaintiff against Officer Petit
and the ATC principals) expressly raised his “concern” that these cases were brought by Plaintiff against ATC, its
principals and Officer Petit in retaliation for the child pornography criminal prosecution and, as to ATC and its
principals, to deter further participation in prosecuting him. See Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2024 WL
3092151, at *3 (D.R.I. June 18, 2024) (citing Boudreau v. Lussier, No. CA 13-388S, 2014 WL 651536, at *1 (D.R.I.
Feb. 19, 2014)) (quashing overbroad subpoenas addressed to ATC’s business vendors and other third parties seeking
burdensome production of documents not relevant to the case; “[t]he Court is also concerned that . . . Plaintiff could
be using this civil litigation to . . . retaliate against those he holds responsible for his criminal charges”).
8 Plaintiff’s 2013 lawsuit ended when the Court entered summary judgment against him. See Boudreau v. Lussier,
901 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming “summary judgment in favor of defendants on all of Boudreau’s claims”).
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charged by the State with embezzlement. Boudreau, 2024 WL 665546, at *2. These charges
were pending in 2015, when Plaintiff was charged again (this time federally) with possession of
child pornography for conduct that occurred after Plaintiff had been convicted by the State of
possession of child pornography using ATC’s computer. United States v. Boudreau, 16-cr-
00011-JJM. Based on his federal guilty plea, Plaintiff was convicted of the new child
pornography charges and is now serving a 235-month sentence in federal prison. Boudreau, 58
F.4th at 29 (dismissing Plaintiff’s appeal and summarizing Plaintiff’s history of crimes against
children, both “hands-on” and by possessing child pornography).
In 2017, Plaintiff filed this case in which he alleges that Officer Petit fabricated the
evidence to support what Plaintiff claims is the unwarranted charge of embezzlement to
retaliate against Plaintiff for filing the 2013 lawsuit. This case was stayed until March 2023,
when the embezzlement charge was dismissed because of ATC’s unwillingness to participate
in the prosecution further as a result of its settlement agreement with Plaintiff. See Boudreau
v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2024 WL 4356314, at *2 (D.R.I. Sept. 30, 2024). With the
stay lifted, discovery began. During the past three years, the Court has issued more than ten
discovery decisions and many text orders in its struggle to manage discovery in this case.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 26(c)(1) permits a party from whom discovery is sought to move for a protective
order based on “good cause” to protect that party from undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(1). Courts have “broad discretion . . . to decide when a protective order is appropriate and
what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).
“The ‘good cause’ standard . . . is a flexible one that requires an individualized balancing of the
many interests that may be present in a particular case.” Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n,
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Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 402 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The
“burden of demonstrating good cause rests on the proponent of the protective order.” Walker v.
IHI Power Servs. Corp., C.A. No. 23-57 WES, 2025 WL 949239, at *2 (D.R.I. Mar. 28, 2025).
“To show good cause, the party seeking the protective order must demonstrate a particular need
for protection; [b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated
reasons, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Heagney v. Wong, Civil Action No. 15-40024-JSH,
2016 WL 2901731, at *3 (D. Mass. May 18, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alternation in original); see Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (“A finding
of good cause must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on
conclusory statements.”).
Rule 26(c)(1) requires that a motion for a protective order “include a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort
to resolve the dispute without court action”; this is similar to the Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 requirement
for motions to compel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); see also Gericke v.
Begin, Civil No. 11-cv-231-SM, 2012 WL 4340520, at *1 (D.N.H Sept. 20, 2012) (motion to
compel did not include required certification – for that reason alone motion could “properly be
denied”); Lalonde v. Textron, C.A. Nos. 02-334S, 02-491S, 2005 WL 8176212, at *2 (D.R.I.
Oct. 12, 2005) (failure to include Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 meet and confer certification in motion to
compel is “technical” violation of rule that in circumstances supports denial of motion to
compel), appeal denied, 2006 WL 8458404 (D.R.I. Feb. 10, 2006). However, it remains within
the discretion of the Court to consider a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) motion on the merits and waive
strict compliance with the meet-and-confer requirement. Criscione v. Divincenzo, Case No.
1:24-CV-1446-PAB, 2025 WL 3153390, at *3 n.5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2025); see Stein v
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Collins, Civil No. 3:23-cv-30100-KAR, 2025 WL 1248916, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 30, 2025)
(court retains discretion to determine whether to deny motion for failure to comply with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37’s meet and confer requirement). When there is no point in denying such motion
without prejudice just so that it may be refiled, resulting in delay, the Court may exercise its
discretion to decline to enforce the prefiling conference requirement in the circumstances of the
particular case. Jackson v. Unicity Int’l, Inc., Case No. 2:25-cv-00738-GMN-NJK, 2025 WL
2222767 at *1 n.1 (D. Nev. Aug. 5, 2025).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The pleading and discovery phases of this case have been plagued by Plaintiff’s
improper, abusive and defiant-of-court-orders conduct. See, e.g., Boudreau, 2024 WL 4356314,
at *8 (finding that Plaintiff “seriously abused” discovery privileges for the purpose of harassment
and to inflict burden and not to procure discovery that is relevant or proportional); Boudreau v.
Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2024 WL 4279094, at *1 n.1 (D.R.I. Sept. 24, 2024) (finding
Plaintiff’s misconduct and defiance of court order undermined court’s goal of moving case into
discovery phase), adopted, 2025 WL 305933 (D.R.I. Jan. 27, 2025); Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No.
17-301WES, 2024 WL 4279522, at *1 (D.R.I. Sept. 24, 2024) (denying motion for
reconsideration; “Plaintiff is seeking the deployment of public money to reacquire documents
that he himself possessed but apparently failed to preserve”). Plaintiff’s abusive discovery
tactics in this case are analogous to conduct found by other judicial officers in other cases that
Plaintiff brought against persons involved in Plaintiff’s criminal prosecutions. Boudreau v.
Smith, Case No. 3:17-cv-589 (SRU), 2019 WL 5417744, at *3-4 (D. Conn. Oct. 22, 2019) (in
case against persons involved in Plaintiff’s arrest for federal child pornography prosecution,
granting protective order barring discovery on matters that court had already ruled to be
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irrelevant or are otherwise improper, denying additional interrogatories that are vague and
cumulative); Boudreau v. Lussier, No. CA 13-388S, 2014 WL 651536, at *1-2 (D.R.I. Feb. 19,
2014) (in case against persons involved in Plaintiff’s state child pornography prosecution, court
determines Plaintiff’s subpoenas should be quashed, except with leave to serve one limited
subpoena).
The pending motion for a protective order is focused on discovery that appears to be the
latest iteration of this unfortunate pattern. Importantly, despite the Court’s guidance urging
Plaintiff to target his arguments by focusing on what remains unproduced that is relevant and
proportional, how the new discovery harmonizes with the Court’s many prior orders and rulings,
and to what specific extent the new discovery is not duplicative because it is grounded in new
allegations in the SAC, the Court still cannot ascertain how to separate the wheat from the chaff.
By way of just two examples, Plaintiff concedes that the new discovery is “duplicative” but
vaguely argues that this may be disregarded because the prior versions were propounded to a
“different defendant since the first defendant claimed it was not in ‘this Defendant’s
possession’”; however, Plaintiff provides the Court with no detail regarding which of the
seventy-nine requests he refers to and which defendant deferred with such a response. ECF No.
266 at 2. Similarly, Plaintiff presents a lengthy Monell argument but appears to take issue with
the Court’s prior Monell discovery scope decisions 9 only with respect to the holding that
Warwick must comply by providing documents and information from July 1, 2012, through June
11, 2014, the date of Plaintiff’s arrest by the Rhode Island State Police for embezzlement. Yet
Plaintiff fails to establish how Monell-based discovery outside the scope of the Court’s prior
9 Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2025 WL 437498, at *6 (D.R.I. Feb. 7, 2025) (ruling on scope of Monell
discovery); Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2024 WL 4771355, at *4 (D.R.I. Nov. 13, 2024) (same).
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rulings is tailored to focus on Warwick’s policies, customs or practices that are causally linked to
the specific conduct that he alleges Officer Petit engaged in. Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. 17-
301WES, 2025 WL 437498, at *2 (D.R.I. Feb. 7, 2025). Instead, Plaintiff buttresses his
opposition by relying on cases holding that post-incident material “may” be relevant in some
cases but fails to explain why an expanded period would result in discovery that is relevant in
this case.10
A. 	Good Cause to Protect Warwick from Responding to Interrogatories
(ECF Nos. 254, 255)
Focusing first on Plaintiff’s new interrogatories, Plaintiff contends that his decision to
name Warwick twice, once as municipality and once as a unit (police department) within the
municipality, entitles him to propound more than twenty-five interrogatories. To support this
argument, Plaintiff relies on Warwick’s having failed to press its status as a single defendant
until now. Plaintiff ignores the Court’s prior ruling on this point. Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No.
17-301WES, 2024 WL 5202023, at *1 n.2 (D.R.I. Dec. 23, 2024) (Warwick and Warwick Police
Department are single entity and therefore constitute single defendant). He also ignores the
Court’s prior rejection of his motion for leave to propound more interrogatories. Text Order of
Dec. 23, 2025.11 Because the interrogatories in the new discovery plainly go past the limit of
10 When anchored in the facts in the SAC and the specific Monell rulings issued by the Court, Plaintiff’s challenge
to the Court’s Monell ruling based on the need for post-incident discovery makes no sense. That is, the core
incident occurred in July 2013 when Officer Petit met with ATC about the embezzlement claim, while Plaintiff’s
formal complaint about Officer Petit, which Plaintiff alleges was not properly investigated, was filed in 2012 and/or
2013. ECF No. 232 ¶¶ 71-73, 252-53. Thus, the time frame for Monell discovery set by the Court expressly
permitted post-incident discovery regarding Warwick’s investigation of Plaintiff’s formal complaint against Officer
Petit. See Fernandes v. Bouley, Civil Action No. 20-11612-GAO, 2022 WL 2915702, at *6 (D. Mass. July 25,
2022) (lack of proper investigation and failure to take disciplinary action against police officers in relation to the
alleged constitutional violations underlying the suit is sufficiently relevant to Monell to permit discovery even
though post-incident). Further, the Court’s Monell ruling specifically contemplated that discovery may focus on
such post-incident investigation of the specific claim. Boudreau, 2025 WL 437498, at *2 (Monell discovery may
focus on “records regarding investigations pertinent to the specific claim”).
11 In the text order, the Court reminded Plaintiff that the City of Warwick and the Warwick Police Department are a
single entity.
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twenty-five and Plaintiff’s motion to expand that limit has already been denied (and Plaintiff has
not suggested any solution such has asking the Court to permit him to proceed with a specified
smaller set) the Court finds good cause to grant the requested protection as to the interrogatories.
While the Court could stop with this ruling, it seems appropriate to comment further on
the other problem with these interrogatories – the content of the questions. Plaintiff stumbles
badly in that most of them are facially improper. For starters, Plaintiff has asked nine new
interrogatories seeking information regarding other cases against Warwick, most of which the
Court has already examined and found to be irrelevant. Boudreau, 2025 WL 437498, at *5 n.10
(holding that Wheeler, Shackelford, Chisholm, and Heon are irrelevant); Boudreau v. Petit, No.
CV 17-301WES, 2024 WL 4771355, at *3 n.4 (D.R.I. Nov. 13, 2024) (holding that Wheeler is
irrelevant). These interrogatories add two new cases that are equally irrelevant. 12 Also ignoring
the Court’s prior rulings, Plaintiff again asks questions based on his misinterpretation of a
holding of the Rhode Island Superior Court. Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-301WES, 2024 WL
4871783, at *1 (D.R.I. Nov. 21, 2024) (“Superior Court’s holding is that no person or entity
committed any Brady or other intentional violation of Plaintiff’s rights because the material that
was omitted from the set that was provided to Plaintiff’s criminal attorney was merely
cumulative and would not have been exculpatory but would have only further confirmed Mr.
12 Plaintiff’s new discovery asks for detailed information about United States v. Pavao, No. 1:22-CR-00034-MSM-
PAS, 2023 WL 3934555, at *2 (D.R.I. June 9, 2023). Pavao is entirely irrelevant to this case not only because it
dealt with whether a prolonged traffic stop was based on adequate reasonable suspicion, with no finding of any
misconduct by the officer, but also because the First Circuit reversed the District Court’s finding that reasonable
suspicion was lacking and found that the “officer acted lawfully.” United States v. Pavao, 134 F.4th 649, 659 (1st
Cir. 2025) (per curiam). Similarly, Plaintiff asks for detailed information about a claim dismissed at screening for
failure to state a claim in Mejia v. Cenerini, No. CA 12-508 S, 2012 WL 5472164, at *1-2 (D.R.I. July 12, 2012),
adopted by text order (D.R.I. Nov. 9, 2012). The problem is that Mejia alleges that the state court judge’s signature
on an affidavit supporting a warrant issued in connection with the claimant’s 2009 arrest was forged and the facts in
the affidavit were false and did not establish probable cause, but Mejia was summarily dismissed because, far from
no probable cause to prosecute, the claimant had been charged, convicted and sentenced by the federal court. See
id.; see also Mejia v. Cenerini, No. CA 12-508 S, ECF No. 2. Mejia is not relevant to this case.
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Boudreau’s guilt [of possession of child pornography]”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original). That leaves a series of questions that are hopelessly overbroad, seek
largely irrelevant information and require answers that would be burdensome and disproportional
to provide. By way of examples, Plaintiff asks Warwick to describe with “specificity and detail”
generic procedures for: procuring a search warrant; communicating with the Rhode Island
attorney general about criminal investigations; providing training to officers accused of
misconduct; record keeping; and the details of every police misconduct complaint of which the
officer was exonerated since 2013. None of these are anchored in the facts of this case.13 And
the Court is unable to ascertain whether those that are not facially improper are nevertheless
duplicative of questions that have already been answered. Thus, entirely apart from the problem
with the number of interrogatories, based on this alternative analysis, the Court finds good cause
to protect Warwick from responding to any of them.
B. 	Good Cause to Protect Warwick from Responding to Some Document
Requests (ECF Nos. 256)
As to the forty-six new document requests, Warwick is responding to some of them and these
responses are not yet due.14 See ECF No. 267 at 9 . As to the remainder, the Court finds that they suffer
from many of the same defects as the interrogatories, in that they are focused on matters as to which the
13 The exception is Plaintiff’s ongoing attempt in this case to cure his lack of evidence based on a claim of spoliation
of evidence that may never have existed. The Court has repeatedly addressed this argument and held, for example,
that “that Plaintiff has failed to establish that there are any specific relevant non-privileged documents, which
existed when Warwick was put on notice that they should be preserved and became subject to a duty to preserve, but
which have been lost due to the ongoing operation of Warwick’s retention policy.” Boudreau v. Petit, C.A. No. 17-
301MSM, 2025 WL 553975, at *1 n.2, 6 (D.R.I. Feb. 19, 2025) (denying sanctions for spoliation, finding Plaintiff’s
“spoliation claim is somewhat illogical in the context of this case as the allegedly ‘lost evidence’ apparently was
within Plaintiff’s constructive/actual possession, custody and control prior to and after his claims in this case were
pending, but, aware of the content, he failed to take steps sufficient to preserve the evidence”).
14 This appears to be Document Requests 4-6, 11-13, 16, 19, 23, 24, 29-32, 35-46. Based on the Court’s Text Order
of January 21, 2026, granting Defendants’ motion to extend, these responses are due thirty days after the issuance of
this decision, although the Court hopes that production will be completed sooner.
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Court has already ruled, such as documents related to the irrelevant Wheeler, Shackleford, Mejia,
Chishom and Heon cases discussed supra, and documents broadly related to any conduct, training and
supervision of Officer Petit and other officers untethered to the facts of this case. Boudreau, 2025 WL
437498, at *2, 6 (ordering discovery regarding training and supervision and investigation of Officer Petit
and other police misconduct of which Warwick is aware, provided that such discovery must be time
limited and “narrowly tailored to focus on the specific conduct alleged to have resulted in the
constitutional deprivation that harmed the claimant”) (emphasis in original). Others of these requests are
improper because they seek documents that relate to the engagement of legal counsel by Warwick and/or
Officer Petit that are clearly privileged and as to which the Court has already ruled, including that a
privilege log is not necessary. Id. at *4-5. Overall, these concerns, coupled with Plaintiff’s clear and
utter disregard for the Court’s prior discovery orders, amount to good cause to justify the limited
protective order that Warwick now seeks.
C. 	Warwick’s Failure to Meet and Confer
Plaintiff is absolutely right that Defendants’ motion for a protective order fails to comply
with the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) that the movant must certify that the parties have
met and conferred. The Court further finds that Defendants’ silence in response to this argument
establishes that there is no certification because there was no meet and confer. And there is no
question that the omission of a certification that the movant made a good faith effort to resolve
the discovery dispute before seeking court intervention may be grounds to deny a motion for a
protective order. Aponte-Navedo v. Nalco Chemical Co., 268 F.R.D. 31, 41 (D.P.R. 2010).
The unique facts and circumstances of this case, however, implore the Court’s discretion
in managing discovery. See Heidelberg Americas, Inc. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 333
F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (“District courts exercise broad discretion to manage discovery
matters.”); Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36 (courts have broad discretion to decide when a
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protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required). The Court notes that
Defendants have not eschewed compliance with the need to meet and confer in this case; to the
contrary, it is clear that they have struggled in the context of other discovery issues to meet and
confer despite the significant difficulties and delays inherent in communicating with Plaintiff
who is incarcerated and serving a long sentence in a federal prison. See ECF No. 270-1 at 2-16
(fifteen-page single-spaced meet and confer letter from Defendants to Plaintiff highlighting
inadequacies in his discovery compliance). The Court further notes the probable futility of a
meet and confer regarding this motion in light of the reality that it arose as a culmination of
events that preceded the filing of the motion, particularly prior court proceedings and Plaintiff’s
disregard of the Court’s prior rulings as outlined supra. In addition, Plaintiff has not pointed to
any issue that he contends would have been mooted by a meet and confer. And Defendants have
complied with the Court’s directive to respond to at least some of the new discovery.
Based on the foregoing and in the unique circumstances here, the Court exercises its
discretion to waive strict compliance with the meet-and-confer requirement, particularly in light
of the inevitable delay that would result from requiring Defendants to engage in a time-
consuming and likely fruitless meet and confer before refiling the motion. See Criscione, 2025
WL 3153390, at *3; Jackson, 2025 WL 2222767, at *1 n.1. The Court declines to deny the
motion based on Defendants’ failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the motion of Defendants Warwick Police Officer Kevin
Petit and the City of Warwick, including its Police Department, for a protective order, ECF No.
261, is GRANTED, except for those document requests in ECF No. 256 to which Warwick is in
the process of responding, and except to the extent that Defendants asked the Court to require
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that any new discovery that Plaintiff may propound must be approved in advance, which aspect
of the motion is denied. To the extent that Plaintiff included a request to extend pretrial
discovery deadlines in his Opposition, ECF No. 266 at 15, that request is denied. And to the
extent that Plaintiff’ Opposition asked the Court to allow him to seek an interlocutory appeal of
the Court’s prior rulings regarding the scope of Monell discovery, the Court finds that this
request is beyond the scope of this decision and makes no determination, one way or the other.
/s/ Patricia A. Sullivan
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN
United States Magistrate Judge
March 17, 2026
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